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Abstract 
This thesis offers an investigation of the transformation of the subjectivity of labour in 
Argentina. The global capitalist crisis of the 1970s produced a unique recomposition of 
capitalist social relations worldwide. For the first time capital asserted itself as a global social 
imagery in which it was seen as free and detached from labour. This `disconnection' between 
capital and labour is deeply disempowering, for it denies the source of social transformation 
(labour) in favour of the reification of an abstraction (capital). In Argentina this was 
manifested during the 1990s through the exaltation of `Stability' as the solution to 
Argentine's chronic political and economic crisis, as well as the belief in the defeat of labour 
altogether. Although stability was considered the main achievement of President Menem's 
period in power (1989-1999), persistent social and labour conflict evoked a re-examination of 
widely shared assumptions regarding both the crisis of labour and the triumph of neo- 
liberalism in Argentina. Analyses of what Menemism meant in political, economic, social and 
legal terms are abundant. Yet, missing has been an adequate interrogation and questioning of 
the theoretical categories and methods used to grasp the new reality of labour. The thesis aims 
to contribute to an understanding of the current forms of resistance in Argentina by means of 
a theoretical proposal and an historical and empirical analysis. The thesis is divided into three 
parts and a theoretical introduction. Chapter one considers Marx's writing and recent 
developments in Marxist theory of the state, value, money and subjectivity. The chapter 
discusses the significance of Marx's method of determinate abstraction for an understanding 
of the subjectivity of labour in capitalist social relations. Going beyond the formulation that 
the state, money and the law are real illusions which mediate the capital relation (Clarke, 
1991, Holloway and Picciotto 1977), I offer the notion of subjectivity of labour as a 
determinate abstraction, i. e. as a transient and contradictory form of being which emerges 
vis-ä-vis a particular- and contradictory-articulation of the subjective aspects (identity, 
organisations and resistance) and the social forms (political, economic and social) which 
mediate labour as a social activity. Subjectivity is a `site of conjunction' which articulates the 
concrete and abstract aspects of labour within the subject. This theoretical framework 
constitutes the analytical and methodological bases for my research. Part I explores five 
historical forms of subjectivity which emerged as dramatic expressions of the social relation 
of capital: the Anarchist (1920s), the Peronist (1940s), the Anti-imperialist (1960s), the 
Revolutionary (1970s) and the Democratic (1980s). The historical journey aims to show how 
labour made history by taking dramatic forms which encapsulated crisis, deconstruction and 
renewed integration into another form. The three chapters which comprise Part II offer a 
detailed analysis of the transformation of the subjectivity of labour in the 1990s, by looking at 
the recomposition of the state, labour reform and stabilisation policies, and employment and 
social policy. Although stabilisation policies led to the halt of hyperinflation, they became the 
lynchpin for the deep social, economic and political recomposition of social relations, leading 
to the decentralisation of labour, the reorganisation of trade union activity into business and 
opposition unionism, the expansion of social conflict, the casualisation and flexibilisation of 
labour, social insecurity, unemployment and poverty. The notion of subjectivity as 
determinate abstraction allows us to understand the paradoxical disjunction between the 
policies presented as the source of stability and the unstable, insecure and unhappy forms of 
private and social life. Moving beyond the debate of `stability vs. instability', this paradox is 
explored through a detailed study of one of the main forms of social protest in 1990s 
Argentina: the roadblocks organised by casual and state workers, the unemployed and the so- 
called marginal social layers. As a determinate abstraction, the roadblock appears as an 
embodiment of the subjective, political, economic and social transformation within stability. 
Thus, roadblocks do not destabilise stability, as some scholars suggest, but rather stability 
destabilises human lives, since, as a form of class antagonism, it legalises, legitimises and 
celebrates uncertainty - the end of labour as the source of power in society and the end of 
politics. The roadblock stands against the violence of stability which causes labour to 
virtually disappear through poverty and unemployment. 
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SEyCL: Secretaria de Empleo y Capacitaciön Laboral (Department of Employment 
and Training) 
SIPD: Sistema Integral de Prestaciones por Desempleo (Integral System of Job 
Seekers Allowance). 
SMATA: Sindicato de Mecänicos del Transporte Automotor (Union of Automobile 
Mechanics). 
SRA: Sociedad Rural Argentina (Rural Society). 
STPS: Secretaria de Trabajo y Prevision Social (Labour Department of Work and 
Social Security). 
SUPE: Sindicato Unico del Petroleo (Oil Workers Union). 
SUSS Sistema Unico de Seguridad Social (Social Security System). 
The 62: Las 62 Organizaciones Peronistas (the 62 Peronist Organisations) 
UCR: Union Civica Radical (Radical Party). 
UF: Union Ferroviaria (Railway Workers Union). 
UGT: Union General del Trabajo. 
UGTT: Union General de Trabajadores del Transporte (General Union of Transport 
Workers). 
UTA: Union Industrial Argentina (Argentine Industrial Union). 
UNTA: National Union of AA (Union Nacional de Trabajadores de AA). 
UOCRA: Union Obrera de la Construcciön (Labour Union for Construction 
Workers). 
UOM: Union Obrera metalürgica (Metallurgic Labour Union). 
UPCN: Union Personal Civil de la Nacion (Civil Servant Central Union). 
UTA: Union Tranviaria Automotor (Automobile Workers Union). 
WB: World Bank. 
WC: Washington Consensus. 
YPF : Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (Oil Company). 
Introduction: Painful Thoughts 
I started this investigation by creating three `levels' of analysis which, I thought, 
could explain the transformation of the subjectivity of labour in the 1990s, since they 
were deeply transformed by the neo-liberal adjustment: the political institutional level 
(the state), the organisational level (trade unions) and the subjective level (identity). 
However, although the first two were theoretically and empirically tangible and 
accessible, the material available in these areas was rich and copious, the third `level' 
was difficult to grasp and research. 
After discarding liberal and post-structuralist conceptions of the individual, since they 
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do not account for inner connection between the 
subjective and the objective world (Dinerstein 1997) I 
revisited Marx's work, as well as exploring some 
recent critical theoretical attempts which posit class 
struggle, labour and human existence at the core of 
their analysis of capital and which constitute the bases 
of my own searching and my attempts to move 
beyond: capital relation theories of the sate, Open 
Marxism, Autonomism (see chapter one). This theoretical journey was, for me, 
revealing. 
In previous years, I had made some progress in the study of the constitution of 
subjectivity and compared social action with dramatic action by looking at 
Stanislavsky's performance method of physical actions. In the method of the Russian 
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director, actors can constitute their `subjectivity' (character) through physical actions. 
The method allows actors to become `unities' capable of feeling their thoughts, as 
well as thinking their feeling in a process of inter-action within themselves and others 
(Dinerstein 1997; see Stanislavsky 1963). Although one, as an actress, must `think' 
in advance about the main features of the character, its background, motivations and 
goals, partly made up and partly provided by the play, it is only through action that 
the character comes to life. In this method, the task of the actress is not to repeat the 
words of the play script, or to represent a premeditated plan or just follow the 
director's instructions. The creation of a `character' requires that the actress goes 
through the conflicts and contradictions brought about the plot. Since theatre is not 
epic but dramatic a play consists, as Ionesco highlighted, `of a series of states of 
consciousness, or situations which become intensified, grow more and more dense, 
then get entangled, either to be disentangled again or to end in unbearable 
inextricability' (Ionesco quoted in Esslin, 1991: 190). I discovered, with the help of 
my drama teachers, that Stanislavsky's method was dynamic, dialectical, critical and 
materialistic (see Serrano 1981). Therefore, an example of how actors constitute their 
subjectivity with a materialistic and dialectic method of performing on the stage 
would help me to see the articulation of these three levels of interaction into a form: 
the character, achieved as the unity (synthesis) of multiple processes of 
contradictions. 
This intellectual exercise turned out to be revealing. For the purpose of subjectivity, 
the similarity between dramatic and social action lay in the vivid experience of the 
conflict and the physicality and materiality of the action and interaction. Through the 
method of physical actions actors do suffer on the stage rather than pretending to do 
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so. Dramatic action in theatre consists of at least three types of conflicts that actors are 
obliged to go through with the method of physical actions: conflicts within 
themselves, with the others and the whole situation. It was then possible to think that 
social action also comprised these kind of conflicts. 
After doing my first visit to Jujuy (field work) I realised that the decision to take part 
in a collective action depends on three aspects: on one's own questions and answers, 
doubts and belief (socially created, but individually embodied); on the interaction 
with others, which includes agreement, confrontation, organisation, co-optation, 
struggle; and on the global `political' or `social' or `economic' general situation, this 
being a more `external' or a non tangible-manageable reality. My own experience and 
the initial interviews with workers in Argentina reinforced this idea. Yet, unlike in 
drama, where action develops in a illusionary setting, the social setting is required to 
locate the production of subjectivity within a social and historical totality: capital. I 
was convinced that Marxism needed to develop a notion of subjectivity in motion, as 
a materialist critique where action means de-alienation and subjectivity the unity of a 
multiplicity of conflicts and processes. 
At this point, I put my proposal up side down. Instead of exploring the initial three 
`levels' (political, organisation and subjective) in order to understand subjectivity, I 
decided to focus on subjectivity, the latter being conceived as the embodiment of 
these `levels'. This shift in the method and, thus, in the structure of the thesis did not 
mean that I was going to abandon the study of the state or trade unions or identity in 
favour of an investigation of `subjects'. Rather, the very analysis of the form of the 
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state, capital accumulation and money, trade unions, labour conflict, resistance was 
directed now to understand the production and transformation of subjectivity. 
By correcting myself, I argued that subjectivity was the crystallisation of social 
processes, the producer and the product of social relations. It would not any longer be 
one aspect among others but the spirit of the capitalist relation. Most importantly, 
subjectivity as a `site of conjunction' dissolved the need for any link of level. 
Whereas in the former proposal power was located in abstractions like `identity', 
organisations, the state or money, i. e. social forms which mediate capital as a social 
relation, in the latter power was located within the subject, although its potential for 
development depended now on the forms taken by the state, identity, organisation or 
money within the struggle over subjectivity, and which articulate within the subject 
in a determinate historical period. If subjectivity was the embodiment of social 
relation constituted through class struggle, then class struggle could not be other than 
a struggle over subjectivity. This meant a struggle over the power of labour. 
In a nutshell, I wanted to show that the production of subjectivity was the heart of 
class struggle, and that there was an inner connection between the transformation of 
capital and the transformation of subjectivity. In order to de-code capitalist social 
relations (Holloway 1992), subjectivity turned out to be theoretically and empirically 
the best `site' to grasp the transformation of labour. I needed now a critical and 
consistent (non-)category to develop these idea without violating the dynamic of 
constitution itself. Since I was `writing in prose without knowing it' I realised that the 
notion of form, fully developed by capital relation theories of the state within the CSE 
in the late 1970s, allowed me to developed a framework for an understanding of, first, 
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the constitution and transformation of the subjective, political, economic and legal 
arrangements which mediate the struggle over subjectivity, and secondly, the 
production and transformation of subjectivity as the historical embodiment of these 
subjective and objective forms of the capital relation. 
The elaboration of an empowering theory of subjectivity demands a critique of the 
category of labour by means of a deep exploration of the processes through which we 
constitute ourselves in and against capital. In this thesis I develop a theoretical 
framework to grasp the inner connection between capital and labour, most precisely, 
between the recomposition of the state and capital, and new forms of existence of 
labour. 
The fascinating process of research-thinking-writing-living allowed me to understand 
myself as a product of my time too. The fact that I was working as a lecturer in the 
Department of Sociology at Warwick University while writing the thesis made my 
PhD the site of encounter of many ideas, discussions and intellectual activities that are 
impossible to reproduce here. Some of them were really significant: the seminars 
organised by the Centre for Comparative Labour Studies and the Centre for Social 
Theory (Warwick); the courses in Political Sociology, Work and Employment, 
Sociology of Industry and Labour, and Gender Class and Empire, which I taught 
during the four years; my visits as a lecturer to the Department of Sociology at the 
Universidad Autönoma de Barcelona through the Socrates Erasmus programme of 
teaching exchange. Finally, the organisation of the International Conference The 
Labour Debate convened by Mike Neary and myself, the product of which is a 
forthcoming book. All this contributed to an endless process of theoretical discovery. 
V 
The thesis also reflects my own everyday struggle, as well as some significant 
moments during these years. The thesis and I established a secret reciprocal 
commitment: whilst it served me to confront my past and understand my own history 
from the distance, and thus explore my present condition, I offered it my whole 
energy to transform it into something else: an act of historical reparation. Each 
chapter contains (implicitly or explicitly) a bit of my own history. My Italian and 
Russian roots and my own experience of `immigration'; my father's anti-Peronism; 
my nostalgia for not being there before my own time to be a Peronist, anti-imperialist 
and probably Montonera; my fear and anger as a teenager during the 1976-1982 
dictatorship; my drawing and drama studies as a way of confronting the mediocrity of 
terrorism; my nightmares and my political participation under democracy; my 
struggle as a trade unionist against Menemism. I recovered the powerful feeling of 
collective action against the marketisation of the University of Buenos Aires, the 
privatisation of Entel (state telephone company) and of Gas del Estado (state gas 
company) during the 1980s and the 1990. 
Sometimes, the thesis and I engaged in a curiously symbiotic relationship. While I 
was doing historical research, I went through the experience of exile and danger, and 
revisited the feeling of being alive `just by chance'. I got literally lost several times, as 
well as lost personal things as if I was not at all in control. I searched and searched in 
circles, like the Madres, looking for the truth. While so doing, I lost my own baby. 
I came to engage 
in my own 
struggle for 
recognition against 
unemployment 
while writing the 
case study on the 
roadblocks - when 
my fixed-term contract job at Warwick was coming to an end I too experienced the 
possibility of `virtual disappearance', yet without having the possibility of collective 
action. 
The thesis also presents some elements of `art'. I aimed to grasp and recover the 
atmosphere, flavour, feelings and mood of each historical period addressed in the 
thesis. The use of films, most of them documentary, allowed me to recover the 
dynamic, animation - the movement that I was trying to capture. The photographs, 
literature, and my own drawings and collages allowed me to portray, visualise the real 
actors, listen to their words, learn about their thoughts, demonstrations, ideas. These 
elements of `art' were not used simply to illustrate the thesis but rather they were 
inspired by my research and elaborated as an important part of it. I found an 
explanation of this in Fisher's idea that art is necessary - it is an act of survival. As he 
highlighted, `art in the dawn of humanity had little to do with "beauty" and nothing at 
all to do with any aesthetic desire: it was a magic tool or weapon of the human 
collective in its struggle for survival' (Fischer, 1978: 36). When I left my Architecture 
studies to move on to drama studies in the 1970s, I felt I was going to loose something 
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very important. I felt the same when, pushed by my own desire as well as the 
`external' circumstances, I left drama to start some trade union activity and studying 
Politics at the University of Buenos Aires. Finally, when I left my political and union 
activism to come to Britain in order to keep studying, I felt once again that I was 
going to detach myself from my own world for good. However, this thesis allowed me 
to assemble all the aspects and dimensions (past and present) which constitute myself 
into the unity: that is I am a determinate abstraction. 
9 
Chapter one 
Subjectivity: a Determinate Abstraction 
When I started, some years ago, with my exploration 
into the hidden universe of capital through theatre, 
politics and Marxism my life changed altogether. 
Everything appeared to be connected to something 
else. All the splits that govern social life (particularly 
those between 'me' and 'myself and 'me' and the 
'world) were highlighted. I was aware that there 
was no point of return and that I must keep on 
moving alongside my object of enquiry. My 
investigation on subjectivity was an exploration 
within myself. 
`Oh God! What could I do? I foamed -I raved- I swore! I 
swung the chair upon which I had been sitting, and grated 
it upon the boards, but the noise arose over all and 
continually increased. It grew louder -louder - louder! And still the men chatted pleasantly, and smiled. 
Was it possible they heard not?... ' (Edgar Alan Poe, The tell-tale heart) 
Do I contradict myself? Very well then ... I contradict myself I am 
large ... I contain multitudes' 
(W. 
Whitman, Song of myse f) 
I 
Menemism: Stability and Defeat 
'As Gregor Samsa awoke one morning from uneasy dreams he found himself transformed in his bed 
into a gigantic insect' (Franz Kafka, Metamorphosis) 
With the election of President Menem in May 1989, the popular concern about the 
possibility of not consolidating democracy which marked the last 59 years of 
Argentine politics, and particularly the Alfonsin period, came to an end. Menem was 
the second president elected after the democratic government was re-established in 
1983, and his election symbolised the end of the threat of a new military putsch. 
Political stability had been reached. `Democratic transition' being over, to produce a 
quick and deep `economic' transformation and to achieve economic stability became 
an absolute priority. 
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The Menem administration incarnated global monetarism. In the 1970s, the global 
capitalist crisis liberated a potential for money flows. This resulted from the end of 
the illusion of the regulation of global money and thus the reduction of national and 
local barriers to all kinds of trade and investments in order to create an increasingly 
open world economy (Picciotto, 1997). The military regimes in the region created the 
conditions for financial speculation and for state subsidies and expenditure to become 
the means of making quick profits (Grassi et al, 1994). During the second part of the 
1970s, the flow of capital offered as international loans fostered an enormous external 
debt in most Latin American countries which reached a critical point in 1982 (see 
Feletti and Lozano C 1997b). Soon after the majority of these `transitional' 
governments took office, the fiction of the end of economic crisis associated with 
dictatorial regimes vanished. The crisis of the external debt conditioned 
democratisation processes since new administrations were trapped between the 
explosion of repressed demands and protests against the deepening of the economic 
crisis and the violation of human rights during the dictatorship, and the government of 
the United States, banks and the IMF pressure to achieve stability and service the 
debt. 
The 1990s marked another turning point in the political economy of Latin American 
countries (see Gwynne R and Kay C 1999; Gwynne R 1999). Stabilisation policies in 
the region were inspired by the Washington Consensus (WC), i. e. `the consensus 
produced between IMF, WB and US executive branch, the inter-American 
Development Bank, those members of the US Congress interested in Latin American 
politics and the think tanks concerned with economic policy' (Williamson in Tedesco 
1999: 83, Fanelli et a! 1994). The implementation of the 1980s package of policies 
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called free market open economy policies (FMOEP) (Richards, 1997 c. f. Hoffman, 
1994)' was deepened in the 1990s throughout the region, under the invigilation of the 
IMF and with little consideration of the differences among the countries (Tedesco 
1999). Other international agencies --such as the United Nations Development 
Programme -- `performed as ideological factories to inspire local and national 
programmes to compensate the social costs of the economic policies of structural 
adjustment' (Grassi et al, 1994: 23). 
According to the WC, the economic crisis in the region was `(a) a product of 
"statism", or hypertrophy of the state apparatus and functions with the resulting 
bureaucratisation, excessive regulations, fiscal deficit, protectionism, expansion of 
inefficient public companies, all aspects suffocating the dynamic forces of the market; 
(b) "economic populism", built by the infirmity of the governments who tolerated 
pressures for wage increases in the public as well as the private sector, this pressure 
leading to deficit and inflation' (Boron, 1993: 62-63). The WC required `fiscal 
discipline and the reduction of some public expenditures such as subsidies, tax 
reform, market-determined interest rates, competitive exchange rates, import 
liberalisation, promotion of foreign direct investment, privatisation, deregulation and 
the new laws of property rights' (Tedesco 1999: 83; Gamarra 1994), but also the 
expansion of an efficient private sector, and state policies to reduce poverty (Fanelli 
and Rozenwurcel in Frenkel et al 1992: 28). Whilst some argued with the WC that the 
structural reforms implemented in the 1990s were to set Argentina on the path to 
1 According to Hojman the popularity of the FMOEP in Latin America is explained by six major 
factors: `(i) lessons learnt from the debt crisis and its immediate aftermath, (ii) more highly qualified 
technocrats, (iii) development of an entrepreneurial middle class, (iv) exhaustion of import substituting 
industrialisation, (v) a combination of tax reform, financial modernisation and export diversification, 
and (vi) a favourable public opinion' (1994: 191). Richards (1997) has discussed Hojman's 
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sustained growth (Pou, 2000) others questioned the link between stability and growth 
since the form of stabilisation promoted by the WC restricted rather than promoted 
economic growth (Tedesco 1999: 84; Philip 1998; Corrales 1999; Frenkel et al 1992: 
28). 
In Argentina, stabilisation programmes were particularly welcomed by capitalists and 
the political class after a period of intense struggle to control money and stabilise the 
economy that marked the democratic transition, but also most Argentineans initially 
accepted the programmes to defeat inflation. The crisis of hyperinflation of July 1989, 
considered by mane as a `market coup d'etat' (Canitrot 1994: 86, also Martinez 0. 
1991), had led to social and economic chaos, namely, 
looting, police repression, middle class discontent, 
financial speculation and the pressure from international 
bodies and banks. Alfonsin's advisers `warned that the 
collapse of the economy could actually lead to a social 
explosion' (Latin American Weeklº' Report, 1.6.89). 
Hyperinflation had dramatically resulted in a tremendous increase in both monetary 
speculation and poverty. Alfonsin's administration ended up with the resignation of 
the President before completing his term of office, forced by new military uprisings, 
the unrest of unions and the international creditors allied with the Peronist Party. 
The `Great Transformation' 
The two most important `achievements' of the Menemist administration that allowed 
its characterisation as a break with the past, were the consummation of economic 
interpretation of the FMOEP by addressing the fundamental forms of class antagonism that they 
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stability and the deconstruction of the power of the Peronist trade unions. Despite 
having been elected as a Peronist presidential candidate, Menem glamorised the 
advantages of monetarism and the market economy over `economic populism' (Boron 
1993) and aimed `to provide assurance to the United States government and banks of 
[his] deep commitment to neo-liberal reform' (Richards, 1995: 60) as soon as he took 
office. Menem's political rhetoric made clear the need to privatise, deregulate, 
decentralise, liberate and stabilise the economy in order to achieve `free trade, growth, 
efficiency, and prosperity' (Robinson and Harris 2000: 41) and to overcome the 
political and economic frustration of the previous years. 
Advocates of neo-liberalism portray Menem as the Machiavelli of the 1990s, as `the 
best interpreter of the world changes in the 1990s that Argentina could have had' 
(Trespuntos no 3, Buenos Aires, 14.10.99: 30). Others argued that Menem, together 
with his Latin American colleagues, was `part of a more generic phenomenon: 
political subservience, insofar as he served the transnational corporations and 
obtained, like Fujimori in Perü and Cardoso in Brasil, external support for their 
authoritarian office'(Petras, 2000: 13-14). 
Four main laws were passed during the first three years of the Menem administration 
to produced a deep transformation: the law of Economic Emergency, the law of 
Reform of the State, the Employment law, and the Convertibility law. This legal 
framework aimed at the liberalisation and deregulation of financial and labour 
markets, the flexibilisation of labour, tax reform, the suspension of state subsidies to 
capital, the restructuring of the central and provincial state apparatuses (by reducing 
implied as well as pointing at the struggles emerging to contest these unpopular measures. 
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`over-staffing' and eliminating `unprofitable sectors', see Oszlak 1990), the 
privatisation of all state-owned enterprises, the decentralisation of the education 
system and the deregulation and marketisation of health, social security and safety at 
work. In order to neutralise parliamentary and labour opposition, many of the 
government's policies were imposed by means of necessity and urgency decrees 
(NUDs). This, `emergency legislation' gave President Menem `sweeping powers' 
(Adelman, 1994: 82). 
The taming of hyperinflation was considered an economic `miracle. In April 1991, 
Chancellor Cavallo's Convertibility plan - the corset of stabilising policies (Bustos 
1993: 152), agreed with the IMF within a favourable international context, changed 
the rules of the game (Marshall, 1995). Although Menem's first trimester in office 
was relatively stable, hyperinflation arose again and persisted. After the 'B. B. Plan' 
launched by the first appointed Economics minister Rapanelli from the Bunge & Born 
capitalist group, and those plans launched by the second appointed Economics 
minister Erman Gonzalez (see Lozano and Feletti 1991), hyperinflation was defeated, 
as explained, by a new plan (Convertibility) launched by the new economics minister 
Cavallo in 1991. 
The Law of Convertibility implied the devaluation of the national currency and the 
pegging of the Argentine peso to the US dollar at a rate of I to 1. By so doing, the 
plan was expected to control money supply at the national level, to encourage 
international investments and the restructuring and technological modernisation of the 
most efficient productive sectors of the national economy, towards an increase in 
productivity and international competitiveness (Bustos 1993: 153). During the first 
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three years of the plan Argentina also accomplished high rates of economic growth 
sustained by foreign capital investments (Bustos 1995b). As a result, stability created 
the illusion that money was under political control. The reasons to suggest that 
stability was the `miraculous' achievement of Menem(ism) lay in the historical, 
political and economic instability characteristic of Argentina. Instability has been the 
most significant Argentine concern for the last 50 years. Whilst economic instability 
has often been presented as the barrier to the development of a sound political system, 
political instability, i. e. the swinging movement dictatorship-democracy, was always 
seen as the barrier to the implementation of long term economic strategies. The 1989 
crisis of hyperinflation had devastating effects, particularly on working class wages 
and living standards. Once hyperinflation was defeated, the notion of stability 
progressively replaced that of crisis and became something else than the stifling of 
hyperinflation. Stability became an end in itself which has to be maintained under any 
circumstances for it is believed, as the WC suggested, to constitute the basis for 
growth and national prosperity. As a result, stability became more than an economic 
strategy: it was asserted as a social imagery which contributed to the reorganisation of 
social relations in a way in which it was seen as the means of everyone's, and 
particularly workers', present improvement and the starting point for the amelioration 
of the future. 
But at the same time, the Menem administration's policy-making was experienced as 
essentially anti-labour. Some argued that Menem changed `everything done by Peron 
after the Second World War'. 2 That is, he abandoned the labour model of 1945 and 
combined the opportunities and restrictions given by the new international situation 
2 Former Economics Minister Domingo Cavallo quoted in Acuna 1994: 38. 
16 
(Caro Figueroa 1996). Others emphasised Menemism as a political strategy `based on 
an aggressive effort to disarticulate collective actors in order to facilitate the 
implementation of radical neoliberal reforms' (Acuna, 1994: 13). Indeed, Menem's 
administration seemed to have reversed the most important achievements of the 
Peronist era, after WW2. Specially during the first term in office, the Menem 
administration's set of economic reforms are argued to have broken with the 
`nationalist, statist, and populist import-substitution model that had prevailed, in one 
form or another, for most of the preceding half century' (McGuire, 1997: 216). 
The assessment and meanings of this transformation vary. The `funeral of populism' 
(Adelman 1994) could mean either the end of social justice or the end of post 1930s 
economic decline (Philip, 1998). The `it's over' diagnoses can be interpreted as 'the 
end of the workerist -Peronist nightmare' or the irreversible crisis of the working class 
and its organisations altogether. In either case `the future no longer is what it used to 
be' (Acuna 1994). Furthermore, some consider that the peculiarity of this Argentine 
Thatcherite revolution lay in the `unexpected combination... of traditional populist 
appeals (successfully made), the determined application of free market policies and 
the successful re-election of the market-reforming populists' (Philip, 1998: 81). In 
other words, that the Peronist Party being the populist (workers') party par excellence, 
Menem's government was able to undertake the most extreme economic adjustment 
without producing unmanageable social conflict (although it couldn't eliminate 
opposition). According to this view, unlike in other moments of Argentine history or 
unlike other Latin American experiences, institutional democracy was not an obstacle 
to such a regressive and reactionary transformation (Boron 1993: 60; also Cotarelo 
2000). 
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In the general elections of May 1989 the majority of trade union activists voted for 
Menem. They expected a renewed Populism which would bring back their political 
power. But Menem, one of the oldest caudillos of the Peronist Party and the governor 
of the northern province of La Rioja, was not just a Peronist candidate. He was 
curiously the best candidate both for those who wanted the reinvention of a social 
pact, and those who wanted to discipline the labour movement under the suggestion of 
the WC. The sought recognition of the working class and trade unions by the 
government did not happen. Menem came to power `as a populist hope to both 
stabilise the economy and provide a renewed emphasis on social justice ... What 
workers actually received, however, was something quite different' (Richards, 1995: 
60). 
RrIERtorýE tI`M, ` Menem's political transvestism produced confusion. His 
conversion to neo-liberalism was regarded as both an act 
of betrayal against the Peronist working class, and the 
political ability to articulate domestic and international 
pressure into policy-making. Soon after winning with 47% 
of the votes, the government engaged in a love affair with 
the extreme right of the Argentine political spectrum and the US. Menem 'converted' 
himself to `neo-liberalism' and embraced global neo-liberal principles (see Robinson 
and Harris, 2000: 41). The government built up a wall between itself and those who 
opposed the neo-liberal measures. This posed major contradictions' within the 
Peronist Party and the unions. These contradictions, which underpinned the `great 
transformation' led by Menem, expanded and multiplied during the 1990s. 
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The fact that it was a Peronist president who undertook a neo-liberal reform was 
argued to be the safety pin for the transformation to take place as well as the best form 
to condition resistance. It is argued that Menem's leadership and the close relationship 
with the trade union leaders through the Peronist Party performed as the foundations 
to revitalise the Peronist idea that `the only truth was reality' and reality indicated the 
need for a major transformation and a drastic and quick solution according to the 
leader interpretation (see Margheritis, 1999). 
President Menem was re-elected in 1995 for a second period by offering the slogan 
`me (stability) or chaos(inflation)'. His re-election was considered by advocates of his 
neo-liberal agenda as a sign of support for stabilising policies as the only way out of 
the crisis. However, Menem's second period in office was characterised by increasing 
social and labour struggles throughout the country against economic adjustment, 
political corruption, and the dramatic rise of poverty and unemployment. The reforms 
implemented between 1991 and 1995, i. e. privatisation, flexibilisation, deregulation, 
stabilisation and decentralisation coupled with industrial restructuring and increasing 
unemployment were, rather than neutralised them, deeply transforming identity, 
organisation strategies and labour conflict. 
Resistance 
Challenging once again all the predictions of defeat, workers reinvented resistance in 
creative ways. In addition to nine general strikes and workplace struggles against 
flexibilisation and privatisation, `roadblocks' organised by the unemployed, public 
sector workers and the local community demanding employment programmes, job 
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creation and capital investments as well as their participation in the decision- making 
process with regards to those matters became the most visible form of protest under 
Menem. Although for the period 1989-1995 industrial conflict decreased by 12.5%, 
there was over the same period an increase in regional and decentralised conflicts, that 
is geographic dispersion (Gomez et al 1996). During 1993 and 1994 spontaneous 
demonstrations organised by public sector workers against overdue wages, 
suspensions, wage reductions and redundancies, as well as cuts in welfare expenditure 
and corruption, erupted in the north and south of the country. 
Unlike the struggle against the physical disappearance of the 1970s, the roadblocks 
articulated a demand against the virtual disappearance entailed in unemployment and 
poverty. Official statistics highlighted in 1995 that since the beginning of the 
convertibility plan, unemployment had doubled in two years and had risen from 6% in 
1991 to 18.5% in that year, reaching around 2,400,000 people. But the main problem 
was not just unemployment but the combination of unemployment with 
underemployment, affecting around 7 out of 13 million workers. In July 2000, the rate 
of unemployment reached 15.4% and it is estimated to reach 17.1% in 2003 (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos, INDEC, August 2000). 
During 1996-1997 the roadblocks reached massive proportions to the extent that some 
of them, like Cutral-c6's and Plaza Huincul's, were considered as `popular upheavals' 
due to their extension, the exercise of direct democracy among demonstrators and the 
development of community solidarity (Inigo Carreras and Cotarelo 1999). In those 
cases, the roadblocks led to the emergence of new organisations with negotiating 
capacity regarding the distribution and management of employment programmes, and 
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community concerns such as public works, the provision of essential services and 
credit for small and medium-scale business. In the following years, the roadblocks 
spread throughout the country. 
The changes in labour conflict from predominantly centralised, institutionalised 
conflicts, run by trade unions and workers towards decentralised, non-institutionalised 
conflicts run by whole communities, social organisations and the unemployed, with 
the support of local trade unions, present a challenge for the central union 
confederations and locally-based trade unions. Divisions and rearrangements within 
`one of the most powerful labour movements in the world' (Richards 1995) emerged 
within the Menemist transformation. Labour opposition was mainly organised by two 
national unions. The first being the Movimiento de los Trabajadores Argentinos, 
MTA, a split from the Peronist CGT led by transport unions, created in January 1994 
by more than twenty unions gathered in the Union General de Trabajadores del 
Transporte (UGTT) to oppose the labour reform. The second being the Central de 
Trabajadores Argentinos CTA, created in 1992 as an attempt to recover 
combativeness against neo - liberal policies and create a broader opposition 
movement. 
In October 1999, the centre-left Alianza won the general elections. The new 
government soon fell trapped between the persistent protests against stabilisation 
policies, and the international pressure to maintain stability in order to improve 
competitiveness. At the beginning of 2000, the de la Rua administration and the IMF 
agreed to a deeper plan to maintain stability. The labour reform, the deregulation and 
marketisation of the trade union sponsored health system of Obras Sociales and a 
significant decrease in state workers' wages followed. Corruption among MPs to pass 
the labour reform bill led to the resignation of the vice president of the nation Carlos 
Alvarez, and several MPs. in October 2000. After that, a new wave of roadblocks 
reached massive proportions across nine regions. 
The Problem 
Persistent social conflict evoke a re-examination of widely shared assumptions 
regarding both the crisis of labour and the triumph of neo-liberalism in Argentina. The 
notion of the `break with the past' outlived Menem's period in office and is renewed 
in the everyday political and academic difficulties of moving beyond it. What is 
missing is not, as I will show, analyses of what Menemism meant in political, 
economic, social and legal terms. Criticism `from the side of labour' against 
Menem(ism) is also abundant. It will be reviewed throughout the thesis. My initial 
investigation showed that what was missing was an adequate interrogation and 
questioning of the categories and methods used to grasp those struggles, which at the 
moment have overwhelmed our intellectual capacity. During the 1990s, Menemism 
asserted itself as a mainstream thought that performed as a barrier to establish the 
necessary theoretical, political and historical links to interpret the present. This makes 
the fascinating research material available to become a limited narrative of the horrors 
of neo-liberalism. 
The problem of assessing labour in the 1990s in Argentina is twofold. On the one 
hand, there is a theoretical and political `naturalisation' of Peronism as synonymous 
with workers' identity, trade unionism and resistance in Argentina, as well as the 
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noun for a historical form of the state and capitalist development after WWII. In view 
of this, the crisis of Peronism would lead not only to the end of the populist state or 
the import-substitution model of development which characterised the period, but to 
the crisis of labour altogether. On the other hand, there is a `reification' of 
globalisation and within it, of stability, this includes those who criticise it. There is an 
impossibility to criticise stability since stabilisation policies accomplished the much 
needed control of the uncontrollable, i. e. hyperinflation. As an untouchable 
achievement stability locates the populist state as the source of political and economic 
instability and popular demands as destabilising stability, since they make 
governability and the accomplishment of international financial compromises 
difficult. 
The reification of globalisation and the need for stabilisation as inevitable processes 
and the belief in the defeat of the working class are not, of course, Argentinean 
inventions but symbolise a global trend. The current forms of valorisation of global 
capital i. e. volatilisation and mobility coupled with super exploitation of labour and 
the recomposition of the nation-state, reinforce the apparent relation of externality 
between the movement of capital and human control. This has been pictured as a 
`growing inmateriality' wherein `the abstract is more true than the concrete' (Negri 
1992: 73); as a world that is `to a greater degree than ever before, driven by 
anonymous forces, dominated by the movement of money... '(Clarke 2001: 14); a 
world in which the global financial system is `eluding any control on the part of the 
states' (Harvey 1999). 
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Although the flight of capital has disciplinary faculties, for it must create the 
conditions for the further exploitation of labour (Bonet, 1998), the speed and agility of 
liquidification3 of capital imply a moment of non materiality. It seems that capital 
jumps into the future without labour. 4 There is an increasing institutional recognition 
of money-capital as the new form of social discipline and decision-making process. 
Globalisation theory recognises the subordination of life to the urge of an abstraction. 
The theory's most `depressing aspect' lies in that `humans are being ignored' 
(Bonefeld and Psychopedis 2000: 4). Sociological attempts to put the subject back 
into the scenario are disappointing. They justify the inevitability of globalisation and 
by so doing, they not only do not provide an accurate account of the other side of 
globalisation, but reinforce the subjective experience of hopelessness vis-ä-vis an 
unavoidable reality. 5 
3 In 1979, `transactions in the international financial markets represented six times the value of world 
trade: by 1986 they represented about twenty-five times the value of world trade (and Walter 1993 
quoted by Bonefeld and Holloway, 1996: 1). 
° The jump requires both a greater exploitation of the labour force, aiming at an increase in productivity 
to obtain a quick rate of return to compensate the risk for betting the future, and unemployment. The 
implications of this are first, the simultaneous instability and unpredictability produced by the 
separation between monetary and real accumulation (Holloway 2000) coupled with both the worsening 
of working conditions and greater exploitation of the labour force involved in the restructuring at stake 
and the expulsion of the labour force which is no longer required. 5 To illustrate this, Gorz has argued that 'it is no longer possible for workers to identify with "their" 
work or "their" function in the productive process. Everything now appears to take place outside 
themselves' (1982: 67; see also 1999a, 1999b). For Touraine, after the 1970s, the economic forces 
become autonomous and uncontrollable. He argued that the unifying principle of modernity is broken 
since there is a `growing autonomy of the economic domain, as it becomes free from controlling and 
social institutions' (1998: 6). Since `economic activity has overridden socio-political institutions that 
gave rise to the present situation of de-modernisation' the new principle of organisation has to be found 
in the individual itself. (1998: 23). Finally to Bauman (2000) the transformation of our time is the 
melting of barriers. The world has become unstable, as have our identities. The `seductive lightness of 
being' lies in the `volatility and unfixity of all or most identities'(2000: 83). He claims that 'the 
present-day "liquidified", "flowing", dispersed, scattered and deregulated version of modernity may 
not portend divorce and final break of communication, but it does augur the advent of light, free 
floating capitalism, marked by disengagement and loosening of lies linking capital and labour' (2000: 
147, author's emphasis; see also 1999). 
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The aim 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the processes of production and 
transformation of the subjectivity of labour in Argentina. The thesis offers a 
theoretical exploration as well as empirical investigation of the historical 
transformation of subjectivity of labour in Argentina, with particular emphasis on the 
period 1989-1999. My concern is as much academic (theoretical and empirical) as 
political. I aim to re-establish labour as a critical category and thus contribute to 
existing Marxist debates on the issue (see Dinerstein and Neary 2001). The 
`rediscovery' of the centrality of labour is theoretically relevant in a moment in which 
labour is disappearing as a significant category from academic and political discourse. 
But this is also politically important since the renewal of resistance worldwide has not 
yet produced adequate ideas which could contribute to their full appreciation as well 
as to the deconstruction of the mainstream thought of defeat of labour and the end of 
politics. The thesis examines the category and reality of labour insofar as they have 
become a barrier to our understanding of the present forms of the politics of resistance 
in Argentina. 
I will suggest that the subjectivity of labour is a determinate abstraction. That is, a 
historical form of existence of labour produced within the process of valorisation of 
capital. Subjectivity is a concept in reality which explains the historical production 
and transformation of specific articulations of identity, organisations and forms of 
resistance and the social forms which mediate social relations (e. g. state, money and 
the law). Subjectivity as a determinate abstraction allows us to capture the 
fundamental contradictions that capital of the human within capital. Namely it allows 
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an understanding of the struggle underpinning the production of social and labour 
identities and collective organisation and action, as well as the objectified forms of 
social relations such as the state, money and the law. In the light of this, subjectivity 
as a determinate abstraction might contribute to the construction of an empowering 
theory of praxis. 
This theoretical exploration is developed by means of the analysis of the process of 
deconstruction and reconstruction of the forms of subjectivity during the 1990s as the 
embodiment of the neo-liberal restructuring process. The thesis demystifies 
Menemism as the `unavoidable' response to world-wide globalisation and which led 
to the definite `defeat' of the working class in Argentina. By looking at historical and 
current forms of labour, capital and the state I will show, on the one hand, that the 
crisis of the forms of labour prior to the 1990s does not indicate the end or the defeat 
of labour, but the exhaustion of particular forms of it. On the other hand, that 
globalisation and stability are the phenomenological expressions of the dependence of 
capital on the real subsumption of labour, even when subsumption appears in the form 
of redundancy, poverty and social exclusion. 
Menemism will be understood as a new form of class antagonism (stability), based on 
the intensification of capital as the subject, the legalisation of uncertainty and the end 
of politics. Stability fostered unstable and uncertain forms of existence of labour 
(unemployment, flexible employment, poverty), as well as new forms of resistance 
against the violence of stability. Since the changes developed in Argentina are in tune 
with Latin American and global changes, theoretical developments on subjectivity 
and an accurate appreciation of the meaning of resistance in the 1990s in Argentina 
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can also serve a critical assessment of the new forms of struggle which are 
confronting globalisation at the present time. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In section I look at some contemporary Marxist 
developments insofar as they constitute an effort to understand the dynamic 
relationship between capital and labour. In section II, I revisit Marx's notion of social 
form and his method of determinate abstraction, as well as those theoretical 
developments which recover the notion of form to put forward a materialist critique of 
the state. The section points at the limitations of these theorisations in serving to built 
up a theory of subjectivity. Special attention is paid to the significance of the 
intensification of the real subsumption of labour under capital and value as a social 
relation. In section III, I offer the notion of subjectivity as determinate abstraction and 
provide the theoretical and methodological proposal for the thesis. In section IV, I 
present the structure and the main arguments to be developed throughout the thesis, 
particularly the main hypothesis to understand the transformation of subjectivity 
during the 1990s. 
II 
Marx, Marxism and Subjectivity 
In Capital (and Grundrisse), Marx examined the category of labour to uncover the 
fetishism of capitalist social relations, within which the metamorphosis of capital and 
its circuit (Capital, vol. 2) becomes a `normal social process' through the constant 
repetition of exchanges (Capital, vol. l: 182). Although necessarily presupposed, the 
issue of alienation, central to the Early Writings, as well as in the CM was not directly 
addressed. But Marx never abandoned the exploration on labour by, as it has been 
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argued, shifting into an exploration of capital in his `mature' works. 6 Rather, he 
deepened the investigation of the social constitution of labour through the critique of 
the commodity form. Marx's theory of value is a labour theory of value (Elson 1979 
b). To Marx, Capital is not an economic process but a total process that implies the 
metamorphosis of humans into value-creating creatures. As a result, `class struggle 
... is no less central for the Marx of Capital than it was for the Marx who had written 
the Communist Manifesto nearly twenty years earlier' (Holloway 1992: 150). 
Contemporary Marxists aim to de-codify it in a way in which labour as the subject 
can appear again as the core of the class struggle. 
Work or Labour? 
In the 1970s, some Marxists counter-posed the distinction between work and labour to 
argued against post-modem theorisations of the end of work. Antunes (1997) argues 
that whilst work creates use values and is realized as an expression of concrete labour, 
labour expresses the everyday execution of work, so becoming alienated labour 
(Heller in Antunes 1997: 67). Work transcends everyday life to become the essence of 
human activity. Labour is the fetishised form of work. To him, the distinction between 
work and labour only makes sense as being two dimensions of the same phenomenon. 
The failure to no consider this twofold dimension makes the crisis of unemployment, 
i. e. a crisis of abstract labour, to appear in the form of a crisis of labour altogether 
(Antunes 1997: 67). According to Antunes, the end of abstract labour would be the 
end of alienated labour, yet concrete labour is, according to this view, inherent to 
6 The notion prevails that there are two Marx: the philosopher and the economist. But this notion 
ignores the unity of Marx's thought. As Bernstein says, 'it is ironic that so many Marxists scholars 
have failed to appreciate the dialectical character of Marx's own development' (Bernstein, 1971: 56; on 
this also Clarke 1991d; Joas 1996) 
human sociability: `the sphere of concrete labour is the starting point towards a new 
society' (Antunes 1997: 71). 7 
Critics of this distinction argue instead that attempts to construct a theory of 
revolution by the categorical affirmation of labour is mistaken for labour cannot be a 
principle of emancipation because it is a capitalist category (Cleaver 2001). Labour is 
the organising principle that capitalists use to impose their command over society and 
therefore is not the basis on which to propose progressive social practices. 
Self-Valorisation 
Italian Autonomism and the theory of Class Composition reject labour as a principle 
of emancipation by highlighting the significance of capital valorisation as a political 
process of subordination. To Cleaver, `the theory of valorisation ... is the theory of the 
way in which capital subordinates, transforms and utilises human productive activity 
for its own purposes: endless command over society' (1992: 116). Being concerned 
with the diversity of autonomous movements within the working class (see Cleaver, 
1979,1993; Holloway, 1995), Italian Autonomism enriched Marxist theory by 
working out the notions of capitalist society as a `social factory' to consider those 
who are excluded from the process of production. They offer the notion of class 
composition to give an account of the `desegregated picture of the structure of class 
power existing within the division of labour associated with a particular organisation 
7 Hannah Arendt advocated the distinction against Marxist economism Unlike labour, which implies 
in her view the production of transitory things, work creates a durable world insofar as it is able to 
unify action and thought in an activity that contributes to the construction of freedom, i. e. politics 
(Aronowitz and Difazio, 1998: 59). The intention underlying the distinction between labour and work 
is political: to Arendt work has not been subsumed into labour, i. e. human activity is not just related to 
the economic sphere. Humans do not form themselves through their labour. Arendt thought that by 
making that distinction she was privileging `politics' over `economics'. Together with Habermas, she 
believed that the `repository of truly human action' was not labour, not even work but language 
(Aronowitz and Difazio, 1996: 334; see Morresi and Amadeo 1999). 
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of constant and variable capital' (Cleaver, 1992: 113). In the idea of the social factory 
(which included unwaged and unemployed) `the "reserve army" was not really in 
reserve at all but actively put to work in the circulation and reproduction of capital' 
(Cleaver, 1992: 115). 
The Autonomists offered the notion of labour's self-activity -- founded on the 
"inversion" of the class perspective as advocated by Tronti (see Bonefeld, 1994) to 
theorise resistance. Analysis was centred on class struggle rather than focusing on 
capitalist development. To Cleaver `the concept of political recomposition 
theoretically articulates the central role of working class struggle at the heart of 
technological change' (Cleaver 1992: 114). In the light of Italian Autonomism, Negri 
offered the term `working class self-valorisation' to theorise such a development of 
working class autonomy. Based on difference and plurality (Negri 1992; Ryan, 1982), 
self-valorisation `designates the positive moments of working class autonomy - where 
the negative moments are made up of workers' resistance to capital domination. 
Alongside the power of refusal or the power to destroy capital determination, we find 
in the midst of working-class recomposition the power of creative affirmation, the 
power to constitute new practices (Cleaver, 1992: 129). 
Inner Connection 
The notion of self-valorisation brought about new problems. Following Holloway, 
`Autonomist theory has been crucial in reasserting the nature of struggle'. But `the 
real force of Marx's theory of struggle lies not in the reversal of the polarity between 
capital and labour, but in its dissolution' (Holloway 1995: 164). In this way, the 
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critique of Autonomism suggested that, in order to emphasise the significance of the 
liberation (self-valorisation) of the working class, it characterises capital and labour as 
two discrete things. Like Structuralism, its most important enemy, Autonomist 
approaches regard the externality imposed on labour and capital as two `independent 
subjects'. The implication of this is that the working class is reaffirmed and 
naturalised rather than seen as socially constituted during the process of valorisation 
of capital. It is argued that this approach `destroys the insight that labour is a 
constitutive power' since `capital is conceived as a subject in its own right' and 
therefore `the inversion of the class perspective is dependent upon two "subjects"' 
(Bonefeld, 1994: 44). 
Critics claim for the inner connection between capital and labour to be re-established 
for this is the way to perceive that `it is labour alone which constitutes social reality': 
`there is no external force, our own power is confronted by nothing but our own 
power, albeit in alienated form' (Holloway, 1993: 19) Labour exists `in and against 
capital since in capital labour exists "in a mode of being denied"' (Bonefeld, 1994: 
51; also Gunn, 1992). However, since capital and labour appear as 
phenomenologically and physically independent entities, Bonefeld (1994) offered the 
terms integration and transcendence to understand the contradictory mode of 
existence of labour in and against capital. 
Ontology 
Neary and Taylor (1999) pushed the discussion further. In order to eliminate any 
relation of externality between capital and labour they proposed that we explore the 
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human forms of existence of money (see also Rikowski 2000). By examining `the 
concrete ways in which life is lived as money-capital'(Neary and Taylor 1999: 10), 
they argued that subjectivity is a form of money: `in a society dominated by money, I 
am money. I am an embodied manifestation of money in all its contradictory 
manifestations' or `money is society and money is the self' (p. 128). This argument 
forces us to think of the status of human practice. The ontological identity established 
between money and the self (that is `we are money') neglects the fact although money 
is constitutive of social practices this can only exist if the former maintains itself as a 
discrete thing, something else than the latter. The externality between money and the 
`self is a real separation which allows both domination and the possibility for 
resistance to exist at once. The intensification of the real subsumption of labour under 
capital does not cancel the ontological and physical distinction between money and 
subjectivity, but rather allows the theorisation of the simultaneous production of 
money and subjectivity wherein subjectivity retains its constitutive power. 
Objective and Subjective 
Postone (1996) suggested that the problem between the social constitution of capital 
as the subject and the possibility of the emergence of oppositional subjectivity can be 
overcome by studying the dialectical mutual constitution of social structures and 
everyday forms of social practice. According to Postone, Marx `analyses social 
objectivity and subjectivity not as two ontologically different spheres that must be 
related but as intrinsically related dimensions of the form of social life that are 
grasped by his categories' (p 224). 
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The implications of this proposal for the development of a theory of subjectivity are 
significant. As Postone argues, `an adequate elaboration of Marx's theory of the 
constitution of forms of subjectivity and objectivity in capitalism would analyse the 
interaction of structure and practice in terms of the nature of the contradictory 
dynamic of the totality... it is a non functionalist theory of subjectivity ... 
based on an 
analysis of the forms of social relations' (Postone 1996: 218). 
Still... 
How could Marxism explain simultaneously the particularity and the whole? 
(Cleaver, 1993). It is still necessary to grasp capitalist social relations of production as 
constituting our-selves. Namely, the contradictory process of production of 
subjectivity in a world produced by labour but wherein capital has become the 
subject. In what follows I will suggest that Marx's critique of political economy and 
his method of determinate abstraction allow an understanding of subjectivity as a 
determinate abstraction. Subjectivity as a determinate abstraction offers the possibility 
to relocate human action at the core of the current forms of the real subsumption of 
labour under capital, i. e. globalisation, and therefore opens the possibility of an 
empowering theory of subjectivity. 
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III 
Subjectivity and the Problem of Real Subsumption 
`J'ai montre mon chef-d'oeuvre aux grandes personnes et je leur ai demande si mon dessin leur faisait 
peur. Elles m'on repondu: "pourquoi un chapeau ferait-il peur? " Mon dessin ne representait pas un 
chapeau. II representait un serpent boa qui diferait un elephant. J'ai alors dessine I'interieur du serpent 
boa, afin que les grandes personnes puissent comprendre' (A de Saint Exupery, Le Petit Prince) 
Form 
Marx's method of determinate abstraction 
developed in Grundrisse and Capital 
implied an immanent critique of political 
economy. Political economy neglected the relation of class antagonism underpinning 
capitalist social relations by naturalising them and `reproduc[ing] uncritically [the] 
social forms through which social relations appear to exist and through which social 
power is transformed into the power of things' (Clarke, 1991b: 85). The way in which 
political economy naturalised capitalist social relations was through its formal 
abstractions. Formal abstractions materialise from the creation of the separation 
between the `objective' and `subjective' dimensions of society and constitute the basis 
for the scientificism of political economy. But `the formal abstractions of political 
economy are not gratuitous inventions but express real abstractions in a mystified 
form'(Clarke, 1991b: 140). Marx was concerned with the real movement of 
constitution and transformation of these existent abstractions. Moreover, that 
movement was its object of analysis (Gunn, 1992). 
In Marx's method, social forms are not just formal concepts, e. g. `the state', through 
which we intervene into the objective world. They are not abstracted from the social 
relations which produce them, but they are abstractions in reality (Gunn, 1992, my 
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emphasis). In other words, social forms are not `convenient fictions' but correspond to 
determinate social processes (Clarke 1991b). Real abstractions embody, crystallise, 
contain and reproduce within themselves the contradictions of capitalist relations of 
production. Unlike formal abstractions, which abstract from the phenomena 
concerned, `determinate abstractions are abstractions in and through which 
phenomena obtain' (Gunn 1992: 23). 
Form and the State 
The Marxist critique of the state developed within the Conference of Socialist 
Economists (CSE) in Britain recovered the Marxist notion of form to put forwards a 
materialist critique of the state (Holloway and Picciotto 1977; Clarke, 1991a). 8 Class 
struggle -and not the state - became the starting point to analyse the state. In other 
words, it was argued that in order to understand the state, one needed to dissolve the 
category of the state (Holloway 1994). The state was not `derived' from capital but 
constituted as the political form of capital. So in order to understand the capitalist 
crisis, what was really required was not a theory of the state or an economic theory 
but a materialist theory, a materialist critique of social forms. In the materialist 
critique of the state, the specificity of the political or the intrinsic logic of capital 
became secondary: the analysis aimed at understanding the forms of the political or of 
the economic in determinate historical moments of capitalist development: 
s This theorisation emerged in the 1970s from the political preoccupation to understand the crisis of the 
state and within it, the redefinition of the form of the state and its relation with global capital. As they 
explained, it was important at that time to replace the notion of 'economic crisis' by the idea of crisis as 
a crisis of the capital relation (Clarke 1991c). See interviews with Picciotto and Holloway in Dinerstein, 1998 and Dinerstein and Thwaites Rey 1994, respectively. See Clarke 1988 introduction. 
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`the economic and the political are both forms of social relations, forms assumed 
by the basic relation of class conflict in capitalist society, the capitalist relation, 
forms whose separate existence springs, both logically and historically, from the 
nature of that relation' (Holloway and Picciotto [ 1977] in Clarke 1991 a: 121-2). 
These forms are determinate abstractions, they are historically constituted through 
class struggle: `the class struggle does not simply take place within these forms. The 
forms of capitalist domination [in this case the state] are themselves the object of class 
struggle, as capital and the working class confront them as barriers to their own 
reproduction ... their development is the outcome of a history of struggle in and against 
the institutional forms of the capitalist mode of production' (Clarke 1988: 16). The 
materialist critique of the state constituted a turning point in the Marxist debate on the 
state and social forms of the capital relation. Nevertheless, it was not developed 
further to the analysis of subjectivity. 
Real Subsumption 
In the Communist Manifesto, (CM) Marx and Engels explained the process through 
which human life was progressively integrated and transformed into an intrinsic 
aspect of capital. They highlighted that the expansion of capital, as the most important 
form of social relations, and the expansion of the working class, as the most important 
form of labour, were inextricably connected. The constitution of the working class is 
presented in the CM as the other side of the constitution of the bourgeoisie: `in 
proportion as the bourgeoisie, i. e. capital, is developed, in the same proportion is the 
proletariat, the modem working class, developed' (CM: 87). Marx and Engels made 
clear that the working class was not simply shaped by capital, but rather created as 
living capital and transformed within the disruptive expansion of the latter, i. e. as a 
36 
fundamental aspect of the `... everlasting uncertainty and agitation [which] 
distinguish[es] the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. ' (CM: 83). 
As argued elsewhere (Dinerstein and Neary 1998), the meaning of the CM does not 
lie in the description of the dynamic which makes the working class to become both 
the possibility (producers) and the impossibility (grave diggers) of capitalism. The 
essential message of the Manifesto is to be found in the exposition of the social 
processes through which `all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to 
face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind' 
(CM: 83). 
This profanation is explained by Marx `not as the result of any intrinsic quality that 
can be located within that which appears to be solid' (Dinerstein and Neary 1998: 
59), but of a dynamic underpinning the constitution of the commodity form. That is, 
the transformation of human activity into abstract labour, the substance of value. The 
expansion of capital implies that value becomes the decisive social relation whose 
content is provided by abstract labour. Labour is the "`definite social mode of 
existence of human activity"' (Marx 1963: 46 in De Angelis, 1995: 109). Value is not 
just an aspect of society, but it constitutes the form of society (Postone 1996; Neary 
2000, also Dinerstein and Neary 2001, conclusion). 
The significance of this for a critique of subjectivity are pretty unexplored. The most 
important implication is that all forms of existence are produced within the totality of 
capital. In Capital, Marx highlighted the difference between formal and real 
subsumption of labour under capital. Under the formal subsumption of labour under 
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capital, capital `has not yet succeeded in becoming the dominant force, capable of 
determining the form of society as a whole' (Capital, vol. 1: 1023), and therefore 
there is a `direct subordination of the labour process to capital' (idem ant 1034). But 
in times of real subsumption, he argued that `the entire development of socialized 
labour 
... in the immediate process of production, takes the 
form of the productive 
power of capital. It does not appear as the productive power of labour' (Capital vol. 
1: 1024; author's emphasis). 
This suggests that, whilst in the former case the labourers were externally subjected or 
dominated by capital, in the latter they have been integrated into the process of 
valorisation as variable capital. Whereas in the former situation subjectivity is still 
external to the economic process, in the latter subjectivity is constituted as an 
integrated aspect of the social world (Aragues, 1995). Under the real subsumption of 
labourers by capital, concrete labour has no longer autonomous existence from the 
social constitution of capitalist social relations. In other words, the concrete labour is 
mediated by and becomes socially realised through its opposite: abstract labour 
(Dinerstein and Neary 1998). 
As previously mentioned, Italian Autonomism extended the notion of real 
subsumption, from the real subsumption of labourers by capital, to a notion of 
valorisation as a political process of subordination, i. e. the real subsumption of society 
in capital (Negri 1992: 72). To Cleaver, `the theory of valorisation ... is the theory of 
the way in which capital subordinates, transforms and utilises human productive 
activity for its own purposes: endless command over society' (Cleaver 1992: 116). 
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But the significance of real subsumption for a theory of subjectivity does not lie in 
that the process of valorisation just `subordinates, transforms and utilises human 
productive activities for its own purpose' (Cleaver, 1992: 116; also Cleaver 2001). 
Rather, valorisation produces forms of human existence that allow capital to 
reproduce and expand, as well as pushes it into crisis. Real subsumption implies not 
only that workers have become part of the machine, and that there is a complete 
subordination of workers to capital's command, but most importantly, that workers 
were constituted as such in the process of expansion of capital, and capital has 
become the form of society. Subjectivity is permanently recreated as capital expands 
itself, as a social relation, through class struggle. The real subsumption `of society in 
capital' (Negri 1992: 72) makes the production of subjectivity the most political 
(central) aspect of capitalist society. In the next two sections I offer the notion of 
subjectivity as a determinate abstraction. 
IV 
Subjectivity: a Determinate Abstraction 
`One of the most exciting searches of modern astronomy has been the attempt to discover a black hole' 
(Silk, 1995: 329). 
In what follows, I offer the premises to understand subjectivity as a determinate 
abstraction, which constitute the theoretical and methodological framework for this 
research. Labour is a value-creating social activity which materialises in two forms: as 
`labour' and as `social forms' both historically produced by class struggle (Postone 
1996; Neary 2000). Whilst the former refers to the human form of existence of 
capitalist social relations, i. e. what we usually call `labour', the later refers to the 
social forms which mediate the impersonal domination of labour by capital (Postone 
1996: 59), i. e. what we usually call `capital': the state, money and the law. In order to 
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understand a form of subjectivity, it is important to look at the relation of struggle 
between the aspects which constitutes `labour' and the social forms which constitute 
the capitalist powers for both mediate labour as a social activity. 
On the one had, `labour' exists through at least three aspects: identities, organisation 
and strategies of resistance. These aspects mediate and shape labour as a social 
activity. For example, the labour movement facilitates both the organisation of the 
working class' resistance and the institutionalisation of it. But although these aspects 
can be approached separately, e. g. in order to understand a form of `labour' we might 
be interested in the significance of the national identity of the working class, or the 
power of trade unions, each of them alone cannot explain a form of `labour' for each 
constitutes a partial expression of a totality. On the other hand, labour as social 
activity is mediated by social forms which, represent the capitalist powers. Capital 
materialises through this forms. The state, money and the law allow capital to exercise 
it command over labour. The state and the law, for instance, are decisive in shaping 
the identity of the working class. However, each of these social `objectified' forms 
represent a partial aspect of capital domination. The study of the relationship between 
`labour' and, for instance, the state, e. g. the struggle of the working class in and 
against the state (LEWRG 1980) although decisive, is insufficient to grasp the 
constitution of the subjectivity of labour. 
Following this, the subjectivity of labour should not be confused with any of the 
aspects and social relations which constitute it but rather it is the site of conjunction of 
them. The subjectivity of labour is not the subjectivity of `labour' but the subjectivity 
of labour as a social mediated activity. As a determinate abstraction subjectivity of 
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labour can be seen as a revealing hieroglyphic of the multiple forms, struggles and 
contradictions which emerged within the struggle to produce subjectivity. As a 
determinate abstraction, the subjectivity of labour is historical, transient, concrete and 
abstract. But unlike the other forms which mediate class struggle, subjectivity retains 
the power-non-power of labour power, the human commodity form. 
Class struggle is ultimately a struggle over the form of subjectivity. The struggle over 
the form of subjectivity does not take place directly, but is transferred on to (or 
asserts itself as a struggle over) the subjective, political, economic and legal forms 
which mediate labour, namely it expresses as a struggle over workers' identity, 
ideology, social imageries and ideologies, the forms of the institutionalisation and 
regulation of class conflict and politics, the forms of control of the power of trade 
unions, the welfare state, the labour code, workers' or human rights, wages and so on. 
This understanding of class struggle as a struggle over the form of subjectivity is not 
only relevant to understanding the main changes in workers and social identity, labour 
and social organisations and the forms of resistance, but most importantly it allows 
first a better understanding of the recomposition of the state, money and the changes 
in the law insofar as the production of adequate subjectivity is their raison d'etre, and 
secondly, of the dynamic interaction between the concrete and abstract aspects of 
capital as a social relation, which are embodied in a particular form of subjectivity. 
Subjectivity, a Site of Conjunction: 
To sum up, my argument has been so far that the Marxist notion of form provides the 
tool for an investigation of the production of subjectivity as an intrinsic aspect of 
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ee leeer de les teedres peede d. bejer trceles. EI 
pelle del teetre es sYb)ecnertr es det ebstrecnew capital as a social relation. I suggested that 
the point of departure for the analysis of 
subjectivity, and more generally the politics 
of resistance, is not the state, money and the 
law or identity, organisations and forms of 
resistance separately. I suggested that 
subjectivity is the starting point since it is produced by conjuring all the aspects and 
forms of the capital relation in a historical moment. I argued that subjectivity 
constitutes the site of conjunction of the capitalist contradictions within the subject. 
Throughout this thesis, I will explore the implications of this. But moving beyond 
Autonomism I will argue that the real subsumption of labour under capital implies not 
only subordination of life to capital's command (Cleaver 1992) but the production of 
forms of life which contradictorily correspond to the commodity form, this does not 
mean the cancellation of the possibility for resistance and transcendence but rather the 
opposite: that real subsumption implies that capital has located the possibility of 
resistance and transcendence at the core of its own reproduction. 
I will show that the forms through which labour exists are determinate abstractions, 
This forms are transient and are permanently recreated by social relations. Whilst their 
impermanence opens the possibility for unthinkable forms of struggle and existence, 
the recognition of the potentiality of each present form of subjectivity, organisation 
and struggle gives the opportunity to grasp the unity in the diverse and to articulate 
the fragmented experiences. 
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V 
Structure and Rationale 
The thesis is composed of nine more chapters organised in three parts, and a 
conclusion. The five chapters that constitute part I, Instability: Tracing the Historical 
Forms of Subjectivity revisit historical moments of subjectivity previous to the 1990s. 
My intention is not to present the history of labour struggles in Argentina, but to 
reconstruct the dynamic principle and the multiple contradictions which underpin the 
production and transformation of subjectivity. Namely to establish the inner 
connections between forms of valorisation of capital and the production of 
determinate forms of subjectivity. Each chapter revisits the case in the light of the 
theoretical ideas presented in this introduction. 
Chapter two, `The Anarchist, The Patagonia Rebelde: Rejection and Resistance' 
addresses the strikes of the rural workers in Patagonia in 1921 as they constitute 
probably the last episode in the struggle against formal subsumption led by the 
Anarchists at the beginning of the 20th Century in Argentina. The analysis of the 
strikes in Patagonia serves a twofold purpose. First, the chapter presents the historical 
background as the prelude to the constitution of the Peronist working class after 
WWWII. Secondly, it constitutes a pilot case for the application of the theoretical and 
methodological proposals developed in this chapter. It will be shown that the period 
pre-WWII embodies the struggle for and against the real subsumption of rural labour 
under capital wherein both Anarchist immigrant workers, as well as land and foreign 
capital, rejected institutionalisation of class conflict by the state. 
Chapter three `The Peronist: the 17`h of October: Recognition and Integration' 
addresses the emergence and constitution of the Peronist form of subjectivity. This 
form integrated class conflict into the state by means of the recognition of the working 
class as the engine of social development and the institutionalisation of class conflict. 
But it will be shown that the integration of labour into the state-form did not eliminate 
resistance at all. Rather, it located it at the core of the state-form by regarding workers 
and trade unions as the `spinal column' of the Peronist movement. Peronism located 
labour at the core of the state. In the light of this, Perön(ism) integrated the personal 
and the political as well as the political and the economic spheres within the subject 
and provided an adequate meaning for the constitution of the working class as the 
most significant expression of labour after WWII. The 17th of October 1945 embodied 
the moment in which workers irrupted and became visible in their search for 
recognition. This form of subjectivity outlived Perön's brief periods in office. The 
period of resistance after the withdrawal of Peron in 1955 led to the radicalisation of 
labour struggles. 
Chapter 4 `the Anti-Imperialist, Cordobazo: Rebellion and Expansion' addresses the 
process of class antagonism underpinning the struggle over the form of subjectivity 
disclosed after 1955 until 1969 and the emergence of a new moment of subjectivity 
which united the students and workers struggles into the events of the Cordobazo in 
1969. The Cordobazo represents the radicalisation of social and labour struggles in 
and against Ongania's dictatorial `Argentine Revolution' aiming at the 
`modernisation' of the economy by means of the opening of the economy to 
transnational corporations. This period entails the intensification of the real 
subsumption of labour under capital. It will be shown that the Cordobazo recaptured 
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the essence of the 17`h October 1945 and moved beyond, as a result of the 
radicalisation of the resistencia Peronista and socialist trade unionism against the 
military, the union bureaucracy and imperialist capital, in an international atmosphere 
of rebellion and revolt. During the 1970s, this project will evolve into broader social 
and political movements and particularly into a guerrilla movement. 
Chapter five `The Revolutionary, Ezeiza, Insurrection and Physical Disappearance' 
addresses the radicalisation of the politics of resistance and the production of new 
forms of politics, i. e. guerrilla movements. In the early 1970s Peronism was 
revitalised in its populist and revolutionary qualities. The chapter shows that, by 
pushing it to its limits, the Peronist guerrilla group Montoneros put in motion the 
contradictions inherent in the Peronist form. The struggle over the state and beyond 
(Socialism) took a violent form. The massacre of Ezeiza epitomised the end of the 
possibility of revolutionary Peronism and embodied the beginning of the struggle to 
deconstruct the integration of labour into the state. Like in other Latin American 
countries, Montoneros as well as the other guerrilla movements were defeated and 
ended dramatically in the disappearance of 30,000 people (most of them young 
Peronist workers) by the dictatorship of 1976. This genocide highlighted the most 
extreme case of the real subsumption of labour under capital to the extent to which the 
state took the form of a killing machine to physically eliminate labour in order to 
achieve an irreversible transformation of the social and economic relations in 
Argentina. This transformation accompanied the global transformation of capital 
during the 1970s. 
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Chapter six `The Democratic, Apariciön con Vida and Sindicalismo de Base, 
Visibility and Disillusion' addresses the main subjectivity that emerged during the 
democratic period 1983-1989, where labour and social resistance took the form of a 
struggle over the meaning of democracy. The chapter addresses, on the one hand the 
expansion of human rights movements with particular focus on the movement of the 
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in 1977, created by a group of mothers of those who 
were `disappeared' (mostly Peronist workers and militants). Mothers constituted a 
unique form of opposition that happened to become pivotal among the human rights 
movements during the 1980s. On the other hand, the chapter shows the 
democratisation and renewal of trade unions revitalised by democracy. The struggle 
for democracy ironically put a limit to the Mothers' and unions' claims for social and 
legal justice. In the late 1980s, hyperinflation asserted itself as the ultimate expression 
of the struggle of capital to suffocate and expel the power of labour. The need for 
stability became a priority. 
Part II `Deconstructing Labour: Stability and the Violence of Stability' comprises 
three chapters which address the threefold struggle over the form of subjectivity 
during the period 1989-1999 under Menem. The chapters offer a detailed analysis of 
the transformation of the state, money and the law under Menem insofar as they 
contributed to both the deconstruction of the power of labour and the social 
construction of Menem(ism) as a new form of class antagonism. 
The main argument underlying part 11 of the thesis is that the Menemist stability was 
socially constructed on the basis of the legalisation of uncertainty and the 
destabilisation of private and social life. Under Menem, the `terrorism of money' 
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(previously asserted itself as financial speculation, the creation of the external debt, 
hyperinflation) was legalised and legitimated, under the form of stability. 
Menem(ism) organised domestic and external factors through three main principles: 
the legalisation of uncertainty, the celebration of capital as the subject and the end of a 
form of politics which links political action with social justice and social change. 
These three chapters highlight the paradox between the policies which are argued to 
be the source of stability and the emergence of unstable forms of live and resistance 
against the instability of stability. It is argued that by locating the new forms of 
resistance within stability (determinate abstraction) it is possible to argue that the 
struggles do not destabilise stability but rather stability, as a form of class antagonism 
is threaten by its own product: uncertain and unhappy forms of existence. 
Chapter seven `Privatisation, Decentralisation and the Politicisation of Labour 
Conflict (the Struggle over the form of the State' concentrates on the process of 
privatisation of state-owned companies and the decentralisation of education services 
insofar as they allow the de-reconstruction of subjectivity. The central argument of 
this chapter is that the reform of the state, and particularly privatisation of state-owned 
companies and the financial and administrative decentralisation of education, did not 
lead to the depoliticisation and privatisation of labour conflict and the defeat of trade 
unions but, rather, the recomposition of the state led to the production of new forms of 
resistance (such as the teachers' hunger strike under the white tent and the provincial 
roadblocks), as well as the renewal of trade unionism (i. e. the creation of the CTA in 
1992) which nationalised and co-ordinate fragmented. The chapter explores the 
emergence of two forms of trade unionism: business and opposition. 
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Chapter eight `Flexibilisation, Marketisation and the Perversion of the CGT (The 
Struggle over the Form of the Law)' focuses on the transformation of subjectivity by 
means of an analysis of the changes in the labour code, industrial relations and 
flexibilisation of labour. The central argument of this chapter is that the struggle over 
the form of subjectivity asserted itself as a struggle over the law to legalise 
uncertainty and instability in work and employment relations, social security and 
health services. The chapter shows that the co-optation of the CGT (Confederaciön 
General del Trabajo) constituted the lynch pin of the legalisation of unstable forms of 
employment, uncertainty and constant worry in everyone's life, including those who 
remained at work and became part of the skilled sector of the working class. 
However, it is argued that the co-optation of the CGT leadership did not prevent 
workplace activism from being renewed and organised in a broader way. The 
decentralisation of collective bargaining and the casualisation of labour lead to the 
emergence of the MTA and to a increasing mobilisation of the shop-floor militants, 
which became detached from the labour bureaucracy. 
Chapter nine `Stabilisation, Unemployment and `Exclusion' (the Struggle over the 
Form of Money)' discusses the reality and theory of unemployment under Menem, as 
the main ingredient of stabilisation policies. The chapter explores the extent to which 
stabilisation policies contributed to the constitution of the highest expression of job 
instability: unemployment and poverty and therefore to a problematic subjectivity: the 
unemployed. The chapter argues, first, that stability posed major contradictions to the 
politics of resistance it became a social imagery which located popular demands 
destabilising stability. However, it is argued that the Menemist stability is itself 
unstable since it is a form of money. Secondly, the chapter offers a critical 
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interpretation of unemployment. Rather than the lack of a job, unemployment is 
understood as a form of labour. Thus, the struggles by the unemployed are located at 
the core of stability (rather than affecting stability). The struggles of the unemployed 
are not then struggles to be simply included but a struggle against the imposition of 
capitalist work under the peculiar form of labour: (un)employment. Since the forms of 
labour are produced within the present forms of capitalist power, the roadblocks 
constitute a form of resistance against the violence of the current forms of capital 
valorisation. 
Part III: `Made in the 1990s. Reinventing Resistance' offers a detailed analysis of the 
most significant form of subjectivity of the 1990s: the roadblock. Chapter ten `The 
Piqueteros. Roadblocks, In and Against the Violence of Stability offers a case study of 
a roadblock unleashed in Libertador General San Martin, a town of 60,000 inhabitants 
in the north-west province of Jujuy, in May 1997. It is argued that the roadblock 
belonged to the historical process of re-de-re construction of subjectivity and 
emerged as a living contradiction, as the embodiment of the major subjective, 
organisational, political, economic, political, legal and social changes that occurred 
under Menem. The roadblock crystallises those changes into one moment of 
confluence, and stand against the main premises that constituted Menem(ism), namely 
the legalisation of uncertainty, the recognition of capital as the subject, and the end of 
politics in favour of the era of the administration of social misery. By setting a 
physical barrier to the uncertainty imposed by the scarcity of money underpinning 
stabilisation, privatisation, decentralisation, flexibilisation and economic adjustment 
the roadblock contests the end of the centrality of labour and the irrationality entailed 
in the assumption of the end of politics. By blocking the roads, workers, the 
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unemployed and the entire community of Libertador made themselves visible against 
the violence of Stability and the `virtual disappearance' of labour entailed in the 
current forms of capitalist work, and whose utmost expression is unemployment. 
In the conclusion 2000 Fighting Virtual Disappearance I recover the inner connection 
between the valorisation of capital and the production of subjectivity in the different 
historical periods explored in part I of the thesis, as well as assess the problem of 
understanding subjectivity in Argentina in light of the Menemist transformation. I 
assess the significance of the notion of form to explain the historical processes 
through which labour moves and reinvents itself. The conclusions brings about the 
problem of the duality stability-instability. The argument here is that political and 
economic instability, usually always associated with many sorts of `lacks' and 
`incapacities' of `Argentine society' actually cannot be explain without looking at the 
processes of struggles which create the imagery of instability or stability as major 
explanations of the social dynamic. I argue that instability lies in the power of 
resistance of labour in Argentina, particularly after its recognition and political and 
institutional integration into the state under Peron. The miracle of stability, achieved 
under Menem, entails necessarily the legitimisation and reification of the breakdown 
of that power and recognition. The defeat or end of Peronism, or the anti-Peronism 
entailed in Menemism does not lie in the strength of Peronism itself but in the power 
of labour expressed in the form of Peronism. The difference is politically crucial to 
detached the systemic and subjective power of labour from one (the most powerful ) 
of its forms. Stability does not imply the defeat of the subjectivity of labour altogether 
but the deconstruction of a particular historical fore: of it. 
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Part I 
Instability. 
Tracing the Historical Forms of Subjectivity. 
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... Si la Historia la escriben los que ganan Eso quiere decir que hay otra histoº"ia 
La verdadera historia 
Quien quiere oir que oiga... 
(Nebia) 
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Chapter Two 
The Anarchist: The Patagonia Rebelde. Rejection and Resistance. 
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Between October 1921 and April 1922, the slaughter 
of thousands of rural workers who were on strike in 
Rio Gallegos, Santa Crz took place by means of a 
military operation to `clear Patagonia of red 
Anarchists'. Like the Red Week massacre of the 1 s' 
May 19099, with the murder of Colonel RL Falcon by 
S Radowit; ky; the struggle of the Centenario in 1910; 
and the Tragic Week in Buenos Aires in 1919,10 the 
strikes in Patagonia in 1921 constitute one of the 
most symbolic moment of the confrontation between 
foreign and oligarchic capital and anarchist labour. 
By 1920, the 435 proprietors who owned the 55% of the Santa Cruz territory imposed 
terrible conditions of exploitation of most of the foreign inhabitants of the area (9,480 
out of 17,925) (see Fiorito: 1985: 9). In October 1920, the Sociedad Obrera of Rio 
Gallegos of Santa Cruz, joining the FORA (Federaciön Obrera de la Republica 
Argentina), put forward rural workers' demands by means of a proposal for a 
collective agreement with the estancieros, 11 which included wage increases, payment 
of wages in money and the provision of more hygienic, safer and healthier working 
conditions as well as the recognition of peones12 organisations and workplace 
delegates. A collective agreement was signed with military mediation. Yet, 
landowners and their British partners joining the Sociedad Rural Argentina (Argentine 
Rural Society, SRA) rejected it. Workers' boycotts, the occupation of the estates and 
strikes persisted and spread as the main tactics of Anarcho- syndicalism. 
9 See Frydenberg J and Ruffo M 1992. 
10 see Bilsky 1985,1984. 
11 Owners of the estates. 
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In April 1921, the crisis of the international wool market following WWI worsened. 
The estancieros decided not to pay salaries as the means of reducing costs. As a result, 
between July and November, several general strikes preventing the shearing from 
taking place were organised against miserable working conditions and starvation 
wages. The Patagonia Rebelde was repressed by means of a military operation 
wherein 260 military ambushed and shot dead around 3,000 strikers. Although the 
slaughter was pictured as a `confrontation', it is well known that no battles took place 
and that only one soldier died in one of the military operations in Tehuelche. After the 
death of the strikers, the collective agreement was definitely deemed invalid and rural 
workers' wages went down again. 
On December 1921, the executive committee of the anarchist FOR A (Communist 5th 
Congress) denounced the massacre in La Organizaciön Obrera (3.12.21: 2). The 
journal La Vanguardia did so too (14.12.21: 5, col. 4). The National Congress treated 
the massacre as a political scandal during sessions held on the Ist and 8 th of February 
1922. The Socialist MPs put forward a request for its investigation. They accused 
Lieutenant Colonel Varela, the chief conducting the military `operation' ordered by 
President Yrigoyen of having killed innocent workers (Fiorito, 1985: 73). The conflict 
vanished from memory until three years after, when a reciprocal revenge took place in 
January 1923. Lieutenant Colonel Varela was killed by Kurt G Wilckens, a 
`Tolstolian German who was obsessed with the execution by firing squad suffered by 
the peones on strike in Patagonia' (Abad de Santillän in Troncoso, 1983/1: 17). In 
12 Peon: lowest level in the hierarchy of rural worker. 
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June of the same year, Wilckens was killed by his avenger Jorge Perez Millän 
Temperley. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the massacre of the Patagonia Rebelde as a 
moment of critical subjectivity. This first form of subjectivity addressed in the thesis 
embodies the struggle for and against the real subsumption of rural labour under 
capital wherein both Anarchist immigrant workers as well as land and foreign capital 
confronted each other directly, and rejected institutionalisation of class conflict by the 
state. The analysis was done by means of first, the reconstruction of the historical 
events as well as the political, social, and economic relations within which the 
struggle took place; secondly, by the use of the film La Patagonia Rebelde, directed 
by Hector Olivera. 13 I have translated the movie screenplay and contrasted the plot 
with the sequence of historical events. 
The use of a film provided me with an excellent tool which matches my 
methodological and theoretical proposal. Whilst historical documents can uncover the 
identity, organisation and forms of struggles, subjectivity exists in the form of a 
mythical representation of the event. The film is an expression of that mythical 
representation. The dramatic nature of the plot allows one to capture the movement of 
production of subjectivity, by recreating the imperceptible dynamic which is 
detectable only in action. Each scene asserts a synthesis of a multiplicity of conflicts, 
meanings, reasons, feelings and contradictions which develop through action. The 
movie deploys a quite accurate sequence of events and the elements of fantasy and 
interpretation do not affect his contribution as a testimonial piece. The next sections 
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present the historical background to the conflict, the development of the struggle 
through the film structure and historical sources and some concluding remarks on the 
Anarchist form of subjectivity. 14 
I 
Class Struggle at the Beginning of the 2 0`h C 
Capital and Labour 
By the end of the nineteenth century and until the WWI, Argentina achieved, under 
the rule of the Buenos Aires' pro-European political elite, an outstanding export-led 
growth with a gross domestic product growing at an average annual rate of 5 percent 
or more (Bergquist, 1986: 85; Diaz Alejandro, 1970). The concentration of land by 
the British capitalists and the national oligarchy in the latifundio structure worked 
with a 70% immigrant working population, mainly from southern Europe and 
neighbour countries. So the local capitalist class was constituted through the 
consolidation of the latif Indio structure of land and the control of finances and 
commerce (Rock 1975b; Säbato, 1991). 15 The exports sector being controlled by 
Argentine rural capitalists, infrastructure, i. e. transport, processing and 
commercialisation of export, were predominantly (but not exclusively) controlled by 
foreign capital (Bergquist, 1986: 87; Ford, 1975). By 1913, `one third of foreign 
investments were in railroads, and 60 percent of foreign capital was British' (Diaz 
Alejandro 1970: 30) 
13 Based on and adapted from the historical novel The Avengers of Tragic Patagonia by Osvaldo Bayer (see Bayer 1973-1974) 
14 To distinguish the scenes of the film form historical data, I will present the information provided by 
the film scenes in the present tense. 15 Rural capital was composed of 400 families: it has been estimated that few than 2,000 persons in Argentina owned as much land as the total areas of Italy, Belgium, Holland and Denmark added 
together' (Rock 1975b: 3; Fiorito 1985). 
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On the other hand, high levels of immigration formed, in a short period of time, the 
labour force to work in the latifundios. The 1850s wool boom had converted the 
gaucho ('semi-nomad horse-mounted shepherd') into an agricultural labourer. Yet, the 
consolidation of the agricultural sector and the emergence of subsidiary industries 
made immigrants the best resource of a labour force required. 16 
In rural areas immigrants suffered from instability and impoverishment, and had to 
face either high rental prices imposed by the estancieros, miserable wages or 
unemployment. The swallow system of harvest recruitment was frequently their 
alternative to the hard conditions of tenancy (Rock, 1975b: 14). After the wheat boom 
of the 1890s, work and living conditions worsened (Bialett-Masse 1985 vol. 1: 10-11) 
in the rural areas, so immigrants began to move to big urban centres (Rock, 1975b: 
17). By 1914, urban population constituted 57,3 % of inhabitants (Source: Censos in 
Vazquez Presedo). 17 
The Labour Movement 
In 1901, the existing cosmopolitan labour force led by socialists and anarchists 
workers founded the FOA (Federacion Obrera Argentina, Labour Argentine 
Federation) called FORA in 1904 (see Lopez Antonio 1987). Within the FORA, 
anarchism prevailed. It expanded and dominated the labour movement until 1915, 
16 `Between 1857 and 1930 there was a net immigration of about 3.5 million into a country whose total 
population was 1.7 million in 1869' (Diaz Alejandro, 1970: 23). Only during the period 1900-1910, 
1,120,000 people migrated to the country (Senkman in Roniger and Sznajder 1998). 17 By migrating to urban centres rural workers did not find better living and working conditions. In 
spite of a process of rapid proletarisation of the labour force, working class living conditions were not a 
matter on the state's agenda. By 1913,80% of the working class population in the city of Buenos Aires, 
half of them foreign born, kept on living `as families in single room places in "a rotting heap of 
nationalities and languages" as an observer described them' (Panettieri in Rock 1975b: 93). 
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particularly among small industrial and service occupations and port dockers (Rock 
1975b). By 1890, socialists had won influence among small groups of skilled 
workers, but failed to build up a mass working-class party. Instead, the anarchists 
mobilised a large number of urban and rural workers and organised huge general 
strikes. This exacerbated class conflict in Buenos Aires (see Rock 1975b: 81). 
18 
Anarchism had been brought into the country by foreign workers and gave them a 
`vision of human dignity through revolutionary struggle [by preaching] individual 
freedom, democratic social relations... rational values to a work force that still 
possessed its own tools, maintained its patrimony over industrial skills, and exercised 
significant control over the work process' (Abad de Santillän quoted by Bergquist C 
1986: 110; see Guerin 1975). 
Workers organised in Mutual-Aid and Resistance Societies, the latter combining 
social aid with industrial action and union activity blossomed among skilled urban 
artisans and workers at the beginning of the century. The mutuales emerged as a form 
of workers' own protection from sickness and death (Berqguist, 1986: 107). They 
provided solidarity links and social activities through which to cope with poverty and 
the uprooting produced by immigration. Resistance Societies kept their culture alive. 
Workers' and their families' activities were combined with ideological and also 
practical discussions between Socialists, Anarchists and Syndicalists. They had a 
press of their own, drama groups and mass meetings. By 1913 these societies enrolled 
255,534 people, about half of the working class of the capital city (idem ant: 107). 
is Between 1902 and 1910 workers participated in massive strikes where direct confrontation with the 
police was usual. Strikes in the ports of Buenos Aires, Rosario and Bahia Blanca (1902); a general 
strike in Rosario and a strike of sugar plantation workers in Tucuman (1904); factory stoppages (1907) (Munck, 1987: 51). 
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In 1902, disagreements between socialists and anarchists led to their split and to the 
foundation, in 1903, of the socialist UGT (Union General de Trabajadores). But a 
third position was growing within UGT: syndicalism. Syndicalists distanced 
themselves from both the anarchists' preference for direct confrontation and the 
general strike, and from socialists' commitment to parliamentary participation. During 
1903 and 1906 their ideas (introduced by French trade unionists) were quickly 
disseminated among workers and leaders. Syndicalism `endorsed the anarchist vision 
of social revolution, but it sought to reach that goal through powerful, established 
organisations in the workplace and non-sectarian working-class unity embodied in a 
national labor central' (Berqguist, 1986: 111). The slogan `all power to the unions' 
became the mainstream of trade unionism, built upon the basis of Syndicalist anti- 
statism (del Campo 1983,1986; La Accion Socialista, July 1905). 
In 1909 a second attempt towards unification was, this time, successful. The CORA 
(Confederaciön Obrera Regional Argentina) unified anarchism, socialism and 
syndicalism, the latter prevailing within the Confederation. After 1910 the trade union 
movement was consolidated (Munck 1987: 54). Anarchism was already weakening 
and six years later the Syndicalists controlled two of the key trade unions at that time: 
port and railroad workers (del Campo, 1983: 2 1). 
The Working Class, the Syndicalist Boon, and the State 
By 1914, the working class was composed of agricultural, industrial, services and 
rural proletariat. The expansion of industrial employment (food and beverages, and 
metallurgical sector) since 1895 led to the development of capital-intensive 
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techniques without concentration of the labour force in the same proportion (uneven 
geographical distribution) (see Munck 1987). The service sector had grown out of the 
ago-export economy and the urbanisation of the litoral (north-east). The transport 
sector was crucial and employed 170,000 workers in 1914. Regarding rural workers, 
the Agrarian National Census indicates the existence of 578,000 workers in 
agriculture and 725,000 seasonal workers. By 1914 there were 14,700 workers in the 
sugar mills (considered industrial workers), as well as an 'unspecified' number of 
indigenous population (Munck 1987: 72-73). 
The WWI had three major effects. First, the war interrupted the expansion of 
Argentine exports and made imports difficult; secondly, it 'halted the flow of 
immigrants to Argentina' (immigrants willing to return to their countries to enlist and 
also declines in living standards); thirdly, it raised unemployment and made real 
wages fall as well as increasing working hours (Munck 1987: 75). During this period, 
Anarchism, Socialism and Syndicalism disputed the leadership of struggles and the 
representation of workers and their organisations against landed and foreign capital in 
the light of the economic crisis at the end of the WWI and the syndicalist `boom' 
unleashed by the Russian revolution, the latter producing a general euphoria. 
The state recomposed itself vis-ä-vis the strengthening of the working class under the 
form of democracy and initiated the struggle for the integration of labour into the 
state. Early workers' struggles had led the parliament to pass some piecemeal and 
limited legislation on behalf of workers too: Rural Codes (1865), Sunday day off 
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(Law 4661 in 1904) and the debate around a National Labour Code19 in the Congress 
as well as some legislation to regulate women's and children's work in 1907 (law 
5,291) and Safety and Risk at work (Law 9,688) in 1915 (Panettieri, 1984). Yet, 
workers' living conditions were terrible particularly in the countryside. In 1907, the 
government created the National Department of Labour, to integrate workers and 
employers into work councils while the President developed personal relations with 
union leaders (Munck, 1987: 81). 
President Yrigoyen from the Union Civica Radical (UCR) was elected as the first 
popular president in 1916. Despite institutional and personal attempts to control, 
institutionalise and civilise class struggle during 1916-1919 class opposition was 
strong. The year 1917 marked the beginning of an upsurge in labour activity (Munck, 
1987: 83). In fact, the Syndicalists were winning control of the major Argentine 
labour central, `and conducted the pivotal strikes that brought the development of the 
early Argentine labour movement to a climax in the tumultuous years following the 
First World War' (Berqguist 1986: 108). By 1915, that it had become the mainstream 
trade unionism was confirmed by the unification of trade union confederations at the 
9th Congress of FORA. This helped the success of the strikes in the key sectors of the 
export economy, such as railroads and the meat packing industry during and after 
WWI run by the portena working class. 20 Syndicalism won from the victories of the 
strikes in 1916 and 1917: the number of affiliates of FORA grew from 12% of the 
19 The draft of the Labour Code drawn up by Joaquin V Gonzalez, Minister of the Interior failed because it faced two obstacles: the resistance from the UTA, la Union Industrial Argentina (Argentine 
Industrial Union) , and the labour movement itself, which rejected its repressive aspects (Munck 1987: 48). 
20 For the period 1917-1919 strikes for wage increases and the amelioration of working conditions rose in Buenos Aires: 'to 138 in 1917,196 in 1918 and 259 in the first half of 1919 alone. In 1917,136,000 
workers took part in strikes in the capital, in 1918,133,000 and in 1919.309,000' (Bergguist, 
1986: 113). The most important of these strikes were waged by transport workers [maritime workers 
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working class at the beginning of 1918 to around 24% at the end of 1919 (the total 
numbers of workers in Buenos Aires being around half a million) (Rock 1975b: 190). 
But whilst the urban working class was getting stronger and organised, the FORA was 
still struggling against capital's rejection of any recognition of rural workers in 
Patagonia. 
II 
Subjectivity in Motion 
January 1923, City of Buenos 
Aires. Lieutenant Colonel 
Zahala leaves his house. A few 
seconds later he is shot dead 
by a man who fiuils at his first 
attempt with a grenade. The 
tM _lbLin .- rý , "In '. " "'ti - 
reason wr this murder could 
on/v he found three Fears ago, in the slaughter of thousands of'rural workers in Rio 
Gallegos, Patagonia (Scene One, La Patagonia Rebelde). 
Sociedad Ohrera - Socic'dad Rural 
During the first tifteen minutes, the film introduces us to the main characters involved 
in the conflict. With the 'set up' we learn, on the one hand, about the identities, 
organisations and the tactics of resistance of those workers involved in the conflict, 
and on the other we identify those who personified capital. 
In a workers' assembly being held at the Sociecluc! Ohre'ra, Spanish, German, Polish 
and Chilean workers and their socialist, anarchist and syndicalist leaders are 
joining the I ()Ni in1910 -191 7. railroad 191 191 \] and meat-packers [19171, both ý ital to the health 
of the export sector (Uergguist 1986 1 14) (sec also Rock 1975h, Lewis 1992) 
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discussing the conditions of exploitation suffered by Hotel workers and plan a 
boycott. Drivers as well as stevedores, mozos and carriage drivers of Puerto Santa 
Cruz give their solidarity to hotel workers. Together with maritime workers, the latter 
had become one of the key unions joining the FORA (Bilsky 1985). 
The boycott is the first stage of the conflict developed in the film. The Federaciön 
Obrera wins the boycott and demands `the reinstatement of the dismissed workers, the 
complete payment of their wages and $1,500 compensation to be paid to the Sociedad 
Obrera to cover the costs of the boycott'. Organisation improves after the triumph of 
the boycott. A campaign for the affiliation of rural workers starts. Facön Grande, 21 a 
gaucho criollo who `knows nothing' about politics but `if he has to fight he fights', is 
in charge of the campaign. His role is important since specific legislation allowed the 
executive power to expel `dangerous' foreign workers from the country by means of 
the Law of Residence passed in 1902 (Panettieri, 1984; see Bergquist, 1986: 111) and 
to control `disturbances' by means of the Law of Social Defence passed in 1910 
(Panettieri 1984, Lewis, 1992: 101; see Rock 1975b: 81-82) Facön walks the 
countryside and talks to the peones about the significance of the Sociedad Obrera and 
why it was important to join it. 
The scenes illustrate the form in which the FORA organised workers in the light of 
the immigration flows, oscillations of temporary jobs, changes in the labour market, 
and immigrant workers' attitude towards a foreign country, on the one hand, and 
increasing repression from the state and capital with deportations, imprisonment and 
persecution, lock outs blackmail and black payrolls, on the other. The FORA 
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developed in the form of small groups of workers with quite a high level of political 
consciousness and a libertarian culture. There lies the durability of the FORA in its 
capacity to unify and mobilise workers in these difficult conditions (Bilsky, 1985/1: 
77). 
Contrasting with the workers' assembly, the film introduces us to some of the 
characters which personify the capitalist powers: the president of the SRA i. e. landed 
capital, the Governor of Santa Cruz (political power) and an English estanciero 
(foreign capital) sitting at a table in the luxurious restaurant of the Hotel Argentino. 
During the meal, the Governor is offered the post of chief manager of the SRA by the 
president of that organisation. The scene illustrates the rural oligarchy's intention to 
secure firm links between political and economic power. These links were crucial to 
confront the democratisation of the state which could force capital to have to 
negotiate with workers. 
Capital Panics 
As workers' organisation improved, a meeting between the governor and the judge 
illustrates in the film capital's fears of workers' revolutionary power. Panic led the 
governor to repress in his own terms an homage to the Spanish anarchist organised by 
workers, and which had been allowed by the law. The police take workers belonging 
to the Sociedad Obrera from their beds, while they were sleeping, and imprison them. 
The conflict between the governor (representing the interests of capital and the 
interior of the country) and judge (representing the national government and the law) 
21 Facön is a type of knife used by gauchos. Grande means big. Facön Grande is a nickname indicating 
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illustrates the rejection of the law by capital whose representative was the governor. It 
also shows the government attempt to mediate and integrate capital and labour. 
The film makes clear that the governor's attitude was supported by the Liga Patriötica 
created in 1919 to organise politically capital's `private' struggle against labour. The 
Liga also functioned as the SRA for against the UCR populism, personified by 
president Irigoyen, who, in fact, released workers and allowed the reopening of the 
Sociedad Obrera, closed by the military police. The UCR, founded in 1891, together 
with the Partido Socialista Argentino (PSA, Argentine Socialist Party), founded in 
1894, played a crucial role in the Parliamentary opposition against the oligarchic elite. 
The UCR was the first populist political movement in Argentina, which embraced the 
emerging pro democratic middle classes struggling against the conservative elite's 
political command. 
Labour pushes it forwards 
In the film, the government's attitude towards workers' rights allows the Sociedad 
Obrera to plan ahead too. To contest repression, the Sociedad Obrera calls a general 
strike to unified fragmented struggles and strikes that were already taking place. Yet, 
to the workers, their liberation was the result of the strength of rural workers' strikes. 
Time has arrived to fight for better working and living conditions by means of a 
written agreement. The union's proposal will be presented to the governor and the 
SRA. It includes the amelioration of working and housing conditions, wage increases 
and the legal recognition of the Federaciön Obrera de Oficios Varios de Rio 
his courage. 
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Gallegos, FORA. Yet, the SRA `will not accept under any circumstances negotiations 
on any matter concerning the administration of its estates with foreign workers'. 22 In 
response, workers decided to `continue the strike until its last consequences'. In order 
to avoid workers' strikes, capitalists bring to Rio Gallegos hundreds of workers from 
the Asociaciön de Trabajadores Libres of Buenos Aires (Association of Free 
Workers) to `collaborate' in the shearing. But the `carneros' (scabs) were met with 
bullets by the strikers. Some workers as well as policemen ended up shot dead. 
The `Military Intervention' 
The direct confrontation between strikers and the police led to a shift in the 
government strategy since `serious business and interests were involved in the matter, 
including foreign interests'. Lieutenant Colonel Zabala is sent to intervene in Santa 
Cruz and solve the conflict at once. As a military man, Zabala is neither in favour of 
the anarchists nor of foreign capital. He represents the national interests against 
foreign ideologies and interests on both sides. 
In Santa Cruz, Zabala holds a series of meetings with all parties in conflict, 
investigates working conditions and inspects the estates' installations. He writes a 
report which indicates that `the responsibility for the chaotic situation in Santa Cruz is 
the authorities' and the police's, the latter being considered very bad'. The report on 
workers' living conditions written in September 1921 recounts the disastrous situation 
suffered by workers in the area, where `the peon is exploited in the most primitive 
22 This is an interesting point for, although the rural labour force was, as explained, mainly foreign, the 
naturalisation of immigrant workers was not allowed. In 1911, the Säenz Pena law made voting 
compulsory. However, the law only enfranchised the native-born workers who were mainly 
concentrated in skilled occupation (Rock 1975b: 92, Diaz 1983). 
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form'. Zabala states that `after one year of hard work, workers remain as poor as at 
the beginning' and that `there lay the foundations for revolutionary strikes and the 
hatred of our society'. As for the conditions, his report coincides with workers' 
proposal for the agreement. His report of the situation coincides with workers' 
demands (Crönica Afensual 45, September 1921: 732 in Fiorito, 1985: 66). As a result 
of Zabala's report, the government prepares an agreement between the SRA and the 
Sociedad Obrera. Yet, the agreement can only be signed if workers hand over their 
weapons. 
Handing Weapons Over and the `Agreement' 
Workers' tactics of direct action were not violent but entailed the use of some forms 
of resistance based on campamentos (campings) where workers gathered in armed 
communities with their own laws and political organisation (Fiorito, 1985: 15). The 
Anarchists main forms of direct action were the general strike, the boycott, sabotage 
(Antonio Lopez, 1987/1: 30-31). These forms of resistance matched the anarchist 
principles of social justice, freedom and emancipation but also anti parliamentary and 
anti-politics (Antonio L. dpez 1987/1: 90). In the film, the German Schultz asks the 
judge: `How are we, workers, supposed to surrender OUR weapons? That is 
inadmissible! ' 
After four months of discussion, the proposal is formally accepted by both estancieros 
and the Sociedad Obrera. The agreement established the obligation of estancieros to 
provide a) wider rooms with ventilation. In each room will sleep only three men on 
wool mattresses provided by the estanciero; b. light and heating; c. Saturday 
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afternoon off; d. each meal will consist of three dishes including soup, mate, coffee or 
tea and dessert; e. each estancia will provide a first aid box with instructions in 
Spanish. As far as wages are concerned, the agreement established that all wages had 
to be paid monthly and with cheques on the name of the workers. A wage increase for 
each category of workers as well as some additional amount of money according to 
the job: ovejeros $ 140, peones: S 120; Carreteros: $ 130; Cooks: S 160, Campanistas 
$ 130 (see Fiorito, 1985: 21-24). 
But in practical terms, most of estancieros did not implement the agreement. 
Moreover, they continue with the discrimination and political persecution of workers 
dismissed in some cases as a result of their participation in the trade union. This led to 
further boycotts and strikes. In the film, another workers' assembly at the Sociedad 
Obrera gathers new information about the estancieros' resistance to observing the 
agreement. They decided to spread the news and go on strike again. At the same time, 
at the Pink House, Buenos Aires, members of the government and the SRA are 
concerned about the impact of the rural strike on international relations. They learn 
that `the Chilean embassy is worried' and that `the strike is considered to be against 
British interests" by the Foreign Office' As a result, many strikers are arrested again 
and severely repressed by a military operation. Facön puts it clearly. `Comrades: in 
[Rio] Gallegos politicians and exploiters together have started to punish us'. The 
Sociedad Obrera calls for a general strike in all estates and for a demonstration to 
Lago Argentino. 
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Uprooting Subversion: the Massacre 
Since workers' strikes persisted, Lieutenant Colonel Zabala is sent to Patagonia in a 
military operation, this time, to `clean' Patagonia: `death penalty to all who resist us'. 
But workers trust Zabala as an honest soldier. 'To the workers and the public in 
general: Salud!. The arrival of the national army brings us back the peacefulness and 
the guarantee that the abuse of the police force comes to an end ... 
it does not matter 
that some estancieros believe that the national army will serve capitalism... they are 
making a mistake' (Commission of Justice, probable date 16.1.20 in Fiorito 1985: 34). 
This illustrates that the anarchists' enemy was capital, yet still understood in a very 
direct form: the capitalists. However, Zabala is implacable: `How about this? When 
they come back we meet them with bullets? If the ringleaders die, surrender of the rest 
will come soon'. The rationale for his strategy is clear. `There is no other way to do 
it... There are only a few of us to dominate all of them ... 
in our case, what really 
counts is to have a strong hand... there is a risk of loosing Patagonia, think of Chile, 
Captain'. 
The brutality of repression put workers' lives, the organisation of the Sociedad 
Obrera and their forms of resistance at risk. Discussions among anarchist, socialist, 
syndicalist and Chilean workers and their leaders illustrate this dilemma: keep on 
resisting (together at the barricades or escaping and hiding) or surrender. Unlike 
Socialist and Anarcho-syndicalist leaders, who, although recognising the increasing 
difficulties of direct action, wanted to resist `until the final victory', the Chileans 
argue pragmatically that 'we need to make a pact now'. The Chilean worker's 
proposal wins. This symbolises a shift from ideological and moral concerns to 
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practical negotiation. However, the military does not accept negotiation with workers: 
`This is not about forgiveness or even punishment but extermination. I would rather 
finish with a hundred ringleaders than witness the death of thousands of innocent 
victims. They might say that I was bloodthirsty, but I was not disobedient' Workers 
died in the firing squad. After the massacre, a new wage scale for estancias' workers 
was applied: 
_Agreement, Februa ry 1921 Wages Decrease December 1921. 
E uiladores ................. non available S 120 monthly Peones (monthly) 
......... .S 120 
S 80 (monthly) 
Carreteros (monthl y) .... S 130 $ 90 (monthly) Jornaleros (daily) 
... 
S non available $5 (daily) 
Ovejeros (monthly) 
......... 5140 
S 100 monthly 
Cooks ......................... 5160 S 120 (monthly) 
Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I attempted to set in motion the historical knowledge about, on the one 
hand the identities, organisations and forms of resistance of Anarcho-Syndicalism, 
and, on the other hand, the state, political regime, capital and labour regulation in 
rural Patagonia in Argentina in the 1920s. This was done through the use of historical 
resources and a film. The historical resources allowed me to reconstruct and 
characterise the period. The film allowed the distinctive features of capital, labour and 
the state to be set in motion and interrelated in-against-within-beyond the others. The 
massacre was the starting point of my analysis since it crystallised the many aspects 
and forms of the capital relation. The Patagonia Rebelde constituted a moment of 
critical subjectivity wherein the historical and specific features and 
interconnectedness were expressed dramatically in a massacre. 
'3 Fiorito, 1985: 21-25. 
''La Union 14.12.21: 3 col. 4 in Fiorito 1985: 55. 
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The anarchist subjectivity emerged as one of the sites of conjunction of the capitalist 
contradictions at the beginning of the 20`h Century in Argentina. The anarchist 
subjectivity in rural areas was characterised in this chapter by an immigrant rural 
labour force with strong ideological convictions about dignity, oppression and the 
effectiveness of direct action against exploitation who achieved a form of existence by 
confronting capitalist intolerance, repression, imprisonment, appalling working and 
living conditions, and even death. The Mutual Aid and Resistance Societies provided 
a family and friendly and cultural environment for workers and families. The FOR A 
became the means of organisation against oppression and exploitation. The strategies 
of resistance were based on refusal to exploitation, boycott and self defence. This 
anarchist form was constituted as an intrinsic aspect of the expansion of the ago 
export economy led by landed classes and foreign capital, and a still repressive state, 
which on the one hand encourage immigration into the country and on the other hand 
repress and persecute foreign labourers and militants. Class conflict was not 
institutionalised. The anarcho-syndicalist form of labour subjectivity was produced by 
capitalist social relations, but soon constituted a barrier to the valorisation of capital 
from within it. 
The conflict highlighted the fact that the capitalist struggle over the form of 
subjectivity for and against the real subsumption of labour under capital took the form, 
in this historical period, of a centrifugal and direct confrontation. To the workers in 
the film, capitalists were 'a bunch of miserable exploiters' who 'give more credit to a 
wall or a horse than to a man because nowadays a worker can be easily substituted by 
another without any cost at all'. Yet, whilst capital is the enemy, they regarded the 
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military as a good mediator, who hated capital as much as they did. This illustrates 
somehow and very symbolically the relationship between workers and populist 
militaries like the Colonel Peron to be developed in the future, when military 
Populism provoked a debate within the labour movement about militarism. 
To the capitalists, Anarchism was `madness', `it transformed the country into a rats' 
nest', `destroyed the nationality, our fatherland and private property', they were 
bandoleros. 2S In this case, the military is regarded as an instrument for their purpose. 
They hate Zabala when he helped the accomplishment of the agreement which 
favoured rural workers, but celebrate his courage after the manslaughter. This is also a 
symbolic reference to the historical ambiguous attitude of Argentine capitalists who 
embrace democracy only if it does not affect their interest but do not hesitate in 
supporting severe repression on behalf of stability and governability. 
Direct confrontation between capital and labour was not only rhetoric. The film 
exemplifies workers' tactics of boycott and direct action, the use of weapons and 
occupation of estates, as well as capitalists' and conservative politicians' direct and 
unlawful repression of workers by means of military operations or starvation wages. 
Finally, the film highlights how the state was shaped in the light of the anti- 
institutionalist action of both anarchists and foreign and rural capital and the 
government's attempts to institutionalise class conflict. The election of President 
Yrigoyen threatened the rural oligarchy and the Liga Patriötica (Patriotic League, 
PL), as well as opening the possibility of legal agreements and legalisation of labour 
15 Criminals with guns. 
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organisations, since workers' support became significant to hold political power, 
particularly after 1912. 
During the conflict, crisis and contradictions developed within workers themselves 
(crisis of identity), within workers' organisations and around their forms of resistance. 
Similarly, the film deployed the multiple contradictions among the forms of capital. 
Abundant examples can illustrate this. With regard to labour, the film shows the 
difficulties of the Sociedad Obrera to organise rural workers in a difficult and 
extensive area, such as Patagonia, the ideological discussions among workers joining 
the Sociedad Obrera and the emergence of pragmatism willing to negotiate as 
opposed to the anarchist idealism of permanent revolution and resistance `until the 
final victory'. 
The film also shows the difficulties for capital to articulate repression since the 
development of the state and the law makes capitalist direct repression more complex. 
Examples of this are the game power between the conservative governor (close to 
capital) and the judge (representing the law). The judge symbolises the initial but 
inevitable separation between political and economic spheres as well as the 
development of the state. There are also controversies between the military and land 
and foreign capital. Zabala symbolises the National interest against the possession of 
Patagonia by British imperialist capital. 
The conflict reaches its climax when workers' interests are directly confronted with 
capitalist interests. Namely, when the international wool market during WWI made 
capital decide not to pay salaries as the means of reducing costs, strikes, boycotts and 
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direct actions were intensively carried out by 3,000 strikers throughout Patagonia 
estates, against miserable working conditions and starvation wages. 
26 By so doing 
they prevented the shearing from taking place and provoke an image of political 
instability and governmental weakness. In this moment capital cannot `integrate what 
it has created': the 'anarchist madness' who rejected both parliamentary politics and 
capitalist exploitation. The power of labour disclosed the fury of capital. President 
Yrigoyen's decision to `exterminate' Anarchism (workers) by means of a military 
massacre was historically condemned. But his unjustifiable decision led to the 
political recognition of the need to integrate labour into a more `civilised form' of 
existence according to the development of international and national capitalist social 
relations. The Anarchist struggle articulated the three dimensions of labour in an 
inadequate form. Thus, all the forms of capitalist powers, including legal political 
regimes and incipient democracy lined up behind the military to repress labour. The 
state was temporarily defetishised as a relation of repression in the light of the 
pressure that capital exercises on the political form of the state. 
Yet, the military operation is the catalyst of the class conflict. As highlighted, the 
massacre (like others that followed) was not 
`an authoritarian adventure, a tragic mistake or an "excess". It is the objective 
manifestation of the fact that when class struggle transcends some limits (even if 
their protagonists are not really conscious of that) institutions... also transcend the 
formality of their own laws... (Fiorito, 1985: 15). 
26 Fiorito provides us with an interesting calculation: if we suppose that these 3,000 men did not get 
their wage since March, at an average monthly wage of 100 pesos, the estancieros saved something like 3 million pesos, that is to say, 10.000 tonnes of dirty wool at the price held in 1921 (Fiorito, 1985: 14). 
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Zabala's brutality tells us about the non-institutional but yet political recognition of 
the growing and untameable power of labour in the period under consideration. 
As the 
character explains: 'There are only a few of us to dominate all of them'. 
By the moment in which the Patagonia Rebelde took place, more differentiated 
forms 
were developing for both capital and labour towards different forms of struggle. The 
strikes in Santa Cruz became a turning point towards new form of the capital relation 
of struggle. Whilst, as previously explained, Anarchism was already weakening 
in 
urban centres by 1910, this chapter showed that by 1920 the anarchist form of labour 
had reached its limits also in rural areas. Antonio Soto's escape symbolises the 
form 
in which labour moved one step forward: `I wasn't expecting such an end. Let's go. 
There is nothing to be done here... If they don't want to fight, I go. I will keep on 
fighting'. 
The massacre in Patagonia highlighted the limits of formal subsumption and the 
capitalist struggle for the real subsumption of labour under capital also in rural areas. 
Real subsumption implies the institutionalisation of class conflict by the state. This 
thesis shows physical extermination of workers will always be an available resource. 
Yet, the Patagonia Rebelde indicated the transformation of the centrifugal form of the 
relation between capital and labour whereby both rejected state institutionalisation, 
towards the nationalisation of the labour conflict and a more systematic state policy- 
making towards the regulation and control of both capital and labour. The struggle 
over the form of subjectivity will be in the future transferred into the social forms that 
mediate class struggle. But once again, the new form of the capital relation will 
create, along the non-teleological and unpredictable movement of class struggle new 
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objective and subjective forms of capital. I shall turn now to the analysis of The 174 
of October as another moment of the subjectivity of labour. 
Chapter Three 
The Peronist. The 17 "' of October, Recognition and Integration. 
I was horn on 17"' October. Ah lather ºt"as disappointed. He trante(l a girl but lie could not 
believe what she had just done to him. He had been a devoted militant in the UCR since he 
was eighteen, and lilught against PerOn 's 'Fascist dictatorship'. He used to tell us the story 0/ 
how, thanks to the Peronist political discrimination at the University o/'Buenos Aires, he was 
never awarded his degree as a dentist in 
the late 1940s. Or when he was sent to 
prison simply because he resisted the 
order of wearing the mourning black band 
ý>n his arm the day that Eva Duarte died, 
in July 1952. This probably explains the 
tact that, in spite of being born on Saint 
Perön's Day, I was not named Maria Eva 
but Ana Cecilia, like nit grandmothers. 
. 
thv father would never forgive Inc for that 
initial act of rebellion against his 
democratic ideals. 
You cannot "become" a Peronist or even "go out of being" a Peronist... You "are" or you 
"are not" a Peronist... Peronism is not something that can be understood but rather that can he 
felt' (Recent interviews with Peronist workers by Martucelli and Svampa, 1997). 
'Why do we come active when we form a common notion or have an adequate idea? An 
adequate idea is explained by our power of understanding, and so by our power of action. It 
puts us in possession of this power' (Deleuze 1992: 283). 
The mayor of the town, Don Ignacio, a life-lone Peronist, arrives one day to work in the town hall to find that he has been denounced by rivals as a Communist. When he informs his 
assistant, Mateo, of the charges against them, the latter replies: "Bolsheviks? But how? I was 
always a Peronist... 1 never Lot involved in politics" (Osvaldo Soriano's novel No huhrcr nrci., 
penu ni ul%(J'. (1994, Buenos Aires, quoted by James, 1989: 264) 
On the 17th October 1945, thousands of workers from Great Buenos Aires and the 
capital city gathered in the Plaza de Mayo to demand the liberation of colonel Peron, 
the chief of the Secretaria de Trabajo y Prevision Social (Secretary of Labour and 
Social Security, STPS). His confinement was produced by the capitalists' pressure 
against the legal and material benefits launched on behalf of rural and urban workers 
by the Colonel. The STPS policies disclosed an open struggle between capitalist 
organisations, political opposition and the trade unions for and against the STPS 
measures. In June 1945, capital had declared war on Peron `Populism' and university 
organisations, the UCR, the PSA, the Partido Comunista Argentino (Argentine 
Communist Party, PCA), as well as the right unified against Peron's `Fascism'. But a 
massive trade union campaign was launched in defence of the STPS and workers' 
rights. Street riots led to violent confrontations which were severely repressed by the 
army. On 9th October Peron was forced to resign his post. Cautiously, the trade unions 
called for a general strike on the 18th October. They demanded general elections and 
the maintenance of workers' and unions' rights. 
However, on the 17th October a massive all-day demonstration greatly exceeded the 
trade unions' prudent attitude, yet it was not a completely spontaneous demonstration. 
Workers and their families arrived in the main squares, the most important 
demonstration being in Plaza de Mayo, Buenos Aires. There, a pact between the 
leader and the masses was sealed. Historians have argued that the 17`" October was 
the `hurricane of history' (Luna, 1982), an event which uncovered, for a short period 
of time, the `essence of social and cultural relations' (James 1995: 129); an attempt to 
subvert, at least temporarily, `the dominant social order' (Plotkin, 1995: 181). After 
the 17th October Peronism was created and soon became synonymous with the power 
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of labour. Peronism outlived Perön's period of time in power (1945-55) by a large 
margin and constantly shaped the debates on the working class identity and trade 
unionism on the grounds of pre and post Peron as well as Peronism and anti- 
Peronism. 
This chapter argues that the 17th October 1945 embodied a moment of renaissance and 
political recognition of a new form of labour: the Peronist working class as the most 
important form of labour at the end of WWII in Argentina. By rejecting those 
interpretations of Peronism as being an institutional phenomena, i. e. a revolution from 
above through which to incorporate and further control the working class by the state, I 
explore the production and main contradictions brought about by this form of 
subjectivity. I argue that whilst the recognition of the centrality of the power of labour 
was achieved by means of its institutionalisation and the attempt at its subordination into 
the state form, by so doing labour resistance was posited at the very heart of the state 
form. This peculiar relation between labour and the state made class struggle `political'. 
In what follows, the political, economic and social circumstances as well as the events of 
the 17'4 October 1945 are briefly sketched. Secondly, I address the production of this 
form (i. e. the moment of irruption, appropriation and recognition). Finally, I look into the 
constitution of the Peronist form, its main contradictions, and the elements of its initial 
crisis. 
I 
The 1930s and the 1940s: a Historical Background 
The Crisis of the 1930s 
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The international crisis of the 1930s impacted Argentina in two senses. First, the crisis 
of the export sector as the dynamic sector of the economy led to a slow but certain 
transition towards industrialisation via import substitution led by the conservative 
elite. Secondly, the 1930s brought about the first military putsch aiming to preserve 
the relations with British capital and control labour. 
The crash of 1929 diminished the demand for products and decreased agricultural 
prices in Europe. The fall-off in exports was accompanied by the transference of 
capital abroad (see Balsa 1994) Global production declined, and in 1932 national 
manufacture was barely working at 55% of the installed capacity. The crisis of 1930 
was solved nationally by adjusting the export economy by its combination with light 
industrialisation. Industrial development, led by the oligarchy and a military 
government , covered an empty space filled in the past by imported products, above 
all food and textiles (Murmis and Portantiero, 1974: 12 and 13). 
By 1940 increasing difficulties arose as how to locate exports abroad and this created 
uncertainty as to how to obtain enough foreign currency to import. The 1932 Roca - 
Runciman Pact, which attempted to preserve the export economy and the relations 
with Britain, greatly favoured British interests. The government needed to further 
promote import substitution to avoid the deterioration of the productive structure 
(Cirigliano, 1986) as well as the deficit in the balance of payments. 
In September, the Minister of Economics Pinedo announced a Plan of Economic 
Revival (never treated in Parliamentary sessions) which proposed new functions for 
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the state, hitherto unthinkable (see Lewis 1992, Diaz Alejandro 1970). 27 Pinedo 
argued that `the sate intervention was indispensable for private initiative won't do it' 
(Nuestro Siglo_no 5: 65). The plan proposed the encouragement of industry in 
branches which did not compete with those belonging to the countries who were the 
buyers of Argentine exports, by means of long-term credit and the use of national raw 
materials. It was to introduce exchange control, the creation of a Junta Reguladora de 
la Producciön and a plan of public works. Pinedo's proposal was rejected by the 
landed classes and financial capital and only supported by the UTA (Union Industrial 
Argentina) (Calelo, 1986; Cirigliano 1986). 28 
Labour 
In 1930, the Confederaciön General del Trabajo (CGT) was created as the unification 
of the socialist COA (Confederaciön Obrera Argentina) and the Anarcho-syndicalist 
USA. It represented only 200,000 workers out of 450,000. The CGT reaffirmed the 
Syndicalist principles of autonomy from political parties and ideological groups 
(Reinoso, 1987: 15; see Barrancos 1993), abandoned direct action and disclosed a 
quite defensive attitude. In 1931 a minimum programme demanding legal recognition 
for trade unions, paid holidays, rights to social security, workers' participation in 
controlling state agencies, mother and childhood protection, the creation of job 
agencies, the reform of `safety and risk at work' law and employment stability for 
state employees (del Campo 1983: 46; see Reinoso, 1987: 31). Yet, the government's 
response was repression. It 'denounced the minimum wage law, interrupted labor 
27 See detailed analysis in Alhadeff 1986. 
28 On industrialisation in Argentina see Schvartzer 1996,1990; Säbato, 1991. 
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meetings, instituted a system of labor spies, broke strikes by police action and made 
no effort to fulfil existing labor legislation' (Baily in Munck 1987: 108). 
The labour force for the expansion of the import-substitution industrial development 
was provided by internal migration from poor areas of the country to the cities in the 
middle of the 1930s (Munck 1987: 107). Yet, unemployment was high. By 1930,44% 
of the total of the unemployed were rural workers, and 37% industrial and transport 
workers. Half of the unemployed inhabited the capital city and Gran Buenos Aires. 
Whilst in rural areas more than `2 million agricultural workers lived in unspeakable 
conditions' (Lewis, 1992: 126), most workers and their families lived in urban 
conventillos. 29 Unemployment, poverty and repression made the level of workers' 
struggles low for the first two years of the military regime (del Campo 1983: 32). 
But labour struggles increased from 1934, this being evidenced by the increase in 
workers' unionisation and participation in trade union meetings and strikes. Between 
1930 and 1940 the PC had led the strike activity and represented the four largest trade 
unions: construction, meatpackers, textile and metallurgical workers (Munck 1987: 
111). Thus, the real issue at stake in 1940 was, for the government, the subordination 
of labour towards the achievement of stability. 
In response, the state shifted from pure repression towards some kind of authoritarian 
policy coupled with some sort of social justice (del Campo, 1983: 54). In 1935 the 
state changed its structure by creating the National Labour Department (DNT), 30 to 
regulate workers' industrial action. By 1942,90% of conflicts' resolutions had been 
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reached by DNT intervention. A proposal for the creation of the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security was considered, a system to determine wages was established in 
1937 and the `National Commission against Unemployment' was created in 1938. 
Although there is no agreement about the degree of industrialisation between 1930 
and the early 1940s (see Berqguist 1986; c. f. Ferns 1973), most commentators argue 
that the incipient process of industrial isation until 1943 reshaped workers' identity. A 
sense of nationality of the new Argentine-bom workers was coupled with a feeling of 
class and brought about the autonomy of syndicalism (see Waisman 1998). But the 
conviction and power of the labour movement's militancy and the growing strength of 
their struggles did not find any political expression. 
The working class was being produced but not recognised and incorporated into social 
life. Neither the dominant class nor the social democratic and radical political parties 
achieved an appropriate political form for representing workers. 31 In spite of the 
increasing state regulation of labour and the recognition of trade unions, the political 
regime remained elitist and corrupt. Intensive accumulation and industrialisation was 
accompanied by no income redistribution (Murmis and Portantiero, 1974). The CGT 
itself was a weak organisation. In 1943, it split into two32. Whilst CGT 1 (most of 
them railroad workers) held a neo-syndicalist attitude and aimed at the construction of 
29 Conventillos: old colonial houses where each family rented out one room. Different foreign tenants 
shared the common patio, kitchen and bathroom. 30 Later on transformed into the Secretaria de Trabajo y Prevision Social (SIPS) . 31 The UCR opposed the conservative landed and pro-British elite (see chapter one) but did not have an 
appeal for the new working class. The PS controlled many important unions (e. g. La Fraternidad, the drivers' and firemen's union within railroad companies, the UOEM (city council workers), the UT Transport Workers Union, and ATE (state employees) but did not influence the CGT leadership. The CP was hardly a `labour' party (del Campo, 1983: 61), which considered the CGT as pro-fascist, pro- 
overnment and only joined it in 1935 when the CP internationally adopted a popular front strategy. ' In 1940 a trade union census indicated that the CGT had 217 affiliated unions (61% of the total), the 
Union Sindical Argentina (USA) had 31 (9%) and there were 83 (23%) autonomous unions which had 
a pragmatic attitude, often co-operating with CGT. The communists controlled the construction, frigorificos (meatpackers) and metallurgical unions; the socialists commercial, municipal and state 
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a labour party, CGT no 2 insisted on the close relation between the labour movement 
and the PS and PC (see del Campo 1983: 102; Munck 1987: 117). All of them 
represented only 20% of the working class (James, 1988). So, by that year the trade 
union labour movement was divided into four central confederations: the anarchist 
Federacion Obrera Argentina (FORA), the syndicalist Union Sindical Argentina 
(USA), and the two CGT: CGT no I and CGT no 2, both of which were led by 
socialist leaders. 
1943: June Military 'Revolution' 
In 1943, the Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (GOU), the nationalist fraction of the military 
forces, took power (see Puigross, 1972). The GOU aimed to achieved political order, 
the control of labour and the repositioning of the country within the international post 
- war arrangement. The cut-off of American arms to Argentina during WWII renewed 
the army's conviction of the need to develop a national defence industry (Lewis, 
1992). Heavy industrialisation was resisted by capitalists linked to the ago-export 
sector of the economy. The GOU was determined to lead the process of national 
development. Generals Rawson and Ramirez seized control of the government and 
Colonel Peron was appointed as the vice-president. 
The military revolution held two opposed strategies towards labour. On the one hand, it 
aimed to disarm Socialist- Communist CGT no 2, considered the'extreme left', as well as 
directly control independent unions joining the CGT no 1, i. e. La Fraternidad (LF) and 
workers and footplatemen; the syndicalist dominated railroads and tram drivers' unions (Munck 
1987: 116). 
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the Union Ferroviaria, (UF) both railroad workers. 33 At the same time, a new Law of 
Professional Associations authorised state intervention in labour affairs. On the other 
hand, the military regime aimed to incorporate labour matters into the state. Whilst the 
former strategy was merely repressive, the latter strategy, led by Peron, suggested the 
convenience of the achievement of `an harmony among social forces.. . to prevent the re- 
emergence of communism after the mobilisation of workers produced by the war (Peron 
1944 in Cordone 1997: 14). 
The STPS encouraged the unionisation of workers and supported trade union activities 
and further organisation of workers through an extensive programme: the extension of 
the pension system, the creation of the Women's Labour Division within the STPS, 
social security and health system, the regulation of rural workers' work (el Estatuto del 
Peon de Canipo), wage increases in different branches of industry and services, housing 
policies, collective agreements for several unions, better labour conditions, built railway 
workers' hospital, the payment of state debts for many workers (del Campo 1983: 155), a 
project for a minimum wage, workers' participation and control on companies shares, 
which was being discussed in Parliament in 1945 (del Campo 1983). 
By 1944, the STPS was the object of a war between capital and labour as well as 
between the anti-labour fraction of the military regime and Peron. The struggle over the 
SIPS was, in fact, a struggle for and against the incorporation of labour into the state. On 
the one hand, capitalist organisations led by the UTA, Argentine Confederation of 
Commerce (CAC), Industry and Production Confederation (CACIP) and the SRA 
33 `Political intervention' is a tool that the national government can use to intervene in a local or 
provincial government in a situation of social chaos by sending an alternative authority for a 
determinate period of time till the situation returns to `normal'. Peron intervened in CGT to destroy 
opposition and impose his own candidates for the secretary of CGT. 
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fiercely opposed the STPS's new labour policy. On the other hand, the CGT officially 
supported the STPS to protect workers' economic rights and give guarantees to their 
industrial action (see Celiz in Torre, 1990: 99). 34 In April 1945, Peron took the side of 
labour and warned that workers' achievements were under threat and, if necessary, he 
would call for their mobilisation (del Campo 1983: 164). 35 
II 
The 17'x` October : Emergence, Recognition and Appropriation 
Renaissance 
In June 1945, capitalist organisations and political opposition confronted a massive 
trade union campaign in defence of the STPS and workers' rights. Street 
confrontations and severe repression led to an unstable situation deemed to end in an 
internal putsch. As a result, Peron was forced to resign his posts and confined. One 
week later, since the political atmosphere and circumstances were favourable, and 
after a hard discussion and voting (16 votes against 11), the trade unions called for a 
general strike on the 18 `h October. Railway workers as well as meatpackers, both 
0...,, 
, --ý--ý- i, ý.. 
linked to British industry and the 
focus of initial labour legislation 
from the STPS, had a great role in 
the organisation of the general 
strike (Nuestro Siglo no 12). 
However, union leaders did not 
34 Until May 1945, the STPS had already benefited 2,580,000 workers by means of 29 decrees, 319 
collective agreements and 174 conciliation agreements (del Campo, 1983: 166). 35 The last straw that contributed to this combative attitude was the STPS's favourable response to a 
meat-packers' strike in Avellaneda, Buenos Aires (see Nuestro Siglo 12: 179), 
ýaýýrraoý 
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demand explicitly Perön's liberation (Tone, 1995) but rather democratic rights and 
the maintenance of workers' and unions' achievements. However, on the 17`h 
October, anticipating the general strike, workers and their families mobilised in 
demand for the liberation of Colonel Peron. Many massive all-day carnivals (the most 
important being the Plaza de Mayo one) inundated the cities. Labour seemed to have 
conjured itself up out of capital. Labour became massively concrete and visible. It 
became political. 
Corporeality and Collective Joy: The Plaza Llena36 
The 17`h October asserted itself as `the violent and open presentation of a new human 
reality' which shocked the urban upper classes (Luna, 1982: 291 and 273). The event 
highlighted the struggle for access to public space, territoriality and corporeal 
recognition. Workers marched from the periphery of the city towards the centre, the 
latter being residential areas of the middle and upper classes (James 1995: 123). The 
class distinction between belonging to the city or to the periphery was revealed. What 
was hitherto a middle and upper class public space became a popular public space. 
There was no agreement as to who they were: lumpen proletariat, criminals, families, 
cabecitas negras37 or unionised and organised workers. The undefined subject was to 
be named as `the people' after its encounter with the `leader' (on this, Laclau 1977). 
Others considered the 17`h October as a moment of temporary subversion of the 
established order (Plotkin 1995: 181). That is, a moment of being in possession of 
one's own, and being oneself by means of articulating collective action with the 
36 The Full Square. 
37 The name black little heads is dismissive: it labels those workers with dark hair (different from those 
whose families were European) who came to the capital city from the interior of the country looking 
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others. In the memory of the workers, this day remains as a cheerful journey as well 
as a moment of disrespect for holy and patriotic symbols and existing ideologies (see 
James, 1995, several interviews with workers) 
The Pact 
The 17`h October can be seen as a political ritual, a `ritual of inversion' through which 
workers literally defined their social space from which they were excluded in the past. 
But the original ritual (the original myth, Neiburg 1995) was transformed into a 
`ritual of reinforcement', that is a ritual which reinforces the social classification of 
subjects by making clear each one's position (see Matta in Plotkin, 1995). The `ritual 
of inversion' transformed labour into a `recognised subject' with a specific form of 
existence. The `ritual of reinforcement' made the centrality of labour appear as 
derived from the institutional recognition of labour by the state. 
The massive demonstration in the Plaza de Mayo demanded Peron's presence. The 
colonel showed up at the balcony of the Casa Rosada and exclaimed: `Workers! ' The 
most significant aspect of Perön's improvised speech that night was its insignificance 
(de Ipola, 1995: 131). What followed was not a speech but a dialogue between the 
leader and the people. The dialogue established an implicit pact between them which 
would last for a long time, until it was deconstructed in the 1970s (see chapter 5). The 
people asked him `Where have you been? '. He answered: `I have been making a 
sacrifice which I would repeat a thousand times for you! ' But he also asked for unity 
between the people, the army and the police. He demanded that the people go on 
for a job during the 1930s and the 1940s and were argued to have given support to Peron for they were 
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strike the next day in order to celebrate that moment. The people celebrated that idea 
and claimed: `Tomorrow is Saint Peron, who is going to work? The patron! ' (Luna, 
1982: 292-297). 
Political Ritual and Appropriation 
Discourse political analyses suggest that through the dialogue with the people, Peron 
located himself at the `core of things' (Geertz in Plotkin 1995: 187) and by so doing 
he embodied the people's dreams and became the means of achievement of their 
needs. From then onwards, his word will be the voice of the people and the people 
will express themselves through the voice of the leader (de Ipola, 1995: 146; see 
Bakhtin in Plotkin, 1995: 187). 
The initial appropriation of the 171h October by the state was reproduced every year 
and embodied by the struggle around the meaning and the officialisation of the 17th 
October. In 1946 there were two celebrations: the official Loyalty Day, organised by 
CGT with the full support of the state, and The People's Day, organised by the unions 
in opposition (see Plotkin 1995: 194). Whilst the official celebration reformulated the 
event in a form in which Peron emerged as the most important actor, the non-official 
act aimed to recover workers' leading role by stressing the 17`h October as a workers' 
achievement. This struggle became even harder during 1947-49, when the Peronist 
doctrine was nationalised and resisted. 
basically illiterate and ignorant. 
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But the appropriation was not only symbolic. The immediate aftermath of the 1 ih 
October was Perön's liberation and the creation, a few months later, of the Partido 
Laborista (PL, Labour Party) by the trade union leaders. Peron obtained great support 
from railway (independent) and meatpacker workers' trade unions led by the 
communist FOIC (Federaciön Obreros de la Came). 38 The PL was born as an 
autonomous party to `allow workers to defend directly the achievements of the 
revolutionary government during these two and a half years' (El Laborista, 8.1.46: 4 
in Pont 1984: 38). 
In the general elections on 24th February 1946, the PL confronted the Union Democrätica 
(Democratic Unity, UD), which gathered all the rest of the political forces unified for 
different reasons against Perön's `Fascism', The election brought Colonel Peron into 
office with 54% of the vote. But after the general elections a progressive movement from 
Laborismo towards Peronismo started to develop (Cordone 1997: 21). The PL was 
dissolved by Peron himself after winning the elections and replaced by the Partido Unico 
de la Revoluciön Nacional (PURN) (Unique Party of National Revolution, later the 
Peronist Party). The unions' reaction to the dissolution of their own party in May 1946 
was fragmented: only a few of them protested against it (del Campo, 1983; Bunel, 1991; 
Reyes, 1984). 39 The dissolution of the PL by Peron indicated the institutional 
appropriation of the 17th October. 
38 The Union Ferroviaria awarded Peron with the name of First Worker in 1943. `The UF was the base of 
Peronism in the country ... 99% of the union leaders became Peronist (Nuestro Siglo no 12: 180-181) The UF leaders as well as meatpackers played an important role in the creation of the Labour Party. 39 Particularly Cipriano Reyes, a shop steward in the Berisso frigorificos played a major role in the 
organisation of the general strike, the mobilisation of workers and the creation of the Labour Party. He was imprisoned in 1948 and remained in jail until 1955. His testimonial book is titled I've made the '17`h October' (Yo hice el 17 de Octubre). 
III 
The Production of the Peronist Subjectivity 
The Reshaping of the State: The `Keynesian' Revolution 
1946-50 was a period of sustained growth. An extensive programme of nationalisation 
of railways (British and French), gas, part of central electricity generation, telephones 
and telecommunications, public transport, air transport, the Central Bank to regulate 
credit, as well as the merchant marine took place. At the same time, new national 
industries like the steel industry i. e. Fabricaciones Militures, the metallurgical 
factories of SOMISA and Zapla were created. The state apparatus itself grew 
siýgnmficantlý. 
Tý 
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The recomposition of the state 
included a shift in repositioning the 
country in international relations. A 
new philosophy, the doctrine of the 
a- '\ý VC 
Third Positron, aimed to develop a 
neutral and independent political 
position hetvween the United States' capitalism and the Soviet Union Communism 
after W\V2:: Veithor i unkee. c nor : 1lurxists: Peroni. ct., au (Paz in N, w. ctro Si 'hº no 5": 
139). 
Argentina followed the post \ý'ýý11 pattern: the belief in the benefits of a semi-closed 
economy with high wages. The government established a distributive dynamic on 
behalf of workers by means of the implementation of some Keynesian policies such 
as increase in productiv itv. egalitarian redistribution, expansion of credit to fiinance 
ni Yank is ni htarxista,: I'crcmista,! On this scc Ntunck R 1986 
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the wage increase; the expansion of public expenditure, and a fiscal deficit to maintain 
the level of activity (see Nuestro Siglo no 13: 194). As a result, during 1945-1950 
labour conditions improved. The purchasing capacity of the working class grew 
significantly from 1943. Workers had a wage increase of 50% over three years 
(Nuestro Siglo no 13: 196). 4' 
In order to establish the minimum wage according to the increase in the cost of living, 
the Instituto de Remuneraciones (Institute for Wages) was created in 1945. A Sueldo 
Annual Complementurio was introduced as a thirteenth month's wage received in two 
installments. The aguinaldo became part of the salary (Nuestro Siglo no 20: 85). In 
addition, rent freezes, low-cost housing, and the Eva Peron Social Aid Foundation 
helped the economic and social position 
of the lower classes. In 1944, the 
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in 1949 (Ntte. ctro Siglo no 20: 84). 
Labour Tribunals were established to deal with workers' legal labour problems. The 
tribunals did not only protect citizens as n'orrkerc against employers' abuse, but gave 
workers legal problems a new status (the labour code) and thus provided a clear sign 
that the state (the Ministry of Labour) was on their side. Social legislation was also 
ýý 
' Vý age's ot'skillerl industrial workers rose hN onk 27 percent, while those for unskilled labour wcnt UP 
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launched to protect rural workers, all workers against unfair dismissal, and change the 
collective bargaining system (Kreimer in Nuestro Siglo 20: 89). 
The Fundaciön Eva Peron was created in 1948. Evita became the institutional 
mediator for trade union demands and social needs. The Fundaciön was financially 
supported by private, state and workers' contributions. This institutionalised and 
legitimized charity, also contributed to public works in the area of health and 
education. Eva Peron became the voice and body of the shirtless, i. e. `the Robin Hood 
of the forties' (Tomas Eloy Martinez 1998a), and 
thus was adored by Peron, by most trade unionists 
and the left wing of Peronism (see Flores 1952). 
Workers' Identity and the Imagery Integration of 
the Working Class 
As previously suggested, Perön(ism) was not only a 
set of policies and material benefits for workers, but 
it entailed an adequate political meaning for labour 
practices and struggles based on everyday life social and labour practices. The 
integration of the proletariat into the system was not just an illusion but a real illusion 
based on different forms of social integration which hid the reality of domination and 
exploitation (Colombo 1993c; also Ansart 1993 ). 
The Peronist social imagery was not an ideological or cultural phenomenon but 
constitutive of subjectivity since it `articulated institutional arrangements and 
individual unconscious' (Castoriadis and Enriquez 1972 quoted by Colombo 1993c: 
by 39 percent. (Lewis 1992: 182). 
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175). Peronism was based on the productivity of the working class and the centrality 
of work as the social engine for economic development. But it also offered a network 
of meanings which were constitutive of and constituted by social practices. By linking 
together the notions of state, nation, development, progress, growth, wealth of the 
post WWII period, with workers' daily personal experience, the Peronist doctrine 
played a major role for the integration of the working class into this form. The 
doctrine of the Movimiento circumscribed progress and growth as depending upon 
workers' productivity within a framework of optimistic social inclusion. 
2 
Expressions such as vigour, strength, the people, enormous step, national recovery, to 
live better, euphoria are abundant in the literature, newspapers and political speeches 
of the time. Workers' identity was constituted in and against this imagery integration 
as an `existential place' (Martucelli and Svampa, 1997). As workers highlighted, 
`Peronism would impregnate everything that your parents could do or tell you at 
home 
... I don't know my life before Peronism' (interviews in Martucelli and 
Svampa, 
1997: 161). 
Peronism produced a simultaneously classist and non-classist form of workers' 
identity and ideology which absorbed left-ideologies and yet redefined workers' 
positions vis-ä-vis the oligarchy and imperialism. Thus, the class dimension of 
Peronism did not lie in its `classist ideology' but in the concrete form of the centrality 
and the political mobilisation of the working class (James 1988). The Peronist identity 
was based on the centrality of the working class, its political significance and the idea 
of the humanisation of capital. As Evita put it, 
42 See definitions of Justicialismo in Fernandez 1986. 
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`The fundamental goal of Justicialismo with regard to the labour movement is to 
make class struggle disappear and to substitute it with the co-operation between 
capital and labour. Justicialismo ... wants ... men to belong to only one class: that 
one of those who work' (Eva Peron 1952). 
Peron defined the labour movement as the spinal column of the Movimiento 
Justicialista now in power. The recognition of labour at the core of social relations 
allowed the unification of private and public and the political and the economic 
spheres into a distinctive form. On the one hand, the interests of the nation were 
assimilated to those of the workers, thus their lives and needs became the main 
concern of the state. Everyday workers' concerns were elevated to a public status. 
Workers' lives were politicised insofar as individual and collective efforts were 
regarded as the essential contribution to the improvement of the national economy and 
international position of Argentina. Going on strike became, in hard times, the lack of 
love for the country or for Peron himself. 
On the other hand, the centrality of labour made industrial action become a political 
(state) matter. At least during the first five years of Perön's rule, workers' struggles 
became struggles for the interest of the nation and thus the most important inputs for 
state policy making. The tight link between economic growth and social justice was 
mediated by a form of citizenship which relied, rather than on individual citizen's 
rights like in most European democracies, on social justice through the expansion of 
workers' rights. This meant a new role for the working class in society (James 1988: 
16) which called into question the distinction between political and economic rights. 
But workers' demands were organically organised through the labour movement. By 
equating rebellion with ignorance, Peron emphasised the importance of trade unions 
for the organisation of workers, negotiation with capitalists, pressure on the state and 
capitalists, the creation of institutions and obras sociales, and the defence of 
professional interests (Fernandez 1986: 82-83). To Peron, disorganised masses were 
problematic: the most dangerous mass was `the inorganic mass' (Peron in del Campo, 
1983: 15). 
The Transmission Belt: Trade Unions 
Trade unions were the site where the general assumptions of the doctrine were 
translated in the form of rank-and-file militancy, struggles and identity. Trade unions 
were indeed the `transmission belt' between the political movement and the daily 
working experience. Each organisation held its own identity regarding the branch of 
industry or services to which workers belonged. As far as each union managed health 
services and benefits, and provided a social life around the trade union, workers and 
their families identified with their job and speciality, as well as with their trade union. 
The political participation and influence of trade unions and the strong rank-and-file 
militancy allowed the development of a powerful working class. From the STPS, 
Peron had eliminated the two existing antidotes against bureaucratisation of the trade 
unions: voluntary affiliation and the possibility of co-existence between several 
organisations in each branch of industry (del Campo, 1983: 111). The Decree 23.852 
of 1945 privileged the existence of only one trade union in each branch of production. 
Its `personeria gremial' had to be recognised by the STPS Cordone 1993; Etala 
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1995) 43 In 1953, the law 14.250 on Professional Associations regulated collective 
bargaining and established that all workers are benefited by the results of a collective 
agreement (Etala, 1995: 5-6). 
The specific relationship between labour and the state gave trade unions political and 
financial power. Trade unions managed resources and participated fundamentally in 
their distribution (Bunel, 1991) and also defined political situations. The union 
leadership became engaged in the `electoral' and unions replaced Peronism as a 
political force and negotiated political agreements when the latter was prohibited. The 
CGT moved from being the transmission belt to the official voice of Peronism 
(Cordone 1997: 25). This made the class struggle between capital and labour take the 
form of a `political' struggle. As a result of this, a new type of trade union 
bureaucracy was consolidated, which would play a significant part against the 
increasing strength of the rank and file militancy, also consolidated under Peron 
(Munck with Falcon and Galitelli 1987: 143) 
The development of the labour movement was massive. Whilst in 1945 unionisation 
reached 528,523 workers, it was 1,532,925 in 1948,1,992,404 in 1950 and 2,256,580 
in 1954 (Cordone, 1997: 24). Between 1946-50 almost all trade unions went on strike 
to demand wage increases or to force the patronal to accept collective agreements. 
Until 1950, workers' strikes were not only a set of demands put in motion, but 
represented the national struggle against a dependent oligarchy who acted on behalf of 
foreign interests. The state was not the target of the strikers. But rather, they aimed to 
persuade the state to mediate between workers' and capitalists on behalf of workers 
43 The Law 23.852 constituted the basis for the structure of the Argentine model of trade unionism 
97 
(Nuestro Siglo no 12: 191). During 1940-1949 there was a marked increase in the 
participation of workers in strikes. Whilst in 1940-44 332 strikes were carried out 
with the participation of 75,067 strikers and 1,235.149 days lost, in 1945-49 there 
were 392 strikes with the participation of 1,226,835 strikers and 9,693,117 days lost, 
i. e. eight times greater (Munck with Falcon and Galitelli 1987: 135). 
A shift from the power of managers to the power of labour took place by means of the 
transformation of industrial relations in the workplace, and the development of workers' 
and trade unions' rights (James 1988). Employers developed several strategies to combat 
"`anti-social" work habits' such as the limitations to work force mobility, flexibility, 
discipline, and job demarcation regulated by the state (James 1988: 57). The struggle at 
the workplace allowed the constitution of a strong practice and ideas about the working 
class dignity against increasing exploitation towards productivity gains (James 1988). 
This rank and file militancy organised in the comisiones internas became `the backbone 
of future labour resurgences' against capital (Munck with Falcon and Galitelli 1987: 
143), as well as the union bureaucracy. 44 
Crisis and Contradictions (1949-1955) 
The Third Position in international relations as well as `Peron's Bonapartist ambition' 
(Munck with Falcon and Galitelli 1987: 137) reached its limits in 1949. Boundless 
credit was used by the Peronist government to subsidise industrialisation and wage 
increases. The aim was to produce a Keynesian virtuous circle and sustain the 
integration of the working class into the state. The industry developed under Peron 
(Etala 1995: 3) 
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was mainly light industry targeting consumption, but not heavy industry. This was not 
just a populist strategic mistake but based on the increasing difficulties for the 
government in producing an effective transference of resources from the ago export 
sector of the economy to the industrial sector without producing a deficit in the 
balance of payment in a context of unfavourable international conditions. 
The European nations who were helped by the Marshall Plan did not need Argentine 
export products. Argentina was losing its privileged position and in 1949 an economic 
crisis arose aggravated by two years of drought. By 1949, the United States of 
America held the presidency of the Organisation of American States and although 
Argentina had recomposed its commercial relations with Great Britain, now the 
interest in the British market was limited. Argentina was increasingly being 
subordinated to the United States of America (Nuestro Siglo no 5). 
In 1949-50, when Europe recovered from the war and the normalisation of food 
supply was re established, the Argentine external market was destabilised for exports 
were not sold. This was worsened by the losses produced by two bad harvests in 
1949-50 and 1950-52 due to the bad weather. In 1951 prices of exports dropped 
dramatically for the United States competed with Argentina (Paso 1987-2: 189), 
producing a negative balance of payments. Peron aimed to reduce current spending to 
solve the balance of payments problem and increasing inflation. 
In 1952 the working class, being recognised as a central force of social development , 
became the barrier for the further national development. The government launched an 
44 The comisiones internas are shop stewards committees constituted by representatives of different 
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Emergency Economic Plan to provoke an increase in productivity, and to encourage 
austerity in consumption and saving. There was also an urgent need to attract foreign 
capital. But these contradicted the main pillars on which the Peronist project was based: 
consumption, spending, high wages and economic sovereignty. 45 To negotiate with 
`imperial forces' and to control labour demands were now imperatives for the Peronist 
government. 
While real wages were falling slowly (Munck with Falcon and Galitelli 1987: 137), 
Peron called for more productivity and tried to make several agreements with the 
main unions to adjust public expenditure. The 1952 Economic Plan was to postpone 
the renewal of collective agreements, to increase productivity and to discourage 
consumption. The government promised a 2nd Plan Quinquenal through which the 
state would purchase the rest of the monopoly foreign companies, an carry out an 
agrarian reform, and tax reform (Paso 1987). 
The need to increase productivity by increasing workers exploitation, and reducing 
social benefits and legal rights found resistance at the work place, where the rank and 
file militancy became a barrier to the government's goals. In 1953, social discontent 
arose and partial strikes and collective protest against dismissals took place in the 
electricity, metallurgical, textile, meatpacking industries. The most important were the 
metallurgical strike which left 300 imprisoned workers subjected to a "internal state 
of war (Paso, 1987-2: 211-212), and the railway workers' strike led by the UF in 
1951. The latter `was declared illegal and placed the rail workers [Perön's great 
supporters] under military control' (Munck with Falcon and Galitelli 1987: 139). The 
sectors in the same workplace. 
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trade union leadership found difficulties in containing workers' and rank and file 
militants' demands. 
Concluding Remarks 
The 17th October marked a turning point in the subjectivity of labour. It embodied a 
moment of renaissance and political recognition of labour by the state. On the 17th 
October labour created Peronism and achieved a new form: the Peronist working class. I 
argued that the 17`h October constituted a moment of critical subjectivity wherein labour 
became corporeal and concrete. After October 1945, class distinctions and identities 
were renegotiated, social forms reshaped. It was argued that Peronism was not an 
institutional phenomenon but rather a particular form of class antagonism wherein the 
centrality of labour was institutionally recognised and integrated into the state, in light of 
the process of import substitution after WWII in Argentina. This was achieved by the 
social construction of a strong self-contained workers class identity and a powerful trade 
union movement. The power of this identity lay in that it became a form of existence. 
The power of the trade unions lay in the consolidation of a bureaucracy with political and 
financial power as well as the constitution of a radical rank and file militancy. 
The main contradiction within the form itself lay in that, whilst the recognition of the 
centrality of labour led to its institutionalisation and the attempt at its subordination into 
the state form, by so doing labour resistance was posited at the very heart of the state 
form. This peculiar relation between labour and the state made class struggle `political'. 
Economic crisis and political instability will be, from now onwards, associated with 
Peronism and the power of the working class. 
as On the latter, Fodor 1989 in Di Tella and Dornbusch Eds. 1989; Ferns 1973). 
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The chapter emphasised that the main characteristic of Peronism does not lie in its 
institutional expression as a form of the state, of industrialisation or of labour 
legislation, but rather in that it produced a very peculiar particular form of subjectivity 
of labour. The peculiarity of Peronism lay in that workers invented it (James 1988), 
as well as that it produced a peculiar form of subjectivity where the political became 
emotional, i. e. a sentimiento (a feeling). The constitutive emotional characteristic of 
Peronism was rooted in the political recognition of labour as the driving force of 
society by the state. The strength of the populist state was rooted in the power of the 
working class. But, as shown, this peculiar arrangement of the post-WWII period did 
not mean the end of class antagonism but a centrifugal form of it. The main 
contradiction of this form lay in that whilst the recognition of the centrality of the 
power of labour was achieved by means of the recomposition of the state in a way 
which it allowed its institutionalisation, the power of labour and resistance was 
posited at the heart of the state. This made class struggle `political'. Economic crisis 
and political instability will be, from now onwards, associated with Peronism and the 
power of the working class. This peculiarity made Peronism a very (if not the most) 
contested issue in Argentine Politics and made the Peronist subjectivity outlived 
Perön's period of time in power by a large margin. The central question for General 
Aramburu's dictatorial regime in 1955 was not just how to repress labour but, most 
importantly, how to deconstruct the Peronist form of subjectivity, i. e. to desperonizar 
labour (Tedesco 1999). But since the Peronist form organised all the dimensions of 
the capital relation in a particular form of being, the struggle for the deconstruction of 
the Peronist form would mark the following 45 years of struggle in Argentina. 
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Chapter Four 
The Anti-Imperialist. El Cordobazo, Rebellion and Expansion. 
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`Workers and students are being martyred 
by means of unemployment, poverty and 
political exclusion on behalf of the needs 
of the oligarchy and the monopolies... the 
executive general secretary of CGTA calls 
for a 24 hour general strike' (CGTA, Press 
release no 47,22"d May 1969). 
`We have reached the necessary maturity 
to understand the present problem; we 
don't want to be a frustrated 
generation... '(Manifesto Universidad 
Integralista Argentina and Union Nacional 
de Estudiantes, 21.5.69). 
a 
`Workers have the right to 
demonstrate against a policy 
that hit them, and fight to 
become the true protagonists of 
national development ... 
students have the right and the 
duty to fight for a university 
opened to the people and to the 
problems of the country, that 
becomes an agency for social 
change. We declare that we will 
be beside them in this process 
   of liberation' (Manifesto of the 
  Movement of the Priests for the 
Third World, pamphlet 
distributed between 16 and 20 May 1969). 
Under Ongania, kissing in public was 
forbidden. 
`The first task of a revolutionary regime 
would be to liquidate the power of 
imperial and monopoly capital in 
Argentina, by expropriations -under the 
control of the masses -that would open the 
door to socialism' (E. Laclau, 1970: 20) 
`My personal assessment, was that the 
economic policy had been largely 
successful' (J M Dagnino Pastore in di 
Tella G and Rodriguez Braun, C 1990: 
106-110) 
`The tragic events in Cordoba responded 
to an extremist organised force's action 
aiming to provoke urban insurrection' 
(General Ongania, message to the nation, 
4.6.69). 
In 1966, General Ongania assaulted the power of the state by means of a military putsch 
against president Ilia. The authoritarian regime concentrated power in the state as never 
before. Although the putsch was supported by the Peronist trade union bureaucracy, 
which regarded Ongania's corporatist project as beneficial, the `Argentine Revolution' 
aimed at the 'modernisation' of the economy on the basis of the suspension of political 
activity, the repression of union militancy and the worsening of workers' working and 
living conditions. By 1968, the rank and file militancy and renewed union leadership 
which had grown between 1955 and 1969 created the CGT de los Argentinos (CGTA). 
The CGTA gathered shop-floor stewards and workers, independent left-wing groups, 
artists and university students, and los Sacerdotes del Tercer Mundo (Third World 
Priests) to fight against the military regime and the bureaucracies within their own 
organisations. It provided the basis for the constitution and development of the 
Sindicalismo de Liberation (Liberation Trade Unionism) and gave the politics of 
resistance the status of a life style. On May 29Th and 30`h, a massive workers' and 
students 'protest leading to an unprecedented and spontaneous urban insurrection in the 
industrial city of Cordoba shook the country. The workers' protest turned into a popular 
rebellion at noon, and became an urban insurrection in the evening (Brennan in Tarcus 
1999). In the context of intensification and expansion of capitalist exploitation and 
ruthless repression, particularly unleashed against the labour and cultural worlds, the 
characteristics of the organisation (joint) and the massive participation of workers and 
students in the protest and the characteristics of the resistance made the Cordobazo 
signal a turning point for the constitution of a new form of trade unionism and class- 
oriented politics. 
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In this chapter, I address the process of class antagonism underpinning the struggle over 
the form of subjectivity disclosed after 1955 until 1969. I explore the Cordobazo as a 
moment of critical subjectivity located at `the intersection of two histories' since it was 
the highest point of the resistance initiated in 1955, as well as the beginning of the 
movement which would end up tragically in 1976 (Torre in Tarcus, 1999: 19). The period 
1955-69 was one of the struggle for and against the deconstruction of the centrality of the 
power of labour, achieved and consolidated under Peron. 
Section I addresses the period 1955-1958. The period was characterised by a dictatorial 
regime that sustained the reestablishment of the agro-export role of Argentina. This 
meant an attack on the nationalistic identity of the working class and its unions at both 
political and workplace levels. As a result, the workplace became the battle field for the 
state and managers' control over workers and the comisiones internas. Yet, the 
Revoluciön Libertadora helped the reshaping of subjectivity of labour into an even more 
combative form, called `la resistencia Peronista' (the Peronist resistance). 
Section II focuses on the period 1958-62. This period highlighted the emergence of the 
second phase of industrialisation via import substitution, which aimed for the 
development of heavy industry through the encouragement of transnational capital 
investments in key areas of the economy. The most significant contradiction of this 
period was the simultaneous need for the recognition and repression of the Peronist 
labour movement. This contradiction led to political and economic instability since 
capital and the military regarded the power of labour as a barrier to economic 
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development whereas labour regarded transnational and national capital and the military 
as their destructive enemy. In the light of this struggle, labour organisations shaped in 
two forms: `institutional pragmatism' (James 1988) (co-operation) and grass-roots 
resistance (anti-imperialism). 
Section III focuses on the period 1963-66. During this period, the union bureaucracy 
confronted the state's attempts to deconstruct their political power by means of 
legislation which restricted their action to the workplace. Unions did not support the UCR 
nationalistic struggle against transnational corporations. Rather, they joined transnational 
capital and supported a new putsch. 
Finally, section IV addresses the Ongania regime (1966-1969) as the immediate context 
within which the Cordobazo took place. This period evidenced the intensification of the 
real subsumption of labour under capital. This was accompanied by a political regime 
which for the first time subsumed the whole society under repression. But the expansion 
of repression supporting the intensification of capital-intensive methods of production by 
transnational capital helped the resistencia Peronista and other sectors of society (such as 
students and artists) to develop joint action against both imperialist capital and political 
repression. 
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I 
Deperonising Labour? The Resistencia Peronista (1955-58) 
The overthrow of President Peron in 1955 produced an euphoric disposition to nostalgia. 
As argued in chapter 3, the Emergency Economic Plan launched in 1952 provoked a 
quick increase in productivity, but undermined the pillars on which Peronism was based. 
The 1955 `Liberating Revolution' had two main goals. First `to abolish all the devices 
protecting the accumulation of national capital which had been erected in the epoch of 
import substitution'. Secondly, `to establish a new economic policy whose principal 
beneficiary would be the agricultural sector, and within this, the land-owing class' 
(Laclau 1970: 4). 
This major change in the balance of power of the capitalist class responded to a new shift 
from industrialisation via import substitution towards the opening of the economy and the 
penetration of foreign investments (large-scale North American monopoly capital) 
directed towards the basic productive sectors suffered by most Latin American countries. 
Since in Argentina the traditional alliance between imperialist capital and the local 
oligarchy of the beginning of the twentieth Century did not work any longer, due to the 
lack of `modernisation' of those sectors for new markets, monopoly capital attempted to 
developed itself by implementing the necessary structural reforms in those countries 
(Laclau, 1970). The pressure from capital led to the transformation of the state and 
politics, as well as forcing the restructuring of the work place. 
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In 1955 Peronism was a form of existence. General Lonardi, the catholic nationalist head 
of the 1955 putsch, was unable to harness labour by proposing a Peronism without Peron 
owing mainly to the rank-and-file resistance which strongly defended Peronism as an 
existential place (Martucelli and Svampa, 1997) and opposed the military regime. As a 
result, a putsch within the putsch gave the conservative wing of the Armed Forces, 
represented by General Aramburu and Admiral Rojas, the command of the `liberating 
revolution'. The new military coalition did not aim at the incorporation of the labour 
movement into the state, since Peronism was considered `a bad dream that had to be 
exorcised from the minds of those enthralled by it' (James, 1988: 54). 
The labour policy of the military regime consisted of the legal proscription of union 
activity, the repression and intimidation of grass-roots union organisation and rank and 
file activists and the rationalisation of production by means of increased productivity, 
holding back wages and the suspension of the collective bargaining system (James, 1988: 
54-55/68). 
New legislation aimed to break the power of trade unions by guaranteeing minority 
representation and allowing plural representation in a single industry (Lewis 1992: 229), 
and by giving all power to managers to implement the rationalisation of the labour 
process towards improvement of productivity, the latter becoming increasingly important 
in the light of heavy industrialisation (James 1988). The Decree 2739/56 `became the 
employers' bible', for it allowed labour mobility within the factory, special agreements 
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concerning new production systems and wages tied to productivity (James, 1988: 61-2; 
Cordone 1999: 34). 
The employers' strategies aimed at eliminating incentive schemes and regulatory clauses 
in the collective agreements of 1946 and 1948 tending to regulate working conditions. 
But their main concern was the working class's culture and its values of social justice, 
which had become a barrier to the imposition of discipline. This culture was related to the 
self-confidence and resistance to managers' prerogatives at the work place, expressed 
through the real power of the comisiones internas (workers' committees, committee 
d'enterprise) in controlling the labour process. 
The resistencia Peronista was born at the workplace to preserve workers' dignity against 
managers' attacks on the labour-culture-practice and the imposition of a discipline which 
undermined the Peronist notion of the humanisation of capital and co-operation. But the 
resistencia Peronista, organised through semi-clandestine groups (unofficial 
committees), also confronted the power of the union bureaucracy: 
`[It was] an embryonic and gradual process which arose from the very roots of the labour movement and which was not dominated by the old bureaucrats but neither did it install a fixed leadership either locally or nationally.... we were a little like islands' (Belloni, 1974 in James 1988: 64) 
Comandos engaged in everyday sabotage and bombing with canos (handmade bombs) 
against the military. Although the comandos accepted the significance of trade unions if 
they served the cause of revolution, their strategy of direct clandestine action accelerated 
the contradictions within Peronism. This process resulted in the institutional separation 
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between the bureaucracy and radical grass-roots resistance. On the one hand, the 62 
Organisations (Las 62 Organizaciones Peronistas, 620) created in 1957, reaffirmed the 
Peronist doctrine in its institutional power and provided a renewed organisation and legal 
status to Peronist trade unionism post 1955 46 On the other hand, the rank-and-file 
militancy organised in comandos structured a counter-discourse based on the pride of 
being workers and the political significance of the working class. Rather than super- 
structural negotiation, the coniandos were a `strange mixture of anarcho-syndicalism, 
Marxist economics and personal devotion to Peron' (James 1988: 93). They advocated 
direct confrontation with employers and with the enemies of the working class (James 
1988: 91) and were argued to be political organisations (Goldar, 1985). This grass-roots 
militancy developed a class-based ideology which was matched by the political 
radicalisation of the middle classes, particularly university students. In the context of the 
revolutionary atmosphere of the 1960s, this development helped the weakening of the 
historical antagonism between the political left and labour militancy: `the new working 
class began its political initiation outside both the democratic traditions of the middle 
classes and the internationalist traditions of the socialist movement' (Laclau, 1970: 13). 
II 
Recognition and Repression (1958-63) 
A deal with Peron from Madrid, in exchange for the promise of the recognition of trade 
unions and the suspension of the political prohibition of Peronism as a political force, 
gave Frondizi the Peronist vote to win elections in 1958. Frondizi allowed trade unions to 
46 There were in 1957, as a result of the reorganisation of the labour movement, four main groupings: the CGT Unica e Intransigente, the Comando Sindical, the CGT Negra and the CGT, all with `very little 
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function, yet the Peronist party remained banned from political participation until 1962. 
The economic strategy of the new government conformed to the second phase of 
substitutive industrialisation leading to the strengthening of the predominance of foreign 
capital in industrial production (Azpiazu et al 1988). 
Under a nationalistic discourse, the government opened the economy by encouraging 
foreign investments and introducing modem technology (on this see Lewis 1992; see 
Frigerio in di Tella and Rodriguez Braun, 1990). New legislation favoured transnational 
corporations, particularly those related to oil production, who form now onwards were 
going to be treated as a national partner (Calello and Parcero 1984, vol. 1). 
Some `concessions' to the unions were given too. In 1958, the Law 14,455 of 
Professional Associations gave unions back the legal recognition of only one union 
(sindicato iinico) with bargaining rights in any one industry. The law distinguished three 
levels of union organisation and structure: first degree, trade unions (workers of same 
trade or area of industry); second degree, federations grouping together first degree 
unions from various provinces; third level, the confederations grouping different 
federations (James, 1988: 166). 47 Alongside the already centralised union system, it 
authorised the retention of union dues on behalf of the unions by employers (James, 
1988: 106). 
influence over the Peronist rank and file' (James 1988: 73). 47 See the struggle for and against this law in chapters 5,6 and 8. 
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This Law must be seen as the crystallisation of a struggle of the labour movement which 
also matched the ideology of Developmentalism (Desarrolismo). Frondizi's 
Desarrolismo was a new form of the state which aimed to recognise labour but adapt 
social relations to the new forms of capital. It was a version of nationalism which 
considered foreign capital under the strict control of the state to be an essential ingredient 
for national development, and which also emphasised the feasibility of the humanisation 
of capital around the notion of the common good. 
The control of labour resistance was crucial to achieve stability to convince transnational 
capital and its local partners to invest in the country. 48 After the Cuban revolution, the 
circulation and allocation of transnational capital into the main sectors of the national 
economy was accompanied by the spread of the international doctrine of anti- 
communism led by the United States of America, the main investor in Argentina. As 
highlighted, `potential investors were resentful of Argentina's militant labor unions and 
feared what might happen if Peron ever returned to power' (Lewis 1992: 365). In the 
Productivity Congress held in 1959, employers decided that the comisiones internas were 
a barrier to the rationalisation of the labour process (Munck with Falcon and Galitelli 
1987: 154-5). At the end of the 1960s, private entrepreneurs refused to invest in 
Argentina's economy: a `strike by capital' (Lewis 1992: 365). 
At the end of 1958, the crisis in the balance sheet and increasing inflation led the 
government to launch a stabilisation plan to achieve fiscal equilibrium. An agreement 
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with the IMF aimed to stop inflation and a stand-by credit obliged the Argentine 
government to devalue the peso, restrict the fiscal deficit and eliminate price control, but 
above all to reduce salaries below the level of prices. As a result wages were reduced by 
25 per cent, and the GDP fell by 6.44 per cent (di Tella and Rodriguez Braun 1990: 9). 
As a result, the year 1959 showed the highest point in the history of the working-class 
struggle. Around 1.5 million workers went out on strike and around ten million days were 
lost in strikes (Munck with Falcon and Galitelli 1987: 152; Cordone 1999). Most of those 
strikes and factory occupation were organised by the resistencia Peronista against the 
rationalisation of the labour process imposed by employers by means of arrangements 
with the unions which restricted the power of the comisiones internas, and privatisation, 
considered by radical militants as the penetration of imperialist capital into the national 
economy. 49 
As a response, in 1960, the Plan CONINTES (Commission Against Internal Upheavals) 
put the repression of unions' activity in the hands of the military forces. The plan was the 
result of military pressure on the democratic government to control the working class. 
Much of the endless questioning to Frondizi's government by the military (seven between 
January 1959 and April 1961) was due to its relationship with the Peronist trade unions, 
the powerful law 14,455 and the difficulties of controlling the workplace and the 
clandestine action of its militants. 
4 'Foreign capital US investment alone increased from U$S 350 million by 1950 to USS 472 million in 1960 and then jumped to U$S 992 million in 1965' (Munck with Falcon and Galitelli 1987: 154). 
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The implementation of the plan CONINTES increased shop-floor resistance and 
deepened the existing distance between grass-root militancy and the burocracia sindical, 
trapped in the logic of `institutional pragmatism' based on the constraint imposed by their 
need for financial resources (James 1988: 130). Yet, repression coupled with the 
consolidation of union bureaucracy led to the triumph of managers over workers. 
Working conditions worsened. Changes in the procedures in the forms of control of the 
labour process by the comisiones internas (see James, 1988: 140) as well as payment-by- 
result piecework schemes coupled with the persecution of militants shifted the power 
balance at the work place. 
Although Desarrollisn: o policies made steel production increase sevenfold between 1954 
and 1965, industrialisation via import substitution found new restrictions to its expansion 
to new branches. Imports were still important. The foreign exchange bottleneck produced 
inflation. This was attempted to be solved through increased agro exports to achieve 
balance. Devaluation followed to increase the value of exports. Devaluation and inflation 
affected wages and the living standards of the working class worsened (James 1988: 164) 
Although labour was repressed, by 1962 the economic crisis deepened. 
In March 1962, the union bureaucracy demonstrated its political strength by achieving a 
remarkable social mobilisation and popular agitation during the organisation of the 
Peronist electoral campaign. Dressed up as the Frente Nacional y Popular, Peronism won 
49 The most striking of all was the strike at the meat packing company Lisandro de la Torre, see James 
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in 11 out of 24 provinces in the local and provincial elections of March 1962. Yet, 
elections were annulled due to military pressure on the government. A 24-hour general 
strike followed, mainly in industry and transport. An internal upheaval within the military 
forces between Azules (Blues) and Colorados (Reds) was resolved in favour of the Azules 
liberals, who demanded President Frondizi's resignation. 
III 
Transnational Corporations and Union Bureaucracy: 
The Fate of Democracy (1963-1966) 
Under president Illia the labour `problem' took a political form. In 1963, the UCR del 
pueblo won the general elections with only 25% of the vote, insofar as the Peronist party 
was banned and then Peronists opted for a blank ballot following Perön's order delivered 
from Madrid. The new government was, to some extent, more nationalistic than the 
previous ones (Lewis 1992; di Tella and Rodriguez Braun 1990). On the one hand, 
president Illia cancelled the oil contracts with foreign companies reached by Frondizi, 
considering them illegal. This was a key issue to put the United States of America against 
the government. An anti-foreign law of medicaments put the transnational corporations 
against Illia. The very national- oriented economic policy faced WB and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) pressure. On the other hand, whilst wages and pensions increased, 
the government attempted to deconstruct the power of the burocracia sindical. Decree 
969 comprised a new regulation of the LPA which `prohibited all acts of proselytism or 
ideological propaganda on the part of unions' (James 1988: 193). In response, the leader 
of the 62 0 and UOM (Union Obrera Metalürgica, metallurgic workers union) Augusto 
1988: 114-115; Munck with Falcon and Galitelli 1987: 152. 
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Vandor unleashed a war against President Illia. Due to the economic crisis and the attack 
on trade union power, over a five-week period 11,000 factories were occupied by nearly 
4 million workers in 1964 (Munck with Falcon and Galitelli 1987: 158). 
The Peronist trade union movement was being reshaped in the light of the transformation 
of capital and the state's attempts to deconstruct the centrality of labour since 1955. 
Vandor advocated the political independence of the CGT from Peron (see McGuire, 
1997). His strategy, called Vandor(ism), was based on `autocratic methods to consolidate 
the tough line of hit and negotiate and to regulate the internal life of unions' and control 
opposition by means of the use of matones (thugs or enforcers) to intimidate and 
persuade workers and militants (James 1988; c. f. Munck with Falcon and Galitelli 1987). 
This form of unionism developed particularly within the UOM and the 62 O. Vandor's 
project comprised the creation of a partido obrero (workers party) which avoided both 
abject collaborationism and the tremendismo guerrillerista (James 1988: 197). 
Two fractions of the labour movement opposed Vandor's project. On the one hand, the 
linea dura (tough line) attempted to maintain the `true essence of Peronism' and 
regarded Vandorism as a betrayal of all the sacrifices made before the 1962 resistance 
era. On the other hand, the MRP (Movie lento Revolucionario Peronista), encouraged 
by Peron from exile, identified themselves as the left (James 1988). This new left, 
represented by John William Cooke, revived the anti-imperialist attitude against the 
`oligarchy' and the bureaucrats and advocated `guerrilla warfare, armed in all its many 
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ideological variants, [which] offered to these militants a solution to this dilemma' 
(James, 1988: 211). 
IV 
Prelude to the Cordoba Barricades (1966-69) 
In 1966, the liberal democratic form of the state was unsustainable. That year, General 
Ongania reached power with the support of transnational corporations, the national 
capitalist class, andthe union bureaucracy. It was the first time that the state concentrated 
all its power to defeat labour (James 1988). The new bureaucratic-authoritarian state 
(O'Donnell 1988) marked another moment of political `instability' and terror as the 
means to achieve stability. It was the first time that the whole society was under the 
repression of the state. 50 Political terror and the intensification of the real subsumption of 
labour under capital, by means of the introduction of advanced technology and capital- 
intensive methods of production sustained by foreign investment affected not only the 
working class but subsumed social development under the rules of capital and terror. 
Thus, `dissatisfaction with economic policy coupled with repression extended towards a 
more civil opposition against repression' (James 1988: 221). It would be also the first 
time that the whole society confronts the power of capital and the state. 
Industrialisation and technological development led to further steps in the process of real 
subsumption of labour under capital (see Munck et al, 1987: 155). In the last years there 
so Le. the suspension of political activity, collective bargaining, the intervention in universities and 
persecution of artists and intellectuals, restructuring plans in state-owned companies as well as frozen 
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has been a shift from labour to capital-intensive methods of production. As a result of 
foreign investment from multinational corporations, technological development increased 
in dynamic industries such as iron, steel, chemicals, petroleum derivatives, rubber, 
automobiles, ad machine building (Lewis, 1992: 299-298). The number of establishments 
and workers had grown from 148,371 and 1,217,844 in 1954 to 190,892 and 1,370,483 
respectively in 1964. 
The contradictions within the CGT toward Ongania's regime led the union bureaucracy 
to enter a deep crisis. On the one hand, the union leadership lacked the support form the 
rank and file militants, engaged in more radical forms of struggle (see James 1988). On 
the other hand, the government limited industrial disputes. Law 16.936 of 1966 
empowered the executive to decide on the solution of a labour conflict. The Law also 
allowed compulsory arbitration in solving industrial disputes. Another Law, 17.183, 
allowed the executive to dismiss state workers on strike without dismissal compensation 
(Cordone 1999: 52-54). 
.:: 
' Fr ýr i'. m. fi t--, ' 
r rý 
Y it However, the 
concentration of industry 
in some areas of the 
country had led to a 
change in the social 
composition of the working class and therefore to a reshaping of identity and the 
strengthening of their local trade union organisations. Cordoba became the automobile 
wages, mass dismissals, changes in pension and dismissal compensation systems, and the suspension of 
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industry paradise where IKA (Industrias Kaiser Argentina), later the IKA - Renault, and 
FIAT grew in a short period of time. Unions became stronger in those branches too. In 
Cordoba SMATA (Sindicato Metalmecänicos), the light and power union (Luz y Fuerza, 
LY F), UTA (Tranviarios del Automotor) and UOM (Metallurgical). 
Krieger Vasena launched a `normalisation program' which entailed, among other 
measures, `the devaluation of the peso to a rate of 350 to the U. S. dollar (a 40% drop)', 
liberalisation of the currency market and cuts in public expenditure. These policies were 
approved by the bourgeoisie and foreign actors, confirmed by the approval of the IMF 
stand-by loan of $125 million `which opened the way for new credits from a consortium 
of European banks... United States banks.. . and the United States Treasury (O'Donnell, 
1988: 85). The unpopularity of the economic policy, coupled with persecution and 
repression, increased the general unrest. 
Some months after the military putsch, the CGT called for a 24-hour general strike. 
Although it was successful, the struggle did not continue due to the contradictions within 
CGT. On the 22"d February 1967, under the pressure of the local branches another 
general strike was organised by CGT. Repression was strong. Trade union leaders 
considered the strike a failure. They were paralysed. The light and power union in 
Cordoba demanded a Plan de Acciön and positioned itself in clear opposition to the 
government's economic plan (see Tosco in Lanot 1984: 42-43) 
democratic rights. 
119 
In 1968, a split within CGT created a new pole of opposition: The CGTA, led by the print 
workers' Raimundo Ongaro, the CGTA became the site for opposition against the 
dictatorship, imperialist capital and the trade union bureaucracy (burocracia sindical), the 
latter personified by Augusto Vandor. The CGTA proposed the renewal of trade 
unionism (Sindicalismo de Liberation) and gathered some sectors of the working class, 
grass-root militants, students, intellectuals and artists. Facing repression in an 
international atmosphere of revolution and protest, university students were highly 
mobilised through the Federation Universitaria Argentina (FUA). Ongania's regime was 
particularly hard with the public university. Students organisation joined social struggles 
against repression particularly after the murder of Santiago Pampillön by the police 
during students' protests in 1966. Also artists and cultural institutes, i. e. the Instituto di 
Tella in Buenos Aires, the portena and Rosario vanguard of artists and the Asociaciön 
Argentina de Adores (The Argentine Actors' Association) accompanied workers' and 
students' resistance against repression (see Sigal in Longoni 1999: 37; 1998). Finally, the 
movement of Priests for the Third World embracing the Teologia de la Liberation 
(Liberation Theology) was constituted in the Episcopal Conference held at Medellin in 
1968. 
In Cordoba, resistance was led by a group called the independents within the CGTA, led 
by Agustin Tosco, a man with `Marxist roots' (Tosco in Lanot 1984(ed): 245), 51 the 
president of the local branch of the light and power union (Luz y Fuerza). When CGTA 
was created, the Cordoba branch of light and power union led by Tosco disaffiliated from 
120 
the orthodox Peronist Federation de Luz y Fuerza and joined the CGTA. The CGTA was 
for him the CGT of rebellion. The Sindicalismo de Liberation advocated a political role 
for trade unions, i. e. unions would bring a solution to the immediate problems at the 
workplace but also fought against the `international imperialism of money' (Tosco in 
Lanot 1984: 14-15): 
`Although all of us were Peronists, our group had inclinations towards 
ýý"/'571 46 '`k= "` "'i Socialism... We lived at the end of the 
Peronist era, with the great metallurgical 
workers' and sugar cane workers' 
strikes.. . the first generation of Peronists 
... were the most grateful 
but the `kids' were 
more rebellious. That generation's divisions 
were reproduced within the national CGT 
where, although the orthodox Peronist 
tendency predominated, one could see at the 
same time another rebellious stream under 
John William Cooke's influence... in our 
union we represented a new dynamic and 
renovating stream-the generation of 1953 
opposed bureaucracy in the union, advocated a kind of revolutionary 
nationalism, the union had to give more' (Tosco in Winter 1984: 4). 
Three episodes inflamed the tense atmosphere in Cordoba in May 1969. First, workers 
the metallurgical mechanics' trade union SMATA went on 24-hour strike against the 
companies' refusal to suspend the quitas zonales (the employers' right to decrease wages 
according to the area of work beyond the collective agreements). Secondly, metallurgical 
workers joining the UOM went on 48-hour strike against the provincial government's 
proposal of eliminating the säbado ingles, which allowed them to work half a day on 
Saturdays. Finally, workers belonging to the transport union UTA had been on strike and 
51 `Frente a Frente, Agustin Tosco y Jose Rucci en Las dos campanas, TV programme 16.2.73 in Lanot 
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planned further action. The CGTA endorsed those strikes and decided a joint action with 
the Cordoba branch of the FUA. 
On the 16`h May both CGT and the CGTA called for a general strike. Demonstrations and 
strikes spread in Corrientes and Rosario too. During a students' protest against the 
assassination of the student Pampillön, Juan Jose Cabral was murdered in Rosario. As a 
response, the University closed and the students demonstrated in a joint struggle with the 
unions. On the 18`h May another student, Adolfo Bello, was shot dead. A silent March 
joined by the Priests of the Third World took place. Regarding the situation, the CGTA 
called for the constitution of a workers - students committee and called for a joint protest 
on May 21 as well as for a general strike on May 23. Struggles spread in Rosario, La 
Plata, Tucuman, Salta, Corrientes, Chaco and also Buenos Aires, where a demonstration 
on May 20th had resulted in 20 injured and 160 detentions. Tosco was detained for one 
day. 
As a response, both the CGT and 
the CGTA launched a national 
plan de lucha which comprised a 
37-hours general strike on 29`h 
with mobilisation in the main 
squares of the country. On May 
1984 (ed) 
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21" there was a student national general strike. The student Norberto Blanco was 
murdered in Rosario. Students created War Councils. On the 22nd May the students of the 
Catholic University declared a permanent assembly and were supported by students 
across the country. On the 23`d May, clashes with the police started on the streets of 
Cordoba. During the massive demonstration of May 29th, Maximo Mena a worker in the 
IKA-Renault car factory, was shot dead by the police. Following this, the city was 
occupied by barricades resisting the repression of the police troops, which were forced to 
retreat. The general strike of the 30`h May was massive, yet the city was, this time, 
occupied by the army special forces. There were about twenty or thirty dead and five 
hundred injured. Around 300 leaders, workers and students were taken prisoner and 
condemned to years of incarceration. 52 The Cordobazo resulted in the discredit of the 
provincial and national governments: resignation of the governor and of the whole 
national cabinet followed. On 30`h June of 1969, Vandor, the epitome of bureaucracy, 
was assassinated. The dictatorial regime collapsed only one year after. 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter explored the 
Cordobazo as a form of 
subjectivity which emerged out of 
the transformation of capital, 
52 Tosco was condemned to 8 years and three months. He walked free one year after due to the protests and 
strikes (Lusardi, 1997) but was incarcerated again in 1970 and latter on he went into hiding until he died in 
1975 from a brain infectious disease. 
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labour and the state during 1955-69. The period under consideration was marked by the 
increasing penetration and expansion of transnational capital in the country's economy as 
well as an increasing imposition of the United States of America in political matters. 
During this period, the state achieved democratic and dictatorial forms produced by the 
capitalist struggle over the form of subjectivity, which in this case meant the 
deperonisation of the working class. The economic and political instability of the period 
is characterised by the attempt to harness the radicalisation of grass-root militants at the 
work place as well as the union bureaucracy's political influence. The expansion of 
capital's command over and the intensification of repression also expanded resistance to 
other social sectors which joined the working class against imperialist capital. 
The struggle highlighted some significant novelties with regards to the 17'ti October 
which developed between 1955 and 1969 and became visible in the Cordobazo. First, the 
existence of a consolidated and combative industrial working class explicitly determined 
to fight imperialism. Secondly, a labour movement divided into the bureaucratic 
leadership and radical grass roots resistance. Thirdly, the unity between workers, students 
and the whole society against a common enemy broke the dichotomy labour movement 
versus university students entrenched by the Peronist doctrine, gathered the CGTA which 
maintained fragmented resistance alive, allowed grass root-militancy to become political 
and made possible the broad co-operation among different social groups and the working 
class. 
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The Cordobazo recaptured the ritual and expansive corporeality of the 17`h of October but 
pushed it forward. The anti-institutional and anti-capitalist spirit or Anarchist labour, 
seemingly superseded by the Peronist form, was put in motion again but this time by a 
new non-bureaucratic and anti-imperialist political movement with a nationalistic class- 
oriented ideology that was to become central to the Argentine politics during the 1970s. 
On 25th May 1970, also one year after the Cordobazo, General Aramburu, the military 
leader of the `Liberating Revolution' that sent Peron to exile for 18 years, was kidnapped 
and assassinated by the Montoneros. In a press conference where they vindicated the 
murder, the guerrilla group which labelled itself as the Soldiers of Peron appeared for the 
first time in public. Together with other radical guerrilla organisations which constituted 
the New Left (Hilb and Lutsky 1984), they believed that armed class struggle was the 
means to recover and extend the meaning of the 17`h October towards a socialist Peronist 
revolution. Their action led to the final return of Peron to power in 1973. 
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Chapter Five 
The Revolutionary. Ezeiza, Insurrection and Physical Disappearance 
I 
I 
In 1972, I was attending 
my first year of high 
school. One morning, I 
was asked by some mates 
attending their third year, 
to go to the patio for one 
minute of silence. So I did. 
It was an homage to those 
16 guerrilleros who had 
i - PATRIA () MIIFQTF 
`Those who are not with those interests, can 
take the 'camiseta' (vest) off and go... we 
need discipline. If discipline is lost, we are 
all lost' (J. D. Perön to the Peronist Youth 
Parliament Deputies', 1974 in La Republica 
Perdida I) 
'It was an experience of power. But power 
as creation, as imagination, as production of 
culture' (in Caadores de Utopias) 
'A terrorist is not just someone with a gun or 
bomb, but also someone who spreads ideas 
that are contrary to Western and Christian 
civilisation' (General Videla to The Times, 
4.1.78, London). 
just been killed in Trelew. 
On the 22nd of August 
1972, they were shot in the 
war maritime base 
Almirante Zar. According 
to the military report 
'when trying to escape'. 
The truth was that the 
guerrilleros had 
surrendered without resistance and they 
died in the firing squad. This act caused 
indignation and grief. Homages were 
massive throughout the country. One of the 
leaders of the Montoneros explained not 
long ago that Trelew was his first 
experience of death. hfy mates (those who 
organised the homage at the school patio) 
were disappeared by the military 
government. Trelew was, perhaps, my first 
experience of death too. It opened my eyes to 
the meaning of subversion. 
'Che' Guevara was like Evita' (Cazadores 
de Utopias) 
On 29'h of May 1970, on the first anniversary of the Cordobazo, the guerrilla group 
Montoneros publicly declared themselves to be responsible for the Operaciön 
Pindapoy which successfully kidnapped and murdered General Pedro E. Aramburu, 
the perpetrator of the military putsch against Peron in 1955 and the epitome of anti- 
Peronism. Peron celebrated this action from Madrid. After the reinvention of the 
populist state in 1973, they obtained massive support from the Peronist youth and 
moved from anti-imperialism to anti-capitalism, by emphasising the revolutionary 
potentiality of Peronism, and pushing it to its limits. In 1973 Peron was returned to 
the country after 17 years of exile in Madrid. Montoneros were in charge of the 
'return operation. A popular celebration was organised in Ezeiza to receive the 
leader. 
The party ended up in a tragedy. Demonstrators expecting Perön's arrival were shot 
from the platform set for Perön's speech by the special forces belonging to the right 
wing of Peronism. Ezeiza embodied the explosion of '30 year old contradictions' 
within Peronism (Verbitsky: 1995: 13) and marked the beginning of the direct 
struggle to expel revolutionary Peronism from the movement. On May I st 1974, these 
contradictions intensified. Montoneros were pushed out of Peronism by Peron. They 
radical left left half of the Plaza de Mayo empty and entered into clandestine action. 
After this symbolic action which broke the pact between labour and the state, state 
terrorism began to take shape. Montoneros as well as the Peronist Youth and left- 
wing militants were physically disappeared. With them, revolutionary projects 
disappeared from Argentine politics too. 
In this chapter, I explore the guerrilla group Montoneros, a subjectivity emerging out 
of the radicalisation of politics after the Cordobazo. The Soldiers of Perön mastered 
all guerrilla groups searching for Socialism, to become the protagonists of Argentine 
politics from 1970 until 1976. Their creators having nationalist and catholic roots, 
Montoneros constituted a highly militarised organisation which conceived politics as 
a war, and postulated foquismo as the best strategy to defeat imperialist monopoly 
capital and its armed arm, the military forces. The debacle of Montoneros is usually 
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attributed to their `cult of death', the (ab)use of violence (Wainfeld and Natanson 
1996; Hilb and Lutsky 1984) and to its elitist, bureaucratic and arrogant leadership 
who miscalculated the Peronist potentiality for revolution (Gillespie, 1982; Geze and 
Labrouse 1975, Giusani, 1984 and Calletti 1979 in Hilb and Lutzky 1984). This 
chapter shall not assess the Montoneros' political or military strategies although they 
constitute an important dimension of the phenomenon that I aim to recapture 53 I shall 
rather explore the emergence, contradictory development and final crisis of the 
Montoneros within the recomposition of the capitalist social relations during the first 
half of the 1970s. 
I will show that Montoneros developed as part of the radicalisation of Argentine 
society in the 1970s (Oilier 1998) and put in motion the contradictions of the Peronist 
form. The struggle over revolutionary subjectivity asserted itself as a struggle over the 
form of the state. This struggle was personified in the relationship between Peron and 
Montoneros. I will pay special attention to two main events: the massacre of Ezeiza in 
June 1973 and the mobilisation of the ls` of May 1974. Ezeiza symbolises the 
explosion of the contradiction of Peronism. The Ist May 1974 highlighted the 
impossibility of revolutionary Peronism and the deconstruction of the pact between 
labour and the state (see chapter 3). 
The chapter is divided into six sections. Section I, introduces Montoneros and the 
Revolutionary Left. Section II focuses on the reinvention of the Populist state in 1973, 
and the significance of this for the lzquierda revolucionaria (Revolutionary Left, IR) 
53 For a complete history of Montoneros, see Gillespie 1982. See recommended bibliography and 
assessment of the main works on the issue in Hilb and Lutzky 1984; also in Natanson and Wainfeld 
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and Montoneros. Section III addresses the significance of Perön's return and the 
massacre of Ezeiza in June 1973, the crisis of Peronism and the failure of the new 
social pact. Section IV focuses on the breakdown of the recognition of Montoneros by 
Peron on Ist May 1974. Section V addresses the economic as well as political crisis 
and the invisible struggle against Montoneros and the labour movement. Finally, 
section VI introduces the 'Proceso de Reorganizaciön Nacional' (1976-1982) which 
forced revolutionary subjectivity to physical disappearance and allowed the 
constitution of a new economic power. 
I 
Montoneros 
The Revolutionary Left 
Montoneros belonged to the New Left (Nueva Izquierda, NI [Hilb and Lutzky 1984]), 
or IR. The IR comprised several organisations which considered themselves as part of 
a process of construction of a vanguard who would lead a popular war of national 
liberation in the Southern Cone (Oilier 1998,1986; Hilb and Lutzky 1984). 54 This 
mission was, in the case of Montoneros, legitimated by Peronism (Oilier, 1998: 17). 
Montoneros embodied a synthesis between Peronist and Guevarist currents (Gillespie, 
1982: 47). Its origins can be found in the catholic right groups such as Tacuara and 
their interaction with the Priests of the Third World who advocated liberation 
theology (Gillespie 1982). 
1996. 
sa Montoneros, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR), Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT), ERP (Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo), FAP (Fuerzas Armadas del Pueblo) and FAL (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaciön). 
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To Montoneros, Ongania's dictatorship 1966-1969 had been a crucial experience 
(Gillespie 1982: 67). The Cordobazo, followed by the strikes SITRAM and SITRAC 
(Lizaguirre et al 1997; Brennan 1994), the Viborazo and the Tucumanazo (Crenzel, 
1991), had opened a `Pandora's box of social and economic upheaval' (James, 1988: 
235). These massive struggles reaffirmed the integration of other groups of society 
e. g. young people, to the struggle of the working class. Between 1970 and 1973 the 
guerrilla groups operating in Argentina `embarked on a wave of actions which 
included direct attacks on military installations, the kidnapping and killing of 
industrialists and political figures, spectacular bank robberies and hijackings, and the 
assassination of leading military figures. Such actions. found an often explicit support 
among the youth who were flooding into the Peronist movement at this time' (James 
1988: 238). 
Revolutionary Peronisni 
Peronism offered a popular alternative to Montoneros, since it was seen as the 
expression of national and popular unity against the oligarchy and imperialism (Ollier 
1986: 50). However, nationalist revolution could only take place by the use of 
violence and the predominance of military over the political aspects of the 
organisation: Peronism will be revolutionary or it will not be at all. 
The Peronist identity will differentiate Montoneros from other organisations in that 
they were simultaneously integrated into the state politics and rejected politics in 
favour of armed struggle and revolution. Peronism connected them with the past and 
imposed conditions on their future action which made a total rupture impossible 
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(Oilier 1986). Peron's own judgements on revolution contributed to it: `They have not 
tolerated Justicialismo, very well then, they will have Socialism' (Primera Plana no 
287,28.6.68 in Oilier 1998: 135). Montoneros' `asceticism, hardness, and a strong 
conviction to die for Peron or for Peronism can be equated to a priesthood' (Hilb and 
Lutzky 1984: 64): the slogan `Peron or Death' illustrates this (Sigal and Verön 1988). 
Montoneros substituted politics with war. To them, `violence was the founding 
element of the economic, social and political order'(Montoneros in Oilier 1986: 65) 
so `to what extent can such a violent power be opposed with pacific methods? ' 
(interview, Cazadores de Utopias). Peron supported this strategy and called the IR the 
`special formations' of the Peronist Movement (Peron in Cazadores de Utopias). 
II 
In and Against Peronism: Knocking on Hell's Door 
The Jotape and the Populist State 55 
By 1972, guerrilla action spread. 56 President (General) Lanusse considered that the 
return to democracy emerged as the instrumental solution to solve the problem of the 
increasing power of the guerrilla movement, the labour movement and of Perön's 
reputation in exile (Ollier 1998: 144). On the one hand, the transitional military 
regime passed the Repression of Terrorism law (Ley de Represiön del Terrorismo, no 
19,081). Magistrates and the Armed Forces were given the faculties to intervene in 
case of subversive action and a special chamber was created to treat terrorist crimes in 
civil court (Ollier, 1998: 147). On the other hand, Lanusse opened the door to the 
return to democracy in November 1972. Peronism was legalised but Perön's name 
35 Jotape: short name for the 1. P, i. e. La Juventud Peronista (The Peronist Youth). 
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was to be excluded from the candidate formulas. Peron appointed Hector Cämpora as 
his personal delegate, until he would definitely return to the country. 
The FREJULI (Frente Justicialista 
Liberaciön), won general 
elections with 49% of the vote in 
March 1973 with a `Peronist' 
program including a dignified 
wage and job stability, housing 
provision and health service, 
justice, by means of a populist state 
within which the working class had 
an important degree of participation (Verbitsky, 1995). The Jotape, who had been 
increasingly incorporated to Montoneros columns and constituted the main force 
behind the electoral campaign (Munck with Falcon and Galitelli 1987), was ecstatic: 
the new government `have a mandate to create a Patria Socialista' (Socialist 
Fatherland). Cämpora also liberated the political prisoners as a symbolic political 
action. 
Although Montoneros probably lacked the direct support of the working class 
(Gillespie 1992; Munck with Falcon and Galitelli 1987), the IR provided a new 
generation of union leaders with an inspiring revolutionary political identification: 
`within 20 days of Cämpora taking office there were 176 factories occupied by their 
56 On political violence during this period see O'Donnell 1988: 296-298. 
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workers... the class struggle in the plants continued unabated' (Munck et al 1987: 
189). 
A Pacto Social (social pact) between the CGT, the Confederatiön General 
Econömica (General Economic Confederation, CGE) and the state aimed in May 
1973 `to reconcile the opposing interests of capital and labour' (Lewis, 1992: 420). 
1971 and 1972 were characterised by a high and increasing rate of inflation (from 
39.2% to 64.2% moving towards an annual rate of 101% during the first five months 
of 1973) (Torre 1983). The Cämpora administration aimed to control inflation, to 
direct the struggle for the distribution of income (Torre, 1983: 49-50) towards full 
employment and expand the internal market, in favour of workers. It included the 
protection of national industry from foreign competition as well as some incentives 
for national industry It established one wage increase of 13% and a price freeze 
(Tedesco 1999: 18). The Pacto Social also aimed at the moderation of labour 
demands. It simultaneously recognised politically and institutionally the power of 
trade unions by means of the LPA 20,615 of 1973) which increased the centralised 
power of the union leaders (Cordone 1999: 70); and limited their functions as 
representatives of the workers' demands, by suspending collective bargaining. 
III 
EZEIZA: the Beginning of the End 
The Significance of Perdn's Return 
Although Montoneros argued that they did not trust electoral means, Perön's brief 
return visit in November 1972 made them re-evaluate that decision and redirect most 
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of their energy into the Return Campaign, whereby la Jotapc would achieve an 
impressive mobilisation capacity. 57 
Afoºttoll ero. c peculiar 
paternalistic love-hate 
relationship with Peron was the 
symbolic expression of the 
relationship between 
º 
/in ýý 
ýý revolutionary labour and the IF " ". -k Mý -t: *ºIiPJIý. 
ýýý, ý. state. This relationship 
fostered a 
f Ir- A 
certain chaos within the 
movement which was by all means incomprehensible for the radical left. The 
Afontoneros saw themselves as the makers of Perön's return, the only ones who 
believed in Perön's return. The slogan Luche y- vuelve'58 captures this. Peron was the 
emhodiment of the possibility to achieve a socialist state. Cämpora's was the first step 
towards Socialism. Peron would follow. Peron had played his guerrilla card' (Pion- 
Berlin I9(89: 84) by supporting and integrating Alontoneros into the Peronist politics 
in order to negotiate his own return to Argentine politics. However. Peron as a 
pe'rSOniflcation of the State, embodied the possibility for national liberation and 
socialism to he achieved, but also of the defeat of the revolutionary attempts, and of 
national unification. If Peron was not able to perform as a synthesiser leading to the 
'' The organisation spread and obtained massive support at the Universit' of Buenos Aires and 
through the JP Regionales which %Norked in the neighbourhoods (barrios). Montoneros worked wth 
J(! P (Peronist Uniýcrsity Youth. JTP (the Peronist Working Youth), the AE (F\ita Group 01' the 
Feminine (ranch) and the N IP (Peronist Tenants 'Movement), the UES (Secondary Students Union) 
MMM\'P (Peronist Shanty To\ýn Dýý, ellers ! Movement), the latter two being the largest. All these 
organisations together became kno\%n as the Tendencia Re\olucionaria (Gillespie I99ý: 134). " Fight and he gill come back'. 
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unity of the country, there was a serious possibility of a civil war in Argentina (J M 
Abal Medina in Cazadores de Utopias). S9 
The Massacre 
Peron was returning to the country after 17 years of exile in Madrid on the 20`h June 
1973. That day was meant to be a second 17`h of October for among the 1'/2-4 m 
gathered at Ezeiza, half of them congregated by the 
revolutionary tendency (Gillespie 1992: 135), FAR 
and Montoneros 
_. . ý! 
'' 
. 
ýý `ý' ý. `'ýý 
wanted to 
impress Peron by 
deploying their 
mobilisation and 
organisation 
capacity (Verbistzky, 1995). But special anti- 
guerrilla forces occupied places in the site 
prepared for Perön's speech and, following a 
predetermined plan, shoot the demonstrators from 
the platform set for Perön's speech. 
59 The symptoms of radicalisation of the youth (not only the Peronist but also the UCR's) and 
increasing violence led to the polarisation between Perön and the military regime (Oilier 1998: 133), 
the latter transforming Perön into a crucial actor for peace to be achieved, the only 'legitimate interlocutor for the military regime and the political leadership'(Ollier 1998: 145), as well as for 
Revolutionary Peronism. 
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For the Peronist Youth, Ezeiza implied `the irruption of the other' (Sigal and Verön 
1988: 152). The illusion of a `pure' paternalistic relation between Peron (the state) 
and his `muchachos' (labour) was contaminated by the possibility of deconstruction 
of the project from within it. The idea of the internal enemy and of a forthcoming 
military putsch spread (Garre in Cazadores de Utopias). Ezeiza was, in short, `the 
great representation of Peronism, the explosion of its 30 year old 
contradictions'(Verbitsky: 1995: 13). 
Ezeiza marked a turning point. Whilst the Peronist IR was rethinking their place 
within Peronism and in Argentine politics, the labour movement, led by the leader of 
the CGT Rucci, moved against Cämpora, `who had begun to incur the displeasure of 
Peron by his apparent inability or unwillingness to control mass mobilisations' 
(Munck with Galitelli and Falcon 1987: 191). Cämpora resigned to facilitate Peron's 
return to the country. 
Peron was elected President in September 1973. The background for his political 
campaign was an underground armed struggle between the urban guerrilla and the 
Anti-Communist Argentine Association (AAA). Montoneros had by then a relatively 
well developed logistic and also at the end of 1973, the idea of developing a guerrilla 
war in the mountains of Tucuman was elaborated by Santucho from the Partido 
Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT) (Oilier 1998: 163). 
The Acta de Compromiso between the three parties, launched by President Peron in 
1973, reaffirmed the Social Pact. Yet, class struggle intensified in the light of the 
global capitalist crisis. On the one hand, `businessmen argued that they were "caught 
l-) U 
in a squeeze between climbing costs and a price freeze "'(Lewis, 1992: 426-7). On the 
other hand, strikes and industrial measures at the workplace around debts and unpaid 
wages, strikes against redundancy and for the restatement of dismissed workers, 
working conditions, protests against violence and repression (Tone 1983: 66) spread 
in spite of the union bureaucracy. 60 
In October and November 1973 new legislation aimed to control labour by means of 
repression and increasing the power of the labour bureaucracy: the reform of the LPA 
(see Munck with Galitelli and Falcon 1987: 192) and the regressive Penal Code 
reform bill. Whilst the former reinforced the power of the burocracia sindical, the 
latter allowed the repression of any subversive movement as well as strikes which 
could be considered unlawful (Sigal and Verön 1988: 200). This new legislation 
provoked a political crisis within the Peronist Movement since the Jotape MPs could 
not support any of those projects. In January 1974 when Peron put more pressure on 
them by warning: `If discipline is lost, we are all lost' (to the MPs of the JP 1974, La 
Republica Perdida 1), all deputies resigned their posts as MPs (Gillespie 1982: 145). 
61 Furthermore, in September 1973 Montoneros killed the executive secretary of the 
CGT, Rucci. 62 But his death was experienced as a `mistake' by the Peronist youth, 
60 From October 1973 until February 1974 the most important conflicts took place in big companies 
such as Philips (electronics) General Motors (American Cars), Terrabussi and Molinos Rio de la Plata (food), Astarsa (shipyard) and Acindar (metallurgical). See the significance of the struggle in Acindar Villa Constitution in Torre 1983: 87-88; Lewis: 1992: 427; Munck 1987: 115; Tosco in Winter 1984: 
55, see Torre 1983: 87, Cordone 1999: 73 and Gillespie 1982: 173. 61 Montoneros had 8 deputies out of 145 from the FREJULI. They also had 50 posts in provincial 
governments and some seats in local legislatures. See their influence in the Parliament in Gillespie 
1982: 130-133). 
62 Rucci's death was identical to that of Vandor and Alonso at the hands of the Ejercito Nacional Revolucionario. They had been accused of being traitors. After Rucci's death, and asked about how to interest trade union leaders in their negotiations `Firmenich had suggested that one way would be to 
offer not to kill Lorenzo Miguel, leader of the UOM and 62 organisations' (Gillespie, 1992: 171). 
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and pushed the relationship between Peron and his muchachos towards its breakdown, 
on the May Day in the symbolic Plaza de Mayo. 
IV 
The Breakdown of Recognition: La Plaza Vacia 63 
On the 1st of May 1974, around one million people gathered in the Plaza de Mayo. 
The meeting was extremely symbolic: the leader was going to talk to the multitude 
again. This was the last opportunity for the renovation of a new pact between labour 
and the state. The control of the power of class solidarity and the strength of the 
organisation of the working class (see Petras 1981) were at stake on May Day 1974. 
That day Montoneros pushed Peronism further to its complete radicalisation (see 
Firmenich in Gillespie 1982). They expected a definition from Peron and rejected 
Isabel Perön's authority for she was the political puppet of the burocracia sindical 
(McGuire 1997) and the Peronist right. But now Peron distrusted that guerrilla 
warfare was the proper method to organise mass support (Peron 20.8.74 in Gillespie 
1982: 122). 
In an almost opposed dialogue to the one that occurred on 17`h October 1945 (chapter 
3), Peron behind an armoured glass located at the balcony of the Pink House, Peron 
attempted to reinvent Bonapartism by vindicating the union bureaucracy and rejecting 
the IR (see Gillespie, 1992: 150). Montoneros demanded a real popular assembly and 
blamed Peron for the presence within the movement and his cabinet of the terrorist 
63 The Empty Plaza. 
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right: `What's going on General, that the popular government is full of gorilas . 64 
They sang against Isabel and claimed for Evita: `If Evita lived, she would be a 
Montonera'. Peron, furiously, accused Montoneros of being `those stupid people who 
shout'. He called them `infiltrators who work within' and 'mercenaries in the service 
of foreign money' He called for an internal war `if the pernicious elements don't give 
way' (Gillespie's translation in Gillespie 1992: 150). 
Montoneros counter-posed another radical decision: they decided to became invisible, 
for the organisation was not prepared to subordinate themselves and their 
revolutionary project to Peron (Oilier 1986; c. f. Gillespie, 1982). As is well known, 
one-third of the Plaza de Mayo was left empty in the middle of the leader's discourse. 
65 With this historical `retirada' Montoneros moved to clandestine political activity: 
`We left the Plaza de Mayo with a great pain. No one threw us out of there'. 
Montoneros attempted to push the recognition forwards, towards the creation of a 
Socialist state. Perön's decision was the phenomenological expression of the 
impossibility for the state to incorporate revolutionary labour. The retirada implied a 
deep crisis of identity. Montoneros felt that "`something was broken after 30 years" 
(Lizaso in Gillespie 1992: 150) that "something" being the magical revolutionary 
relationship which they had believed to exist between Peron and the masses, and 
which they had hoped to experience in the Plaza (Gillespie 1992: 150). They had 
genuinely believed that there were two projects in dispute and that the right was going 
to be removed by Peron. The feeling of betrayal based on the idea that Peron might 
64 Anti-Peronists 
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have used them to achieve his return and then left them when he was already in 
power, was shared by most of the militants. The breakdown of their central role in the 
political arena devastated the organisation: clandestinity meant the destruction of the 
links between the organisation and its bases. To that extent, the option of clandestinity 
was the first step to their isolation and further disappearance. 
V 
The Invisible Struggle and the Crisis 
Peron died on 1.7.74. The AAA, a `right-wing death squad' which was illegally 
sponsored by Lopez Rega, the Minister of the Interior and Isabelita's chief adviser, 
became the main tool for a terrorist campaign against workers, students, guerrillas and 
sympathisers (Pion-Berlin, 1989: 87). Street posters publicly called: `Help the 
Motherland: Kill a Montonero'. 
Clandestinity or `strategic withdrawal' fostered a twofold debate. First, the 
organisation suffered from its polarisation between those who were scared 
(particularly those militants in workplaces and neighbourhoods) and those who, by 
believing in `the worse the better' proposed to increase the struggle. Whilst for the 
former, the coup d'etat had been a misfortune, for the latter, it was a form for the 
contradictions to fully develop. Secondly there was a need for the decentralisation of 
the organisation to protect their militants. Montoneros was unable to provide security 
for all the militants who had been activated at home, or in their workplace or 
65 Although `only trade union banners and flags were permitted by the organisers to be carried into the Plaza' (Gillespie 1992: 149), it was clear that one third of the million people deemed to be gathering at the historical Plaza de Mayo belonged to or sympathised with the revolutionary movements. 
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neighbourhoods and thus could be easily identified. Political autonomy of each 
`cell' 
and financial decentralisation of the distribution of weapons and money was a 
solution. Yet, this was not accepted by the leadership which remained in control of the 
whole organisation. thus 'leaving thousands of militants and sympathisers at the 
mercy of the repressive forces, with no personal resources or means to pass to 
clandestinity' (Wainfeld and Natanson 1996: 11). 
Coupled with increasing signs of economic crisis and unlawful repression, the 
government dismantled the bastions of labour movement opposition. The Law 
(20.840) imposed prison from one to three years to those who, after the authorities of 
the 
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Ministeno de Trabajo y Seguridad Social 
(MTSS) characterised a strike as unlavv t i1, 
persisted in their industrial action (Condone 
1 00I): 7-'). The authorities removed from their 
positions the leaders of the ('G'I. A lnd 
representatives of eta slst unionism. 
Meath provoked also the redefinition of 
strate, -, 
ies within the Peronist labour 
mo\ ement. The polarisation between grass- 
roots militants and the labour bureaucracy intensified. In the CGT Congress of 12i11 
July 1974, both the CGT and its dominant stream 620 lined up behind president 
lsabelita (Torre 1983). Labour conflict decreased. But since the power of labour was 
no longer identified just with the working class, intimidation and repression was 
extended to almost the whole societ\,. 
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The Rodrigazo and the Operativo Independencia 
In June 1975, in an attempt to stabilise the economy, the new minister Rodrigo 
announced a 50 per cent devaluation of the peso and increase in public tariffs 
(Tedesco, 1999: 19). The shock to correct disequilibrium of the balance of payments 
and the fiscal imbalance led to the deepening of the economic crisis, intensified this 
time by massive capital flight (Fanelli and Frenkel 1989 in Tedesco 1999: 20) under 
the form of `unregistered capital outflows' (Lewis, 1992: 443). 66 The Rodrigazo was 
seen as `the savage response towards a furious redistribution of income against that 
established by the Social Pact in favour of the working class' (Porta in Cazadores de 
Utopias). 
Workers reacted with a wave of strikes which forced the CGT to call for a general 
strike for the first time against a Peronist government (Munck G 1998: 53). Economic 
crisis coupled with the repression of radical trade union leaders and grass-root 
militancy at the hands of the AAA increased guerrilla action. 67 In December 1975, 
under the international demand for governability against the danger of communism 
and capital pressure for stability against `social chaos', Isabelita empowered the 
military Forces with the faculties to repress guerrilla insurgence in the northern 
province of Tucuman. Now, by lawful means, the military have `almost unlimited 
powers to pursue their "war against subversion" (Munck G 1998: 55) while the social 
imagery of chaos and the need for a strong hand grew and spread. 
66 Slightly over $2 billion left the country between the beginning of 1974 and the end of 1976 (Lewis 1992: 443). 
67 `From the day [Peron] died [1.7.74] to September 1975 some 248 leftists were assassinated by the AAA, another 131 were shot by the police, and 132 unidentified bodies ... were discovered (Lewis 1992: 435) 
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VI 
The `Proceso de Reorganizaciön Nacional' 
On the 24`h March 1976 a military putsch took power. The military junta advocated 
the National Security Ideology (NSD) inspired by the international struggle against 
communism. The state was considered as the main tool to guarantee national security. 
The armed forces had a special role in providing that `domestic security' and 
`exterminating' all kinds of threat to it (see Pion-Berlin, 1989). 
Whilst state terrorism was justified as a crusade in defence of the national interest 
against subversive international communism, transnational capital took power in the 
banks, financial centres, industry and stock markets, taking advantage of the new 
economic plan launched by the military regime based on the transference of resources 
from the working class to capital. The Argentine economy was converted into 
capitalist heaven. The period 1976-1982 is well know. 68 In what follows I will refer to 
it insofar as it produced the definitive collapse of Montoneros and the transformation 
of subjectivity by means of three forms of violence: state terrorism; legal repression 
and economic violence. 
State Terrorism and the Forms of Disappearance: the annihilation of opposition 
The main goal of the regime was to destroy political and union activism, `particularly 
at the rank-and-file level of the labor movement, where guerrilla organisations were 
seen as having the greatest chance of infiltration'(Munck G 1998: 67). Most of the 
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disappeared were young workers who disappeared from their homes at night, at work 
and in the streets. This highlights that the armed guerrilla had been defeated by 1976 
and now the target was the whole society. Repression focused on particular 
geographic areas i. e. Buenos Aires, Rosario and Cordoba where insurgence had taken 
place for the last decade (Munck G 1998: 67). 
Argentina became a hidden battlefield. The methods leading to the disappearance of 
around 30,000 people differed from previous dictatorships. The forms of getting 
invisible, of disappearing, documented in the book Never again, the official report of 
_ý 
the National Commission for 
Missing People, CONADEP 
(CONADEP 1984; 
i 
interviews Cazadores de 
Utopias) were detention in 
torture, concentration and ý 
extermination camps, forced 
disappearance without knowing the crime committed and the fate of the body of the 
victims, mass execution by firing squad, and the handing over in unlawful adoption of 
the children born in captivity or captured with their parents in military operations, 
appropriation of the victim's and family's material possessions, legalised prisoners in 
prisons of extreme security, exile in Latin American or European countries and 
domestic exile, with the loss of elementary rights (Bellucci, 2000: 3). The horrors of 
68 Sequence of events 1976-1982 see Troncoso 1983,1984,1988,1992, 
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this experience are inexplicable and `hard to believe' (Dworkin in CONADEP, Never 
Again, 1986: 9). 69 
Exile particularly to Mexico and Spain, which sometimes represented an option, was, 
for the majority, another form of disappearance (Rozitchner, L 1998). Finally, those 
who remained alive suffered from the disappearance of themselves vis-a-vis the 
others: `Day after day, I felt more and more lonely, lifeless... I think I was sharing the 
disappearance of my mates with them, I felt like another "disappeared"' (Interview, 
Cazadores de Utopias; see Heker 1998; Martinez, T. E. 1998b). 
The Dictatorial `Larv' 
A set of Laws repressed unions' and workers' activities as well as suspended their 
rights. The regime modified the Labour Contract Law (Ley de Contrato de Trabajo, 
LCT) The modification of the LCT, which reinforced unions' central role and direct 
participation in business matters (Abos 1984: 19), was symbolic of workers' defeat, as 
was the author of the Law, Dr Centeno's, murder in July 1977. The new Law of 
Professional Associations (22.105) passed in 1979, labelled as a `legal freak' by 
experts (Abos, 1984), dissolved the CGT and meant the prohibition of both unionising 
and political activity for trade unionists (see Richards, 1995). The Redundancy Law 
21,274 was enacted and allowed the public sector also to be `cleaned'. The suspension 
of collective bargaining and the strict wage increase as established by the state 
69 Introduction to Never Again, published by Farrar Straus Giroux, New York, quoted in The Vanished Gallery, (http: //www. yendor comIvanished/conadep htm, additions based on the report in brackets, 19.05.00). 
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allowed a 40% wage reduction in the first three month with a price increase of 75%: 
recession with inflation (see Cordone 1999: 79). 
Terrorism of Money 
The policy of the military regime attempted to radically restructure the economy on 
behalf of a new concentrated and transnational capitalist power by deconstructing 
national industry and imposing social discipline on labour. The programme included 
the following points: freeing of prices, liberalisation of the exchange market, of 
imports and exports, of urban house rentals, of wages, of foreign investment and 
technology transfers, a financial reform, the elimination of subsidised fuel and prices 
in other sectors of the economy (Martinez de Hoz, 1990). The control of inflation was 
a priority. Wages were frozen for three months, the control of prices was suspended 
and the exchange rate was increased. Once these problems were overcome, a second 
phase would privilege investments as a driving factor (Azpiazu et al 1988: 91 also 
Richman 1990: 11). 
A new law to favour foreign investments was passed in 1976 (law 21,382,13.8.76), 
modified in 1980 to allow invested capital to go back to the country of origin 
(Minsburg 1987 vol. 1: 86), the state assuring extraordinary rates of profit. During 
1977- 1983 there were 699 allocations of foreign capital allowed into the country, 514 
out of them were approved by the government between 1977 and 1980 and they 
allowed the creation of 166 companies, most of them (47%) were dedicated to 
services and finances (Minsburg 1987 vol. 1: 93-94; Fuchs, 1993). The rest was 
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directed to gas and oil, car industry, finances and banks. USA, Italy, France and 
Western Germany being the most important investors (Minsburg 1987 vol. 1: 93). 
In December 1977 the government implemented `the most fantastic instrument' to 
control industrial prices: the tablita (little table). It was an `anticipated scheme of 
increases in the exchange rate under the inflation rate' (Peralta Ramos 1988: 60). The 
market was inundated by foreign products and prices went down. The financial 
reform allowed capital to `transfer income violently towards the financial sector it 
pushed capital forwards. and thus to impose a new form of industrial development 
based on the leadership of some branches of industry: ago-industries' (Peralta Ramos 
1988: 61). 
The tablita allowed capital to enter the country in dollars. Dollars were transformed 
into overvalued pesos which produced a fantastic profit based on the high interest 
rates. Afterwards, capital was transformed into dollars again and taken back home. 
This was done by means of financial speculation supported by the wage reductions, 
the decrease of public savings and the repression of labour (Tedesco 1999). 
The lack of democratic control over expenditure and credit created an external debt by 
means of a dynamic involving international private capital, IMF, WB and the national 
bourgeoisie and landed classes led by the Chicago think-tanks (Petras 1981: 100; 
Ferrer in Teubal 1986: 23). The creation of the external debt is explained by the 
expansion of private international business by means of the creation of the market in 
eurodollars and the consequent availability of credit on a global scale: `foreign credit 
was resurrected in unlimited supply'(Canitrot, 1994: 79, Marazzi, 1996). This was 
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accompanied by the facilities and pressure that the governments of powerful countries 
put on the Latin American ones. For instance, the main nine international banks gave 
to Latin American countries an amount equal to 135% of their capital (Teubal, 1986: 
23). 70 
Whilst in December 1976, the external debt -private and public- was 8,279 million 
dollars, in 1983 it had reached 47,234 million dollars and 90% of this figure 
corresponded to financial debt (Minsburg 1987, vol. 1: 100). The essential component 
of the external debt was 28 billion dollars of capital fugado (escaped capital) 
(Minsburg, 1987 vol. 1: 102; Fuchs, 1993; Lewis 1992). The explosive growth in 
1979-81 was `the product of transactions made by Argentineans who had deposits 
abroad' (Basualdo in Tedesco 1999: 44): `They brought the money back to Argentina 
and these transactions appeared as a new credit. Capital flight during 1979-81- which 
amounted to US$16.2 billion - was around 23 per cent of Argentina's GDP' (Fanelli 
and Frenkel in Tedesco 1999: 45). 71 The external debt produced by several 
mechanisms was used for military and repression costs (! ), gigantic public works, and 
events to build up popularity such as the 1978 World Cup. Argentina took advantage 
of the process of petrodollars recycling (Martinez de Hoz, 1990: 160; see Canitrot 
1994). 
70 The 1970s and early 1980s was a period of debt-led (and inflationary) growth in Latin America (Gwynne and Kay, 1999). Whist in 1976 the total of the external debt -private and public- in the area represented no more than 100,000 million dollars, in 1983 it represented 336,230 million dollars. `The total amount of credit required by the poorer countries has been calculated at $40 billion in 1976, while 
about 50% of the profits of the major US banks now come from loans to these same countries -a situation which makes it unlikely that moratoria will be widely permitted' (Marazzi 1996: 86; Teubal 1986: 36). 
71 See role of public enterprises in the creation of the external debts in Minsburg 1987: 103; also Fuchs 1993. 
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Socialisation of Risk and the New Economic Power 
In 1982, credit was cut off. A drastic solution to the problem of the external debt was 
undertaken in the last months of the military rule by Domingo Cavallo, later to be the 
creator of stability under Menem (Cavallo, 1990): the reduction of private debt by 
means of a financial reform and the Central Bank subsidies in the form of guarantee 
contracts and swaps (Peralta Ramos, 1988: 72). This not only helped the private 
sector to cancel its external liabilities at a subsidised price (Tedesco 1999). The most 
important implications brought about by this corrupted mechanism was that a large 
amount of the private external debt was nationalised: `the Central Bank assumed the 
private dollar debt and became creditor of local debtor firms in domestic currency' 
(Canitrot 1994: 80). The public sector took responsibility for 52.3% of the external 
debt in 1979 and that rate increased to 62.2% in 1982.72 
The process of deindustrialisation and the reposition of the accumulation process on a 
new basis led to the predominance of financial valorisation of capital and the flight of 
capital abroad over industrial investments. The emerging capitalist class was large 
capital organised in integrated or diversified transnational enterprises, with multiple 
firms throughout different sectors of the economy and a high level of concentration of 
capital (Azpiazu et al 1988). 
This transformation had another side: the impoverishment of the working class 
(Tedesco, 1999: 40). Whilst in 1974 the wage bill as a share of national income was 
72 See the evolution of the external debt and the non justified movement of capital and debt non explained by the balance sheet in Fanelli and Frenkel 1990. 
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50.5%, in 1981 it had fallen to 32.5 (Orsatti A 1983 in Tedesco 1999: 27). Industrial 
employment decreased (see Canitrot 1981 in Tedesco 1999: 36; Basualdo 1992). 
The effects of the economic policy over the industrial labour market where 
desalarizaciön and terciarizaciön (reduction of wage labour and increase participation 
in the service sector). Whilst `from the employer's point of view, labour costs fell 
from 43 per cent in 1974 to 35.7 per cent in 1976... productivity increased 37.6 per 
cent from 1974 to 1983. Those two factors meant that the absolute profit rate 
increased. As wages decreased it was calculated that the funds appropriated by the 
industrial employers increased 69 per cent from 1974 to 1983' (Tedesco 1999: 40-42; 
also Minsburg 1987). 
Instability: the `Failure' of the Military Regime 
Yet, the military government was unsuccessful in settling the basis for long term 
capitalist development. Its failure in achieving stability asserted itself as inflation, the 
monetary expression of the class struggle over the distribution of income (Tedesco, 
1999; Peralta Ramos, 1988). The anti-inflationary policy of the military regime was 
unsuccessful in the light of class struggle. Two years after the coup d'etat, inflation 
remained around 200% annual (Schvarzer 1990: 65). Although `the annual rate of 
inflation went down in 1980... the collapse of the economy in 1981 and the failure of 
economic policy in 1982 took the rate of inflation back into three figures' (Flichman, 
1990: 24). On the one hand, a fierce competition was disclosed among different 
fractions of capitalists through the `uncontrolled development of speculative 
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practices' (Peralta Ramos, 1988: 52). On the other hand, by November 1977, 
thousands of workers were on strike: railway, water and light and power, oil, 
telephone, airlines mainly against the wage flexibilisation, i. e. the breakdown of the 
power of bargaining of the trade unions and the wage fragmentation and 
differentiation (Abos 1984: 35). Progressively the whole society was increasingly 
involved in protests and mobilisations against the military and for the return of 
democracy against the same enemy - the military forces and `capital speculation'. 
The labour movement reshaped itself. In January 1977, a document signed by 
representatives of 78 unions against the dictatorship's policies was made public. They 
demanded `wage increase, a lifting of the ban on union activity, and end to the 
"intervention" of the CGT as well as of individual unions, the repealing of the law No 
21,476, which modified the "special regimes" that regulated the activities of workers 
in the state sector, the release of unionists held without cause and the clarification of 
the status of all detained unionists' (Munck G 1998: 83). After the appearance of such 
a document, the Commission of the 25, (The 25) was created. It became `the first site 
for debate among the top labor leadership level constituted outside a government- 
sanctioned framework' Within the 25, the Peronist Syndicalist Movement 
(Movimiento Sindical Peronista, MSP) was predominant (Munck G 1998: 83, pp 244 
and 87). 73 
In August 1978 another group, the National Labor Commission (Comision Nacional 
de Trabajo CNT, was formed (Munck G 1998: 86). On the 24 `h April 1979, the first 
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general strike against the military government was carried out (Munck, G 1998: 89). 
Protests multiplied and strikes spread in Buenos Aires and Cordoba, particularly in 
the car factories of Chrysler, Ford, Fiat and Ika-Renault. In August 1979, divisions 
were attempted to be solved by means of the creation of the Conduction Unica de 
Trabajadores Argentinos (CUTA). Yet, 20 trade unions did not join the CUTA and 
created instead the Commission of the 20 which would later be part of the CGT 
Azopardo (Abos, 1984: 60). By mid-1979, there were two labour groupings: whilst 
the 25 represented the confrontacionistas (those who confronted the government), the 
CNT was colaboracionista (collaborators), and the latter grouping created the 
Movimiento Sindical Peronista in 1978 (Cordone 1999). 74 
New forms of resistance emerged from the new forms of repression implemented by 
the Juntas, and reshape labour struggle under the form of a struggle for human rights. 
The Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos (Permanent Assembly for 
Human Rights) was created in 1975 as a reaction to the AAA. The organisation of 
Relatives of the Disappeared and Imprisoned for Political Reasons was created in 
1976. In 1977, a unique form of struggle emerged from the darkness and suffering 
brought about by disappearance: the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, mothers of the 
disappeared started a weekly protest at the central square of Buenos Aires, demanding 
the apariciön con vida (reappearance alive) of their sons and daughters. Their form of 
protest (walking in circles around the main monument of the historical square with 
73 The first executive committee was composed by representatives of sparkling water (soda), food, state 
workers, ship drivers, truck drivers, telecommunication (telepostales), railway, paper and food, power 
and light, miners, travellers, metal mechanics and telephone workers (Abos 1984: 35). 74 The CNT gathered the big unions such as UOM (metal workers), AOT (textile workers), UOCRA (construction workers) light and power workers (FATLyF) and commerce workers (CGEC). The Comision de los 25 was heterogeneous and comprised 78 trade unions which, unlike the CGT, 
were not intervened by the junta (Fernandez, A 1988: 163; Cordone 1999: 81; Munck G 1998: 83). 
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white scarves on their heads on Thursdays), as well as the significance of their 
motherhood becoming increasingly public and `political' (Bellucci, 2000, Guzman 
Bouvard 1995) developed into a leading group among human rights social 
movements. During the dictatorship the Mothers called the attention of the whole 
society, other countries and international bodies to the Argentine `disappeared' (see 
next chapter). Some months after the creation of the group Mothers (October 1977) a 
group of women looking for their grandchildren organised as the Grandmothers. In 
March 1980, the Centre for Legal and Social Studies was also created to support 
Human Rights movements (see Jelin, 1985). Also a powerful neighbourhood 
movement was organised in the last years of the dictatorship, producing the vecinazos 
in 1982 (see Garcia Delgado in Jelin, 1985). 
At the end of 1980, the CGT was born again, unifying the 25 and part of the 20. Led 
by Ubaldini (beer workers) it implied a new challenge against the dictatorship. In July 
1981 a second general strike was organised this time by the historical CGT and in 
November 10,000 people marched against the dictatorship under the slogan `Pan, Paz 
y Trabajo' (Bread, Peace and Work) (Abos 1984: 80). Political parties, trade unions 
and human rights social movements were increasingly engaged in the struggle for the 
democratisation of the political system and economic stability. Class struggle 
intensified. A wave of dismissals in car factories, as well as port workers protests 
against unemployment at the beginning of 1982, led to another massive demonstration 
on the 30`h of March 1982, (Abos 1984: 85) to reoccupy the Plaza de Mayo: It was as 
if by occupying the Plaza, people recovered their own materiality. Demonstration was 
severely repressed. 
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The occupation of the Malvinas islands in April 1982 was the last dictatorial attempt 
to retain and legitimise its power. The war divided Argentine society, including those 
in exile, and awoke nationalistic feelings among the population. During the war the 
CGT was divided again: the CNT became the CGT Azopardo and the CGT took the 
name of the street CGT Brasil (opposition). Paradoxically, the defeat of this 
belligerent policy allowed for the return to democracy, not least because of the 
credibility gained by unions and democratic political parties in their opposition to the 
war. 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter explored the emergence, development and disintegration of the 
revolutionary Montoneros in the light of the recomposition of capitalist social 
relations during the 1970s. The Soldiers of Peron evolved as part of the constitution 
of the Revolutionary Left in Latin America, and the radicalisation of politics in 
Argentina after the Cordobazo. Montoneros put in motion the contradictions 
underpinning the Peronist form and pushed it toward its limits. 
Montoneros revolutionary subjectivity asserted itself as a struggle in and against the 
state, personified in the contradictory relationship between them and Peron. In Ezeiza, 
the pure relationship between revolutionary labour and the state, as well as the 
possibility of revolutionary Peronism were called into question. On ls` May 1974, the 
pact between revolutionary labour and the state was broken. Insofar as the 
radicalisation of Montoneros developed as a dimension of the radicalisation of 
Argentine society in the 1970s (see Oilier 1998), the `disappearance of Montoneros' 
implied the defeat of both the Peronist project and the socialist dream and paved the 
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way to the crisis of politics not only for the Peronist or the left, deeply affected by the 
repression and economic crisis, but for the whole society, and mainly for the working 
class. The period 1976-1989 marked a decisive moment of both the abstraction of 
capital and the 'disembodiment' of labour. 
State terrorism killed and disappeared one generation of militants and advocates of 
social change who died or remained alive yet deeply depressed or damaged by 
repression. The features of the victims indicate that, whilst the guerrilla in the north of 
the country was their excuse to intervene, the real target for the military forces was 
the labour movement (basically Peronist) (Abos, 1984; see Pion-Berlin 1989, 
Fernandez, A 1985). The physical annihilation of opposition allowed the military 
regime to transform the state and the economic structure by reversing the process of 
industrialisation and populist state towards the realignment of Argentina into the new 
international division of labour and the creation of a new capitalist power. The 
economic policy of the military regime led to a dramatic reduction of industrial 
activity (20% less in 1983 than in 1977) increased wage differentiation, increased 
precarious and marginal jobs and unemployment and reduced the share of wages in 
national income (Basualdo et al, 1991; Richards, 1995). However, the regime could 
not solve the instability created by class struggle but intensified it, since it asserted 
itself in the monetary form of inflation. The dictatorial period fostered the seeds for its 
own collapse in 1982. During this democratic period (1982-1989) labour would 
confront the two spectres of state terrorism and the terrorism of money: the 
disappeared and hyperinflation respectively. The two emerging subjectivities of the 
Mothers and the renewed CGT correspond to the struggle against these two spectres 
in and against democracy. 
155 
Chapter Six 
The Democratic, Apariciön con Vida and Sindicalismo de Base, 
Visibility and Disillusion. 
In December 1983, democracy 
Off. `ý+i/ come to light. The report Nunca 
`ti ýý horrors of the period 1976-82 to 
0,01 returned'. On the one hand, the 
IWr! "4 Mäs by the CUNAllr r 
most amazing ana . iurrýi« 
ýý 
. 
ýý published in 1984 condensed the mod 
stories of anaucnon, torture, 
"ý rape and crime. I started to 
---, sutfer from insomnia ana 
"AP+ paranoia for nearly three years. 
! ýý The feeling of guilt . 
for having 
MIL` remained alive although just by 
s. i hnnýv -liil nnl ieave me alone. 
/ and has never gone away. I was 
, 'iii; i+r~lýiMIs scared any time a military 
`To dream alone is only a dream. but to 
dream with others is revolutionary. 1 feel 
like a revolutionary Mother, a fighting 
Mother every day, resisting and 
combating' (Mothers in Guzmän Bouvard 
1995: 189) 
upheaval seemed to threaten `democracy' 
again and strongly supported the Alfonsin 
government. However, on the other hand, 
the political world opened before me: 
participation was in the air. I left my 
drama studies and began my degree in 
Politics. I also became a shop-floor 
`I did things I wouldn't have done had it representative for the capital city branch 
not been for the fear of instability, and I of the telephone workers trade union 
didn't do things I would [otherwise] have FOETRA, the latter going through an 
done, because I had the obligation to exciting process of democratisation and 
consolidate democracy' (Former President renewal under the leadership of. Julio 
Alfonsin, April 1993, interview in Guillän, a Peronist from the CGTA. We 
McGuire 1997,202-3) firmly struggled against President 
Alfonsin's attempts at privatising L'Ntel, 
`Our Peronism is not shameful. We have the telephone company. We also joined the 
never been part of the patola and we have struggle for Human Rights. 
always believed in the existence of a 
transforming Peronism' (German Abdala, 
1984 in Jelin 1985: 65) Dancing with the missing 
Dancing with the dead 
Dancing with the invisible ones 
They dance along... ' (, Sting) 
In 1983, democracy was socially revalorised as opposed to state terrorism. The struggle 
for human rights opened a new political space, non existent in Argentina before 1976. 
The Movimiento por los Derechos Humanos' (Human Rights Movement) demands 
performed as the engine for democratisation insofar as democracy was the new 
`mobilising utopia' (Sondereguer 1985: 27). The Movement of the Mothers of the Plaza 
de Mayo became the voice of the disappeared behind the slogan apariciön con vida and 
juicio y castigo a los culpables. 75 From the Plaza de Mayo, their claim circulated 
(Sondereguer, 1985) and expanded. The Association of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo 
(created in 1979) built up a significant information network and solidarity support 
through 14 branches throughout the country. They decided to wear a white baby shawl 
on their heads with the name of their children embroidered on it. A group of women who 
looked for their grandchildren constituted Abuelas (Grandmothers) and also formalised 
their organisation. Under the principles of independence from political parties and the 
values of peace, brotherhood, justice, Madres and Abuelas built international reputations 
and a world solidarity network 
The labour movement also resumed the open fight for the recovering of wages and 
workers' living standards as well as an intense activity towards their reorganisation and 
democratisation, and the recovering of their bargaining and political power. Like human 
rights activists, workers and trade union leaders aimed at the recognition of the power of 
labour organisations by the state. During the 1980s, unions confronted international 
bodies and the capitalist pressure tt'ith regards to stabilisation policies and the solution 
for the external debt. The background for human rights and unions' struggles was 
economic instability and military unrest. 
This chapter argues that during 1983-1989 class struggle took the form of a struggle over 
the meaning and content of democracy. I suggest that the period of transition to 
democracy cannot be fully grasped by focusing on the transformation of the political 
regime. The Transitions perspective (Lievesley, 1999) deprived democracy of its class 
75 Apparition alive and punishment to the guilty. 
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content (Boron 1995a) thus preventing the `other' transition underlying the `political' one 
to be grasped (Dinerstein and Repetto 1991). The other transition underpinning the shift 
from a dictatorial to a democratic political regime is the transition from economic 
instability to the legitimisation of the terrorism of money in the form of stability in the 
1990s. The analysis of the struggle over the form of subjectivity during this period allows 
an account of `the other transition'. State terrorism constituted the means for 
transnational capital to penetrate the national economy and expand in the form of 
uncontrolled credit and economic instability. Financial speculation meant a perverse 
monetary circuit of easy profit-making which led to the simultaneous flight of capital 
abroad and the concentration of economic power in the hands of a few corporations, as 
well as the impoverishment of the working class caused by unemployment and falling 
wages. An authoritarian and indebted state as well as fragmented labour organisations 
were also the visible outcomes of the period. The `consolidation of democracy' by means 
of the reestablishment of a sound political system which assured the rule of law and 
respect for human rights, as well as the `stabilisation of the economy' by means of the 
halt of inflation and the modernisation of the state, were the two main goals to be 
achieved by the Alfonsin administration. 
However, by looking at the Mothers and unions' subjectivity, I aim to show that the most 
important contradiction of the period with regard to labour lay in that whilst democracy 
made visible the outcomes of state terrorism and of the economic policies by legitimising 
human rights and the political re-emergence of the labour movement, it also imposed 
significant barriers to them. Their demands were met if they allowed the stabilisation of 
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the economy and therefore did not threaten the consolidation of democracy. In other 
words, human and social economic rights as well as the recognition of the power of 
labour were both the basis for the consolidation of democracy and the barriers to it. As a 
result, the democratic state imposed limits on the subjectivity created during the 
dictatorship and legitimised during the democratic period, insofar as they presented a 
barrier to the stabilisation of the instability created by the terrorism of money (Marazzzi 
1996) and the discipline of labour during the 1970s. The Alfonsin's period in office 
crystallised the peak of the struggle of global monetarism over the political, in this case 
social democracy. 
The chapter is organised in five sections. Section I presents the subjectivity of the 
Mothers. Section II focuses on their struggle in and against the state (i. e. the CONADEP, 
the public trial of the Juntas and the Law of Due Obedience and the Punto Final bill). 
Section III addresses the main transformation faced by the labour movement during this 
period. Section IV focuses on the unions' struggles in and against the state and the 
international bodies (i. e. the Mucci Law to deperonise unions, the normalisation sindical 
and the unions' struggle in and against the external debts and the stabilisation plans 
launched by the Alfonsin administration). Section V focuses on the crisis of 
hyperinflation as the ultimate expression of the class struggle disclosed during this period 
and which would lead to the legalisation of uncertainty and the rule of money under 
Menem. 
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I 
Dar a Luz : The Madres of the Plaza de Mayo 76 
Within the Movement for Human Rights, the Mothers are special case. 77 Mothers were 
born in a climate of uncertainty and fear shared by most Argentineans. Initially, the 
disappearance of a daughter, a son, or a close relative produced a personal and family 
shock. The private drama transformed their views and ideas about the world and their 
role within it (Guzman Bouvard 1995), and they became political mothers. They met in 
the corridors of police stations, hospitals, ministries, consulates, embassies, churches, 
official and military dependencies, political parties, morgues, and fought uncertainty by 
contacting people who could help them in their desperate search. On the 30 April 1977, 
14 of them appeared in public by walking in circles around the pyramid of the Plaza de 
Mayo (Guzman Bouvard 1995). 78 The `circles of madness' (Agosin, 1990) led them to 
be named as `viejas locas' (mad old women) by the dictators. 
The process of awareness of a 
shared situation with others was, 
some extent, the same 
lki _ .,, s_ ". ý' S T' e 1Y' "ýýý 
ýý ýý` 
ý: s-2eý,. 
- 
experience as the whole society 
(see film The Official History). 
Their walk in circles around the 
monument of the square is very 
symbolic. The circle is an emblem of irresolution and frustration in their enquiries. It is 
76 In Castillian, dar a luz means give birth. Literally: to give to light. 77 See existing human rights organisations in Guzman Bouvard, 1995, Bellucci 2000, Sondereguer, 1985; 
Föscolo in Bellucci 2000. 
160 
also a symbol of their persistence. The march in circles with the photographs and names 
of those who had left the Plaza empty allow their visibility, their `resurrection for a 
couple of hours' (Nora Cortinas, in www. madres. org). By so doing they forced society 
into collective memory and became the living memory of a political tragedy, therefore 
memory becomes deeply political (see Bellucci, 2000; Kerber, 1986). 
The action of the Mothers questioned gender relations (see Feijoo in Shanley and 
Ackelsberg 1992; Shanley and Ackelsberg 1992: 58), and the separation between public 
and private spheres. Although most of the Mothers were housewives, they called into 
question that separation and connected both spheres in their own form of being. What 
made the Mothers political activists was their motherhood, the latter being permanently 
redefined in the light of their political activism. Within their politics, Mothers presented 
an alternative form of rationality by `the reuniting of thought and feeling from their 
artificial separation into reason, on the one hand, and emotion on the other' (Guzman 
Bouvard 1995: 247). 
II 
The Limits of Democracy: Mothers In and Against the State 
As soon as the new government took office, the Mothers implacably reaffirmed the 
slogan Aparicidn con Vida (Guest 1990: 38 1): if their children were alive when they were 
abducted by the `task groups', then it is not the Mothers who `must' accept their death, 
's See Asociaciön de las Madres de Plaza de Mayo 1999. 
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but it is the government which has to investigate who did what and punish the guilty 
(Cortinas in Jelin 1985: 33-35). 
Apariciön con vida did (does) not search for the impossible. It rather illuminated the 
complexity brought about by a `disappearance' in terms of identity, death and social 
relations. The disappeared was a non-existent person being: `It is not, neither dead nor 
alive, does not have entity at all' (General Videla, 1979 in La Republica Perdida II). 
The need to bury the dead is not only emotional and psychological but social, and it is 
based on the need for recognition of the temporality of life: `to obliterate its end is to 
obliterate life itself insofar as it cancelled the temporal reality of history' (Beresin 1998: 
71). The recognition of the other as an equal and the recognition of the rights of existence 
are violated not by the interruption of life but by the uncertainty created around one of the 
moments of the cycle of life. The Mothers were tortured by uncertainty. The 
disappearances became political for they created the insecurity of the whole `polis' (see 
Beresin and Kamkhagi in Beresin 1998). The ceaseless mourning implied in the 
impossibility of burying the dead was transformed, by the Mothers' collective claim, into 
an endless moaning for the Apariciön con Vida. 
The Mothers' restless demands opened a contradiction within the state. The mission of 
the Alfonsin administration was the consolidation of democracy. The re-establishment of 
human rights and the punishment of those who had massively violated them were the 
musts in the government agenda. However, `too much democracy' could unleash unrest 
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within the military, and prevent political stability from being achieved. Without political 
stability, economic stability and steady growth, international support would be 
withdrawn. Alfonsin launched his own campaign to undermine the political power of the 
military yet, at the same time, attempting to temper the anxiety and thirst for justice of the 
human rights movements and society in general. 
The government abolished the military self-amnesty law 22.924, sanctioned by the 
military regime in March 1983, by another law 23.040 passed on December 22,1983.79 
After the failure to promote the self-cleansing of the- military by means of a reform of the 
Military Code Law (see Tedesco 1999: 65). Decree 158 of 1983 brought the military to 
trial for the human rights violations of the period 1976-1982. As required by the Mothers 
and the human rights organisations, the government also chartered the CONADEP to 
investigate the fate of the thousands of disappeared people. 
The CONADEP compiled 50,000 pages of documentation with evidence and information 
about abduction, disappearance, torture and executions. During the first four years of 
democratic rule, the victims of abduction and torture as well as their relatives went 
through a painful process of acknowledgement and sharing of the experience of terror 
towards the punishment of the juntas. All is documented in the CONADEP (1984) 
shocking summary. 
79 See Ley de Autoamnistia in www. nuncamas. or 
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The Mothers disliked the rationale behind the CONADEP investigation which was to 
provide the required information for the trials by assuming that the disappeared were 
dead (Guzman Bouvard 1995). The report also produced an expected military unrest 
which the government attempted to solved by the theory of the two devils, and, secondly, 
the due obedience and the further `full stop' bill. Whilst the former equated guerrilla with 
state terrorism, the other two led to the punishment only of the heads of the military 
Juntas. These two actions became the main points of confrontation between Mothers and 
the democratic government since both aparicion con vida and juicio y castigo a los 
culpables were jeopardised. 
The Theory of the Two Evils, `Due Obedience' and the Full Stop Bill 
'The theory of the two evils suggested that radical militants' violence was responsible for 
provoking the anti-subversive military campaigns. The Mothers aimed to keep alive their 
children's struggle for a `better world' by forcing society to exercise its collective 
memory (La Vo_ de los Paiiuelos). Yet, the leaders of Montoneros as well as other 
guerrilla movements were going to be brought to trial too. Thus, the disappeared became 
the victims of both state and guerrilla `terrorism(s)' and their revolutionary project was 
condemned for being either mistaken or violent. 
The public case against the Juntas Militares began on 22 April 1985. The public 
prosecutor Strassera presented the case on the moving evidence provided by the victims 
and their families in 709 cases of abduction, torture and murder, during `17 dramatic 
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weeks of hearings'(Strassera in http: //www. nuncamas. org/document). He accused the 
military of several types of crimes. The sentences for the nine members of the three 
military juntas went from life imprisonment, perpetual disqualification from holding 
public office and loss of military rank to nine years of imprisonment. 80 The trial was a 
unique case in Latin American politics and it was exemplary for human rights militancy 
in the world (Guzman Bouvard 1995: 159). 
But the `due obedience' proposal was extremely controversial. It was based on three 
different levels of responsibility in the violations of human rights: the degree of 
punishment will differ according to the following criteria: those who planned and 
supervised, those who committed `excesses' and those who obeyed orders (Tedesco 
1999: 65). Thanks to this criterion, those who participated in the infrastructure and 
development of state terrorism (e. g. those working in the grupos de tareas and in the 
torture camps) walked free after they and their actions were identified by the 
investigation carried out by the CONADEP. 81 
Facing increasing military unrest, the government passed in December 1986, the Punto 
Final (full stop) law, which set a 60-day deadline for initiating further prosecutions 
(McGuire 1997: 186). The law was sent by the government when the judiciary was on 
holidays to prevent the judges from reacting. Yet the judiciary suspended their holidays 
80 General Videla `was found guilty of 66 counts of homicide, 306 counts of false arrest aggravated by threats and violence, 93 counts of torture, 4 counts of torture followed by death and 26 counts of robbery' (Guzman Bouvard 1995: 160). See complete argument put forward by the public prosecutor as well as the 
sentences in www. nuncamas. orp, /documents, lsoca. htmi. 81 The Law of Due Obedience, 23,521 was passed in June 1987. 
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in some part of the country like Cordoba, Bahia Blanca, Tucuman, Rosario, Mendoza, 
Comodoro Rivadavia and La Plata `in order to clear the backlog of judgements before the 
new law came into force' (Tedesco 1999: 123). 82 
The differences between the government and the Mothers over trials, exhumations and 
pacification took the form of a war `over the substance of democracy' (Guzman Bouvard 
1995: 154). By asking for the `impossible' they confronted the government idea of what 
consolidation of democracy meant. By so doing they became a permanent obstacle to 
stability and the consolidation of democracy. Thus, under the pressure of the military and 
international bodies, the government disclosed a campaign to discredit the Mothers. 
Whilst President Alfonsin explained that `the political objectives of the Mothers did not 
coincide with the national interest', the Minister of the Interior called them the `Mothers 
of terrorists' and the press (La Naciön) also claimed that `the Mothers were exercising 
another kind of terrorism "sentimentalism"--and described them as dangerous' 
(Guzman Bouvard, 1995: 156). 
Although democracy allowed the disappeared to come to light and recover their identity, 
since the punishment of all the guilty did not take place and the revolutionary project was 
equated to state terrorism, the Mothers and human rights militants felt that their children 
were assassinated again, this time by democracy, for the issue was now buried. 
sz `By the date of the deadline of the Punto Final Law, 487 cases had been presented to courts against over 300 officials, 30 per cent of whom were on active duty (Clarin 22.2.87 in Tedesco 1999: 123-24) The 
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A military rebellion caused by the confrontation between different levels of the army 
hierarchy (Tedesco 1999: 124-125) carried out in 1987 by the Carapintadas83 led by 
Captain Rico, brought political instability back. The `Holy Week Rebellion' was 
massively rejected and democracy obtained absolutely massive support by all political 
parties and social, political and labour organisations and led to the Acta de Compromiso 
Democrätico (Democratic Commitment Act). After negotiating with the rebels, President 
Alfonsin stated: `la casa estä en orden' (the house is in order). This famous expression 
epitomised the limits of democracy at the hands of terrorist demands, i. e. capitulation 
(Acuna 1994: 35). 
III 
The Reshaping of Trade Unions: Regaining Power in opposition 
The labour movement emerged out of the 
dictatorial period deeply damaged and 
fragmented. First, the physical 
disappearance of workers and militants 
and the suspension of unions' elections 
favoured the bureaucratisation of the 
leadership and the fragmentation of shop- 
floor struggles (Fernandez, A 1985). 
Secondly, the working class share of national income decreased from 45% in 1974 to 
Punto Final bill was passed thanks to the UCR MPs who where the majority in the House of Deputies. The majority of the MPs from the Peronist Party and very few from the UCR voted against it. 
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30% in 1976, declining to 24% in 1989 (Basualdo, 1992). Deindustrialisation led to a 
decrease of unionised workers by 30% (Fernandez 1985: 95) and the displacement of 
industrial activity towards finances as the most profitable forms of capital (Basualdo 
1992). In addition to the internal migration as well as migration from neighbouring 
countries, the trend towards the informal and black economy, underemployment and 
unemployment (Pozzi and Schneider 1994) resulted in a less homogeneous, less male, 
less industrial, and more state-related and urban working class (Heller and Grana, 1993). 
I 
Thirdly, Peronism went through an ideological crisis particularly marked by the bad 
reputation of Vandorist unionism, and after Montoneros and the AAA experiences, both 
being born in the bosom of the Peronist movement. The crisis increased around the need 
for the trade union leaders to take a position towards the military violations of human 
rights (Fernandez 1985; also Lopez and Lozano 1993). But the institutionalisation of the 
Peronist Party in opposition for the first time in history (McGuire 1997) helped the 
unions to rebuild their opposition capacity (Bisio, 1999: 130). They aimed at the 
reestablishment of the connection between leaders and shop-floor activism and workers, 
the recovering of workers' living standards and wages, and the recomposition of their 
political relationship with Peronism. The three aims were an obstacle to the government's 
attempt at controlling the process of trade union democratisation, stopping inflation, and 
fighting the alliance Peronist Party-Peronist Trade Unions to dilute, co-opt or integrate 
opposition, respectively. 
x3 They painted their faces like soldiers do on the battle field to reaffirm their conditions as soldiers. 
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IV 
The Limits of Democracy: Unions in and Against the State 
The Anti-Peronist Labour Reform: 
The UCR government aimed to `dilute both the political and economic strength of the 
Peronist-dominated CGT' (Richards, 1995: 58) and `democratise' them in order to 
control inflation (Roudil 1993). To democratise the trade unions was, in the government's 
view, to deperonise them (Tedesco 1999). This purpose was sustained by the widespread 
pluralist diagnosis which proclaimed that unions and military corporatism were the major 
causes of political instability. $4 Democracy could be only sustained by means of a 
political engineering towards the full functioning of the party-system (see de Riz in 
Munck with Falcon and Galitelli 1987: 225, O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1988, O'Donnell, 
Schmitter and Whitehead 1986). 
Whilst the crimes against humanity were coming to light in the anteroom of the public 
judgement of the military Juntas, the CGT rejected the government's new Law of 
Professional Associations proposal, which they understood as a direct intervention of the 
government into trade union matters. 85 The law encouraged the reorganisation of trade 
unions `from the bottom to the top... without any influence from the state, the political 
R1 .. 
at on corporatism in Latin America see Wiarda 1981 
0" The CGT had split into two in 1982 when the CNT became the CGT Azopardo and the CGT took the 
name of the street where its headquarters were, CGT Brasil (in opposition) (see chapter 5). Now four 
general secretaries were appointed. Lorenzo Miguel from the `62 organisations' was excluded. The four 
secretaries were the leader of the beer workers Ubaldini and the rubber industry workers' Borda for the 
CGT Brasil and the leader of the plastic industry workers Triaca and Baldassini of the post office workers for the CGT-Azopardo. 
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parties or the business organisations' (Alfonsin 1983 in Tedesco 1999: 71). 86 Ironically, 
the `Mucci law' empowered the Minister of Labour to appoint a delegado normalizador 
(a delegate) who would control the electoral process within trade unions. The delegate 
`would form a Junta Fiscalizadora (Regulation Board)' (Tedesco, 1999: 74). 
The Mucci bill failed to be passed in the chamber of senators where the majority was held 
by Peronists (see Acu>a 1994) and influenced by the CGT leadership. The government 
replaced the Minister of Labour and appointed a delegate in union matters (Barrionuevo) 
and new legislation aiming to normalise elections within trade unions was passed by the 
government. 
Renovation 
In 1982, the working class was extraordinarily mobilised 
by the return of democracy. Resistance increased, 
particularly in state and city councils, railway and 
telephone workers, the renewal of their shop-floor 
delegates and local branch leaders. The new legislation 
facilitated a genuine bottom-up renewal that had been 
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revolutionary and anti-bureaucratic leaders coupled with the emergence of a young new 
shop-floor activism led to a new configuration within the labour movement (see 
86 Like President Illia in 1963, Alfonsin aimed at the democratisation of the shop-floor to break the link 
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Palomino 1985; Pozzi and Schneider 1994; Roudil 1993; McGuire 1997; see De Genaro 
in Calello and Parcero, 1984vo1.85: 252). 
The normalizaciön sindical (Law 23,071 of 1984) led trade unions to go to elections. 
Their results indicated the existence of opposition lists which were constituted to confront 
union bureaucrats. 87 Many of these new groupings won union elections with a high 
percentage of votes by means of the creation of pluralist fronts with the participation of a 
wide political and ideological spectrum (i. e. Peronist, UCR activists, socialists, 
communists and others' (Palomino 1985; also Pozzi and Schneider 1994). There was also 
an increase in workers' participation in union elections. 88 
Leadership within the CGT also recomposed. Three heterogeneous groups co-existed 
within the CGT: the traditional sindicalismo Peronista (Peronist Unionism), the 
Sindicalismo de Base (or anti-bureaucratic `Rank-and-file Trade Unionism)' and Gestiön 
y Trabajo (Palomino 1985). Whilst the two latter constituted an homogeneous group 
close to the CGTA and non-Peronist and democratic political groups respectively 
(Palomino 1985: 48), the Sindicalismo Peronista gathered in the unified CGT was 
heterogeneous. It was composed by the 62 0 that advocated the Vandorist tradition and 
those joining the `25', which emerged as the first opposition group to the military regime. 
The 25 had won elections held in 1984 in three of the largest unions: railway workers 
between Peronism and trade unions (see chapter 4). 87 Whilst in 1973-76,67.4% of the trade union elections took place with the presentation of only one list of 
candidates, in 1984-85 this went down to 21.6% (DIL in Pozzi and Schneider 1994: 47). 88 Going from 53.9% in 1965-68 to 66.3% in 1984-85 (Pozzi and Schneider 1994: 47). 
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(143,000 members), retail clerks (408,000) and state workers (86,000) (McGuire 1997: 
192). 
Ideological differences between the two groups also arose. Whilst Lorenzo Miguel 
argued that he was an anti-leftist, the 25 stood against transnational capital and U. S. 
policy (McGuire 1997: 193). The 25 were also close to the human right issue and `vocal 
advocates for the families of the disappeared' and held the post of Secretary of Human 
Rights within CGT (McGuire 1997: 196). The tense coexistence between the different 
groups within the CGT and the '25' was solved with the emergence of `Ubaldinismo' i. e. 
the leadership of the beer workers Ubaldini from the CGT Brasil, appointed when they 
unified in 1984. This produced a recomposition of alliances between the 62 0 and some 
leaders from the Gestiön & Trabajo grouping (McGuire 1997: 197). 
The Co,: certacidn Social 
After the failure of the Mucci law, the government shifted to a strategy of social 
agreement by means of the creation of the concertaciön social between labour and 
business organisations and the government `to attack inflation and change the economic 
situation' (Tedesco 1999 75). In fact the government's aim was to control trade unions 
and stop labour demands which, during 1984, increased affecting 4.5 million workers 
(Munck et al, 1987: 224; also McGuire 1997: 199). 89 Strike activity was facilitated by the 
89 `Of these 62 occurred in the sugar industry (496 hours lost to capital), 29 took place in the car industry (149 hours lost), 608 hours were lost in the metallurgical sector and 584 in the construction industry' (Munck et a!, 1987: 224). 
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government refusal to endorse collective contracts `that included wage hikes above 
specific ceilings' and by the pressure from the delegates from the interior branches of the 
trade unions joining the CGT (McGuire 1997: 199-200; see Battistini 2000b). 
In order to rebuild political power and achieve wage increases but at the same time show 
capacity for democratic renewal, the CGT agreed to participate in the concertaciön 
process yet it held a Vandorist strategy of hit and negotiate. A general strike strategy (13 
in total), accompanied the acceptance of concertaciön, serving the purposes of opposing 
the government's economic plans, regaining political power and unifying the labour 
movement behind the CGT leadership. The first of the 13 general strikes was carried out 
by the CGT in September 1984 when after giving a wage increase of 18 per cent, the 
government refused to give wage supplements over the increase. 
By February 1985 inflation was growing and the government was under pressure from 
the IMF to stop it in order to renegotiate the external debt. The debt crisis coincided with 
the democratisation of the state but in the context of the decrease of real wages and the 
consequent increase in the rate of exploitation of Latin American labour by both local and 
international capital (several authors in Richards 1997: 23 Pastor and Dymski, 1991). 90 
The politicisation of the issue by the government failed. The first financial arrangements 
between Argentina and international creditors and the IMF over half of the interest on the 
debt amounted to 70% of the country's exports (Drimer 1990). By 1985, the service of 
90 Between 1982-1989 under the WC, `Latin America transferred to developed countries a `net flow of 
resources amounting to 203 billion dollars (Iglesias in Tedesco 1999: 83). 
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the debt and default were both impossible (MacEwan in Richards, 1997: 23, c. f. ECAC 
1990). 
The stabilisation plans launched by the Alfonsin government during his period in office 
highlighted the government's struggle to resist, on the one hand, the imposition of 
international creditors over the domestic economy and, on the other hand, the pressure 
from the CGT in a framework of military unrest. The plans went from a `Keynesian' 
strategy, to a non orthodox plan to control inflation, and from there to the implementation 
of the economic and financial measures imposed by the IMF. 
The Plan Austral 
After the failure of the first heterodox stabilisation plan 
launched by Minister Grinspun in 1983, based on the 
reactivation of the economy, to prevent the rise of 
inflation (Tedesco 1999; Acuna 1994), the 1985 Plan 
Austral aimed directly to diffuse the threat of 
hyperinflation (Fanelli and Frenkel 1990: 194) in order 
to negotiate the external debt without a deep economic 
adjustment. 
i 
Supported by the IMF and the US government, the new plan's seven points (Lewis 1992: 
484) rested upon three main pillars. First, a general wage and price freeze was decreed 
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after a wage increase of 23%. Second, the plan aimed to reduce the fiscal deficit from 
12.8 per cent of GDP to 2.5 per cent. Third, a new currency, the austral (one austral = 
1000 pesos) and the de-indexation of the economy were applied to prevent `inertial' 
inflation (Tedesco, 1999: 103). The CGT reacted against the Plan Austral by publishing a 
document called Los 26 Puntos (the 26 issues) entitled `Defending production and 
employment in order to defeat inflation' and CGT called another general strike for the 29 
August (see Beliz in Tedesco 1999: 116). 
The plan was successful in the short term: inflation fell and the fiscal deficit declined. 
The balance of payments improved and industrial activity grew (see Machinea and 
Fanelli in Tedesco 1999: 105). The support from `highly ranked officials in the U. S. 
government' (Canitrot 1994: 83) and the public judgement of the military juntas led to a 
rise in the government's popularity and its victory in the September 1985 congressional 
elections (Acuna 1994). Namely, the plan Austral seemed to achieved `democracy plus 
stability' (Canitrot 1994: 82). But this was just a remedy for short term stabilisation but in 
no way a deep programme towards economic growth (Tedesco 1999: 104). In October 
the armed forces were given a wage increase of 5%. In order to avoid the idea that this 
was a concession the government also gave an increase to teachers, this time of 25%. 
These political measures undermined the main pillar of the plan Austral: wage control. 
The IMF withdrew its support for the government and economic stabilisation declined 
(see Tedesco 1999: 106). 
The withdrawing of support meant that, insofar as the plan was `bolstered by the 
refinancing of the current external debt in exchange for the payment of debt 
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arrears'(Canitrot 1994: 83), the government needed a plan to reduce the fiscal deficit. 
This was done by the state reform and the attempts at the privatisation of public assets 
(Acura, 1994: 35). 
The shop-floor 
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privatisation. 1 The struggle against 
branches of the unions joining `the 
were going through a process of 
democratisation encouraged by the 
started a furious campaign to resist 
the privatisation of 49% of the 
telephone company ENTeI as well 
Aerolineas Argentinas by minister 
elaborating alternative proposals to 
privatisation led to a deeper union organisation 
renewal. In many cases, the shop-floor and local leadership confronted the national 
leadership of those unions. In others, alliances between historical `enemies' were 
constituted to fight the Alfonsin reform of the state. Most of the renewal of the trade 
union leadership took place in the public sector and state-owned enterprises and there 
was a democratic yet nationalistic euphoria in defence of public and state assets by 
workers and the trade unions (see next chapter). 
In November 1985, workers joining the UOM (metallurgical), the UOCRA 
(construction), AOT (textile) and LF and UF (railway) were pressing for wage increases 
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(Tedesco 1999: 116). The CGT centralised these fragmented demands and called another 
general strike to be held in January 1986. In February 1986, a second attempt at 
stabilisation was launched. Alfonsin announced the new stages in front of a massive 
demonstration in the Plaza de Mayo. In April 1986, price control was abandoned for a 
price administration and nominal wages (private sector) could be increased (Tedesco 
1999: 109) But going further seemed to be, like apariciön con vida, impossible. In March 
and June two more general strikes organised by the CGT rejected new economic 
measures and demanded a wage increase. 
The Bureaucratic Pact 
The government shifted to co-optation by first encouraging negotiations between trade 
unions and employers without the intervention of the CGT and, secondly, by creating a 
pact with the most orthodox sector of the labour movement (Goldin 1997 in Freytes Frey 
1999: 199). The 15, constituted by leaders from the 62, the 25 and Ubaldinismo, belonged 
to big industrial unions and aimed at their integration into the state. They rejected the 
CGT general strike strategy and constituted a bureaucratic pact with the government 
(Munoz and Campione 1994: 105). The pact led one of its leaders Alderete, from the 
light and power workers, to be appointed as the Minister of Labour in 1987. 
The bureaucratic pact was undermined by two more general strikes on December 9, and 
April 14 (Tedesco 1999: 153-54) carried out by CGT and by the confrontation between 
91 See AA's privatisation in Badia et al 1992; Dinerstein 1993, Thwaites Rey 1993; 1994, chapter 7 of this 
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the Labour Minister Alderete and the Economics Minister Sourrouille on labour 
legislation. Minister Alderete was replaced by Tonelli after the electoral defeat of the 
UCR in parliamentary elections. 
The Plan Primavera 
A new plan attempting to control inflation and to establish an alliance with the most 
important industrial organisations was launched in 1988. The Plan Primavera was based 
on an agreement with the Union Industrial Argentina (Argentine Industrial Union, UTA) 
and CAC. It reduced the rate of inflation by the use of the exchange rate `as a brake on 
internal prices'. The plan was supported by the IMF and the WB but rejected by the 
`agriculture and livestock associations' (Acuna 1994: 36). 
At the same time, metallurgical workers started an `indefinite strike which represented a 
loss of 1.5 per cent of GDP. The Economics Minister Sourrouille authorised the private 
sector to transfer the costs of the wage increase to price rises. `After 33 days of the strike, 
the agreement determined in August 1988 a wage increase of 48 per cent which would be 
paid in different steps (Gaudio and Thompson in Tedesco 1999: 118; Acuna 1994: 36). 
Two more general strikes demanding a general wage increase followed on October 9 and 
January 26 1987. 
thesis). 
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The CGT attempted not only to win wage increases and free collective bargaining but to 
unify the labour movement (e. g. control the UOM) against the IMF. The IMF and 
international actors `lost confidence in the Plan Primavera. The government was not 
meeting the IMF targets and could not reduce the fiscal deficit'. In April 1988 Argentina 
`decided to unilaterally suspend the service of the debt without declaring a unilateral 
moratorium... but continued negotiations' (Tedesco 1999: 134-135). 
V 
Crisis, Hyperinflation and Distrust: the Terrorism of Money 
The Plan Primavera collapsed in July 1989 `when wholesale and retail prices 
skyrocketed 208.2 and 196.6 percent, respectively.. .. During the period spanning the 
plan's initial application in August 1988 through the end of July 1989, retail prices rose 
3,610 percent, while wholesale prices increased 5,061 percent' (Acuna 1994: 37). The US 
government withdrew its support for the Alfonsin government till elections were held 
(Canitrot 1994: 86). The suspension of $350 million credit, and `a run against the austral 
due to the approaching elections and the uncertainty of the economic strategy of Carlos 
Menem' (Tedesco 1999: 141 led to a break of the alliance between the UTA and the CAC 
and the government, and the resignation of Economics Minister Sorrouille: `The value of 
the dollar in the parallel market nearly tripled during these months (Acuna, 1994: 37). 
A new capitalist grouping, the `group of the 8' (UTA, CAC, Association of Banks of 
Buenos Aires [ADEBA], Chamber of Construction, Commerce Stock, Union of the 
Construction, SRA and Association of Banks of Argentina [ABRA]) proposed to the 
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government and the new Economics Minister Pugliese a plan based on an improvement 
of exports and reduction of the fiscal deficit (Tedesco, 1999: 145). In May 1989, Carlos 
Menem, from the Renovaciön wing of Peronism won general elections with 47 % of the 
votes (see Tedesco 1999: 146; Martinez, 0 1991). After wining elections while Alfonsin 
was still in office, Menem proposed some measures to favour the international creditors 
and the agricultural sector, i. e. Alfonsin's enemies (Tedesco 1999: 146). After this 
metamorphosis, which paralysed the trade unions and all those who expected a populist 
programme, uncertainty and instability grew. 
The distrust in the national currency led to a very low dollar supply and an extremely 
high demand. The crisis appeared as an increasing demand for dollars and the exhaustion 
of the central bank capacity to fill that demand. The same banks that had facilitated the 
creation of the external debt in Argentina were now closing the `circle of madness' by the 
manipulation of money as a means of social discipline. 92 With this action, the exploitative 
nature of capitalist social relations were temporarily (openly) de-fetishised since the 
national currency was unable to perform as the sound means of exchange, and therefore 
to reproduce the social imagery of exchange among equals in a free market: `the 
incapacity of central bank authorities to contain it does not have another explanation but 
92 `The Republic of New York Bank bought US$ 35 million; The French bank, US$ 24; Morgan, US$ 24; 
Citibank, US$ 20; Chase Manhatan, USS 8 and among national banks, Credito Argentino bought US$ 14 
million, and Provincia de Buenos Aires US$ 7 million (Majul 1990 in Tedesco 1999: 142). In chapter 5 it 
was argued `the total amount of credit required by the poorer countries has been calculated at $40 billion in 1976, while about 50% of the profits of the major US banks now come from loans to these same countries - 
a situation which makes it unlikely that moratoria will be widely permitted' (Marazzi 1996: 86). The same banks, like the Chase Manhattan Bank, were producing the economic coup d'etat. 
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the loss of unanimity on which money is founded, and which plays a catalytic role' 
(Aglietta and Orleans 1984: 184). 
The Central Bank suspended sales in February 1989 and the price of the dollar exploded. 
Inflation followed. `The exchange rate of the dollar rose from 14.7 australes in February 
to 650 australes in July. The Central Bank's exhausted foreign currency reserves were 
replenished in just a few days. Some referred to this inflationary episode and its 
denouement as a "market coup d'etat"' (Canitrot 1994: 86) This `economic terrorism' 
(Martinez, 0 1991) must be regarded as the national expression of the `monetary 
terrorism', whose `first consequence is a loss of autonomy of national states and which 
makes the shift of state power to the world level - the level at which monetary terrorism 
operates' (Marazzi, 1996: 85, author's emphasis). 
Hyper-inflation proved that money is constitutive of social relations and not just the 
means of exchange. Inflation is not a distortion produced by monetary expansion or the 
pressure of organised labour for wage increases (Tedesco, 1999: 87) but rather a 
`particular manifestation, within a given historical context, of the social divisions and 
conflicts which such an economy tends always to generate' (Goldthorpe in Tedesco 1999: 
87). Under the form of hyperinflation, money ceased to be the efficient means of 
exchange to become the means of uncertainty. Looting, police repression, the middle 
classes' discontent, financial speculation and the pressure from international bodies and 
banks meant that some of Alfonsin's advisers `warned that the collapse of the economy 
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could actually lead to a social explosion' (Latin American Weekly Report, 1.6.89). 93 The 
Alfonsin administration ended with the resignation of the President before completing his 
term of office, forced by new military uprisings, the unrest of human rights militants, the 
Peronist unions and the international creditors allied with the Peronist Party. 
Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I investigated the emergence and reshaping of subjectivity by the Mothers 
of the Plaza de Mayo as well as the labour movement during the period 1983-1989. 
During the democratic period, demands and resistance which emerged in and against 
physical legal and economic repression during 1976-82 were legitimised and expanded. 
The human rights and the labour movement constituted the basis for the consolidation of 
democracy. Mothers emerged out of the physical elimination of labour into a form which 
appears to be of another kind since it is classified as another kind by the state, i. e. human 
rights. Although the Mothers' cannot be considered as the struggle of the working class, I 
argued that the significance of their struggle lay in that they emerged within the process 
of recomposition of capital and the consequent struggle over the form of subjectivity, 
took over the struggle of their children and by so doing they became a barrier to the 
recomposition of the state and capital. The Mothers' demands became subversive as they 
implied not only the recognition of the revolutionary struggle of the past decade but 
asserted itself as a barrier to political stability vis-ä-vis the military claims for recognition 
of their action and the US government demand of governability. 
23 On looting during 1989-90 see lnigo Carreras et a! 1995. 
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On the other hand, democracy allowed the reorganisation and renewal of the labour 
movement which had gone through a deep crisis during the 1970s. New trade unionism 
grew and organised around democratic claims and struggle against the union 
bureaucracy. It was shown that the popular claim of national independence as well as 
distribution of income in favour of workers was also seen as subversive and the source of 
instability vis-a-vis the IMF and international bodies and banks to make the external debt 
effective and achieve economic stability. Like `Apariciön con vida, the CGT `s 
`Defending production and employment in order to defeat inflation' became the barrier to 
achieve stability under the new rules of global money. 
I argued that during this period class struggle took the form of a struggle over the 
meaning and content of democracy. It was suggested that the transition to democracy 
could not be grasped by focusing on the transformation of the political regime. I proposed 
that the struggle over democracy was the political expression of a deeper transformation 
underpinning the transformation of the political regime. Namely, the struggle over the 
subjectivity of labour towards the legalisation (democratisation) of the terrorism of 
money. Pluralist analysis pictured the period of transition to democracy in Latin America 
as a problem of gobernability (Dos Santos 1996), i. e. as a simultaneous `process of 
democratisation of the political regime that was tending to be politically inclusive', and a 
`process of modernisation of the state that was tending to produce social exclusion' 
(Calderon and dos Santos 1990). 9 However, in order to pose the right question, 
94 Also Colombo and Palermo 1984; Tula, J 1990; Alfonsin 1985; Alfonsin in Pinto 1988; Floria in Pinto 
1988 vol. 2; de Riz in Oszlak 1985, Portantiero in Oszlak, 1985; Morlino in Pinto 1988, vol. 3; Lechner 1990, Acuna 1994. 
183 
democracy has to be seen as the deeply embedded political form of the social relation of 
capital. These accounts fail in grasping the transformation of the political sphere as one 
aspect of the crisis and reshaping of the capital relation, wherein subjectivity, in their, 
words `social actors', are the central issue. 
Although human rights' and unions' struggles could be perceived as two discrete issues, 
the separation is the result of the separation between the political and the economic 
spheres which underpins capital and is reaffirmed by liberal democracy. This separation 
imposed limits to the Mothers and the unions' strategies yet both forms of social 
subjectivity were unified by the struggle over the form of subjectivity, namely by the 
struggle for recognition and for visibility after more than seven years of physical 
disappearance and economic and political exclusion in and against the democratic state. 
Alfonsin's period in office crystallised the apex of the struggle of global monetarism over 
the political. The external debt and the pressure from international creditors and bodies 
for stabilisation plans were not just constraints to democracy, but defined a particular 
form of it, since they provided the specific material form to be articulated with the 
political regime. The discussion is not formal or participatory democracy but a more 
fundamental one: that of the fore: of the political vis-ä-vis the increasing legitimisation of 
the terrorism of money. In 1991 the Menem administration put an end to economic 
instability. Yet, as will be shown in the next chapters, the stability of the 1990s was not 
achieved through economic growth and participating democracy, but the result of the 
legitimisation and legalisation of the global terrorism of money under the form of 
Stability. 
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Part II 
Deconstructing Labour. 
Stability and the Violence of Stability. 
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Chapter Seven 
Privatisation, Decentralisation and the Politicisation of Class Conflict 
(the Struggle over the Form of the State) 
The While Tent for Dignity not only 
represents teachers' demands but 
embodies the critical situation of the 
whole country ... In two month more 
than 300,000 people have visited it 
to bring their solidarity' (CTA 
Capital no 1, June 1997, Buenos 
Aires: 3). 
The process of privatisation was 
: µj hard for those who opposed it from 
within. In Gas del Estado, the 
opposition at the work place 
`I want to stress once again that my friends and 
mates, the workers will cease to be mere 
spectators to become the main actors in this 
process of transformation in Argentina' 
(President Menem, 8.6.91,111 Congress 
UOYPEP, San Juan in Pc gina/l2,9.7.9 1: 5) 
'In a practical day-to day sense state workers are 
the state' (LEWRG, 1980: 77). 
`The government has institutionally broken the 
structures which prevented the transformation of 
the state from taking place. Many things were 
not done optimally. The Law of Economic 
Emergency --of my authorship wasn't a 
democratic law. But it had to be issued ... it was necessary in order to make progress towards a 
deeper transformation' (M Ikonicoff). 
'I resisted till the end. But if I did not go, my 
mates would have become the victims of my 
action ... They were not going to stop until they had destroyed the last one' (shop floor 
representative, Gas del Estado, author's interview, 1996). 
organised by the Lista Gris had to confront a 
powerful enemy since the trade union 
confederation was the best ally for both 
government and managers. Many things were at 
stake: contracting out, deregulated services and 
the management of the millionaire share 
property programme for state workers. This 
enemy would (did) not hesitate in using any 
method available to 'convince' workers that 
privatising the second most profitable state- 
owned company in the country was the best 
option. The 'war' for and against this 
privatisation entailed for me the form of direct 
and everyday intimidation at the workplace and 
outside it coupled with the dismissal of my 
husband, my confinement to a sector two hours 
away from my house without any assigned task, 
and a wage decrease. Most of us were forced to 
move on... to the other 'war' that was taking 
place outside the workplace. in the streets of 
Buenos Aires and at the roadblocks in the 
interior of the country. They were experienced as 
chaotic forms of protest, but also as a new form 
of saying 'enough' to capital's expansive power 
of destruction. 
The reform of the state in Argentina was one of the fundamental processes leading to 
the transformation of the subjectivity of labour. Public administration perspectives 
understand privatisation and decentralisation as technical processes, i. e. neutral 
administrative tools towards the improvement of efficiency and efficacy in the 
provision and administration of public services and social policies on behalf of the 
community. 95 Others contest this view by considering these policies as political 
strategies to relocate the bases of social domination and legitimisation by reorganising 
the distribution of power within the state and in society. 96 Finally, privatisation and 
decentralisation are regarded as instruments of macroeconomic policy aiming to 
reduce the external debt and alleviate the fiscal deficit. The role of the state is 
9' transformed in the light of the pressure of global capital . 
An extensive literature on labour studies has addressed the various aspects of the 
transformation of labour vis-ä-vis the recomposition of the state. Research focuses on 
trade unions, the transformation of industrial relations, as well as regional effects of 
privatisation and the economic adjustment on the labour market and forms of 
employment in a context of social exclusion and poverty including the study of social 
protest (see the next chapters) . 
The reform of the state involved the policies of privatisation of state-owned 
companies, the administrative and financial decentralisation of health and education 
95 See CLAD 1992, Oszlak 1994 (ed. ), Klisberg 1984, La Serna 1988, Basco et a! 1988, Ilchman 1984, Vickers and Yarrow 1993, Calleja 1992, Donahue 1989. 96 See the tension between political and administrative aspects of both policies in IDEP 1998; Oszlak 
and O'Donnell 1982. See the effects of privatisation and decentralisation on individuals and social 
groups (Rozas y Reveco in Minsburg 1993: 94). See the crisis of social policy, the problem of Federalism and the fiscal pact in Ilevia 1991, Tenti 1990, Isuani and Tenti 1989, Isuani 1991, Lo Vuolo 1990a, 1990b, Marshall 1988, Campanini eta! 1993, Grassi eta! 1994. 
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services, the redefinition of the fiscal pact between central and provincial 
governments, the restructuring of the public sector and central and provincial state 
apparatuses. It also comprised the freeze of wages and the regulation of collective 
agreements and the restriction or even cancellation of state subsidies and protection of 
national capital. 
This chapter focuses on the privatisation of state-owned companies and the financial 
and administrative decentralisation of the education system. It will be shown that the 
recomposition of the state and state-policy making emerged out of the struggle over 
the form of subjectivity and comprised the deconstruction of the identification of 
workers with the national interest, of the relation between the trade unions and the 
state and of the institutional forms of resistance. Although privatisation and 
decentralisation were supposed to reduce the level of politicisation of labour conflict 
as well as fragment workers' and unions' struggles, they led rather to the politicisation 
and nationalisation of workers' demands, articulated by new organisations like the 
Central de los Trabajadores Argentinos CTA and new forms of resistance like the 
White Tent of Dignity. 
The exploration of the deconstruction and recomposition of the form of labour 
affecting particularly workers in state-owned companies, central and decentralised 
administration, and public services in the areas of health and education (Orlansky and 
Orciani 1994: 9) is explored in five sections. Section I addresses the historical 
background and the main features of the process of privatisation and decentralisation 
of education during the 1980s and the 1990s. Section II focuses on the politics of 
97 See Basualdo 1992, Sanchez 1993. Azpiazu and Basualdo 1995, Yarrow 1999, Vickers and Yarrow 
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depoliticisation and decentralisation launched by the government at the political, 
industrial relations and shop-floor levels to neutralise resistance and deconstruct the 
existing forms of labour. Section III addresses the reshaping of trade unions into two 
main forms: the CGT business trade unionism and the CTA opposition. Section IV 
approaches one of the main forms of struggle emerging as a new form of politics of 
resistance: roadblocks and the White Tent organised by teachers on hunger strike. 
Finally, in the conclusion I assess the notion of the power of trade unions in the light 
of the transformation of the forms of resistance produced in and against the 
recomposition of the state. 
I 
The Recomposition of the State in the 1980s and the 1990s 
The urge to stabilise the economy and to solve the debt crisis and the fiscal deficit 
pushed the Alfonsin administration to introduce privatisation in the government 
agenda (see Boeker 1993). Deindustrialisation and financial valorisation of capital 
had led to the lowest levels of investment ever (Basualdo 1994: 28-9; also 1992). By 
1983, most state-owned companies showed a high financial deficit, low productivity, 
growing debt, technological anarchy and long term disinvestments (Gerchunoff and 
Canovas in Margheritis 1999: 125). The crisis of the state presented an opportunity 
for the pescados gordos (big cats) who emerged and grew through the use of state 
subsides, cheap or free services from state-owned enterprises, state credit and tax 
exemption between 1975 and 1981 (see Margheritis, 1999). 98 
1993, Gerchunoff 1993, Lozano 1999b, Minsburg 1993, Rojze, 1991, Pirker 1991, Keifman 1991, Rocco and Minsburg 1991, Suarez and Kozulj 1991, Thwaites Rey et a! 1995. 99 e. g. Techint, Perez Companc, Soldatti, Bunge & Born, Loma Negra. 
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However, under Alfonsin, privatisation failed owing to the impossibility to stabilise 
the economy. Strong workers, unions and political opposition in defence of national 
interest and sovereignty contributed to this. 1988 marked the highest number of 
strikes (949) of the decade, the reasons being the worsening of wages and working 
conditions in the public sector and the attempt at privatisation. 99 
In 1989 privatisation and decentralisation became the two chief issues of the 
programme supervised by the WB, which intervened directly in its implementation 
(Fuchs, 1993: 147; Sanchez, 1991; Narodowski 1991; see introduction to this thesis). 
In the government's rhetoric, the improvement of the quality of public services, the 
promotion of economic efficiency, and the democratisation and generation of new 
investments in key areas like education were the priorities. The privatising and 
decentralising solutions to the state crisis presupposed in abstraction `the existence of 
an inefficient public sector within an efficient society and an efficient economy' 
(Madoery, 1990: 80; also Yarrow, 1999; Vickers and Yarrow 1991,1993). Beyond 
rhetoric, the projects of privatisation and decentralisation sought to achieve 
macroeconomic stabilisation, the reduction of the fiscal deficit and the re-negotiation 
of the external debt with the IMF 
Two emergency macro laws provided the legal framework for privatisation and the 
restructuring of the state. The Law of Reform of the State (23,696 of 1989) declared 
an administrative emergency of the state in the provision of public services for a one- 
year period, established the legal framework for the privatisation of state-owned 
99 The unions which led the conflict in 1986,1987 and 1988 were the Asociacion dc Trabajadores del Estado (ATE) and the Union Personal de la Nacion (UPCN), CTERA and FOETRA (Federacion de Obreros y Empleados Telefonicos de la Republica Argentina) (Orlansky and Orciani, 1994). 
190 
companies and 'gave the executive the function and faculties to scrap (desguazar) the 
state by decree' (Lozano and Feletti, 1991: 132; IDEP 1993b). The law established 
the Property Share Programme (PPP) for workers in those companies to be privatised. 
It gave the executive the power to rationalise the public sector (by reducing 'over- 
staffing' and eliminating 'unprofitable sectors'). 
The law of Economic Emergency (23,697 of 1989) restricted the possibility for any 
administrative unit to hire employees in public sector and state-owned enterprises and 
authorised the executive to undertake policies towards efficiency and productivity in 
the public sector. The law also allowed the government to revise the employment 
regimes and labour contracts within public administration and state-owned companies 
and to modify the amount of redundancy payment in case of unjustified dismissal 
established in the LCT no 20,744 (IDEP, 1993b). Privatisation was a good `option' 
for external creditors, local and foreign investors (Basualdo 1994a: 30) and also for 
the government, which was under pressure from foreign creditors trying to collect 
debt payment in arrears and therefore wanted to re-establish the state's cash flow and 
put the foreign accounts in order (Gerchunoff 1993: 18-19; Goldin, 1997: 9). It 
offered the possibility to achieve a quick reduction of the external debt by means of 
debt-equity swap (Fuchs 1993; Keifman 1991). 
The ambitious and accelerated programme sold most of the 93 state-owned companies 
in 4 years. 100 Whilst only 7 capitalist corporations were benefited by privatisation 
100 The first phase (1989-1991) included the sale of the telephone company ENTeI and Aerolineas Argentinas, but also TV channels, some railway branches and national oil reserves. After the implementation of the Plan of Convertibility by the Economics Minister Cavallo, in a second phase (1991-1993) it included the privatisation of electricity, gas, metallurgy, water, the rest of the railways, subways, oil and hydroelectric energy (see Margheritis, 1999: 130; Sanchez, 1993, Goldin, 1997). 
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(Sanchez, M 1993: 39 and 42)101, by 1993 there had been 280,509 job lost, with a cost 
to the state of 2,035 million dollars in `voluntary redundancy', the latter financed 
by 
the national treasury and credit from international bodies (Goldin, 1997: 73). 
Privatisation was accompanied by strict provincial economic adjustment, reinforced 
by the fiscal pacts I and 11 reached between the central and provincial governments in 
August 1992 and 1993 (Axelrad, 1998: 103), 102 which aimed to reduce the fiscal 
deficit by means of three measures: i. the reform of the revenue-sharing system 
towards the restriction of provincial revenues, which obliged local administrations to 
share the deficit of the national pension system (through their 15% contribution) and 
to reduce expenditure (from revenue sharing) by 10% (Feletti and Lozano 1992: 16; 
see Richards 1997); ii. the rationalisation and privatisation of official provincial 
banks; iii. and the financial and administrative decentralisation of the provision of 
health and education aimed to alleviate the national budget. 
The Law 24,049 of 1992 allowed the transference of secondary and tertiary education 
to the provincial and the city of Buenos Aires county halls (Campanini et al 1993). 
Decentralisation was presented as a democratic instrument per se. However it left 
local governments of several provinces and districts unable to pay wages in time, and 
incapable of delivering public services properly. The Menem administration aimed to 
achieve fiscal balance `by devolving greater responsibility to provincial governments 
101 Perez Companc, Soldatti, Astra, Techint, Benito Roggio, Citibank, Macri. Redundancy was 
distributed as follows: 26% railways, 16.5% telephone companies, 13.3% oil company, 8.1% 
electricity, 8.1% Somisa, 3.8% AA, 3.3% water and the rest to other privatised companies). 114,538 (40.8%) out of the 280,000 left the public sector through voluntary redundancy (Goldin, 1997: 73). 102 The decrees 435,612 and 1757 of 1990 allowed the reduction of the public sector staff (IDEP 1993b: 78) by means of the suspension of overtime hours, the suspension of promotions, and forcing 
retirement on those of pension age and the freeze of vacancies and job opportunities (Goldin, 1997: 27; Recalde, Pdgina/12,8.3.90). On Fiscal Pact see Carciofi 1990 
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to provide social services at the same time that federal revenue sharing has been cut' 
(Richards, 1997: 34). 
The `provincialisation' of the education system reinforced the inequality in working 
conditions and wages (Paviglianitti in Campanini et al 1993: 19). The transference 
increased political disputes related to teachers' working conditions, wage differences 
and health services. In addition, the new Federal Law of Education passed in 1993 
which aimed at the `modernisation' of education became, together with 
decentralisation, the most important reason for the labour struggles in the sector. 
Teachers' unions indicated that insofar as 90% of the investment in education was 
invested in wages, in conditions of uneven development and poverty, with lean and 
overdue wages the restructuring of the education system was impossible to be 
undertaken. They opposed the financial sources for the reform, i. e. the fondos 
coparticipables since they came from regressive taxation rather than direct taxation 
on wealth and profit. They also questioned the fiscal pacts agreed between the central 
and provincial governments that sustained the transference (Grassi et al 1994: 96) and 
/warned 
of the potential distributive struggle between the provinces and the nation- 
state as well as among provinces, and of the danger of large differentiation in wages 
and working conditions among teachers (Campanini et al 1993: 32). 
II 
The Politics of Depoliticisation 
The Anti-Strike Decree 
During the period 1989-1990, state workers and unions became the major barrier to 
the privatisation euphoria of the Menem administration. By 1990, the telephone 
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workers joining the FOETRA as well as the aeronautic workers joining the 
Asociaci(in de Personal Aer-onciutico APA were engaged in a massive campaign to 
defend their companies. '()' Strikes, demonstrations and public campaigns in defence 
of public enterprises and the central role of the state in the provision of health and 
education (and against the `scrapping' of the state organised by telephone, airline 
workers, see below) and the public sector, particularly by teachers, spread. In April 
1990, a massive strike organised by railway workers joining LF joined the struggle 
and paralysed a major part of public transport of the country (see Battistini, 1999). 
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The strike constituted a turning point in the 
relationship between the state and trade unions. 
The government decided to regulate the right to 
strike in the public sector (Battistini, 1999: 275- 
6, Lopez Artemio and Lozano C 1990). Coupled 
with coercion at the work place and suppression 
of union militancy from the Ministry of Labour 
managed by Triaca, a former leader of the CGT. 
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the proposal aimed at the cleppoliticisation Of 
labour conflict and the deconstruction of the political role of state workers and their 
union leadership as the guardians of the national interest. This would lead, first, to the 
achievement of a stable framework to offer to the buyers; secondly to `privatise the 
labour conflict' and, thirdly, to divide the labour movement at the political level, and 
therefore neutralise and fragment opposition at the shop-floor level (Falcon, 1993). 
10' The defence of I-NTel included wage increases, investments and the participation of the unions in 
the company matters, and pointed to corruption (IDEP I998) and the eakness of the government to 
exact a fair \alue for its assets' and the role of the debt in reshaping the profile of Argentine 
capitalism (Adelman 1994: 1{7: El Tele/onico, several issues). See issues on valuation of assets in 
Adelman. 1994 S7: also Lozano 1999b: Gutierrez, 1995: 3l; Sanchez 1993.11. Nladoer\, 1990. 
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On 17`h October 1991 the executive issued the'anti -strike' Decree (2,184). Symbolism 
aside, the decree forced the companies to provide minimum (essential) services during 
industrial disputes, the former being determined by the executive power. Workers' 
refusal to work in minimum services during the strike would be considered as a 
justified cause for dismissal. The executive power could force workers to provide 
essential services by means of the security forces. Those public services considered as 
essential were health services and hospitals, transport, provision of water, electricity, 
gas, telecommunications, as well as justice and education at all levels. 
Fighting the Public Powers 
In the case of the privatisation of AA not only the workers and unions but also 
democratic procedures became a barrier to the quick privatisation restructuring of the 
state. APA led the opposition by demanding an air transportation policy which 
defended state property. Their criticism was, firstly, that the sale-price did not cover 
even the cost of the twenty-nine Boeings. 104 Secondly, the legal contradiction in 
creating a commercial association with State minority participation. Thirdly, that 
nobody knew either the economic situation of the buyer nor the real global assets of 
AA. Fourth, that the company was profitable, efficient and in no way was it a 
monopoly. Fifth, that privatisation was immoral because they were really selling the 
national sovereignty; but above all because it was an uncertain transaction within 
which the national state had few possibilities to gain benefits. Sixth, that the 
Government had no idea what would happen to air transportation policy after the sale. 
Seventh, the real and significant reduction in the external debt was doubted. Eighth, 
104 This fact had been recognised by the buyers themselves who had said that certainly, with the sale of 
six Boeings, they would be able to pay the debt to the national state. 
that the Shared Property Programme PPP (see later) was a fraud. Ninth, that the 
government sold the company taking charge of its previous debts hence providing the 
new owners with a tidy company that had no existing debts (Aerogremial, several 
issues). 10S The campaign organised by APA and the National Commission of 
Aeronautic Workers Unions created in 1988 involved many strategies: workshops in 
the streets of Buenos Aires to encourage a public debate; radio and press; mass 
pickets at the workplace; regular mass meetings and demonstrations legal appeals to 
the Courts against Decree 1591 (Aerogremial, January 1990), 106 and the publication 
of documents based on technical research which suggested ways of improving 
efficiency without privatising. 107 The unions also provided broad and detailed 
information about privatisation for the press, radio and to the Comisiön Bicameral de 
Seguimiento de las Privatizaciones (CBSP) such as dossiers, research papers and 
data. 108 
Given the high level of social mobilisation around AA's case and the pressure against 
the sale by the judiciary, political parties, MPs and unions, the Supreme Court of 
Justice, under the government pressure, used the Per saltum, to allowed the sale- 
process to go on, this being an extraordinary resource that the Supreme Court uses 
only in an emergency case, when the security of the nation would be in danger. By so 
doing, the Supreme Court went over all the other constitutional powers and 
103 See 'Abdala y Guaragna polemizan sobre privatizaciones' in CASH, Ptigina/12 12.5.91 106 APA, created in 1946, represents all the employees who work on the ground (4,000 workers); 
APTA is composed by personnel repairing planes (1,000); AAA are the non-technical flying staff: air 
hostesses and air stewardess; APLA is the pilots' union (600); ATVLA are the technical flying staff 
(100); UPSA is the high level management union; UPADEP is the union of workers who belong to 
foreign enterprises; ATEPSA is formed by air traffic control employees who belong to the Air Force. 107 The papers charted issues such as external debt, management efficiency, including some suggestions 
on the autonomy of management, another concept of `enterprise', and the importance of labour 
participation in policy making. 
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institutions of the democratic political regime to allow IBERIA to be chosen as the 
only buyer in a very corrupted process. 109 
Paving the Way: Flexibilisation at the workplace and the Decentralisation of 
Collective Bargaining 
The features of industrial relations at the shop-floor level in state-owned enterprises 
were a barrier to selling the companies. State-owned enterprises possessed almost no 
financial or management autonomy, but had a close relation to the state which 
subordinated their finances and management to political or economic objectives, i. e. 
cheap services to the widest sector of the population (Tomada and Senen Gonzalez C, 
1998), or lower service prices to capitalists. This subsidiary role was assured by the 
centralisation of bargaining and a high level of unionisation among workers, who 
enjoyed some additional benefits which made them a special category within the 
working class. 
Most transnational corporations conditioned their participation in the sales to the 
reaching of collective agreements before privatisation (Tomada 1999: 185). 
Significant changes (instrumental at first, but legalised by collective agreements 
latter) modified employment and working conditions as well as industrial relations in 
the public sector and state-owned enterprises subjected to privatisation. The union 
bureaucracy signed collective agreements in their respective branches to allow the 
changes related to the lengthening of working hours, flexibilisation, functional 
polyvalence, fragmentation, decrease in staff members by 40% or more by means of 
108 The parliamentary commission (Comisiön Bicameral de Seguimiento de las Privatizaciones), was 
created by Law 23,696 and was composed of 6 senators and 6 deputies to control the application of the 
law and the process of privatisation. 
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voluntary redundancy, dismissals and early retirement, the losing of some components 
of the salary and the introduction of temporary jobs according to the 1991 New 
Employment Act (NLE) (Tomada and Senen Gonzalez C 1998: 132-136; Tomada, 
1999: 186-188; Bisio et a! 1999). Whilst these collective agreements neutralised 
labour conflict at the branch level, they did not stop the increasing unrest and conflict 
at the level of the enterprise, where a climate of uncertainty and coercion under a new 
and foreign management coupled with the recomposition of trade union activism 
against bureaucracy was widespread. 
From Proletarios to Propeeaarios: 110 the Logic of Money into the State 
The PPP included in the Law 23696 enabled state workers to became the holders of 
10% of the shares of the ex state-owned enterprise. The PPP has been considered by 
many as the carrot of privatisation since it constituted a tool for the co-optation of 
union leaders (Goldin, 1997: 43; Furman in Pagina/12 1994; Ramirez 1999). The 
programme created business, aimed to control workers' resistance, as well as improve 
discipline and productivity. In 1994 more than 70,000 workers in the 30 privatised 
enterprises owned shares valued at 2,150 million dollars. 
However, the PPP posited major contradictions at the heart of the state-owned 
companies. The first one being the contradiction between being simultaneously a 
worker and a shareholder. As shareholders, workers were supposed to be interested in 
reducing the labour costs and improving the productivity and efficiency of the 
company. This clashed with the workers' rights and resistance: `things that [were] 
109 For a complete analysis of this privatisation see Thwaites Rey 1999,1994,1993 and Badia et al 
198 
convenient for the shareholder, [were] not convenient for the worker, for instance to 
reduce the labour costs! ' (Ruiz, 1996 and Moreno 1996 author's interviews; Lozano L 
et al 1992: 21 and 41). This destroyed solidarity and identities, changed the 
relationship of workers and trade unions with the management, and deeply affected 
the trade union as a workers' organisation. 
The second contradiction brought about by the PPP was that, since the law did not 
make explicit how to organise the PPP, but only suggested the trade union as the 
`natural organisation' to do it, ' 11 the PPP disclosed a war between those trade union 
leaders `designated' by the government to deal with the millionaire PPP and the rank- 
and-file opposition. ' 12 Whilst through the negotiations with the government, the state 
labour bureaucracy benefited from unionised shares (syndicates), that is, the workers 
obtained the right to have a workers' director within the executive of the PPP to 
represent workers' interests, the rank-and-file opposition either used the PPP to fight 
the union bureaucracy by winning the syndicates or rejected the involvement of the 
union in business. 
The case of the privatisation of Gas de Estado is illustrative in many respects. 113 it 
was achieved by two corrupted actions. First, an electoral fraud in the main union, 
organised by the bureaucracy and supported by the government, aiming to destroy 
left-wing opposition to privatisation of the ex-state-owned company Gas del Estado 
1992; Gosman 1991. 
110 From Proletariat to Proprietors. 
111 The `silence of the law' 21,696 leaves open the specific role of trade unions in the PPP, which had 
to be regulated by other legislation such as the LPA, the LCT or the Collective Bargaining Acts 
(Lozano L et al 1992: 99-100). 
112 See the unsuccessful case of Entel in CASH, Pägina/12 14.5.93: 9; 20.3.94; 24.3.95: 11; 23.5.93: 
12. Others in Murillo 1997 and Chumbita 1993. 113 On the privatisation of Gas del Estado see CASH Pägina/12 6.12.92; Calleja, A 1992; Suarez and 
Kozulj 1991. 
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(see Dinerstein 1993; see Frente VG Lista Gris Pamphlet). Second, the corruption 
within the Parliament in the discussion and vote regarding the form of privatisation of 
the company. 114 In light of this, privatisation also led to a struggle around the 
management of the millionaire PPP, particularly because those in opposition who had 
been the victims of the electoral fraud won the election for workers' director within 
the PPP. This unexpected situation made the union and management develop a series 
of strategies to `get rid' of this disruptive position. 115 
Against a climate of fragmentation, discontent, unrest, fear and political betrayals, 
difficulties, negotiations and struggle the workers' directors of the PPP managed to 
run it successfully but not without difficulties. They overcame the lack of practice in 
these matters and achieved the necessary consent. 116 As they put it, 
'How about this: 300 people who don't know how to get the 30,000,000 dollars of the 
shares have chosen you to solve their problem! I have spent months and months 
'rowing' among deep, changing and touching loyalties, betrayals, miseries, and regrets' 
(R. R, director for the workers, PPP TGN, former Gas del Estado, author's interview, 
3.11.99). 117 
114 In March 1992 MPs had to vote the fate of Gas del Estado. 130 MPs approved the privatisation of 
the state-owned company. The vote was taken with the minimum quorum required since the opposition 
(UCR) announced its decision not to vote. Parliamentary journalists alerted that fake MPs had 
participated in the ballot. MP Samid had been replaced by his adviser Kenan the day of the ballot 
(Pägina/12 26.3.93: 12). He was called Diputrucho (Dip = deputy; Trucho = slang for fake). The ballot 
took place again. The absent MP this time turned up and voted for privatisation. Due to the scandal, a 
commission for the investigation of the event was created ad hoc, although it never said anything about 
it. One year after (April 1993), the MPs voted the end of the investigation (P4gina/12,30.4.93: 2; See 
also Thwaites Rey 1999: 164). 
115 Once having been elected as the director of the PPP on the workers side, RR was dismissed by the 
company after having been offered 200,000 dollars for 'voluntary redundancy'. The Catalan 
management did not understood either the significance or the history of opposition for these workers. 
Since RR's answer was 'No thanks, I am not going to be unemployed because you want me to be so' 
the managers dismissed him with the compliance of the union. Yet, workers' directors did not (but 
should) enjoy any legal immunity. He was given back his job after a trial and a favourable legal 
decision on the matter. 
116 The PPP being a plc, it requires to be organised as such through two bodies: an assembly of 
shareholders and an executive committee (composed of a few members elected by the shareholders). 
The third body is a controller one (Lozano L et al 1992: 56). All shareholders of the same type should 
be part of a 'General Transference Agreement' and a 'Pact of Syndication' gives them the advantage 
of agreed collective action. In this form of association the unanimity in the decisions of the 
shareholders is essential, for the contracts are not constituted by the vote of members, but by the 
general consent of all shareholders (Lozano L eta!, 1992: 61-62). 17 For a general assessment of the whole process see Goldin 1997. 
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Breaking Solidarity at the Work Place 
Sälvese quien pueda! 118 
The transformation of the work place comprised the restructuring of sectors, the 
policy of `voluntary redundancy', transference to other sectors in the same city, other 
cities or other companies (contracting out), the dismantling of all those welfare and 
social benefits provided by the state-owned enterprises (e. g. children's recreation 
park, holidays, accommodation facilities). These changes had a significant impact on 
everyday private and social life, within and outside the enterprise, since privatisation 
involved workers and their families' lives, culture and traditions as well as labour 
relations and forms of trade unionism. As a result, the workplace became, as in the 
past, the site for the opposition to bureaucracy and the government's policy 
The changes produced before and during the privatisation led to the meaninglessness 
of work, the break of a paternal and protective form of labour relations, the rupture of 
a sense of belonging experienced by state workers' direct relation to their workplace 
and the company, the break of the sense of solidarity, trust and confidence and, 
indirectly, with the state and the public goals of the enterprise. 
The restructuring of the workplace led to the disclosure of power conflicts already 
existing used by managers to reduce over-staffing and achieve the flexibilisation of 
labour most of times with the compliance of the union. The workplace became a 
coercive and uncertain place where individualism and atomisation of workers 
its Save yourself if you can 
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flourished against cooperative action. The selection of workers to be dismissed 
disclosed betrayals, sadness, competition. Workers described the process as a war: 
`we were knocked out... injured.. . we have been shocked 
in many respects and in 
many forms... . they change the working culture with technology, and new 
management things such as psychological tests of the employees, video recorders, 
cameras, etc. Then came the betrayal from the union, from the government, from your 
mates at work. We remained asking: who can I trust? ' (Risuto, author's interview, 
1996). 
The Retiro Voluntario 
The two forms of decrease of staff employed were voluntary redundancy (by the 
emergency decree 287/92, reaching 179,647 workers) and dismissals (reaching 
180,898 cases) (CISI in Fundaciön Sindical 1993: 12). `Voluntary redundancy' was 
most significant before privatisation, to make the companies more profitable, and 
during and after by reducing staff without breaking the promise made to the 
government of not dismissing workers after privatisation or concession of the 
company. 119 
The individual solution was a temptation, insofar as they were offered considerable 
amounts of money to become `self-employed', as well as the way out of the unrest 
experienced at the workplace. Yet, as soon as unemployment increased and those who 
had accepted this form of concealed dismissal went bankrupt, resistance to voluntary 
119 Before privatisation, there were 302,600 workers working in state-owned enterprises. In 1994, there 
were only 53,600. Thus, the reduction of personnel was 249,000 workers. 114,400 out of them were 
re-contracted by privatised enterprises under new and in general unfavourable conditions. Out of the 
remaining 134,600,103,100 were made redundant or took voluntary redundancy and 31,500 got early 
retirement. (Furman, Paging/12.1994). See staff reduction by voluntary redundancy in CASH, 
Pägi na/ 12,26.5.96: 4. 
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redundancy increased. Then, the offer of voluntary redundancy became a 
psychological torture with dramatic consequences. 
Specific research on the issue (Ramirez 1999) reconstructed the ways and means by 
which management aimed to convince workers to leave the company: i. all employees 
who did not `enter into the company plans' were included in a payroll under the title 
inducidos (i. e. induced to accept voluntary redundancy) 120; ii. the circulation of 
internal memoranda with explanations of what to do with those inducidos: iii. some 
members of high-level management were attributed the special task of `convincing' 
workers: first workers were informed that they had no future in the enterprise. If they 
didn't accept quickly, the human resources management kept interrogating them till 
they gave a positive answer (some cases indicated that this happened more than 10 
times a day). If this kind of pressure did not work, managers started a series of 
reprisals such as compulsory transference to another province; discrimination in the 
adjudication of tasks which generate more income like those which required overtime; 
the suspension of any task and sending the worker home waiting for them (like 
prisoners); to transfer workers to sectors with no tasks to let them think about it; 
giving workers some tasks with a higher skill demand, impossible to achieve or very 
stressful tasks; iv. punishment of shop floor representatives and stewards making 
them lose some additional sums of money; inclusion into the payroll as inducidos of 
workers after their participation in strikes or demonstrations organised by trade unions 
(Ramirez 1999: 355). The implications of this management `strategy' were in some 
120 Military jargon during the Dirty War. 
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cases very dramatic, i. e. heart attacks, strokes, depression and suicide (Ramirez 1999: 
359). 121 
The pressure increased when the worker who was offered voluntary redundancy was a 
shop-floor representative. Labour bureaucracy was involved in the process of 
selection of those who were offered `voluntary' redundancy, so `voluntary' 
redundancy was not only the main tool for the management to get rid of those workers 
with the age to retire, or with health problems, but above all of shop floor militants. In 
most of the sectors of the ex-state-owned company there was a policy of persecution 
of union reps who opposed privatisation and the trade union bureaucracy. 
The Peinador case is paradigmatic. After 20 years working for Gas del Estado, and 
being a shop-floor representative of 200 workers of Gas Natural Ban, he was forced 
into redundancy by the company. Managers aimed at restructuring the sector and 
aimed to dismiss 17 workers. Since he resisted to collaborate with the company he 
became himself the target of persecution and redundancy: `The company threw me 
away, but the union supported them, la cama me la hizo el sindicato' (Peinador, 
authors' interview, 1996). 122 
III 
The Reshaping of Trade Unions: Business or Politics? 
Menem's redefinition of Peronism in 1989 unleashed fundamental contradictions 
within the labour movement which favoured an increase in the historical distance 
121 Research was based on denunciations by workers and put together by MPs in a petition to the 
government (resolution 2248,5.3.97) where workers demanded an explanation of the procedure to 
achieve voluntary redundancy in France Telecom, Telefönica, Telintar and Techint from the 
government (Ramirez 1999). 
22 See also Pagina/12,26.5.96: 4-5. 
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between the bureaucracy and grass-roots militants. In October 1989, the CGT split 
into two (Falcon, 1992). On the one hand, the CGT San Martin unified those unions 
who supported Menem and which constituted the `Club de Amigos' (Friend's Club). 
They were workers in the plastic and food industries, taxi drivers, council workers, 
meatpackers, the public sector workers joining UPCN, and construction and sugar 
cane workers, the unions from sectors and companies under privatisation like SUPE 
(Sindicato Unico del Petroleo) and Obras Sanitarias. These leaders explicitly 
supported Menem's project. 123 In order to recompose their financial and political 
power (Falcon 1992: 7), they accepted the proposal of integration through their 
participation in privatised business as well as in the management of the PPP (McGuire 
1997 236-237). 
On the other hand, the CGT Azopardo unions in the public sector and industrial 
workers who remained lined up behind the general secretary of CGT Ubaldini. They 
were the beer workers, CTERA, UTA; FATUM (University Administrative Workers), 
some members of `the 25' like ATE, lorry drivers, ship and dockers, commercial 
travellers, and some autonomous groups such as post office workers and railway 
workers joining LF. The UOM joined the CGT Azopardo too. 124 
A third group called the independent or Critical Menendst were close to Menem 
without constituting his political support. They were the big union corporations in the 
private and service sector FATSA (Sanidad), banks and commerce, and also FATL y 
123 See joint document between union bureaucracy and the representatives of the SR, Bunge & Born, 
Perez Companc and the City Bank in Fuchs, 1993: 199-200. 
12' However, disagreement between the 'duros' (tough) led by Ubaldini and the 'moderados' 
(moderate) led by Miguel (UOM) grew within the CGT Azopardo. Whilst the `duros' aimed at 
confrontation, the 'moderados' aimed to maintain a certain degree of negotiation capacity with the 
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F. Whilst their political power deteriorated, financial resources were scarce and 
questioned by the economic transformation, and membership dropped, `the 
independents' aimed at developing a strategy to restore power by means of 
transforming the union into an `economic unity' (IDEP 1993b: 23). 
The strategy of business `attempted to compensate for the loss of political resources 
produced by the combination of the abolition of their quota of representation in 
electoral candidacies within the party and policy shifts by the party that strained its 
historical alliance with the unions [by] purchasing firms in their sector; creating 
retirement funds to participate in the privatisation of social security; establishing firms 
that provide services to privatised enterprises and jobs to former employees of those 
companies; reorganising welfare funds to compete for health care provision; and 
managing the employee-owned stock of privatised state enterprises' (Murillo 1997a: 
84 and 86). 
In 1992, the CGT reunified to increase its power of negotiation towards the defence of 
the union-sponsored health system of Obras Sociales (OS) as well as to oppose the 
flexibilisation of labour introduced by the 1991 Employment Act. The first 24-hour 
general strike organised by the CGT against Menem's policy-making was carried out 
(see next chapter). However, neither the idea of business nor the general strike 
contained the unrest brought about by privatisation, decentralisation, and provincial 
economic adjustments that became visible around 1994. 
government. The strategy developed by the industrial sector, led by UOM and the 62 organisation, 
remained tied to the traditional orthodox strategy to recover the trade unions' power within the CGT 
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Unemployment increased dramatically from 6% in 1991 to 18.5% in 1995 (see 
Palomino and Schvartzer 1996: 17; Feldman 1995a: 58; Barbeito 1995). For the 
period March 1992-March 1993,342 out of 657 conflicts in the public sector were 
around political issues such as demands for investments in education. These 342 
conflicts led to 535 political demands. In the following year, the politics of 
depoliticisation and decentralisation led to an increasing level of politicisation of 
labour conflict. Political and union demands occupied the second place after wage 
demands and before redundancy (Zeller et al 1993). 
In 1995, the plan of stabilisation launched by Minister Cavallo entered into a crisis 
(see chapter nine). The IMF aimed to renew the pressure to discipline the national and 
provincial economies under the stabilisation plan launched in 1991. The government 
cut all sorts of financial support to the provinces and demanded from them the 
repayment of some advanced loan they had received as part of the Federal co 
participation (Axelrad, 1998: 104). For the period 1989-1995, regional and 
decentralised conflicts increased, as well as industrial disputes against redundancy 
and unemployment increase from 46.6% to 70.6% in 1995 (Gomez et al, 1996: 134). 
The provinces' strikes and mobilisations marked a different stage in industrial conflict 
owing to the scale and location of the uprising and the extension and expansion of the 
strikers' demands beyond the centralised unions' organisation. The niotin in Santiago 
del Estero in 1993, i. e. the Santiagazo (Inigo Carreras and Cotarelo 1999; Auyero 
2000), was followed by numerous manifestations particularly in the provincial public 
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sector and those areas of the country where the main resource of employment and 
development had been privatised or restructured (closed). 125 
In 1996-97 onwards, riots became roadblocks. As it will be shown later, under 
Menem, the roadblocks became the most important form of protest. Between the 
Santiagazo and October 1999 there were 685 roadblocks throughout the country 
(except the province of Formosa). Most of them took place in the capital city (24%), 
Santa Fe (14%) and the rest in Jujuy, Neuquen, Cordoba, province of Buenos Aires, 
Gran Buenos Aires and Tucuman (Inigo Carreras and Cotarelo, 1999). Nine general 
strikes accompanied decentralised and local struggles. 
Fighting Fragmentation and Organising Diversity: the Creation of the CTA 
The increase in grass-roots resistance and social conflict coupled with the CGT goal 
to recompose its super structural power led to the emergence of a pole of trade union 
opposition. In 1992 the Encuentro Sindical por el Proyecto Nacional gathering 500 
trade unions of the public sector (ATE and CTERA), ex-state-owned companies 
(APA) some other industrial and service unions (miners and port workers), the local 
branch of the metallurgical workers (UOM branch Villa Constituciön) and the small 
maritime workers and pneumatic workers' unions pointed out that the CGT was `an 
appendix of conservative politics' (Pagina/12,8.11.92: 4). 
125 Conflicts took place between 1993 and 1995 in Cordoba, Chaco, Jujuy, Salta, Santiago del Estero, 
San Juan, Tierra del Fuego, Rio Negro, La Rioja y Tucuman (See Clarin - several issues, 1993-5). 
According to a study done by the Centro de Esrudios Union para la Nueva Alayoria, 67.4% out of the 
322 labour conflicts that took place between 1.6.94 and 31.5.95 were led by state and public sector 
workers, particularly teachers. 
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The Encuentro created the CTA which aimed to constitute a new current of union 
opposition at the workplace, as well as at the political level, by organising fragmented 
struggles against unemployment and for welfare provision. The CTA contested the 
traditional state-sponsored Peronist unionism. It proposed three new premises: 
independence from the state, independence from political parties, and direct affiliation 
to the central union, the latter including the unemployed and those who were 
technically `socially excluded' (see Lopez Artemio and Lozano, 1993). 
At the work place, they encourage individual membership and a relationship between 
the individual workers and the central union. At the political level, they aimed to give 
voice to the public sector and state workers as well as the diversity of subjects 
emerging from the process of transformation such as the unemployed, pensioners and 
the poor (see De Genaro, Basteiro and Depetris, CTA, 1997, author's interviews). 
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The idea of autonomy comes from the renovation 
that ATE (the main union within CTA) experienced 
under Alfonsin, led by Abdala and De Genaro. They 
advocated pluralism and independence from the 
state and introduced the direct vote of affiliates in 
their statute of 1989 as well as encouraged 
I"MI" 
horizontal organisation through the creation of 
union regional autonomies, and organismos colegiados. They also aimed to break the 
rule that it was necessary to be Peronist to become a union representative (Martucelli 
and Svampa, 1997: 280). 
209 
With regard to membership, the CTA has produced a renewal in that individual 
workers and the unemployed as well as pensioners or other social groups can join the 
central union and vote for the executive committee directly, avoiding the traditional 
hierarchical system. 126 These three premises stood consciously against the three 
pillars of previous forms of trade unionism: statism, political dependence on the 
Movimiento Justicialista and centralisation and bureaucratisation of the labour 
movement (see IDEP, 1991). 
The creation of the CTA differs from previous splits within the labour movement for 
it reflects the need for a renewal of trade unionism in the light of the new form of 
struggles, regional and grass root based. Unlike the CGT, the CTA aimed to 
coordinate fragmented labour conflict that was taking place in isolated areas of the 
country as well as the work places. 
In 1994 the CTA called for a 
national and annual plan to oppose 
the labour reform and the new 
Fiscal Pacts. It organised regional 
meetings and encouraged alliances 
with medium and small 
entrepreneurs The CTA general 
strikes are not imposed from above but co-ordinate fragmented protests as well as 
measure the capacity of the new confederation to centralise dispersed conflict. 
In July 1994 a massive Marcha Federal over Buenos Aires, severely criticised by the 
CGT (Pagina/12 7/7/94: 3), was followed by a general strike that took place on the 
126 See CTA statute. 
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2d August 1994. The general strike was accompanied by strikes, demonstrations, 
marches with torches, as well as open radios and debates (Pagina/12 7.12.94: 4) and 
the creation of the Congreso del Trabajo y la Producciön (CTP). 127 In 1995, CTERA, 
the teachers union joining the CTA, called for a teachers' general strike on March 13. 
Another general strike 21.4.95 was organised by CTA and MTA with great provincial 
impact in Rosario, Cordoba and the provinces of the north-west. The reason for this 
strike was the death of workers in Tierra del Fuego, and against the economic plan. 
128 
During 1995 there were to more Marcha por el trabajo y la justicia In August 1996, 
another general strike. In 1997, the teachers union CTERA organised another Federal 
March for investments in Public Education. 
IV 
The Politics of Resistance: The Teachers' Hunger Strike 
In 1996, roadblocks organised by public sector workers and the unemployed were 
widespread throughout the whole towns of Cutral-C6 and Plaza Huincul. The 
roadblocks marked the beginning of a new form of struggle that became widespread 
in the following years (see chapters 9 and 10). The popular rebellion in these two 
small communities of Patagonia was produced by the privatisation of the state- 
company Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF), which was the main resource of 
economic development in the southern province of Neuquen, a historical provider of 
127 Also constituted by the University Federation (FUA), the Assembly of Small and Medium 
Enterprise (APyME), the Agrarian Federation (FAA), and the Instituto Movilizador de Fondos 
Cooperativos (IMFC). 
128 In 1996, there were 3 general strikes organised by the CTA, MTA and also the CGT. The strikes 
were interpreted by the liberal paper La Naciön as a political: 'No one could expect a change in the 
economic policy as a result of the strike. There is only one objective behind this strike: to obtain public 
attention and to get institutional recognition ... 
The strike renews the struggle for trade union power' 
('Otra vez la huelga politica', La Naciön 23/4/95) . 
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energy, oil, gas and electricity (see Alvarez Guerrero 0 1993). The closure of the 
plants left thousands unemployed. The quasi welfare state developed around the 
companies collapsed and with it the whole community (see Favaro et al 1993, Favaro 
and Bucciarelli 1994; Axelrad, 1998; Mases and Rafart 1997). Between 20 and 26 
June 1996 5,000 people gathered and literally `besieged the city' of Cutral-C6 and 
Plaza Huincul, in Neuquen. 
In 1997, provincial teachers from Neuquen initiated a protest against overdue wages 
and for new investments in education. Teachers were against the transference of 
education services from the central to the provincial administrations (1992) as well as 
against the Federal Law of 1993. The general secretaries of the CTERA met in 
Viedma and called a national strike for the 20`h of March. The struggle received 
support from representatives of other unions joining the CTA and from Rio Negro and 
San Juan, who also marched on the 26 March to Neuquen, to dialogue with the 
governors and support the struggle in Neuquen. However, provincial authorities were 
not receptive to workers' demands and teachers joining ATEN (Asociaciön de 
Trabajadores de la Educaciön de Neuquen) and more than 18,000 people went on a 
roadblock of the national and provincial highways 22 and 7. The government 
repressed the demonstration violently. A group of 100 youngsters between 14 and 20 
years old who confronted 400 gendarmes during several days armed with slingshots, 
sticks, stones and some Molotov cocktails, firmly prevented any movement of traffic. 
They called themselves fogoneros and emerged clearly to support the teachers, in 
spite of the fact that most of them were illiterate or with a low level of education 
(Klachko, 2000: 24). Unlike the Piqueteros, who commanded the roadblocks in1996, 
the Fogoneros did not want to negotiate with the government (see Favaro et al: 1997: 
LIZ 
21). 129 Coupled to the teachers' demands, the roadblock also demanded job creation, 
for those dismissed by the privatisation of YPF and Gas del Estado. They also 
demanded discounts in the gas and electricity bills, and productive investments. The 
roadblock was the result of the destruction of the welfare state and privatisation, since 
the area had got the highest rates of unemployment in Patagonia. 
The CTA called for a repeat of the struggle and not to isolate Cutral-C6 from the rest 
of the country(Fuentes, President of CTA, Rio Negro and Neuquen, in 
Conectandonos, no 11, April 1997). The result of the repression was a growing 
solidarity among teachers, fogoneros and the whole community. Leaders of the 
CTERA repudiated repression and rejected the 180 million dollars (pesos) that the 
government aimed to send to neutralise social conflict. The CTERA called a general 
strike on 31 March against repression and a deep solution to the problem of education. 
90% of teachers then went on strike. 
Fighting Depoliticisation and Fragmentation: La Carpa Blanca de la Dignidad 
In April 1997, to reinforce their demand, the National Congress of the teachers' 
union, in solidarity with the struggles of Neuquen, Rio Negro and San Juan went on a 
hunger strike under a big white tent called The White Tent for Dignity (Carpa Blanca 
de la Dignidad) located in front of the national parliament in Plaza Congreso, Buenos 
Aires. 59 teachers from different regions of the country demanded the creation of a 
special fund to finance public education, the suspension of the reform of the state, the 
suspension of the Federal Law of Education, overdue wages, job stability and wage 
129 More on the privatisation process in Neuquen see Kozulj, 1993, Calleja 1993; Stagni, 1993, Alvarez 
Guerrero, 1993. 
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increase (Conectandonos, no 12, May 1997: 3). The idea was not only to support 
provincial struggles but to centralise, nationalise and universalise teachers' demands. 
On the 3rd April, CTERA called 
for a new 24-hour national strike 
for the 7th April to protest 
against the repression of hunger 
strikers who had occupied the 
highways in Neuquen. More than 
15,000 people marched over the 
streets of Neuquen to support the teachers' strike (La Naciön, 8.4.97, On line). 
Repression continued. On the 12th April a 24 year-old teacher and mother of three 
died after she was shot in the carotid by the police (Clarin, Internet, 14.4.97). As a 
response, 95% of teachers and lecturers all over the country went on the third massive 
strike `against the police repression unleashed during a workers' protest last Saturday 
12th April in Neuquen'. The strike was massive and national -- there was a silent 
march with 20,000 persons organised by teachers, lecturers, CTA and MTA. CTERA 
called another general strike for the 14th April (Journal CTA Capital, no 1: 3). 
The Multisectorial of Neuquen, constituted by many different political, social and 
union organisations, also repudiated the violence. They made the National Military 
Police and the Provincial police responsible for Teresa's death and demanded the 
resignation of ministers of the interior (national and provincial) as well as the political 
trial for the governor as the person responsible for the repression in Cutral-C6 and 
Plaza Huincul (Conectandonos, no 11, April 1997). An agreement was reached after 
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37 days when the government promised to suspend teachers' dismissals and new 
redundancy and to pay 50% of the 37 days loss. 
The teachers' hunger strike under the white tent persisted. 130 The Carpa Blanca 
articulated the problem of education with unemployment, poverty, exclusion and the 
significance of education to overcome uneven development and inequality. It 
embodied a national concern: it expressed not only teachers' and lecturers' demands 
but the socially critical situation of the whole country. By June 1997, more than 
300,000 people had visited it' to sign petitions, show solidarity, bringing from poems 
to money, drama, music (Journal CTA Capital, June 1997: 3; also Steimber, in Clarin 
3.8.97: 10). 
The Carpa Blanca achieved an horizontal `network of solidarities and an expanded 
public support through the media' (Behrend, 1999: 170). It penetrated into every 
house since education is a crucial social issue. Solidarity came from all sorts of 
national and even international organisations. As a form of struggle, the Carpa Blanca 
achieved visibility and permanence as well as dynamic and movement. The teachers 
physically and literally confronted power (the tent was located opposite the national 
parliament): `La Carpa is like a pimple for the government' (Miguens in Clarin 
3.8.97: 10). 
The rotating hunger strike gave the tent a dynamic of struggle and circulation: `around 
1,400 teachers participated in it and hundreds of thousands participated in the 
mobilisation and marches organised by teachers, and a million signed a petition for 
130 It lasted for two years and was deconstructed under the de la Rua administration in 2000. 
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the creation of an education emergency fund' (Behrend, 1999: 9). The Carpa Blanca 
articulated the individual and the universal: on the one hand, the slogan ALL OF US 
ARE TEACHERS universalised and politicised the teachers' partial struggle. On the 
other hand, it highlighted, the teacher striker, who perhaps came from an isolated area 
of the country, achieved a central attention as never before since she became part of a 
national struggle taking place in front of the mass media who visited the tent and 
reported daily the hunger strike. `Teachers suspend their everyday life for a while and 
deposit trust in the tent and its leaders' (Martinez in Clarin 3.8.97: 10). The tent 
became 
`a peaceful and cheerful form of demanding: it is not a place of sorrow with suffering 
people ... teachers on hunger strike are under medical cares... artists and children come 
along... it is a place where people reconcile with politics as future, as an antithesis of 
corruption. It is a serious thing, responsible, strongly organised' (Puigros in Clarin 
3.8.97: 10). 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter explored the transformation of the subjectivity of labour with regard to 
the privatisation of state-owned companies and the decentralisation of education 
under Menem. I argued that these policies were not administrative or political tools 
but the embodiment of the struggle over the form of subjectivity leading to the 
discipline of labour under monetarism. This implied the deconstruction of the Peronist 
form of labour but also the social construction of Menem(ism) as a form of class 
antagonism. 
The recomposition of the state was asserted as a crisis of identity for those workers in 
the public sector and state-owned companies; as a redefinition of trade union 
organisation and their relationship with the state, and as a weakening of rank-and-file 
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resistance. As opposed to the process of imagery integration of the working class into 
the state (see chapter 3), state workers lost their central significance and became many 
other multiple fragmented identities: workers in ex-state-owned companies under 
foreign management and ownership, workers contracted out, unemployed workers, 
self-employed, early retired or voluntarily left. Insofar as the state-owned companies 
performed as a quasi welfare state organised through the unions, providing welfare 
and social activities, deconstruction affected labour relations but most importantly 
impacted on workers' personal and family lives. The struggle in and against 
privatisation entailed a struggle in and against the deconstruction of themselves. 
Within this process, the collective `us' at the workplace was broken by means of the 
changes in the forms of the administration of labour which fostered the fear of losing 
the job and joining the union. Union representation was weakened by coercion, the 
introduction of the logic of money, the isolation and dismissal of shop-floor stewards. 
The personal and collective pride of belonging to a state-owned company, as well as 
of having their job as a source of wealth, culture and world knowledge (Offe, 1985; 
Catalano, 1995) was shattered. The identification of interest of the state-workers with 
the interest of the nation ceased to exist. Furthermore, the interest of state and public 
sector workers became a barrier to the realisation of the new national interest: 
stability. 
Privatisation and decentralisation also contributed to the change in the forms of 
industrial dispute and workers' struggles. Whilst 1990 showed a record in strikes 
(864), in 1991 they decreased to 581.1992 was marked by the lowest number of 
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strikes in ten years, the most important sector on strike being education workers 
joining the CTERA. 
Over the period 1989-1991, the struggle against privatisation found many sectors of 
the labour movement together. Whereas during 1989-91 labour conflict associated 
with the reform of the state constituted 20% of all labour conflict calling into question 
public policies, in 1992, it decreased to 15.6%. Towards 1994, when the process of 
privatisation was complete, there was a visible diminution of labour conflict (Goldin 
1997: 52) The co-optation of the trade union bureaucracy led to the belief that conflict 
had decreased, but it was asserted under new forms. 
In view of this, some argued that 1991 marked the end of a period in which trade 
unionism was a factor of power (Orlansky and Orciani 1994; see P6gina/12 1.9.96). 
The reasons argued are the impossibility for unions to impede the process of 
privatisation, the expansion of deep reforms affecting safety at work, employment and 
the regulation of strikes; and the break of the identification of trade unions with the 
Peronist political structure. 
It is argued that after a period of confrontation, trade union leaders, pushed by the 
decrease in their political power, 131 the decentralisation of negotiation, the decrease 
in the power of industrial workers, the decline in membership due to the massive 
redundancy in privatised companies, ' 32 found new bases for constituting power: their 
participation in the marketisation of those privatised areas of the state and society (see 
131 Whilst in 1983, there were 35 trade union MPs, in 1985, there were 32; in 1987,29; in 1989,23; and 
in 1991 only 19(Rios, Clarin, 8/11/93, p. 12-13). 132 In 1989 before privatisation there were 300,000 workers and only 110,000 remained in their posts 
(Orlansky and Orciani 1994: 10). 
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Orlansky and Orciani, 1994; also Fernandez, 1993; Goldin, 1997; IDEP 1993b; 
Murillo, 1997a; 1997b; McGuire 1997). By so doing, they would have gained 
economic power by means of their participation in the PPP, and the privatisation and 
deregulation of pensions, safety at work, and health (Orlansky and Orciani 1994: 5-6; 
Murillo, 1997a, 1997b. ) 
In fact, some unions were successful in doing business out of privatisation. Through 
the privatisation of YPF, the `SUPE (Federation of United Unions of State Oil 
Workers) set up 215 firms that hired 7,194 laid-off workers, and was in the process of 
establishing another 39 firms utilizing 663 workers slated for dismissal' (SUPE 1993 
in Murillo 1997: 86). This national union, together with the regional union and the 
workers, `bought part of YPF fleet and shares of an oil equipment firm... It also 
charged a fee to a private retirement fund for referring union members to it and started 
organizing a welfare fund for the workers of the newly created firms' (La Naciön, 
2.8.93; Pagina/12 8.5.94, and SUPE leader in Murillo 1997: 86). 
The union managed the 10% PPP. In this case the state authorised in July 1997 the 
sale of the 10% workers' shares that were worth initially (in 1993) $19 per unit at $31 
in 1997. This implied that most of the workers (4,596) agreed to sell (with the 
exception of 4) (see Goldin, 1997: 43; La Naciön 13.7.97: 2). 133However, the chapter 
aimed to give an account of the other side of the contradictory process of privatisation 
and decentralisation. It was shown that the deconstruction of the subjectivity of state 
and public sector workers led to the renewal of opposition trade unionism and to the 
emergence of new forms of resistance like roadblocks and the Carpa Blanca, which 
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led the politicisation and nationalisation of the fragmented struggles in and against the 
recomposition of the state. 
As highlighted, the increase of productivity and profitability of the companies on sale 
came from redundancy and sector restructuring, contracting out and the flexibilisation 
of labour, the de-legitimisation and persecution of shop-floor representatives and the 
trade unions and the cut of wages and social provision (Goldin 1997: 81). 
Privatisation and decentralisation, coupled with the general economic adjustment 
required to maintain the stability, led to poverty, unemployment, casualisation of 
work and the isolation of many areas of the country where the state-owned companies 
were the only source of employment and welfare. 
The general impact of privatisation on the labour market (from 347,240 employees in 
1989 to 66,731 in 1993 [Goldin 1997: 72-73]) was deeply deconstructive in those 
areas whose economic and social development depended on the privatised company. 
The privatisation of the national companies impacted on regional and local 
employment and regional development. The dismantling of the quasi-welfare state 
developed by the former state-owned companies, which dominate the local economy 
and were in the past privileged places to live and work since life developed through 
and around the industry, led to new forms of protest and solidarity networks in many 
regions of the country. 
The contradictory process of recomposition of the state led to the transformation of 
power itself. Business and opposition unionism are not just organisational strategies to 
133 The same strategies were devised by FATLyF , UF and FAC (The Argentine Federation of 
220 
survive financially or politically (Murillo 1997) but rather the result of the struggle 
over the form of subjectivity unleashed by the recomposition of the state. The 
construction of the Menemist form of labour proposed the integration of trade unions 
into the logic of money. Whilst the CGT represents the historical institutionalised 
labour bureaucracy which accepts the game devised by the state, the CTA embodies 
the spirit of the CGTA and the sindicalismo de base which rejects subordination and 
aims to organise the fragmented identities and resistance emerging out of the same 
process. 
To the CGT leaders `a union leader must be up-to date. He has to `globalise' himself 
just as the world economy does; he has to behave according to what is going on 
throughout. He must have a computer on his desk in order to manage the union as if it 
were a company. To me, the union is like a company' (Casia in Mundo Laboral, no 1, 
Buenos Aires, 1994). To them, `as strikes had become ineffective, union participation 
in the privatisation process was the only alternative left by state reforms to combat 
both unemployment and the decline of financial and political power of the 
organisations that support workers' demands' (Casia in Murillo 1997: 86). 
To the CTA, `the CGT has found a way to survive at the expense of the weakness of 
the trade union itself. They depend on private pension, risk at work insurance 
companies, sharing property programme of privatised companies... The CGT 
managerial trade unionism is an example of how trade unions can become `stronger' 
at the expense of workers' misfortune, by becoming enterprises, in spite of the loss of 
membership... but a trade union should not be that' (author's interview with De 
Commerce Employees). 
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Genaro, President of the CTA, 4.8.97, Buenos Aires, see also Gutierrez in Pagina/12 
1.9.96: 3). 
The CTA aims to create a new form of trade unionism. The CTA leadership defines 
power as the political capacity to articulate geographical, political and social 
differences. Power means the articulation and sharing of experiences of the different 
forms in which the new forms of labour appear to exist to socialise knowledge, share 
experiences and spread solidarity to reduce the level of uncertainty, suffering, anxiety 
and individualism produced by the law of money. Power is to lead the process of 
construction of political power: 
`we cannot separate trade unionism from politics. Trade unionism is 
eminently political in the broadest sense. Politics to me is the capacity to 
construct power and the construction of power is inextricably linked to the 
most elemental workers' demands... ' (De Genaro, interview CTA in 
Cuadernos del Sur 22/23-1996-: 107; see also Rauber 1998). 
The hypothesis that Menem(ism) entailed the end of the power of trade unions can 
only be sustained through a managerial notion of power which equates the power of 
workers and trade unions with the power of the state. It was shown that workers and 
trade unions contested the politics of depoliticisation and decentralisation by 
articulating organisation and new forms of resistance in a political and national form. 
Privatisation and decentralisation did not solve the problem of instability but rather 
created unstable and uncertain forms of labour within the state and thus new forms of 
struggle against the violence of `stability' emerged also within and against the state. 
The chapter suggests that the only way of assessing the power of trade unions under 
Menem is by looking at their capacity to reshape themselves and organise and connect 
fragmented identities, organisations and struggles that emerged out of the neo-liberal 
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transformation, and which opposed the logic of uncertainty and depoliticisation 
entailed in the Menem(ist) form of stability. 
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Chapter Eight 
Flexibilisation, Marketisation and the Perversion of the CGT (the 
Struggle over the Form of the Law) 
The Labour Reform will be 
difficult to swallow by 
society' (Caro Figueroa, 
Pägina'12,24.12.93). 
Journalist: -'Dr Menem, is 
the labour reform project 
inspired in the Spanish 
one? ' 
President Menem - `Yes, 
exactly'. 
Journalist: -`But their rate of 
unemployment rose to 20% 
and ours is just 10%! ' 
President Menem: -Well, 
don't worry. We will get 
there soon' (Ballnn y el 
Frances, Soluciones no 1, 
ATE, 1993: 5). 
`The flexibilisation of labour is an irreversible 
fact throughout the world. It is indubitable, 
indisputable, inevitable' (an employer in 
Freytes Frey 1999: 240). 
A temporary contract 
implies something 
like a two-in-one: 
temporary job and a 
temporary 
suspension of 
unemployment. The 
most difficult thing is 
on the one hand to 
enjoy your job and 
accomplish it 
properly as well as to 
develop some degree 
of commitment and 
solidarity at work, 
but, on the other 
hand to protect 
yourself from getting 
too attached or 
ei joying it too much 
or planning tow much. In my experience a 
temporary contract is not just a temporary 
contract but means a temporary life too 
whereby a volatile but yet heavy present never 
meets the unforeseen and uncertain future. 
`The CGT tends to disappear' (Lescano, CGT, 
July 1993). 
`Let everything fall away, and then let's see 
what is there. Perhaps, that is the most 
interesting question of all: to see what happens 
when there is nothing, and whether or not we 
will survive that too' (P. Auster: In the country 
of the Last Things). 
Those who feel less lonely and might have 
more perspectives for the future are not those 
who possess more or represent the largest 
number of people, but paradoxically, those 
who learnt to put up better with the 
helplessness and to survive in insecurity' (C. 
Kreimer, Uno Mismo). 
`The more powerful they appeared in terms of 
influence within the state, the less effective 
they became in either representing or 
restraining their members. Their power was 
increasingly a hollow power, an institutional 
power without substance' (Holloway1995: 27). 
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This chapter explores the labour reform insofar as it contributed to the transformation 
of the subjectivity of labour. Stabilisation policies and the reform of the state imposed 
fiscal and external restrictions on capital (Cortes R and Marshall, 1999). The reform 
aimed to sweep away the barriers to the increase in productivity and competitivity of 
manufacturing industry and to adjust the production of exportable goods to the 
requirements of the global and regional markets (Santantonio and Tavilla, 1994: 2) by 
means of the flexibilisation of labour, the deregulation and marketisation of social 
security, occupational accidents and health, and the breakdown of the financial and 
bargaining power of the trade unions. 
The extensive literature which addressed this area of transformation under Menem 
opened three distinguishable areas of academic concern and political debate. The first 
links the labour reform to general strategies to improve international competitivity 
and domestic productivity in the light of the exigencies of the global markets and 
regional arrangements like the Mercado Comün del Sur (MERCOSUR). 
134 The 
second focuses on the impact of the internal and external flexibilisation of labour and 
the marketisation of social security and safety at work on the working class, the 
labour market and social integration. 135 The third explores the impact of the reform on 
labour relations and on trade unions' action. Namely, changes in the forms of 
production, introduction of technology and management techniques, the regulation of 
industrial disputes, collective bargaining and political negotiation, industrial dispute 
and labour conflict, the transformation of the labour code; the crisis and reshaping of 
134 See Kosacoff et a! 1993; Kosacoff, 1995; Fontana, 1996,1995 Santantonio and Tavilla, 1994; 
Battistini 1995a, Stolovich, 1995,1994, Montoya 1993; Minsburg et a! 1993; Neffa et a! 1999; Porta, 
1992; Bustos 1995; Richards 1995; Roffman 1993. 
135 See Roffman, 1996, Barbeito and Lo Vuolo, 1995; Neffa et a! 1999; Hintze, 1996, Penalva and 
Roffman, 1996, Schemelson, 1996; Monza, 1995,1996, Beccaria 1996, Marshall 1994, Lindemboin 
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the trade unions and the transformation of the workplace, particularly in those areas 
affected by the deregulation of the economy. 136 The latter will be given special 
attention in this chapter. 
Some scholars argued that Menem's government did not succeed in reducing the 
financial and bargaining power of the CGT, but rather revitalised corporatist 
behaviours typical of post WWII, which were thought to have disappeared 
(Etchemendy and Palermo, 1998). Neither the Law 14,250 of Collective Bargaining 
nor the LPA 23,551 were changed under Menem. The Unions' Managed Health 
System of Obras Sociales (OS) was deregulated under de la Rua in 2000. Others have 
argued that the labour bureaucracy has adapted itself to the new rules imposed by the 
Menem administration by an `organisational autonomy' strategy directed to their 
participation in those businesses created out of privatisation and deregulation (Murillo 
1997; see Novick M 1996). However, the reshaping of the trade unions with regard to 
the labour reform cannot be grasped by focusing on union strategies or their political 
negotiation with the government. These processes are part of the deeper 
recomposition of the form of labour, the reshaping of the trade union power being one 
of its outcomes. 
I suggest that the struggle over the subjectivity of labour asserted itself primarily as a 
struggle over the law. The law and the state being constitutive of subjectivity, on the 
1996; Cortes and Marshall 1999, Felletti and Lozano, 1996, Minujin (ed. ) 1996; Palomino and 
Schvarzer, 1996; Fernandez 1999; Castel 1991 a, 1991 b, 1991 c, Kessel man 1996. 136 See Catalano and Novick 1996; Neffa 1993; Sardegna, 1994; Beccaria and Lopez 1996a, 1996b; 
Esquivel, 1997; McGuire 1997, Cortes and Marshall 1999; Marshall 1996,1990; 1988, Feldman 2000, 
1995a; 1995b, Falcon, 1992,1993; Etchemendy and Palermo 1998, Murillo 1997a, 1997b, Battistini 
and Montes Cato 2000; Bissio et al 1999; Recalde 1994,1995; IDEP 1993a; Ramirez, L, 1993; 1nigo 
Carreras 1999; Deibe eta! 1994, Estevez 1993; Catalano and Novick, 1992; Santantonio, 1994; Godio, 
1993; Battistini 1996b, 1995b, Bustos Fierro 1994, Lopez Artemio and Lozano 1993, Testa 1993, 
Walter 1994a, 1994b; Basualdo E et al 1991. 
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one hand, each law or decree emerged as the partial outcome of class antagonism. The 
modification of the legislation that regulated employment and industrial relations as 
well as the resistance to it was underpinned by the struggle in and against the de-re- 
construction of subjectivity. The labour reform contributed to the social construction 
of Menem(ism) by means of the legalisation of uncertainty, the reification of capital's 
`needs' and the deconstruction of the state-sponsored labour movement. However, as 
a contradictory process leading to increasing instability. 
My argument will be that the government strategy of co-optation of the CGT 
leadership aimed to achieve the necessary stability towards the achievement of a 
complex reform which would legalise the flexibilisation of labour and legitimised, 
together with other policies under Menem, job instability, deprotection of workers, 
and social and labour insecurity. The Menem administration aimed to neutralise 
political opposition to anti-Peronist measures such as the destruction of the labour 
code, the decentralisation of collective bargaining, the flexibilisation of labour and the 
marketisation of the pension system. It also aimed to control the rank-and- file 
militants who resisted the flexibilisation of labour introduced by new forms of 
production and wage policies. 
However, it will be shown that the struggle for the co-optation of the CGT by means 
of the financial support to the OS and the maintenance of the unions' ratification of 
decentralised collective agreements, although performed as the safety pin to achieve 
the reform, led to the perversion of the CGT and thus to its inability to control the 
instability created by the labour reform. 
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Paradoxically, the financial stabilisation and the political recognition of the CGT 
leadership was achieved by means of the destabilisation, flexibilisation and 
lotterisation of workers' lives. The latter was achieved by legislative changes which 
had the active participation of the CGT. The detachment of the CGT from rank and 
file militants and workplace resistance allowed the relative autonomy of the rank-and- 
file in negotiations and the politicisation of struggles led by the CTA and the MTA. 
The flexibilisation and casualisation of labour led to the emergence of new forms of 
resistance and union redefinition which contested the labour reform and by so doing 
confronted the CGT strategy of power. Whilst the co-optation of the CGT was a 
constitutive aspect of the politics of stabilisation that led to the legalisation of 
instability and uncertainty, the CTA (and the MTA) aimed to organise workers' 
struggles against the violence of the Menemist stability. 
The exposition of the struggle over the law has been organised in four periods. Each 
one focuses on the dynamics between the transformation of labour relations, the 
reshaping of CGT vis-ä-vis the negotiation with the government and the actual 
process of transformation of labour and the resistance of workers and trade unions in 
opposition. 
I 
The Transformation of Labour Relations and the Struggle for and against the 
Deperonisation of Labour (December 1991 - June 1994) 
This section addresses the introduction of the flexibilisation of labour, the 
decentralisation of collective bargaining, the deregulation of the labour market and the 
marketisation of social security. During this period, the CGT leadership recomposed 
around the deregulation of the OS and the decentralisation of collective bargaining, 
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both inextricably connected through the state-sponsored trade union system. A new 
grouping was formed out of the CGT, i. e. the MTA, to oppose the reforms. Labour 
conflict against flexibilisation policies in the industrial sector was coupled with the 
spread of state workers' and the unemployed struggles against unemployment and 
redundancy in the interior of the country. 
Destabilising Labour, the Price of Life and the Marketisation of Social Security 
The NLE aimed explicitly at the encouragement of productive employment, the 
protection of unemployed workers and the regularisation of employment relations to 
punish unregistered employment and tax evasion (Caro Figueroa, 1993; also 1996). 
Implicitly it was the first legal step towards the flexibilisation of labour and the 
reduction of labour costs by means of the introduction of four forms of fixed-term 
contracts called `modalidades promovidas de empleo'. 137 These flexible contracts 
were accepted by employers in exchange for the exemption by 50 to 100% of 
employers' contributions to pensions, the national employment fund and family 
allowances (Feldman 1995: 109). As a condition, they had to be agreed and included 
in the collective agreements. 
137They are: i. 'Fixed term contract as the means of encouragement of employment' (Contrato de 
Trabajo por Tiempo Determinado como bfedida de Fomento del Empleo, ii. 'as the means for 
launching a new activity' (Contrato de Trabajo de Tiempo Determinado por lanzamiento de nueva 
actividad); iii. 'Training Contract' (Contrato de Trabajo formation) and iv. Pasantias. The latter was 
introduced in 1992, a new 'promovida' form was put in practice by Decree 340. The system aimed to 
achieve a link between formal education and labour practice for students and teachers to help their 
integration into the labour world (see Caro Figueroa, Recurso Laboral 11, October 1994: 39). Other 
forms of contract like 'Eventual Job' (Contrato de Trabajo Eventual) were also introduced, yet this form was not encouraged. 
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The NLE was the subject of strong criticism. It was considered the means to legalise 
the existing practice of flexibilisation and force workers to renounce their 
irrenunciable rights (principio de irrenunciabilidad) in order to maintain their jobs (A 
ýj `f 
R and BF in Sol ucione s 1993: 8-13), to constitute a 
blackmail for workers, whereby the trade unions 
exchanged workers' rights for money, and force the 
new forms of employment to be accepted by 
collective agreements. It destroyed job stability. 
Workers were forced into flexible contracts and 
increasing exploitation and thus endure the costs of 
the capitalist crisis with no compensation at all. It 
also shattered the protection provided to workers by the labour code (Ramirez and 
Fernandez in Püginu/12,3.9.91: 8; also Recalde 1994, Sardegna 1994, Soluciones 
1993: 6-7, Battistini 1996b). 
The Decentralisation of Collective Bargaining 
The stabilisation of the economy required the destruction of the financial and 
bargaining power of trade unions. This power was legally achieved by the LPA 
23,551, Law 14,250 on Collective Bargaining and Law 23,660 on welfare funds 
which together allowed a very centralised, hierarchical and financially powerful trade 
union system. "K 
138 Following Murillo (1997) unions were organised in a pyramidal form based on the monopoly of 
one union per activity or industry. This reduced the autonomy for local unions and shop-floor delegates. `National leaders collect union dues and welfare funds' compulsory fees by a system of 
automatic retention at the source by the employers (Law 14,250 and 23,551)' (p 75). The Law on 
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Thus the main policies to deconstruct the power of the trade unions were the 
decentralisation of negotiation, namely the introduction of collective agreements at 
the company level without the intervention of the unions at the branch or activity level 
and the suspension of compulsory retention of welfare funds at source and the 
deregulation of OS (Murillo 1997; also Tomada and Senen Gonzalez C, 1998: 124; 
James 1988). 
A series of decrees aimed to partially modify collective bargaining and wage policy. 
Decree 1757/90 swept away the obstacles to flexibilisation by revising those clauses 
within collective agreements which `distorted productivity' (Goldin 1997: 31). By 
modifying 48 laws (Ferreira Rubio and Goretti, n. d.: 48), Decree 2,284 of 1991139 
`allowed collective bargaining below the industry-wide level [with the consent of 
unions], including firm-level bargaining. Those collective negotiations introduced the 
flexibilisation of labour (Goldin, 1997: 61; Battistini, 1996b)'4° and did not require 
administrative recognition, only registration' (Murillo 1997: 79-80). These major 
changes were complemented by the Decree 1334/91 which introduced wage 
negotiation at lower level than those of branch, including the level of the enterprise. 
The Attack on the OS 
The system of OS was born as part of the system of social security and presents a 
unique case whereby `social security' was managed and administered by the union of 
Collective Bargaining forced the employers to negotiate per industry with the national union leading to 
the 'monopoly of representation recognized by the state, and established the right of unions to negotiate 
with employers the retention of extraordinary quotas, which applied to members and non-members 
alike because the outcome of collective bargaining includes every worker' (idem ant: 76). 139 See decree in Recalde 1995: 183-93. 
140 These collective agreements were signed by the union at the level of the branch or activity. 
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each branch of economic activity in the absence of an National Health Service. The 
OS provided health insurance to all workers under the wage relation and their 
families. In the absence of an integrated national health system it played a major role 
in the reproduction of the working class and the system of social security. It covered, 
in 1991,18.8 million people. The OS interact with other health services and 
subsystems (like public hospitals and private medicine) and run also tourism, 
recreation, sports and other services for their affiliates (see Feldman 1995a: 32-33). 
In January 1992, the government announced the intention to reform the health system. 
This implied the reduction of the number of OS from 340 to 30-40, to encourage the 
free affiliation of workers to the OS, and create a special body that would collect the 
employers' contributions and redistribute them among unions to allow them to 
manage the OS. Since by the law the affiliation to the OS was compulsory for workers 
in that branch (Danani 1994), the reform offered workers a `free rational choice' by 
forcing the unions to compete and then those OS which proved to be inefficient would 
perish (Clarin internet, 4.6.00). 
The rhetoric for the deregulation of the OS was that it was overlapping of services and 
overspending of resources and corruption as well as the fact that workers were 
trapped into the logic of the corporatist trade unions' interests. Trade unions argued 
that deregulation would only change the situation of those workers who were already 
covered by the system but would not provide a solution for the crisis of the public 
health system. Second, that if one considered that fifty per cent of the population was 
not covered by any system at all (public or private) and that hospitals operated within 
a framework of increasing scarcity produced by the cutting-off of public expenditure 
(Navarro in Pägina/12,12.6.00), the introduction of market criteria in health matters 
would only make the health provision for workers either worse or more expensive, 
and will not bring any solution to those who don't have any coverage at all. 
However, the debate was not just about the provision of health but the collection and 
administration of welfare funds as well as competition with private health companies. 
The OS were the fundamental source of financial and union power. The Laws 23,660 
of OS and 23,661 of Seguro Nacional de Salud of 1989 had re established that the OS 
were a patrimony of workers and that they will be administered by the union 
association legally recognised. The employers' contribution was defined as 6% of the 
wage, whilst workers contributed 3% and further 1.5% for each family member. 10% 
of the total of these contributions went to the ANSSAL (National Administration of 
Health) to redistribute them among small OS (Danani 1994). Thus, the OS retain 45% 
of the contribution and conceded the other 55% to the ANSSAL. The OS also should 
use 80% of their resources for health services (Feldman 1995a: 33). 
But Decree 2,184/91 created the Sistema Unico de la Seguridad Social (SUSS) 
(Integrated System of Social Security) whereby a tax office collected and 
administered all contributions to social security, pensions, health and employers' and 
employees' contributions to the OS, i. e. of the Contribuciön Unificada de Seguridad 
Social) (CUSS) (Unified Contribution to Social Security). The `SUSS would 
distribute the sources to each OS monthly' (art. 87 decree 2,184/91). The CGT 
opposed the decree since it made the unions depend on the tax office to collect the 
funds for the OS, instead of receiving the funds from the ANSSAL, which was 
managed by them (McGuire, 1997). The decree also anticipated the next issue of 
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contention: after competition among unions was established as the form of 
functioning of the OS, private companies would be allowed to compete with the trade 
unions in this captive health market of 18 million beneficiaries so changing the 
solidarity system for workers into a health market for customers (see Grassi et al 
1994). 
At the beginning of 1993, Decrees 9 and 576 abolished workers' compulsory 
affiliation with the welfare fund of their respective trade union. The ANSAAL was to 
compensate the differences that could emerge between contributions and the costs of 
basic services. The decree allowed the OS to unify themselves or associate. The new 
scheme destroyed the solidarity system by introducing a basic module (prestaciön 
bäsica) which must be complemented with other modules according to the service 
required by the patient. 
The CGT rejected the reform of the OS by arguing that the decrees were anti- 
constitutional (Pagina/12 6.4.93 front page) and demanded that the government avoid 
the introduction of the logic of the market into the health system, which was part of 
the system of social security. Yet, at the same time some of the leaders from the Club 
de Amigos were offered to integrate the Advisors' Council for the ANSSAL 
(Pagina/12,21/8/93: 5). 
The CGT First General Strike against Menem 
Although the CGT formally unified in 1992, it remain internally fragmented. On the 
one hand, the moderados, led by the independent unions in commerce, light and 
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power and health were critical of the Menem administration, but avoided direct 
confrontation since their goal was to participate and even create business (see 
Cavallieri in Phgina/12,22.7.93: 12). On the other hand, the duros led by the UOM, 
the '62 0' and those unions joining the UGTT intended to strike against Menem's 
economic policy (Pdgina112,6.5.93: 7). The UOM disliked the CGT attitude and 
made pressure with wage increase demands as well as organising a one-hour per shift 
strike during June, with quite de colaboraciön as the means of expression of the 
stalemate of wage negotiations (Pdgina/12,3.7.92: 3). 
In October 1992, the Comite Central Confederal of the CGT demanded from the 
government the suspension of decree 1334/91 that allowed wage collective bargaining 
at the company level, an increase in the state expenditure on pensions and a$ 536 
minimum wage (Pi gina/12,24/10/92: 2-3). In order to give the government the 
necessary time to meet its demands, the CGT called a general strike without date. 
Since the government did not respond favourably, the first 24-hour general strike 
organised by the CGT against Menem's policies was carried out on 9th November 
1992. 
The strike was partially successful in the industrial ring of Gran Buenos Aires as well 
as in the public sector in the interior of the country. It was supported by some unions 
joining the CTA (e. g. ATE, UOM Villa Constituciön, but not by CTERA) and by 
most of the political parties on the left (Inigo Carreras, 1999: 4). Yet, the government 
continued with its plan to deregulate the system of OS, open the pension system to 
market competition and to adjust wages to productivity, but this time the government 
offered something in exchange. 
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The Marketisation of the Future 
The Law 24.241 of 1993 (Ley del Sistema Integrado de Jubilaciones y Pensiones) 
opened the pension system to market competition (Cortes and Marshall 1999). It had 
the consent of the CGT. It was based on previous projects designed by the IMF, 
mirroring the Chilean system (See Pägina/12 27.12.92; CASH 18.4.93). The chronic 
crisis of the system was exacerbated in the 1990s by the suspension of financial help 
from the central government and the increase in unemployment, casualisation of work 
and the black economy which reduced the amount available for pensions. 
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The `solution' to the crisis combined the old individual distribution system based on a 
solidarity mechanism sustained by the Prestaciön Bäsica Universal (PBU) plus a 
Prestaciön Compensatoria (PC) provided by the state, with a new system of 
capitalisation opened to market competition. This was achieved by the creation of 
privately administered retirement funds, Aseguradoras de Fondos de Jubilaciones y 
Pensiones (AFJyP). The AFJP are chosen individually by workers according to their 
age, personal situation, career, interest rates and future wages. 
Whilst those unions joining the CTA opposed the marketisation of pensions and 
recommended workers to remain in the state system, some unions joining the CGT 
actively participated in the new system either by creating their own AFJP or by 
mediating between AFJPs and workers. Thus, the Federaciön Argentina de 
Trabajadores de Luz Y Fuerza (FATLYF), the Sindicato del Seguro, Federaciön de 
Obras Sanitarias, SMATA, county workers of Buenos Aires and FATUN in 
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partnership with the Bank UB created Futura. Another example is the coalition 
between UOCRA and FATSA, which joined the Bancos Provincial and Social de 
Cordoba, Cenit Seguros/ITT, Hartford and Mastellone to create Claridad. The union 
of Gastronomy, civil associations, chemist, painters, glass, pasta, port workers, 
workers of the OS of Pensioners PAMI, together with Apem S. A. created the AFJP 
San Jose. Other unions acted as `comisionistas' receiving a commission for every new 
affiliate to the AFJP. This is the case of the UOM and 38 more unions with Activa and 
the porters of SUTERH with Previsol (Furman , CASH, 8.5.94,1-3). 
Socialising Risk: Wage Flexibility and the Reduction of Employer Contributions 
In March 1993 Decree 470 of wages linked to productivity imposed a flexible wage 
policy which required decentralised negotiation (Bisio et al, 1999: 153). 142 Wages 
linked to productivity meant that temporary wage increases or decreases at the plant 
level according to the economic cycle were allowed, and both a union with legal 
recognition and the company were encouraged to ask for the opening of negotiations 
at any moment. If there was no agreement, the Minister of Labour would intervene in 
the negotiation. 
Wages were going to be composed of a fixed amount called modulo fijo which 
established the minimum wage and general working conditions, and a variable 
amount called the modulo variable according to productivity. Whilst the variable 
module allowed capital to reduce costs in the context of economic stability, it made 
the wage uncertain since it depended now on the rate of `productivity' and the market. 
141 On this Isuani and San Martino quoted by Battistini 2000b; also Jauregui, 1994; Lozano C 1993; 
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This `wage instability' in the context of stabilisation supported the increase in 
productivity by means of the reduction of costs via flexploitation (Gray, 1995) rather 
than being based on the introduction of technology, training of workers and a non 
regressive distribution of income as demanded by trade unions (see IDEP- CTA, n. d. ). 
The government attack on job stability, wages, pensions and unions' financial 
resources multiplied and increased divisions among workers and was reflected at the 
core of the CGT, where confrontations arose between unions in the industrial sector 
and the service sector, in addition to the increasing difficulties for the labour 
bureaucracy to control the comisiones internas that were forced to negotiate at the 
company level. In April 1993 Brunelli from the metallurgical workers' union was 
elected secretary general of the CGT. This showed a certain impulse to recover the 
power of opposition. Nevertheless, Menem's re-election campaign (which required 
major changes in the National Constitution), 143 conditioned the historical strategy of 
`hit and negotiate' led by the UOM. On the one hand, the CGT leadership followed 
the proposal of the UOM and Transport Unions and called another general strike 
`without date : On the other hand, leaders made public their support for the reform of 
the national constitution and Menem's re-election on the occasion of the 1s` of May of 
1993. As they put it, `the re-election of president Menem was crucial to the 
construction of a modern society'(CGT in Clarin, 1.5.93). 144 
Lloyd-Sherlock, P 1997; Tolosa 1993; Feldman 1995a, Lo Vuolo 1995. 
142 It replaced Decree 1334/9 1, and modify indirectly the Law 14,250. ial The national constitution did not allow a president a second period in office, the re-election 
campaign for 1995 required a high degree of consensus (see IDEP 1993b; also Ferreira Rubio and 
Goretti 2000a, 2000b, 1995). 
iaa As a result Brunelli was nominated as candidate to MP for the Peronist Party for the October 1993 
parliamentary elections and other political appointments were distributed among the leadership such as ANSSa1 and the Obra Social for Pensioners, PAMI. (Schurman in Pagina/ 12, September 1993: 11). 
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Beyond political negotiations between the government and the CGT, the UTA 
demanded governmental support to further reduce labour costs. Capitalists' pressure 
materialised in a new Decree no 2,609/93, issued by the Minister of Economics, that 
reduced the employers' contributions to the health system, pensions and family 
allowances by 30 to 80%. 145 The UTA saw this action as `the best of the Menem 
administration' (Pagina/12,29.12.93: 10-11). But the decree was experienced by the 
CGT as a direct attack on their financial resources, i. e. the reduction of the employers 
contribution to the OS by 1,500 millions dollars (Pägina/12,26.12.93: 5; Rios in 
Clarin 27.12.93). More than hundred of unions joining the CGT discussed the 
organisation of a Comite Central Confederal for the 29`h of December and the 
possibility to launch a plan of action against the government's policies (Pagina/12, 
24/12/93: 5-6). 
The Decree produced a crisis within the cabinet. The Minister of Labour, Rodriguez, a 
solicitor in the labour area with many contacts and commitments with the CGT 
leadership, resigned his post as a form of protest against the mentor of the decree, the 
Minister of Economics Cavallo. The new Minister appointed, Caro Figueroa was a 
technocrat ex vice-minister of Labour of the Alfonsin administration and one of the 
mentors of the NLE in 1991. 
Labour Conflict and the emergence of MTA 
During 1993 workers in the metallurgical, car and electronics industries were 
involved in strikes and struggles against company restructuring, flexibilisation, 
145 The reduction of employers' contributions was geographically differentiated (see Battistini, 2000b). 
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redundancy, and wage decrease. In 1994, owing to the increase in interest rates in the 
United States, the reduction of foreign investment, and, at the end of 1994, the so- 
called Mexican tequila crisis (Gomez et al 1996), companies in the exportable goods 
sectors went further in the reduction of labour costs and the increase in the rate of 
exploitation by redundancy, flexibilisation and wä\decreases. Labour conflict by 
workers joining the UOM grew in the interior of the country146 to oppose 
flexibilisation and redundancy, and demanded wage increases. 
The UOM used the general strike in the branch to demonstrate the power of industrial 
workers. 147 This combative attitude was maintained until 1995. But from 1995 
onwards the increase in unemployment and redundancy associated with the 
rationalisation of forms of production reduced dramatically the level of dispute in the 
industrial sector (Gomez et al, 1996). Most of these disputes were `solved' when both 
employers and the government accepted the wage increase only if the union accepted 
the inclusion of clauses of functional polyvalence, redistribution of holidays in low 
season, and limited shop-floor representatives' protection in the new collective 
agreements (Pdgina/12,13/7/94: 4). 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, also during 1993-95 spontaneous workers' 
protests increased against overdue wages, redundancies, the cutting of social security 
and services, as well as the restructuring of the provincial states' apparatus wherein 
corruption of high level management was not an exception, organised by the public 
sector workers in the interior of the country. 
146 Tierra del Fuego, Cordoba, Rio Grande, Catamarca, La Rioja and Tucuman. 
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Forced by the pressure from the UOM and social protest the CGT called for a general 
strike for January 31 1994. However, since negotiations for the future of the OS, 
collective bargaining and the labour reform were still taking place, the strike was 
suspended until the end of March (Lescano, La Naciön, front-page, 21/1/94). But this 
time the CGT manipulation of the general strike to negotiate with the government 
produced another split within the confederation, following that of 1992, when the 
CTA was created. In January 1994, more than twenty unions gathered in the UGTT 
constituted the Movimiento de los Trabajadores Argentinos (MTA) to oppose the 
labour reform. With the creation of the MTA, the CGT became a bastion of Menem's 
politics, with no internal opposition. 
II 
Co-optation, Perversion and Detachment 
(July 1994 - September 1995) 
This section features the agreement between the state, capital and the CGT wherein 
the labour bureaucracy formally accepted the flexibilisation of labour, collective 
agreements at the company level with their consent, the marketisation of safety at 
work, and supported Menem's re-election campaign, in exchange for financial rescue 
for the OS and unions' debts, their participation in pension and occupational accidents 
new business, and political appointments in the new cabinet and state bodies if 
Menem won the elections. At the same time, flexibilisation policies as well as 
informal negotiations at the workplace intensified. Workers' protests spread. 
The Agreement to Agree: the Acuerdo Marco 
147 UOM carried out a 20-hours sector strike on 11`h of July 1994, and another one on the 18 `h and 19`h 
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During 1993, the government failed in its attempts to pass a law of flexibilisation. By 
November 1993, only 0.7% of wage labour was employed under the new form of 
flexible contracts (Giordano and Torres quoted by Etchemendy and Palermo, 1998: 
569). In April 1994, the last of a series of four drafts was sent to the Congress. The 19 
articles comprised the elimination of special clauses, the reduction of the working day 
from 2,400 to 1,950 hours with the obligation of higher flexibility of working hours 
required by the employer; the increase from 2 to 3 years of the new forms of fixed 
term contracts. The project did not pass through due to parliamentary opposition. 
Thus, the government, together with the UTA, aimed to encourage a `framework of 
social peace' to avoid strikes and agree the pending discussions with the CGT (see 
Blanco Villegas, president of the UTA, in P6ging/12,15.7.94: 10), as a general super 
structural tripartite agreement was offered to the CGT bureaucracy. 
The Menem administration offered the CGT leadership three things, in exchange for 
withdrawing its project of flexibilisation from the Congress: first, to recognise them 
as the only valid interlocutors for the Government; second, if the CGT accepted the 
reduction of employers' contributions by decree 2609/93, the National Treasury 
would provide extra financial support for unions' debts and for those OS affected by 
the reduction of employers' contributions; and third, new political appointments. In 
exchange, the unions were to participate in the elaboration of new flexibilisation 
projects, a new Law of Safety at Work, an integral reform of industrial relations, and 
Menem's re-election campaign. 
July of the same year (La Naciön, 11/7/94: 8 and 18/7/94: 5). 
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As a result of negotiations, on 25th of July 1994 the CGT, the government and eight 
employers' organisationst48 reached the Acuerdo Marco para el Empleo, la Produc- 
tividad y la Equidad Social (Framework Agreement for Employment, Productivity 
and Social Equity, the AM). The AM was defined by its creators as an `agreement to 
agree'. It established a timetable to achieve its goals, the accomplishment of regional 
agreements for employment 149 and created some tripartite bodies such as the Consejo 
del Sistema Nacional de Prevision, the Consejo Nacional de Formaciön Profesional. 
The most important of the 16-points of AM were the flexibilisation of labour, a new 
law of occupational accidents, which included the reduction of accidents and fatal 
injuries payments, and the reform of collective bargaining to allow the `disponibilidad 
colectiva' i. e. that an agreement at the company level could rule over a collective 
agreement or even a decree or a law (Bustos Fierro, 1995: 107-111). The CGT's 
commitment to the AM and the silence of capital are better explained by two more 
complementary bilateral agreements over the OS and the debts of the TU and 
regulatory bodies. 
Decree 2609/93 had reduced the employers' contributions to the OS and pensions in 
some cases by 80% (Bustos Fierro, 1995: 11). However, in order to obtain the support 
of the CGT to this indirect subsidy to capital, the state was going to provide financial 
help to the CGT. In October 1994 expenditure for the OS was cut by 15%. 290 
millions from that reduction came from the employers' contributions and another 120 
million were directly reduced by the ANSSAL (Pagina/12,11.10.94: 9). The 
government compensated the difference. By so doing, capital socialised risks and the 
148 UTA, CAC, Camara Argentina de la construccion; Union Argentina de la Construccion; SR; Bancos 
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state supported a labour movement which had agreed the flexibilisation of labour. In 
addition, the government delayed once again the deregulation of the OS to be enacted 
in 1996 (Pagina/12,25.5.95: 2-3). This delay aimed to give the unions time to 
`modernize and prepare the merger of welfare funds' services in order to be able to 
compete within the new institutional framework' (Murillo 1997: 81). 
The super structural agreements signed by the CGT were rejected by the CTA and the 
MTA. Both organisations echoed the provincial workers' protests and the strikes in 
the industrial sector and carried out a general strike on the 2nd of August 1994 against 
the economic policy of the government. 
`Negotiated' Flexibility: The Legal Changes under the Agreement 
Four laws gave materiality to the 16-points of AM during 1995. The Law of 
Flexibilisation of Labour in Small and Medium Enterprises (those companies with 
less than 40 employees and profit established by the law) (Ley de PYMES 24,467). It 
introduced the `disponibilidad colectiva', the old capitalists' `aspiration' (Capon 
Filas, 1998 in Battistini, 2000b), the fractioning of the thirteen's month wage 
(aguinaldo), the redefinition of a `post' (job) agreed between the employer and the 
union at the company level; in case of the extinction of the contract caused by 
bankruptcy under the crisis prevention procedure, redundancy payment could be 
financed totally or partially by the Fondo Nacional de Empleo (National Employment 
Fund) (MTTS, 1995c; Recalde, 1995; Fontana, 1995). 
and Bolsa de Comercio (AM, and Pcigina/12,27/7/94: 14). 
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The reform of the LCT no 24,465 introduced a training contract for three to 24 month 
for young people aged 14 to 25. This meant that the first three month of the fixed- 
term contract were considered a probation period, that could be extended to six month 
if this was agreed with the union at the company level. In these cases, employers were 
exempted from contributions to pensions and to the Fondo Nacional de Empleo. 
The Nuevo Regimen de Concursos y Quiebras Law 24,522 regulated the conditions of 
continuity of the contract in those enterprises that went bankrupt. The labour relation 
was `dissolved automatically without any protection to workers, who have no means 
to face a legal appeal' (Battistini 1999). Previous collective agreements became 
ineffective in case the company was to be reopened under a new management, since 
continuity in employment is not allowed. Redundancy payments and occupational 
accidents payments were to be dissolved at the moment of the transference of the 
company to the new management (see Recalde, 1995; Battistini, 2000b). 
Finally, the Law of Risks at Work 24,557 destroyed the protection of workers 
established by the labour code. Whilst the Law of Occupational Accidents of 1993 
forced workers to go to the civil court, instead of the labour court, in case of an 
occupational accident, the new law cancelled also the possibility to go to civil court. 
Political and union opposition argued that the law consecrated inequity and inequality 
(Pdgina/12 10.8.95: 10) as well as reducing the incentive for employers to improve 
working conditions (Recalde and Ciampa 1995, CASH 8.10.95: 2). 
149 Like the Acuerdo Regional para el Empleo en el Norte Argentino (ARENA) in November 1994. 
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The novelty of this law was that it introduced the logic of money in occupational 
accident regulation by creating the safety at Aseguradoras de Riesgos de Trabajo 
(ART), i. e. private entities with lucrative ends hired by the employers to protect 
themselves from accident compensation. Like in the case of the AFJP introduced by 
the new pension system, unions were allowed to participate directly in the new system 
by creating their own ART and by collaborating in the company risk assessments. The 
acceptance of this law which by the CGT was conditioned by an agreement with the 
Minister of Economics wherein the government must pay the CGT favour by 
suspending the reduction of 90 million dollars for the Obra Social for Pensioners 
(PAMI) (Ämbito Financiero, 26/10/94: 12; Pagina/12,19/10/94: 7). 
The ARTs had to be authorised by the Superintendencia de Riesgos del Trabajo 
(SRT), which administrates, controls and regulates health and safety, suggests plans to 
improve working conditions at the company level, and provides financial support to 
employers. The companies had the obligation to hire an ART unless they were able to 
provide insurance themselves. The employers contribute with a monthly quota 
determined by the Superintendencia. The ART gives insurance per branch and trade 
unions and employers could constitute one if they had I million dollars. Employers 
are exempted from their responsibility of the accident since an accident is considered 
a civil crime (not labour), except those contained in Article 1072 of the C6digo Civil 
(civil crime). Those diseases caused by the workers' fault or alien to working reasons 
are excluded from insurance. The nature of the accident and disease as well as the 
degree and incapacity are fixed by medical commissions working for the ARTs. 
(Pagina/12,15/6/95: 8). 
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The `Reality' of Flexibilisation and Workers' Resistance 
In order to improve competitivity and productivity companies implemented a 
multiplicity of strategies which deepened the heterogeneity and fragmentation of the 
labour collective and affected the power of union resistance at the shop-floor level. 
Informal agreements at the company level carried out in the car, metallurgical, iron, 
electronics and telecommunication sectors indicate the relative success of 
flexibilisation policies. Particularly in those sectors, flexibilisation of labour was 
complemented with contracting out and the fragmentation of the production process 
as well as the casualisation of labour. '5° However, this was not a smooth process but 
rather contested and resisted by workers. '5' 
Between 1991 and 1998 there was an informal process of decentralisation of 
collective bargaining. Since the Law 14,250 remained untouched and enterprise trade 
unionism did not exist, the new forms of production and working conditions were 
agreed by the shop-floor representatives by either informal acts signed by the 
comisiön interna and the management, sometimes agreed by the union at the level of 
the branch of activity as a daily reality of the work-place (Bisio et al 1999). Whilst in 
1991 39.4% of collective bargaining was reached at the level of activity, 42.3% at the 
branch level and 18.3% at the company level, in 1998 the agreements at the level of 
activity went down to 10.4%, branch level to 1.3% and at the company level increased 
150 The indicators of casualisation of labour (according to the methodology used by the IPA, 
Investigaciön sobre pobreza en Argentina (see Santantonio and Tavilla 1994: 15) are the absence of 
contribution to pension system, to OS, fixed-term contract, wage per piecework. Whilst the two former 
indicate an illegal casual labour relation, the two latter indicate a legal precarious labour relation. The 
EPH also offers some indicators like redundancy payment when dismissed, pension contributions, etc. 
According to the EPH Gran Buenos Aires for the period 1989-1991 the number of casual labourers 
increased by 22% and remained the same until 1993 (Santantonio and Tavilla, 1994). 151 On this see Battistini and Montes Cato 2000, Bisio et al 1999, Brinkmann 1999, Freytes Frey 1999; 
Esquivel, 1997, Walter 1994, Deibe et a! 1994. 
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to 88.3% (Bisio et al 1999: 157). Decentralisation of collective bargaining was 
facilitated by the `disappearance of the Ministry of Labour in its control and 
regulation of labour relations (Freytes Frey 1999: 212). 
In the telecommunication sector, decentralised agreements signed between unions and 
Telefönica de Espana and France Telecom (e. g. agreements no 201/92 and 257/97), 
introduced incentives for productivity, functional polyvalence, mobility, outsourcing 
and contracting out; special `peace clauses' to solve conflicts and new forms of 
organisation and management (like quality circles and work groups), fractioned 
holidays, flexible working hours, the casualisation of jobs by the use of pasantias in 
customer services, the loss of rights, the suspension of the historical special benefit of 
discount in phone calls for telephone workers, the suspension of the day of the 
telephone worker as a holiday and of special bonuses and job stability (Battistini and 
Montes Cato 2000, Goldin 1997: 63; also Brinkmann, 1999). 
The car industry was particularly affected by the reduction in credit available 
produced by the `tequila' crisis, as well as by the Brazilian stabilisation plan (Plan 
Real) of 1994 which affected import policy by encouraging domestic consumption 
(see INDEC, 1999a: 9-10). New agreements signed by the SMATA (together with the 
UOM, the union representing workers in the car industry) with several companies also 
shows the policy of flexibilisation of work and employment. The agreement between 
SMATA and General Motors became emblematic because it introduced clauses of 
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`social peace' whereby unions were obliged to find a peaceful form of solution to 
labour conflict (CCT 98/94; Laborda, La Naciön 13.4.98: 6). 152 
The struggles in the metallurgical industry were led by the UOM. During the 1960s 
and the 1970s the union had become a symbol of the strength of the industrial 
working class and trade union leadership (see Martuccelli and Svampa 1997) and a 
leading case in centralised collective agreement and the determination of wage 
standard in the metallurgical sector (Freytes Frey, 1999: 201; see chapter four). 
Deindustrialisation and flexibilisation fostered new forms of production and 
management techniques that required a daily negotiation that involved the comisiones 
internas at the workplaces rather than the national bureaucracy (see Bunel, 1992; 
Freytes Frey, 1999). 
On the one hand, the shop floor representatives found themselves forced to negotiate 
since the initiative came this time from the employers. The refusal to agree at the 
company level was ineffective since there was a high degree of informal and multiple 
changes agreed through acts to allow the changes in the form of production to 
develop. This relative power of negotiation gave the comisiones internas a certain 
degree of autonomy and the opportunity for shop-floor militants to free themselves 
from the constraint imposed by union `verticalismo'. 
On the other hand, trade unions found difficulties in controlling the so called fraude 
concomitante, (concomitant fraud) that had become a common practice in small 
workshops, whereby workers renounce their rights or agree to be paid `en negro' to 
152 See agreements between SMATA and YASAKI, FIAT, CHRYSLER, TOYOTA, DEUTZ. 
keep their jobs (CASH, Pagina/12,28.10.90: 3; Esquivel 1995: 60). The strategy of 
the leadership of the UOM was to maintain a discourse that advocated centralisation 
but that was in fact accompanied by a decentralised negotiation about which most of 
the time the central union did not get any information. The UOM opted for the 
rejection of formal negotiation to avoid getting involved directly in the loss of 
workers' rights but not getting much out of it, and accepted laissez faire at the 
company level (see Freytes Frey 1999). 
III 
Confrontation: General Strikes versus the Decretazos 
(October 1995- August 1998) 
This period was characterised by a new attitude of the CGT leadership towards the 
government whereby it aimed to maintain its financial and bargaining power of 
struggle against the government insistence in legalising the decentralisation of 
collective bargaining. Workers' struggles evidenced the detachment of the CGT from 
the actual changes in social relations and the attempt by the CGT leadership to 
recover their confrontation power by using the general strike to threaten the 
government. Unlike the CGT, the CTA and the MTA general strikes aimed to co- 
ordinate fragmented struggles which became apparent as a result of the increase in 
unemployment rates and economic adjustment. 
Productivity and Unemployment 
Over the period 1991-1994, there was a notable increase in labour productivity in 
manufacturing industry (40%), privatised services such as Gas (68%), 
AUTOLATINA, MERCEDES BENZ and RENAULT in Battistini and Montes Cato, 2000: 23. 
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Telecommunications (57,5, %) and electricity (310%) (Bustos, 1995). The majority of 
clauses of productivity included in the 808 collective agreements at the company level 
reached between April 1991 and April 1994 referred to reduction of labour costs, 
introduction of functional polyvalence and quality circles, increase in labour time, 
rationalisation of labour, reorganisation of tasks and incentives for productivity 
(MTSS in Santantonio 1994: 12-13). 153 
Whilst between 1991 and 1995 unemployment climbed dramatically to 18.5%, the 
GDP grew by 30.6% (Esquivel 1995). Therefore, increase in productivity was 
achieved by means of a greater exploitation of the labour force, not only by the 
replacement of labour by capital, but also by the rationalisation of the use of the 
labour force looking for a reduction of labour costs, mostly without any significant 
investment in new equipment (Bustos 1995: 27; see Tokman 1996, Lindemboin 
1995). According to INDEC, between 1990 and 1996 industrial production lost 20% 
of its workers, whereas productivity increased by 30% (Clarin, Internet, 10.2.97). 
A study of 19 branches of the economy, which represent 80% of industrial 
employment, 82% of exportable goods and 55% of industrial imports highlighted that 
since 1994 the labour cost (represented by the real wage of the worker) decreased by 
16%, the figures reaching 20 to 32% in textile, shoe making and electronics. The 
decrease is explained by two combined factors: the decrease of the wage and the 
increase in the productivity per worker. The increase in productivity had also great 
significance in the expulsion of the labour force since there was a tendency to move 
153 On productivity, wages and collective bargaining see Deibe et al 1994. On employers' strategies 
and the new forms of organisation of production and management see Walter 1994; Esquivel 1995. 
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from labour-intensive to capital intensive production (Centro de Estudios para la 
Produccion (CEP), Montenegro, Pagina/12,28.8.97: 14). 
The introduction of new forms of production and management, as well as 
decentralisation of collective agreements led to the change in the content of labour 
conflicts. As previously mentioned, during the first two years of convertibility the 
industrial sector struggled over the distribution of income. In 1994 the crisis of 
convertibility and the dramatic rise in unemployment produced a decrease in the 
levels of dispute by 12.5%. But there was, for the same period, an increase in regional 
and decentralised conflicts (geographic dispersion). As for the content of disputes, in 
1991 industrial disputes for wage increases constituted 37% of industrial conflicts but 
by 1995 they had been reduced to 2.4%. 
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The main source of conflict had moved 
to an attempt to recoup unpaid wages 
and against increasing redundancies, 
from 40.6% in 1992 to 70% in 1995 
(Gomez et al, 1996: 134). In April 
1995, the struggle in the metallurgical 
industry was resumed with strikes, 
occupation of factories and 
mobilisations supported by other unions and repressed by the police. During the 
demonstrations in Tierra del Fuego, a construction worker, Victor Choque, was shot 
dead by the police. The UOM Tierra del Fuego and the Front of Unions in the Public 
Sector called for a strike on the 13 `h April. Meanwhile, UOM Central Union called for 
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an urgent general meeting of its Council on April 17 to repudiate police repression. 
On 14th April all the unions demanded the resignation of the Governor and prepared a 
national general strike. The MTA and CTA called for a national day of sorrow and 
organised a march to the National Parliament on 17`h of April (P6gina/12,15/4/95: 5). 
The general strike, carried out on 2l't of April 1995, was successful in Santa Fe, Entre 
Rios, Tierra del Fuego, Rio Negro and the north-west of the country (Inigo Carreras, 
1999: 4). The CGT did not take part in the strike. 
In August 1995, the CGT entered into another crisis. Two important leaders left the 
CGT for opposed reasons, which shows the depth of the crisis. The leader of the 
SMATA, Rodriguez was against the CGT's open support for the Law 24,467 to 
flexibilise labour within small and medium enterprises within the AM. The secretary 
general of the CGT, Casia, also left but by arguing instead that the confederation's 
opposition strategy was not convenient for the CGT relationship with the Menem 
administration after the 1995 election. After they left, the leader of the construction 
workers aimed to recover the power of opposition and bargaining and called a general 
strike supported by the MTA and CTA on 6th of September 1995. The strike was 
accompanied by the largest demonstration under Menem (60,000 people). The 
negotiations around the OS continued after the strike and, as a result, the unions 
retained $400 million for the OS (Etchemendy and Palermo 1998: 580). 
As previously suggested, in 1996 a provincial roadblock in Neuquen marked the 
beginning of a new and persistent form of protest which was accompanied by four 
general strikes organised by CGT, CTA and MTA. The general strike carried out on 
the 9th of August 1996 by the CGT was accompanied by a Marcha del Trabajo 
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(March for Employment) organised by the CTA and ollas populares (popular meals) 
organised by the MTA. Demonstrations were severely repressed by the police. The 
strike was massive: according to organisers 90% of workers in industry and transport 
went on strike. After recognising that this had been the most important strike under 
Menem, the government offered the CGT to dialogue (Ifligo Carreras 1999; Clarin 
9.8.96 internet). However, another 36-hours general strike against labour 
flexibilisation and economic policy with a demonstration to Plaza de Mayo also 
organised by the CGT and the MTA (supported by the CTA), was carried out on the 
26 and 27 of September 1996. 
El Decretazo 
The `negotiated flexibilisation' on the basis of the `disponibilidad colectiva' was a 
requirement for the further reduction of labour costs suggested by the WB (L Guasch, 
WB in Clarin 3.12.96 internet; Labour Report 1996-97, ILO in Bermudez, Clarin 
3.12.96, internet; Clarin 27.1.97). According to the government `the paralysis of 
collective bargaining (due to its centralisation, the impoverishment of those 
negotiable aspects) prevents employers and unions from using their capacities to find 
joint solutions to simultaneously improve competitivity and defend employment' 
(Caro Figueroa, La Naciön, 7.8.95: 5, c. f. Fontana, IDEP in Pagina/12 27.12.96; also 
MTSS, 1996b). 
Since the laws of collective bargaining and professional associations remained 
untouched, and facing the visit of the IMF mission to supervise fiscal achievements, 
and to provide a credit of 150 million dollars (Clarin internet 3.12.96), President 
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Menem followed the IMF recommendations (IMF 1996) and issued three decrees 
(NUDs)154 1553,1554 and 1555) in December 1996. By so doing the government 
excluded central confederations from wage bargaining in the PyMES and eliminated 
the `principle of ultra actividad' that ruled industrial relations that had caused the 
paralysis of negotiation and therefore the need to implement the `disponibilidad 
colectiva' to enlarge the field of negotiation. 
The principio de ultractividad allowed all collective agreements to rule the labour 
relations in the branch until trade unions and employers agreed a new one. Unions 
like UOM used this principle to avoid new negotiation and thus maintain their 
achievements of the last round of negotiation of 1975. The suspension of this 
principle meant that the consent of the confederation of the union at the branch level 
is not required to reach agreements at the company level even if the latter modified 
the former (disponibilidad colectiva). As a result, the 1975 collective agreements 
would lose their power. 
The struggle over the `decrees' led to the third 24 hour-general strike of this period 
organised by CGT with MTA and CTA on 26`h of December 1996. It had a partial 
attendance, but it was very significant in the industrial ring of Gran Buenos Aires, 
Santa Fe, Rosario, Cordoba, Tucuman and Mar del Plata (Inigo Carreras 1999: 4). 
Legal action was also pursued by the CGT and supported by the opposition of the 
UCR and FREPASO MPs. Eventually, the Courts considered the NUDs unlartful, 
anti-constitutional and inapplicable for they violated international agreements of the 
ILO as well as Arts. 14 and 17 of the National Constitution. After this, negotiation 
154 Decretos de Necesidad y Urgencia: Emergency Decrees. 
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was resumed between the CGT, the government and the Grupo de los Ocho. In 
January 1997 they agreed that flexibilisation should be achieved by the law and not by 
decree (Clarin, 17.1.97, internet). '55 
Negotiated Flexibilisation 
Whilst the Ocho and particularly the UTA insisted on the exclusion of national unions 
from wage bargaining and negotiation over working conditions at the company level 
(Reato, Clarin, 21.3.97; La Naciön, 2.4.97), 156 the CGT accepted the elimination of 
the ultra actividad only if the unions representing the activity or the branch took part 
in collective bargaining at the company level. In view of the stalemate of negotiations, 
the government offered an institutional mediation with the intention to postpone the 
discussion on the labour reform until after the October elections. Yet, on the 2nd of 
May the CGT threatened the government with a 36-hour general strike without date. 
As a result, the confederation imposed its view on centralised collective bargaining on 
the government. In a joint document the two parties agreed to encourage collective 
bargaining whereby the central confederation would have the right to negotiate or 
delegate this to a lower level of organisation (i. e. the comisiön interna). They also 
agreed to the suspension of the deregulation of OS by preventing the private sector 
from entering into the OS system (La Naciön, 7.5.97, on line). 
'" See the IMF's same position in Velazquez in Clarin 14.2.97 internet. 156 The Ocho also aimed to replace redundancy payment with a system of capitalisation whereby 
workers would save around 4% of their salary in case they were dismissed (see Freytes Frey 1999: 
209), and their proposal to maintain their contributions to the Redundancy Payment Fund at 2,5% 
(whilst the CGT demanded 8% and the government, 4%). Instead, the CGT leadership wanted to 
discuss the distributive policy as well as the creation of a solidarity fund for unemployment. 
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IV 
The Hollow Agreement (September 1998 - October 1999) 
This section addresses the shift in the Menem administration's strategy towards trade 
unions and the devolution of centralised collective bargaining and reestablishment of 
the financial help for the OS by the Law 25,013 which assured the CGT its 
organisational power, against the IMF advice. Yet this did not reverse the process of 
destabilisation, flexibilisation and casualisation of labour. The political and financial 
stability of the CGT was achieved by means of the legalisation of uncertainty and 
workers' lives' instability. 
The IMF Memorandum 
In April 1998 an Official Memorandum from the IMF157 (which had initiated its visit 
and fiscal `monitoring' of the Argentine govemment) critically assessed the `current 
economic trends in Argentina' and particularly the new governmental project of 
labour reform to solidify the agreement between the Minister of Labour and the CGT. 
The Memorandum stated that 
`the recent proposed reform of the labor legislation falls short of the 
undertakings outlined in paragraph 28 of the letter of intent, in particular 
those relating to the gradual elimination of the "ultractividad' clause; the 
phasing out of the special labour statutes; the decentralization of labor 
negotiations; and the promotion of competition among "obras sociales". 
Specifically, the proposed reform reaffirms the "ultractividad" of all 
contracts which were subject to even minor modifications since 
1988... makes no mention of the special labor statutes and reserves to the 
higher levels of labor union representation the right of negotiation of all 
contracts, whether sectorial or at the enterprise level. Finally, it does not 
157 Unpublished official document signed by its Deputy Director for the Western Hemisphere 
Department Teresa Ter Minassian. 
257 
include any steps to promote competition among the "obras sociales" 
Memorandum IMF, 6.4.98: 3). 
Nevertheless, in order to recover political power vis-ä-vis the increasing power of the 
Ministry of Economics led by Cavallo and supported by the WB and the IMF, the 
government appointed a new Minister of Labour, the Peronist politician Erman 
Gonzalez, who assured the unions their control over collective bargaining by law 
(Battistini, 2000b). The Law 25,013 of September 1998 rescinded three major 
changes produced by the reform on behalf of capital. 158 
First, it rescinded the modalidades promovidas de empleo that had been introduced in 
1991 and reinforced in 1995, reduced the probationary period of fixed-term contracts 
and regulated the contrato de aprendizaje and pasantia. They had become, according 
to the MTSS, `an abusive practice' leading to casualisation of labour and permanent 
uncertainty for workers (MTSS 1998a: 22), producing a `roundabout effect' (efecto 
calesita). 159 Secondly, the law reinforced the role of centralised collective bargaining 
since it ruled that the central unions (activity or branch) were the legal representative 
of negotiation at the company level unless this representation was delegated by the 
central unions to a lower level, i. e. the comisiön interna. Thirdly, collective agreement 
at the company level could only rule on a major level if the articulation between both 
levels was achieved. But if in a one- year period the negotiation at the minor level did 
isa The law was designed by the CGT advisor Lucio Garcon Maceda, an ex-solicitor of the 
Montoneros. 
159 The efecto calesita means that once the casual contract finishes, rather than the worker being 
incorporated to the permanent staff, he/she is dismissed without redundancy payment and replaced by 
another worker under the same conditions. By 1996 a poll organised by the MTSS highlighted that 
14% of the labour force, i. e. 500,000 workers, were under this kind of contract, 280,000 of them under 
the 'probationary period' (Berm(idez, Clarin, 27.1.97 internet). 
not take the form of a collective agreement it would perish, and then the collective 
agreement would rule for all workers in the company (MTSS, 1998a, 1998b). 
160 
ý, ý, ý ý Flexibilisation and Casualisation 
From April until August 1997, 
provincial roadblocks and upheavals, 
as well as the teachers' hunger strike 
under the (wyw Blanca (see the 
previous chapter) presented another reality than that of negotiation. '6' 
By April 1997,15"o of wage labour was under fixed-term contracts and 80% of new 
workers were hired for a probationary period or fixed-term contract, which exempted 
employers from most contributions. Among the 3,500,000 workers there were only 
500,000 under legal contracts (MTSS in ('lurin internet 11.4.9 and 17.4.97). 
40% of workers in Capital and Gran Buenos Aires earned less than 400 dollars. Since 
this income sustained the whole family, it was deemed that each member lived on less 
than 100 dollars per month (INDEC, (7arin 10.2.97, internet). The fragmentation of 
160 Also One day after being defeated by de la Rua in the general elections (October 22 1999, President 
Menem issued the last NUD (necessity and urgency decree) of his administration (no 1215) to 
autonomise the Solidarity Fund for the Obras Sociales (Fondo Solidario para las Obras Sociales) from 
the national budget and transfer it to the control of a tripartite body constituted by the CGT, capital and 
the government. The 1"ondo Solidario was meant to subsidise the OS with less resources and pay for 
medical treatments of high complexity. The decree intended to bring back both the power of 
negotiation over the funds for the OS and the power of the financial management of $ 360 million 
pesos per year that in 1994 had been incorporated to the national budget also by decree (Clarilr, 
internet, 26/ 27/29.10.99) to the CGT. However, the decree was suspended by the courts after the CTA 
as well as other unions and OS managed by unions joining the CTA (e. g. OSPA) claimed it was anti- 
constitutional (C/aria, internet, 20.11 99). 
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distribution of income also occurred. Whilst in 1991 the poorest 10% of the 
population received 2.3% of national income, in 1997 the rate decreased to 1.6%; 
whilst the 10% richest people received 34.2% in 1991, the rate increased to 35.3% in 
1997 (INDEC, Clarin Internet 24.3.97). Real wages had decreased 10% in the 
previous 2 years (Clarin 6.12.96). 
Regarding the situation, the WB helped the government with a new credit to control 
social protest. The Commission for the Analysis of Social Conflict was created and 
the Armed Forces studied the situation and elaborated a potential plan in case of 
social chaos (Clarin 27.5.97 and 30.5.97; also New York Times, The Herald Tribune 
and The Washington Post position in Clarin Internet, 3.6.97). Whilst the CGT awaited 
for the agreement with the government to be frozen by the new law, another general 
strike for 24-hours was carried out by the CTA and MTA (as well as CCC and UOM), 
who were free from the constraint of the negotiation with the government and 
opposed flexibilisation projects and economic policy, on 14`h of August 1997 (Inigo 
Carreras 1999: 4). 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter explored the process of struggle around the labour reform under Menem. 
During the hyperinflation period, the power of labour, and particularly of the trade 
unions had been threatened by the new economic power emerging out of the process 
of globalisation, which aimed to flexibilise the use of labour in order to achieve a 
reduction in labour costs and increase in productivity towards international 
competitivity. The institutional and legal protection of labour, the state involvement in 
161 In May 1997 roadblocks were carried out in Jujuy (see case study chapter 10); Neuquen, Cordoba, Santa Fe, La Plata, Salta, Tierra del Fuego, Mendoza, Entre Rios and a student protest in the city of 
LbU 
the reproduction of labour, job stability and social security, and the centralised 
financial and bargaining power of the unions were the main barriers to achieve those 
goals. The transformation of employment relations and labour contracts, changes 
in 
the labour process and the reshaping of the relationship between trade unions and the 
state was investigated by looking at the unions' struggle for and against the 
flexibilisation in work and employment (see Poliert 1988), the marketisation of social 
security, occupational accidents and health, and the decentralisation of collective 
bargaining. 
It was argued that through the labour reform, the struggle over subjectivity asserted 
itself as a struggle over the law. The law allowed the deconstruction of the Peronist 
form of labour and thus the social construction of the Menemist paradigm of stability 
by means of the legalisation of uncertainty, insecurity, risk and instability. 
Flexibilisation in work meant for workers the establishment of uncertainty with regard 
to their contracts (now not assured for life and becoming increasingly short and 
casual), their time at work (which now depended on the production arrangements), 
their wages (now based on productivity gains), their leisure (since holidays depended 
now on production cycles). Flexibilisation in employment and the `casualisation of 
jobs' as well as unemployment led to social vulnerability, isolation and the 
deconstruction of solidarity links outside work. 
In some cases, insecurity became the motivation for workers since they forced 
themselves into bad labour conditions to achieve productivity incentives and therefore 
increase their salary beyond the fixed module, with health, psychological and 
Buenos Aires (Clarin 23.5.97). See next chapter. 
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emotional effects on workers' lives. Functional polyvalence and the marketisation of 
the relationship among workers (where workers from other task groups are treated as 
customers) led to the worsening of solidarity links at the workplace as well as an 
increase in occupational diseases (see study of the car industry in Battistini and 
Montes Cato, 2000: 20). The differentiation of the labour collective (fragmentation 
between core and periphery) and the mutual discipline of different groups of workers 
(Esquivel 1995: 81) deeply affected identification, organisation and resistance at the 
work place. 
The privatisation of social security contributed to the expansion of the law of lottery 
(Neary and Taylor 1998,1999). Workers were compelled to put their future under 
risk, either going with a state system in bankruptcy or the stock market. The 
deregulation and privatisation of the health system meant the deconstruction of the 
principle of solidarity, the differentiation of the working population and the 
marketisation of health. Deregulation implied a new form of discipline of labour 
which in the case of the OS is based on the idea of free workers and free choice as 
well as `private' competition for the best health service (Grassi et al 1994: 170). 
Uncertainty was coupled with insecurity: occupational accidents and safety at work 
became a problem for employers who were now protected by the law against workers' 
`abuse'. The protection of workers against the capitalists' abuse at the workplace was 
put upside down: the new legislation protected employers from the risk of having to 
pay a large amount of money for a fatal injury. The amount paid for a `fatal injury' is 
none other than the price of the life of a worker, that has been established at 55,000 
dollars, according to the calculation of the labour cost for capital. 
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The crisis and recomposition of the state and the law intensified the reshaping of the 
labour movement. The struggle over the legal decentralisation of collective bargaining 
meant three things: the weakening and blackmail of shop-floor representatives at the 
workplace, the break of the organic relation between the bureaucracy and comisiones 
internas and the co-optation of the CGT leadership. 
The CGT played a significant role in legitimising the flexibilisation and 
destabilisation of workers' lives, labour relations and working conditions. 
Menem(ism) put the CGT leadership between the devil and the deep blue sea: for the 
first time in history to defend workers' rights and demands meant the deconstruction 
of the trade unions' institutional power. Since under the Peronist form trade unions 
and the state were inextricably linked, the option before both was not just a matter of 
moral or political decision but actually a deeper problem of definition of Peronism 
itself, and with it, of the definition of the power of trade unions altogether. 
On the one hand, the co-optation of the CGT was the safety pin to allow the labour 
reform to go through, except in two issues that involved the unions directly: the OS 
and the decentralisation of collective bargaining, the latter being not simply the 
agreements at the company level, which actually took place and spread as a common 
informal practice, but the creation of enterprise unionism by means of the 
modification of the law of collective bargaining and of professional associations. 
On the other hand, the CGT negotiated their survival by perverting and detaching 
themselves from the content of their raison d'etre. It reshaped itself in a form 
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whereby collective bargaining and their participation in business were the means to 
exchange workers' rights for the government's or capitalists' financial or political 
privileges for the unions. I call this the perversion of the trade unions. Perversion was 
used here neither as an abnormality or an aberration nor as a moral or ethical critique 
of leaders' attitudes but rather as a distortion or misuse: the financial stabilisation of 
the unions was achieved by means of the legalisation of the instability of workers' 
lives in a moment in which these policies were being discussed, negotiated and also 
imposed. By so doing, they survive financially and politically yet lost membership 
and legitimisation. 
But the perversion of the CGT did not mean the triumph of the government goals 
`against' labour. The super structural recreation of the power of the CGT did not 
account for the reality of labour. Since the co-optation, confrontation and agreement 
between the CGT and the Menem administration was `institutional', the government 
could not control grass-roots resistance and the expansion and politicisation of labour 
conflict. The other reality of the struggle highlights first, the crisis and decline of the 
UOM as a paradigm of trade unionism in Argentina and, second, the emergence of 
new opposition led by the CTA (and the MTA) which attempted to organise the 
fragmented resistance that emerged not only against the labour reform and its 
implications, i. e. casualisation of jobs, unemployment, crime, and poverty, under new 
premises. 
The use of the general strike by the CGT does not indicate, in this case, the 
recovering the-power of organised workers' struggles (Inigo Carreras 1999) but rather 
its weakness, insofar as the general strike, which disrupts workers' lives and puts 
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them and their jobs at risk, was their tool to intimidate the government during the 
process of negotiation. The struggle of the CGT to maintain their previous political 
space and methods of negotiation, as well as the struggle of the Peronist government 
to use the unions to secure control of workers' struggles fell short of achieving 
stability. The form of the labour conflicts and social protest which spread in and 
against the labour reform elucidated the inadequacy of the CGT strategy to capture 
and articulate the fragmentation, decentralisation, geographical dispersion and 
politicisation of labour conflict, owed in great part to unemployment, one of the main 
products of the labour reform agreed by the CGT. 
265 
Chapter Nine 
Stabilisation, Unemployment and `Exclusion' (the Struggle over the 
Form of Monev) 
`This is a special time. If those who are 
opposed to the reforms don't succeed in 
twisting my arm, they will not have any 
opportunity in the future' (Former Argentine 
Minister of Economics Cavallo, Pägma 12, 
17,4.94: 4). 
`Our country has difficulties to translate 
economic growth into job creation' (MTSS, 
information leaflet). 
`Naci para trabajar/ naci para trabajar/y no hay 
trabajo' (song by Baglietto). 162 
`The subject thus constituted initially will be 
always in process of de (re) constitution, or 
always at stake and questioned' (Elliot in Galli 
and Malfe 1996). 
`We are unemployed workers and we only 
want to stop being exploited' (Piyuelero, La 
Nacion, 12.5.00) 
`The National Constitution guarantees the 
right to work, which is, in fact, the right to 
life'(First Meeting for the Unemployed, CTA, 
1997). 
Workers' struggles cannot destabilise 
stability. Stability is a threaten to our lives. 
-Ill of us were experienced this in one way 
or another. When we confront this cruel 
corm of the existence of money, the 
abstraction can easily become the most 
udimentary, form of coercion: death. 
1lowever, not to confront it would also 
, Wean death, namely to leave the fiture in 
lie hands of the depredators of happiness. 
'L'ordre monetaire est mortel' (Aglietta 
and Orlean, 1984: 182). 
`That all Brazilians are able to have breakfast, 
lunch and dinner would be also a revolution' 
(Lula, leader PT, Brazil) 
`The working population ... produces 
both the 
accumulation of capital and the means by 
which it is itself made relatively superfluous' 
((, apical vol. 1: 783). 
162 `I was born to work, I was born to work, 
and there's no jobs' 
This chapter discusses the significance of both stabilisation policies and 
unemployment for the transformation of the subjectivity of labour. In 1991, after 
some stabilisation attempts (see Beckerman 1995; Pou 2000), hyperinflation was 
controlled by means of the Convertibility Plan launched by the Minister of Economics 
Cavallo. 163 The control of hyperinflation by means of strong state intervention and the 
initial impulse of the plan was considered an economic miracle leading to the idea that 
economic stability had been achieved and that STABILITY would benefit everyone. 
Yet, the destructive nature of the neo liberal stability broke the link between economic 
growth and distribution of income towards full employment and workers' welfare, 
leading rather to increasing unemployment (Barbeito 1995; Lindemboin 1995; 
Barbeito and Lo Vuolo 1995, Carnota, 1994; Monza, 1995). 1M Consequently, 
institutional changes, active and passive employment policies, as well as social 
programmes were launched (Castillo Marin 1993) to contain the so-called `side 
effects' of stability, and solve the paradox manifested by the success of the economic 
policies in stifling inflation and the dramatic increase of unemployment (Tokman, 
1996). 
In spite of institutional efforts, President Menem's second period in office (1995-99) 
was characterised by increasing social unrest throughout the country against industry 
and state restructuring and the extension of poverty and unemployment. Stabilisation 
163 The Convertibility Plan consisted of eleven measures that included cutting the public deficit, the 
deregulation of the economy, the administrative reform of the state, reduction of the foreign debt and 
improvement of tax collection, trade liberalisation, the lowering of labour costs and labour and social 
security reform (Acuna, 1994: 45-47). 
164 See debate on the `destructive effects of the Convertibility Plan' in 'La Convertibilidad otra vez en 
Debate' The Washington Post 15.1.01 in La Naciön 16.1.01 on line. 
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policies fostered an unprecedented `two digits' rate of unemployment, and therefore 
produced the most unstable form of labour. 
As it has been shown, neo-liberal policies contributed to the transformation of labour 
and social conflict into a more regional, decentralised and `politicised' workers' and 
social struggles. The most characteristic form of these struggles is the roadblock. 
Under Menem, roadblocks were the most important and visible form of protest that 
called into question the policies of stabilisation. The roadblocks, organised mainly by 
state, unemployed workers and the poor with the participation of the local community, 
social organisations and trade unions, demanded employment programmes, job 
creation and industrial development against the economic adjustment in areas where 
the chronic economic crisis and the restructuring or closure of the only source of 
employment led to the worsening of working conditions, massive unemployment, and 
the increase in poverty. 
It will be shown that the governmental rationale behind the introduction of focused 
social policies, as well as specific state active and passive employment policies by 
law, is to compensate the `lack' of jobs produced by the economic transformation. 
However, employment programmes and social policy only contributed to the creation, 
affirmation and legalisation of unstable and uncertain forms of capitalist work, within 
which unemployment is its highest expression. 165 
In order to assess stability and employment policies the chapter contests the dominant 
assumption that unemployment means the lack of work and exclusion from the labour 
165 On neo-liberal social policies see Marshall 1988; Grassi et al 1997. 
market, while the absence of adequate employment policies implies the erosion of 
job-creating social networks (Castel, R 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, de Bemis 1994, 
Gershanik and Mercer 1996, Hintze 1996, Rosanvallon 1995 among others), I argue 
that this traditional interpretation does not account for the broader reality of 
unemployment and acts as the tool for the disempowerment of the unemployed. My 
main argument in this chapter is that (un)employment is not produced by lack of work 
but constitutes a form of labour produced by the intensification and expansion of 
capitalist work (see De Angelis 2001 and Cleaver 2001). This form of labour 
produces forms of existence which are experienced by subjects as exclusion from the 
production process, yet they constitute an integral part of the process of valorisation 
of capital. In a context of scarcity, policy-making asserted itself as the means towards 
a new form of `regulation' of the labour market and labour relations. State policies 
were unsuccessful in harnessing social conflict since the subjectivity of the 
unemployed does not lie `outside' social relations but constitute an essential aspect of 
stabilisation policies. 
Whilst the form `unemployed labour' is defined by the non-participation of the 
unemployed in the productive process, i. e. the unemployed cannot sell their labour 
power, and the condition of labour under capital implies that the unemployed cannot 
free themselves from their commodified form of existence. This is what it is meant by 
real subsumption. However, while labour is really subsumed and becomes `invisible' 
through its non-participation in the labour process, I mean to show how labour, as a 
form of subjectivity, is still a barrier for the expansion of capital, in so far as it 
constitutes problematic subjectivity (yet imperceptible). These problematic 
subjectivity entail an `unrealised materiality'. In order to make the subjectivity of the 
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unemployed visible and material I extend Marx's formula for the reproduction of 
capital C-M-C/M-C-M' and its crisis and recomposition in its money form i. e. M-M' 
(Capital vol III), with my own equations that highlights the critical subjectivity of 
labour: M- a; ß; ? -M', where a, ß, and % portray the contradictory forms of existence 
(subjectivity) produced within the process of valorisation of capital. 
This approach contest the widespread idea that the roadblock and workers' struggles 
are a reaction which `destabilises stability' (Dinerstein 1999). It will be shown that, as 
an articulation of a form of the state, capital and the law, `stability' is not threatened 
by social struggles but, rather, it destabilise and makes human life unsustainable. 
Social struggles aim to stabilise social relations by making the violence of stability 
material (physical and visible). 
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section I addresses the process of 
production of the unemployed and the poor as subjects of state policy. The section 
outlines the reality of unemployment, as well as the arguments put forward by 
political authorities as well as scholars to explain it. Section II sketches out the 
institutional changes and agreements and a set of passive and active employment 
policies launched under Menem to control unemployment. The section assesses the 
problems of focused policies in the Argentine framework, as well as the political 
implications of state policy in `constituting' a fragmented subject. Section III 
critically considers the sociological work and most important debates on 
unemployment and the unemployed workers' capacity for resistance. The notion of 
unemployment as the `lack' of jobs, the underclass thesis and the proletariat as the 
reserve army are revisited. Section IV presents a theoretical critique of the 
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aforementioned notions. An alternative view of unemployment as a form of labour as 
well as the `unemployed' as a problematic subjectivity is offered. This theoretical 
development is fully explored through a case study in the next chapter. 
I 
Stability, Unemployment and Social Exclusion: 
Creating the Subject 
Convertibility 
Privatisation, flexibilisation and company restructuring, achieved within the 
framework provided by the convertibility plan, fostered unprecedented job instability 
and unemployment. The end of inflation meant the destabilisation of workers' lives. 
Cavallo's economic reform aimed at the opening of the economy, making sound the 
public finances, stability of the real exchange rate and the flexibilisation of the labour 
market (FIEL in Goransky 1994: 49). The Law of Convertibility (No 23,928) allowed 
the devaluation of the national currency and the pegging of the Argentine peso to the 
US dollar at a rate of I to 1. As a result, inflation bounced back from 11,832 percent 
in 1990 to 4 percent in 1994 (McGuire, 1997: 219; The Economist, July 6`h 1996: 63). 
Once it was achieved, the government made use of the macroeconomic stability, 
structural reforms and the expansion of demand to encourage capital investments and 
increase productivity (Gerchunoff and Machinea, 1995: 51). During the first three 
years of the plan, Argentina accomplished high rates of economic growth and a 
notable increase in labour productivity in manufacturing industry and the service 
sector. Sustained foreign capital investments financed the expansion (Bustos, 1995: 
19; McGuire, 1997; Welch, 1993). 
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However, after its initial expansion and success, the plan being vulnerable to the 
movement of global capital and financial markets (Goransky, 1994), in 1992 there 
were increasing distortions in relative prices, an undervalued dollar vis-a-vis an 
overvalued peso and the exchange-rate parity was very precarious (Acuna, 1994: 
48). 
In 1994, the plan was undermined by an increase in interest rates in the United 
States, 
and the reduction of foreign investments. This coincided with the Mexican `tequila' 
crisis that affected the stock market and the dollar - peso relation (Garcia and 
Gomez 
1995). 166 These `external financial' factors were put forward as reasons for the 
inability of the plan to prevent increasing unemployment, accelerating outflows of 
capital and the increasing cost of credit (Gomez et al, 1996 c. f. Lindemboin 1995: 
58). By 1997, the economic recovery after the `tequila' crisis was accompanied by an 
increase of the rates of underemployment and unemployment that were 30% and 10% 
higher than in 1994 respectively thus indicating a very unstable form of the 
accumulation of capital. 167 
The Industry of Unemployment 
One of the most important industries developed during the first years of the 
convertibility plan was the industry of unemployment. In August 1995, official 
166 The Argentine stock market was also affected by the Brazilian stabilisation policy, the Plan Real, 
that led to the development of the Brazilian domestic market and the reduction of imports from 
Argentina within the MERCOSUR (INDEC 1999). 
167 See IDEP, 1999. Since 1991, job insecurity has been considered the most important long-term 
problem of the Argentine economy. See for instance Lopez Murphy in El Economista, 14.7.95: 15; 
Heugas in La Naciön, 30.7.95: 1 and CAC (La Naciön, 1/8/95: 9). Economists and politicians -- and 
also Church leaders -- were worried about the negative social impact of the economic miracle, i. e. `the 
inhuman face of adjustment'. The reason being that unemployment in Argentina entails the risk of 
complete deprivation, poverty and mental and physical illness (Kessler, 1996; Kliksberg 1996, see 
Lozano, 1997; Schemelson, 1996; Gershanik and Mercer, 1996; Galli and Malfe, 1996). Many posed 
the question of governability in the crisis (Dos Santos 1996) and the sustainability of the system 
(Penalva and Rofman 1996). Others asked whether capitalism could survive with such a level of 
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statistics (EpdH May, INDEC) highlighted that since the convertibility plan, 
unemployment had risen from 6% in 1991 to 18.5% in 1995 (Palomino and 
Schvartzer, 1996: 17; Feldman, 1995: 58; Barbeito 1995). This means that 
unemployment increased three times reaching around 2,400,000 people in only five 
years. In Capital and Gran Buenos Aires (where half of the unemployed are 
concentrated) the rate of unemployment went up to 20.20% in May 1995. 
Unemployment was named a flagellum (Lindemboin 1995; see Cademartori, 1995). 
Rather than being a temporary situation, most economists agreed that unemployment 
`has come to stay'. In July 2000, the rate of unemployment was 15.4% and it was 
estimated to reach 17.1% in 2003.168 
Urban Active Population (May, in thousands) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Active 11,234 11,542 12,272 12,393 13,160 
Employed 
workers 10,458 10,746 11,057 11,067 10,712 
Unemployed 
Workers 775 796 1,215 1,326 2,448 
Sources: Lindemboin 1995: 58, based on INDEC 
unemployment (Leon, 1997). Political parties in opposition elaborated proposals to `fight against 
unemployment'. 
168 INDEC, August 2000; MTSS in La Naciön on line 11.7.00; see Verbitsky, H 'Al mal tiempo buena 
cara' in Paging/12,16.7.00 on line). 
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Intensity of the predisposition to work: Groups of the population according to intensity 
Year Period Unemployed Workers Underemployed Workers Total Economica 
Looking for looking who don't look working % of the Ily Active 
a job for a job for another job more than PEA Population 
% 35 hours (PEA) 
1990 May- 8.60 13.30 4.83 11.95 38.71 100 
October 6.00 12.82 5.41 11.91 38.14 100 
1991 May- 6.31 12.40 4.70 11.23 34.64 100 
October 5.30 10.94 4.81 10.89 31.91 100 
1992 May- 6.70 12.80 4.47 9.64 33.56 100 
October 6.70 12.40 4.03 9.37 32.48 100 
1993 May- 10.61 15.27 4.56 9.18 39.59 100 
October 9.63 13.92 5.32 8.75 37.64 100 
1994 May- 11.06 16.02 5.60 9.00 41.69 100 
October 13.12 16.70 4.73 9.71 44.25 100 
1995 May- 20.20 21.20 4.00 8.60 54.00 100 
Source: INDEC in Feletti and Lozano, 1996: 3 
But the main problem was not just unemployment but the explosive combination of 
unemployment with underemployment (Monza, ILO in Pägina/12,10.6.90: 11; 
Monza 1996). According to Lozano, in 1996 50.8% of the economically active 
population (PEA) was underemployed (1997: 3). And 41.2% of the PEA of Gran 
Buenos Aires had job problems, i. e. between around 5 million and 7 million workers 
out of 13 million experienced employment problems (1996: 4). 
Although in 1996 employment increased by 1.6% in the private sector it was achieved 
by means of precarious contracts according to the new rules included in the NLE. As 
shown in the previous chapter, better economic performance was accompanied by a 
growth of the informal economy (Feldman, 1999), more precarious working 
conditions (see Lindemboin) (1996) and by means of fixed contracts which allow 
employers to avoid from 100% to 50% of social security payments and also receive 
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compensation for undertaking competitivity - orientated training schemes. 
169 Workers 
in the informal sector constitute a large portion of the Argentina labour force. 
170 
Following the Latin American pattern (i. e. Brazil and Perü), the ILO reported that in 
Argentina the participation of the informal sector in the economy increased from 
39.4% in 1980 to 47.5% in 1990, and to 52.5% in 1994 (Panorama Laboral, ILO, 
1995 in Feldman, 1999: 106). By 1997 there were 4 million workers in the informal 
economy (Clarin Internet 7.3.97). 
Official pronouncements claimed that rising unemployment had nothing to do with 
the convertibility plan but rather with internal factors, like the combination between 
an `influx of non-traditional job seekers attracted by new economic opportunities' 
(McGuire 1997: 222) and the rigidities within the labour market. 
' 71 Yet, 
commentators explained that the dramatic increase in unemployment was due to the 
simultaneous increase in the number of people able and aiming to work, and 
economic growth based on job destruction. The year 1991 marked a turning point in 
the relationship between growth and the rate of unemployment: whilst the rate of 
activity grew between 1990 and 1995 by 9%, the rate of employment decreased by 
4% (Feletti and Lozano, 1996: 10). 172 In short, since the convertibility plan, the 
decrease in the capacity for job creation and the destruction of jobs in the public and 
industrial sectors went together with an increase in the demand for jobs (Feletti and 
Lozano, 1996: 10-11; Cholvis 1991). 
169 In 1995 the state provided $ 4,000,000 (fiscal credit) to help those enterprises that decided to invest 
in training- schemes (MISS, Informe Especial 1996). 
170 The informal sector includes the self-employed, micro entrepreneurs with low income (except 
professionals) and rural work based on family activities (Feldman 1999: 104). 71 C. f. government's view in MISS, 1996a. 
172 In absolute figures: since the convertibility plan, 495,000 jobs had been created between 1991 and 
1993, but there also an increase in the demand for jobs of 1,000,000 people. Between 1993 and 1994 
more people aimed to enter the labour market (100,000 more) but the economy started to destroy jobs, 
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Whereas it was clear that economic restructuring led to job destruction and the 
intensification of the exploitation of workers, the reasons for the rise of the demand 
for jobs was debatable. According to Beccaria and Lopez (1995) there are two 
explanations for this. The first being that before 1991, many workers remained 
unemployed for there were no jobs available, i. e. so-called invisible unemployment. 
So the intention to work increased due to the success of stabilisation policies. The 
Minister of Labour put it like this: `the problem is that at the moment, there are more 
employed workers than ever, but there are not enough jobs to cover the demand for 
jobs' (Caro Figueroa in La Maga, 7.12.94: 5). The second hypothesis explained the 
rise of the number of workers aiming to work on unemployment itself, low wages and 
poverty produced by stabilisation policies, that forced women as well as pensioners 
and also children to try to enter into the labour market and some workers to find a 
second job (Beccaria and Lopez, 1995; also Bour 1995). Marshall (1995) supports this 
hypothesis and adds another one: the increase in the flow of immigrant workers from 
neighbouring countries, attracted by the over-valuation of the peso (see Feldman 
1995a; c. f. Lindemboin 1995). 173 
McGuire argued that `the main causes of unemployment were not those highlighted 
by the government but rather civil-service layoffs, personnel cuts by newly privatised 
enterprises, increased import competition and the replacement of human by 
mechanical labor. The convertibility plan contributed directly to the civil-service 
thus unemployment grew (177,200 workers). In 1994 and 1995, there were 800,000 more people 
looking for a job whereas 246,900 jobs were destroyed. Unemployment grew by 1,046,900. 173 To the government too, coupled with the lack of training and the capacity to reconvert the labour force according to the requirements of the new forms of production and the rigidity of the labour law, illegal immigration is one of the most significant causes of the difficulties for workers to enter the labour market (Lindemboin 1995: 57). 
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layoffs.. . privatisation, spending cuts, liberalization, and deregulation not only 
contributed to unemployment but also stripped power from unions as organisations' 
(McGuire 1997: 223). So the proposition that it is the `bad effects of stabilisation' 
rather than its success that has led to the rise in the demand for jobs has been 
considered the most appropriate by scholars that stood against governmental rhetoric. 
Others pointed at the impact of flexibilisation policies on the labour market 
(Lindemboin, 1995; Felletti and Lozano 1996; Beccaria and Lopez 1995). Although 
flexibilisation policies were, according to the government, enacted to provide a 
solution to unemployment, the rate of unemployment reached 18.4% in 1995 when 
flexibilisation policies were legitimised by the Laws 24,465 and 24,467. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the convertibility plan forced small and medium 
enterprises to reduce costs and reorganise the production process (Beccaria and 
Lopez, 1995: 214; McGuire 1997: 221). As has been shown, insofar as the 
requirement that the monetary base must be `backed fully by an equivalent amount of 
foreign reserves in the Central Bank prohibits the use of reserves for any other uses, 
foreign debt payment included' (Canitrot 1994: 88), stability, the increase in 
productivity and economic growth demanded by the IMF have to be achieved by 
means of a greater exploitation of the labour force, regressive income distribution (see 
Beccaria 1996; Marshal 1995), by wage reductions, the spread of precarious contracts, 
a reduction in labour costs and the avoidance of social security taxes (Feletti and 
Lozano, 1992: 10-13). 
Thus, `far from encouraging employment, fixed-term and casual contracts allowed the 
reduction of labour costs but increased the rate of unemployment too' (Feletti and 
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Lozano, 1996: 7). A desegregated analysis of the type of unemployed and the cause of 
redundancy highlights the increase in unemployment produced by the end of a casual 
contract. For instance, only in Gran Buenos Aires, the rate of unemployment 
produced by the end of temporary contracts increased by 290% from October 1993 to 
May 1995. The following two tables illustrate this: 
Rate of unemployment disaggregated 
by type of unemployed and causes of redundancy 
Gran Buenos Aires Gran Rosario Gran Cordoba 
Type of October May October May October May October May October May October 
Unemployed 1993 1994 1994 1995 1993 1994 1994 1995 1993 1994 1994 
TOTAL 9.6 11.1 13.1 20.. 2 11.8 13.1 12.4 20.9 6.9 7.7 9.6 
1. OLD 8.2 9.5 11.3 17.4 8.0 9.6 9 15.4 5.7 5.5 7.0 
WORKERS 
1.1 Made 6.6 8.1 9.7 14.8 6.3 8.0 7.7 12.9 5.1 5.0 6.3 
Redundant 
for Working 
Reasons 
Redundancy 2.6 3.0 3.7 5.2 2.6 2.6 2.7 5.2 1.9 1.9 2.4 
Destruction of 1.6 2.1 2.4 3.0 1.9 2.5 2.5 3.2 1.6 1.1 1.5 
jobs 
End of a 1.0 1.5 1.7 3.9 1.1 1.9 1.7 2.5 1.0 1.3 1.61 
Temporary 
Job 
For labour 1.4 1.5 1.9 2.7 0.7 1.0 0.8 2.0 0.6 0.7 0.8 
conditions (1) 1 1.2 Made 1.6 1.4 1.6 2.6 1.7 1.6 1.1 2.5 . 0.6 
0.5 0.7 
redundant 
for Personal 
Reasons 2 
2. NEW 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.8 3.8 3.5 3.4 5.5 l. 2 2.2 2.6 
WORKERS 
Source: INDEC in Feletti and Lozano 1996: 7. (1) Includes low wages, overdue wages (2) includes voluntary 
redundancy, retirement 
Gran Buenos Aires Gran Rosario 
1993 1995 % 1993 1995 % 
October May October May 
Total 9.6 20.2 110.0 11.8 20.9 77.0 
End of 
Temporary 1.0 3.9 290.0 1.1 2.5 127.0 
Contracts 
Source: Feletti and Lozano 1996: 8 
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Poverty 
Argentina's case reveals the absence of a policy of amelioration of the social 
consequences in depressed areas, and of a national strategy to achieve a balanced 
distribution of industry, employment and population as between different regions by 
encouraging interregional mobility, and also the lack of a network of regional 
agencies (on this Barberis and May, 1993). The convertibility plan reinforced the 
tendency towards a regressive distribution of income leading to the development of an 
unequal or dual society, 'an enormous factory of poverty' (Boron 1995b: 4; also 
Auyero, 2000; IDEP 1999: 327; Feletti R and Lozano C 1997a; Beccaria, 1996; 
Goransky 1994; Minujin 1996, ed.; Gomez Sabaini and Santiere 1996; Beccaria and 
Carciofi, 1996). Scholars suggested that the convertibility plan led to the destruction 
of those regulatory bodies that supported the weakest sectors of the regional 
economies (Rofman 1995). 174 
The deepening of the uneven development of regional economies without state 
protection for less favourable zones and the concentration of capital in a few localised 
industries (Manzanal, 1995: 72-3) led to insecurity in the interior of the country. This 
limited even more the mono-productive character of the interior economy and 
increased the development of the `dual' economy. Small producers subsist thanks to 
solidarity networks, organisations and self-consumption. The scenario of rural 
unemployment and regional heterogeneity (Delich, 1997) was completed with the 
privatisation of the railways and telecommunications. The reduction of services, 
because they were non-profitable, limited the exchange between different small towns 
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and cities, and some of them are literally vanishing (Manzanal, 1995). As a result, a 
geographic transformation of the labour market took place: since the convertibility 
urban unemployment increased from 800 thousand to 1,300,000 workers (Lindemboin 
1995: 58). 175 
Stability also undermined the capacity of those vulnerable sectors of society in 
devising survival strategies (Hintze 1996: 66). The institutional and economic 
transformation in a context of lack of economic growth (estancamiento) had a 
substantive impact on the structure and dynamic of the labour market and constituted 
the basis for `social exclusion' (Tenti Fanfani 1996: 243, my emphasis). 
Unemployment produced inequality. According to Tenti, `we are witnessing today the 
destabilisation of significant sectors of the population who in previous years enjoyed 
all the social advantages provided by a stable relatively well-paid job' (Tenti Fanfani 
1996: 247; see Conceicoa and Ferreira 1999). Poverty and unemployment combined 
constitute a `vicious circle' since they are reciprocally related, i. e. under relations of 
social exclusion it is difficult to be reinserted into the labour market insofar as 
nutritional, educational, and housing problems create competitive disadvantages for 
the poor to get into the labour market (Kliksberg 1996: 45; on this Altimir 0 1995). 
The Menem administration argued that during convertibility, poverty decreased. 
However, this seems to be more a matter of statistical measures than a real fact since 
the tendency towards a regressive income distribution was only softened but not 
174 E. g. the Junta National de Granos to sustain and support the production and export of grain, as well 
as other bodies to protect and support production of yerba mate, wine and sugar (Rofman 1995: 168-9). 175 In 1991 there were 28.4 million people living in urban areas. In May 1994 there were 29.7 and in 
May 1995 it was deemed that more than 30 million lived in the cities. 
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solved by the convertibility plan (Boron, 1993: 67). 176 Studies of the relationship 
between poverty and unemployment highlight that in Argentina, 70% of poverty is 
not structural but rather caused by unemployment or a vulnerable employment 
situation: `a significant part of poverty that Argentina endures nowadays is hidden 
behind houses' front doors and is not able to be registered as marginal population or 
the poor, nor can it be solved with a strategy of focalised social policy'. The kind of 
social policy recommended by the IMF and the WB to solve poverty do not 
contemplate this fact (Lozano 1997: 7). AIDS, poor housing, child mortality, and 
school marginalisation among others seriously affect a large part of the population of 
the city of Buenos Aires (Lopez, Artemio, 1997a, b, c and d; see also Beccaria and 
Lopez, 1996). 
Being Unemployed 
Studies of the psychological and sociological effects of unemployment highlighted the 
fact that unemployment is experienced individually as something more than the lack 
of a job. It is experienced as a feeling of social helplessness, of abandonment, of 
exclusion. Unemployment appears collectively represented as both a temporary state 
and a permanent state. Duration of unemployment is the point of inflection: time 
makes the dangerous temporary situation become a permanent state (Kessler 1996: 
114-116). 177 
176 During the military regime and the 1980s poverty increased in astonishing proportions. As 
highlighted, whilst in 1974 only 3% of households were under the established `poverty line', in 1988 
there were 29% of families in that situation (Boron, 1993: 66). 177 The average term of unemployment has increased. Long-term unemployment of 12 months (non- 
existing in 1991) in May 1996 affected 10% of the unemployed whereas half of them had been 
unemployed for about 2 to 12 months (MTSS working paper, unpublished, 1997) 
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In their everyday struggle for a job the unemployed do not simply suffer from the 
humiliation of lengthy queuing, excessive requirements (more than those held by 
existing employees), rejection because of their age, abuse of power by managers who 
interview them, reduction of their expectations regarding wages and working 
conditions. Most importantly, they experience the need to recover the ability to sell 
themselves again: `One has to sell oneself all the time! '... `How does one sell what 
one has got to offer, what one really is? ' (interviews by Kessler, 1996: 135). In short, 
the unemployed suffer from the tension between what they are and need, and whether 
what they are and need is useful for capitalist development, for the process of 
capitalist fetishisation entails the detachment of needs from capacities (see Heller 
1976: 41). 
In so far as the political appears as external and capital's requirements as abstract 
needs, this results in an introspective attitude, frustration and the consequent 
construction of handicaps as self-stigma. Consequently, being a parent, or a single 
mother, or the lack of new skills and qualifications, or some decisions in changing 
jobs taken in the past, or political participation in joining the trade union or a political 
party, or age, or any disabilities are considered by them as obstacles to their social 
reinsertion in the productive system, that is in the community (Kessler 1996). Their 
very identity is redefined since `their entire lives turn adrift, as much in terms of adult 
identity as in terms of survival' (Grassi in Hintze 1996: 68). 
It is argued that the unemployed have difficulties in organising themselves since high 
rates of unemployment also undermine the negotiation and pressure capacity of the 
trade unions, particularly for the unemployed workers (Murmis and Feldman (1996). 
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Tenti Fanfani has also emphasised the crisis of, first, the classical forms of 
representation of the working class vis-a-vis capital, and, second, the crisis of the 
capacity to be represented which constitute the basis for collective action (i. e. 
workers, obreros, proletarians, and entrepreneurs, patrones, capital) (Tenti Fanfani 
1996: 255). 
Some work has been done to explore the degree of social organisation or collective 
action and their interaction with other social and political organisations of workers 
among the unemployed, the poor and workers in the informal sector. By moving 
beyond statistical classifications and standing against the notion of passivity, Feldman 
and Murmis (1999) showed empirically some cases where workers in the informal 
sector engaged in organisations or networks. They conclude that although the `world 
of informality' is not completely disorganised, there are many organisations and 
networks. However, there are many financial and organisational difficulties for those 
organisations just constituted by informal workers and new organisations are almost 
non-existent. Nevertheless, as explained below, demonstrations provoked by 
economic restructuring and unemployment and social instability became a common 
feature from 1993 onwards. State policy-making aimed to control social unrest and by 
so doing, maintain `stability'. 
II 
Institutional Changes and Employment and Social Policies 
Controlling the Subject 
Stabilisation policies led to the recomposition of the state with regard to 
unemployment. As the political form of capital, the state is a crucial aspect of the 
constitution of the forms of labour and their further regulation. During the 1990s, both 
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unemployment and poverty became `political' problems. As the Minister of Labour 
put it, `unemployment is a concern of the state and that involves all of us' (Caro 
Figueroa, MTSS 1994: 13). 178 In order to uphold stability, employment policies as 
well as new social policies were introduced. 179 Instead of corporatist negotiation with 
the trade unions over e. g. Keynesian expansionary programmes, now excluded from 
the state agendas by the convertibility plan, the government launched a series of 
`active' employment policies financed by international credit. These programmes 
were aimed directly at the unemployed, recognising that unemployment will be a 
permanent phenomenon, and the unemployed will become a social and political 
threat. It was argued that the state should intervene to help job creation and soften the 
bad effects of economic restructuring that affected a large portion of the population. 
Thus, institutions were transformed progressively in order to `cope with the drama' of 
unemployment. Active and passive employment polices were inaugurated by the NLE 
(Caro Figueroa, 1996: 18; Freyssinet, 1994; Diaz, 1995). The Ministry of Labour 
changed its structures and functions to devise `employment policies' and reinforced 
social policy. The transformation of the state form led not only to the transformation 
of the form of labour. By means of `active' employment policies the state not only 
recognised unemployment as a problem but created `the unemployed' as subjects for 
state policy making and therefore, created them as a political subjectivity. 
The ARENA 
178 The issue of 'unemployment' was also incorporated into the national constitution (reform 1995) and became a main concern of Menem's election campaign in 1995 (Diaz, 1995: 91). 179 The government's argument was that stability and economic growth would not solve the problem of 
unemployment on its own. Between 1990 and 1996 the GDP grew 4.8% whilst employment grew only 1.2%. See MTSS 1995b. 
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The state's commitment with regard to unemployment was expressed in the 
agreement achieved with the CGT and employers' organisations in July 1994. As 
considered in chapter 9, the AM, provided a framework for new flexibilisation laws to 
be passed but also to accomplish joint action against unemployment. In November 
1994, the Regional Agreement for Employment in the Argentine North (Acuerdo 
Regional para el Empleo en el Norte Argentino-ARENA) was reached to deal with 
the problem of unemployment in the northern provinces of Jujuy, Salta, Chaco, La 
Rioja, Catamarca, Santiago del Estero, Formosa, Tucuman (MTSS 1994; MTSS 
1994). 180 According to the ARENA, the region presented in 1994 one of the highest 
levels of unemployment of the country as well as a low rate of economic activity, and 
a large deficit in professional training. The agreement explicitly recognised the 
necessity to `reinforce the co-ordination of national and provincial policy-making in 
economic, labour and social areas' (p. 8). The regional AM established the creation of 
productive employment as its main goal and priority. The national government 
committed itself to reinforce employment programmes in the area as well as to 
provide support to the regional employment department and improve economic and 
technical assistance to the unemployed (p. 10). Provincial governments committed 
themselves to launching provincial employment policies. Labour and employers' 
organisations committed themselves to assess the impact of their actions on 
employment (p. 11). After the agreement, the CGT, the CTA and the MTA made 
unemployment one of the central issues for the general strikes called in September 
1995 and August and September 1996 (see chapter nine). 
180 The ARENA was signed by President Menem, the eight governors, the CGT provincial secretaries 
and the representatives of the provincial branches of the UTA. 
Institutional Innovation 
Also in the framework of the AM, Decree 286/95 established the need `to modify the 
structure of the MTSS to provide it with the tools to act with celerity and rationality' 
(see old structure in Decree 1518/88), namely, to create a new sector to give a more 
integral response to the complexity of unemployment. The new National Direction of 
Employment created in 1991 was primarily responsible for all aspects related to 
employment, utilisation of labour capacity and the functioning of the national 
employment system, job creation and administration of employment benefits. 
181 The 
new Secretaryfor Employment and Professional Training within the MTSS was in 
charge of devising employment policies and training programmes, to implement them 
with the collaboration of the Direccion Nacional de Relaciones del Trabajo and to 
elaborate proposals for the assignation of resources from the Fondo Nacional de 
Empleo. 
Job Centres (Agencias Pz blicas de Colocaciones) were opened throughout the 
country to `mediate between unemployed workers and the labour market' and `help 
workers to find a job and employers to satisfy their demand'. The government held 
`matching criteria', i. e. to help the people to get the best job and entrepreneurs to 
choose the best people (Ashton 1986: 52). The agencies opened in Rosario, Santa Fe, 
Bahia Blanca, Corrientes, Resistencia, San Miguel de Tucuman, Catamarca, Jujuy, 
181 According to the director of MTSS Regional Buenos Aires, the Ministry of Labour was traditionally 
concerned with the regulation of labour relations and collective bargaining. The issue of unemployment 
occupied a marginal place within the MTSS. The Direcciön de Empleo was a small office in charge of 
statistics and specific studies on the labour market. But in 1984, under Alfonsin, there was an important 
change which produced a debate on the regionalisation of the MTSS and the role of the new regional 
secretaries of employment. At that moment, both unemployment and the decentralisation of collective bargaining transformed the role of the MTSS (author's interview, 15.8.97). 
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Santiago del Estero and Salta. In April 1996, Decree 385 created Gerencias 
Regionales de Promociön del Empleo (Regional Employment Gerencias) in Chubut, 
Neuquen and Rio Negro, Santa Cruz, and Tierra del Fuego, particularly problematic 
areas with regards to economic restructuring, unemployment and social protest. A 
policy to fight `non-registered employment' was also launched. 182 
The `Federal Program for the Encouragement of Registration of Employment' 
(Programa Federal para Promover la Registraciön Laboral) and the `Program 
against Clandestine Employment' (Programa contra el Empleo Clandestino) aimed to 
reduce informal labour, i. e. employers' tax evasion by means of non-registered 
employment that had increasingly affected workers and the unemployed, particularly 
since 1991: 
Year % of workers without 
pension contribution 
1989 28.8 
1990 26,7 
1991 30,4 
1992 32.3 
1993 32.8 
1994 33.0 
1995 32.2 
1996 33.4 
1997 38.1 
Source: EPdH (lndec, May) in MTSS, Kritz 1997. 
As a counterpart, the government encouraged the use of those fixed-term contracts 
introduced by the NLE and new legislation. 183 Although the flexibilisation of labour 
was claimed to encourage job creation by facilitating hiring and dismissing 
182 Non-registered employment means that the worker is not registered under the labour law, i. e. LCT 
or NLE, and therefore the employer does not contribute to social security. This casual form of hiring is 
measure by the data provided by the EPDH (INDEC) (Neffa J et al 1999: 111). According to official 
statistics, a non-registered worker earns 40% less than a worker under a legal contract and excluded 
from social security during work time and pension at the age of retirement (Neffa J et al 1999: 110). 
According to the MTSS non-registered employment implied a loose of $ 4,960,000 to the social 
security system (idem. ant.: 112). 
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procedures and reducing costs, the government launched a set of employment 
programmes to deal directly and indirectly with unemployment. Most of the 
programmes were devised under the umbrella of 1991 NLE and the `National 
Programme against Unemployment' (PRONACODE) (Caro Figueroa 1996; see Diaz 
1995: 103). 184 
Passive Employment Policies 
The NLE created the new employment benefit, or Sistema Integral de Prestaciones 
por Desempleo (a contribution system) (Diaz, 1995: 97-98) which entitled all 
unemployed workers that worked under the LCT to 50% of the best wage of the last 6 
months for one month to one year maximum, depending on the contribution they had 
made during their work-time. The benefit is funded by the National Fund for 
Employment (Fondo Nacional de Empleo) (Diaz 1995: 97 and 107; Lo Vuolo 1995: 
265). It has been estimated that the benefit can cover in the future 10.3% to 13.35% of 
the urban unemployed (Feldman 1995: 37). The benefit excludes state, construction, 
rural and domestic workers (Lo Vuolo, 1995: 265). Young people and women 
entering into the labour market for the first time, or those workers who work in the 
black economy (MTSS, special report 1996; 1996a) are also excluded: 40% of 
unemployed workers are excluded from social security. 185 Those beneficiaries of the 
SIPD were called to participate in public works and works of communitarian interest 
183 400 promotores of employment visited more than 480,000 private companies during 1995 to 
encourage the use of new forms of employment as well as provide information about the state 
programs (Diaz 1995: 98). 
84 By definition, active employment policies demand compromise or participation of the beneficiary. 
They are employment programmes, labour training programmes and programmes of institutional 
strengthening. Unlike active policies, passive employment policies do not demand any participation 
from the beneficiary, i. e. employment benefit (MISS 1999: 177). 
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(e. g. Programa Intensivo de Empleo, PIT) and training programs, see below) under 
the national programme `Back to work' (MTSS Resolution 448/94). 
186 
Active Employment Policies 
Active employment Policies comprised: i. Programmes of Direct or Temporary 
Employment 
The first programme launched by the government in 1993 was the Intensive Program 
of Employment (Programa Intensivo de Empleo, PIT) to help provinces or counties in 
occupational emergency to create employment. The PIT, subsidised by the Fondo 
Nacional de Empleo, allowed the unemployed inscribed in the Servicio de Empleo to 
participate for a short period of time in a local social project. The programme created 
120,000 jobs and more than 250 million pesos were spent on the programme in two 
years (Diaz, 1995: 102-3; Decree 18/93; 661/94 and 883/94). 
During 1994-1995, the government launched the Program of Solidarity Assistance 
(Programa de Asistencia Solidaria, PROAS and the Programa de Entrenamiento 
Ocupacional PRENO). They provided financial help of $200, health services and 
social insurance to those unemployed involved in communitarian, agricultural and 
public work projects. The Program for Employment of Social Interest (Programa de 
empleo de interes social, PROEDIS) helped NGOs to assist long-term unemployed 
from public or private service companies over 45 and the low-skilled with job 
contracts of one year in public works. *The program ASISTIR encouraged the 
temporary employment of young workers under 25 and the projects were directed by 
185 For instance, in May 1995 only 104,861 (monthly average) workers out of around 2,200,000 
enjoyed the benefit through the SIPD created in 1991 by the NLE (Diaz, 1995: 97-98; Feldman 1995a). 
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NGOs and the Army. The program PROCOPA (Programa de Empleo 
Coparticipador) was based on the execution of public works by provincial 
governments with an intensive use of labour and financed by the Fondo Nacional de 
Empleo. 
The Programa TRABAJAR I, II and III created in 1995 in the framework of the NLE 
aimed to bring temporary employment through local, provincial and national projects 
assisted by the Secretary of Employment and Training and administered by the 
Gerencias Regionales de Empleo (MTSS Resolution 576/95; SEyFP Resolution 
03/95). The TRABAJAR only allowed the unemployed in absolute poverty to obtain a 
160 peso per month job for a period of three to six months in public works, with the 
beneficiaries working in extremely precarious conditions, and the jobs do not include 
pension contributions, but only basic health care. During 1996 it involved around 
5,000 projects of sanitary infrastructure, social infrastructure, housing and other 
public works and covered 118,106 beneficiaries. In 1997, the programme was 
widened by $162,000,000 and continued as the TRABAJAR II and III to cover those 
unemployed `in poverty and under vulnerable situations' (MTSS Resolution no. 
240/97 and SEyCL Resolution no 202/97). This programme deserves special attention 
for it led to paternalistic relations and corrupt practices (Lopez, Artemio, 1997a). 
The Program SERVICIOS COMUNITARIOS also aimed at the creation of casual 
jobs (Resolution MTSS 453/96 and SEyFP 107/96) in the community. In this case, 
80% of the casual jobs were for women, preferably breadwinners. SPECIAL 
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMES aimed to cover those areas and beneficiaries not 
186 See amounts spent and number of beneficiaries of all programmes in MTSS 1999. 
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covered by other programmes. The Programme Local Development (Desarrollo de 
Empleo Local I and II) aimed to create a legal framework to undertake temporary 
employment programmes by means of reaching individual agreements with different 
organisations. The programme Movilidad geogräfica aims to facilitate the mobility of 
those workers in situations of vulnerability to areas where there is a demand for 
workers. 
ii. Programmes to Encourage Private Employment 
The Programa Promociön del Empleo Privado for Small and Medium Enterprises, 
PEP-PYMES (decrees 87/94 and 735/94; resolution MTSS 47/95 and 5/95) encourage 
the hiring of 37,000 workers 16-25 years old, women without age limit and men over 
45, in small companies (less than 100 workers) though the financial help of the 
National Employment Fund. The PEP was regionally run by the Gerencias 
Regionales de Promociön del Empleo (MISS) Cost of $ 30,000,000 (MTSS 
information flyer). The Programa Nacional de Pasantias, PRONAPAS aimed to train 
apprentices between 16 and 25 years, women without limit of age and men over 45. 
The pasantia could not be longer than three months, with a monthly payment of $200 
and companies have the obligation to incorporate 20% of these hired workers into the 
permanent staff. 
The Program of Subsidies for Occupational Accident 1994-95 (Programa de Subsidio 
a las Primas por Accidente de Trabajo; PROSA) encouraged job creation by means 
of a subsidy to victims of occupational accidents PyMES (40 -100 workers) engaged 
in it. Workers should be between 16 and 25 year old, all women and men older than 
45. The national program FORESTAR was launched in October 1995(MTSS 1996c). 
It aimed to encourage the temporary hiring of unemployed workers for short-term 
forestation projects undertaken by private agricultural companies according to the 
legislation for agrarian work (the Regimen Nacional de trabajo Agrario) no 22,248; 
as well as to encourage the creation of permanent jobs for those workers and was 
administered by the Gerencias Regionales de Empleo. 
The program PROEMPLEO aimed to create private employment in productive sectors 
or areas under productive restructuring, encouraging the hiring of workers over 38. 
iii. Localised Training Programmes 
The Proyecto Jöven encouraged training for young people. It combined the creation 
of employment with professional practice in companies. The programme Talleres 
Protegidos de Producciön provided workshops for disabled workers, financed by the 
Central Bank. Acciones Especiales de Capacitaciön brought training to those workers 
in sectors of the economy or regions under crisis. The Programa Regional de 
Fortalecimiento del Entrenamiento Tecnico y Profesional de Mujeres de Bajos 
Ingresos is a regional programme targeted to increase job opportunities for women 
from Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Ecuador. It was subsidised by the Banco 
Interamericano de Desarrollo and the Fondo Nacional de Empleo. 
iv. Programmes for the Development of Human Capital 
The program for the Encouragement of the Training Contract (Fomento al Contrato 
de Aprendizaje, APRENDER) aimed to encourage temporary job creation (3 to 24 
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months) by means of a contract between a young worker (14-25 years old) and an 
entrepreneur under training conditions according to the Law 24,465. The program 
aimed to assist 100,000 apprentices and spend $28,800,000 (MTSS 1996a). The 
Programme MICRO project supported workers `affected' by economic restructuring. 
The IMAGEN project of Orientation to Employment was targeted at the long-term 
unemployed particularly from the public sector, i. e. the `surplus labour population 
from the restructuring processes' and aimed to train unemployed workers in searching 
for a new job (MTSS leaflet information). 
v. Programmes towards Institutional Strengthening (Talleres Ocupacionales). 
The Programa de Talleres Ocupacionales created in 1995 aimed to training of the 
unemployed and workers in small and medium enterprises in relation to the 
requirements of the labour market. In 1997,300,326 workers had been benefited by it 
and the state spent $83,519,772. Genuine job creation during 1997 was claimed to be 
1,000,000 jobs (Lopez Artemio 1998: 2). 
The significance of state policies in shaping the capacity for struggle of the 
unemployed has also been a matter of sociological investigation. By holding a neo- 
Marxist approach, Piven and Cloward (1977) argued that `the poor only protest when 
there is a widespread economic, ideological and political crisis' of those institutions 
that provide the unemployed workers with an income. These institutions shape the 
struggles of the unemployed, whose protests are directed to those who deal on a daily 
basis with their income support. In short, they argue that protest should be seen as `the 
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mechanism through which the lower classes obtain concessions from elites' (Piven 
and Cloward in Baguley 1991: 23, authors' emphasis). 187 
Employment policies in Argentina are more a source of conflicts than their solution. 
First, employment policies resulted in a struggle over scarce resources and credit from 
international bodies. Rather than democracy, decentralised management led to 
corruption and paternalistic distribution of the employment programmes as well as 
increasing the fierce competition to obtain and even manage the programmes within 
the local and provincial states. The allocation of employment programmes was also 
used by the central government as a form of political compensation or punishment to 
those governors who were accomplishing or not the economic adjustment required by 
the IMF. The governors used the programmes to favour political allies before 
elections or to co-opt unions. In short, generally speaking, focused and patchy 
employment policies in a context of scarcity of resources and historical institutional 
inefficiency led to the reinforcement of the segmentation of the labour market and 
social differentiation that it supposedly aimed to solve. 
Regulation via Fragmentation and Scarcity 
After the wave of protest of 1996-97 in Neuquen, and the installation of the Carpa 
Blanca in the Plaza de Mayo (see previous chapters), the IMF was concerned not only 
about the rise in unemployment rates and the unequal distribution of incomes but 
18' To Baguley, although these authors deal with the important issue of the institutional structure of 
protests their approach is too deterministic, it `lacks an analysis of the different forms that state 
unemployment relief may take'. This is an important aspect because, according to him, 'the electoral 
control of the institutions of unemployment relief is a crucial, if uncertain, prerequisite for the 
emergence of political organisations of the unemployed' (p. 29). 
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most importantly about the future of economic restructuring and the risk of increasing 
public expenditure during electoral years to suffocate workers' unrest by governors. 
188 
-. Mom 
Following Barbeito and Lo Vuolo, 
with the exception of education 
(that was devised at the end of the 
19`h C when the modem 
conceptions of social policy were 
not developed) most social policies 
in Argentina had corresponded `to 
the Bismarckian principle of insurance during the 1940s and whose `subject' was the 
worker rather than the citizen. Rather than an `integrating state', social policy depends 
both on the negotiation with corporations and organisations such as trade unions who 
received the public funds to run them, and on the capacity of marginal sectors to 
mobilise and demand assistance policies. The lack of employment benefit and residual 
assistance policies to those not included in the labour market are examples of this' 
(Barbeito and Lo Vuolo 1995: 120-21). 
Although there are no official evaluations of the efficiency and efficacy of these 
policies, it can be said that they mirror the historical problem of social policy in 
Argentina. The historical features of social policy in Argentina (fragmented and based 
188 Note that the preoccupation was shared by the Minister of Economics who assured the international 
institution that, although the fiscal deficit was in the red, the budget would be respected and Argentina 
would accomplish the IMF requirements for the first half of 1997. See Calvin Sims 'Crecen las 
protestas en Argentina, a medida que aprietan las reformas econömicas' published by the New York 
Times and reproduced in The Herald Tribune and The Washington Post. But in January 2001, the 
Washington Post argued that for Argentina the convertibility plan meant too high a price, since the 
country's finances are tied to the domestic necessities of the Federal Reserve of the United States. A 
similar view was presented by the president of the IMF, H. Kohler, who explained the limits and 
problems of holding a fixed exchange rate, like the Argentinean case(La Naciön, on line, 16.1.01) 
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on corporatist practices) made the government `efforts' quite unsuccessful. The major 
trick brought up by stability is that whilst the expenditure in so-called `Keynesian' 
inflationary expansionism is excluded from the convertibility agenda, public 
expenditure in neo-liberal social policies to control labour struggles against economic 
adjustment was constrained by the control over public expenditure by international 
bodies. This shift from national expansionist to IMF-focused policies recomposed the 
state and deconstructed the typical Peronist relationship with the state. Although, as 
shown in the previous chapters, the Peronist trade unions joining the CGT were 
incorporated into the Menemist neo-liberal corporatism, this reshaping detached them 
from the control of new forms of struggle that emerged out vis-ä-vis the 
fragmentation produced not only by the economic restructuring but also by the state 
policy-making itself. 
The contradictory nature of social and employment policies lies in that whereas the 
state seems to provide financial, welfare and legal `help' to those unprotected sectors 
of the population to be `integrated' into society, it simultaneously classifies and 
fragments labour into segmented sectors. By so doing the state reinforces 
fragmentation rather than dissolves it. In short, in a context of scarcity, social and 
employment policies became in most cases a matter of corruption, paternalism and 
confrontation. Focused food and other social policies reinforced the segmentation of 
the labour market as well as `naturalised' inequality (Grassi et al, 1994). Employment 
policies reinforced fragmentation and the individualisation of unemployment by age, 
social status, duration, geographical area and branch of industry. Insofar as policy- 
making is not a tool but results from the struggle over the form of the state, the state 
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transforms itself in its attempt to control labour. The two main forms of regulation of 
labour entailed in the `stability' are scarcity and fragmentation. 
III 
Inclusion, Exclusion, Reserve and Underclass 
Interpreting the Subject 
Inclusion and Exclusion 
Empirical sociological studies on unemployment and poverty are usually driven by 
two main theoretical ideas. First, unemployment is considered as a lack or shortage of 
jobs (see Rifkin, 1995, Gortz 1982,1999a, 1999b c. f. Cleaver, 2001) and therefore a 
path to exclusion from the productive system (Hintze, 1996; de Bemis 1994), the 
latter leading to exclusion from the network of social relations (Castel R 1991 b). The 
notion of unemployment as the `lack' of jobs is based on the understanding of work as 
the most important factor of integration of capitalist societies (Tenti Fanfani, 1996, 
Hintze, 1996; Murmis and Feldman, 1996; CTA 1999; Runciman in Morris 1993). As 
Tenti Fanfani (1996) put it, `the structuring principle of advanced capitalist societies 
is not the possession or non-possession of means of production but the forms of 
incorporation to the productive system' (p. 256). Thus, the lack of employment is 
argued to affect the human capacity to live, create, socialise and even survive. 
Unemployment appears as a condition suffered by workers, until capital gives them 
the possibility to reinsert themselves into the productive system with perhaps the help 
of the state, since there is an `incapacity of the economic structure' to meet the 
demand for jobs. What follows is social marginalisation and crime. 
Secondly, scholars are concerned with the capacity to protest of those who are 
excluded from the production system and society. Since the unemployed and the poor 
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are considered as socially and economically excluded, most commentators distrust the 
possibility that the unemployed and the poor can organise any protest beyond the 
demands for inclusion via job or employment benefit. In any case, the possibility to 
influence state policy-making or capitalists' decisions on investments for the long- 
term is deemed as very remote. This two ideas underpinned the American debate on 
the underclass thesis, renewed in Britain in the late 1980s. 
Underclass? 
The underclass thesis debate addressed the questions of whether or not the 
unemployed were part of the working class or whether they constituted a group of 
people outside class relations altogether. Whilst for the conservative version of the 
underclass thesis the exclusion of workers from the labour market or even society is 
rooted in cultural or behaviourist explanations (see Baguley 1991: 3; Westergaard 
1992), its radical version exclusion as produced by the social and economic processes. 
This situation can lead to either direct action or the political passivity of the excluded. 
Critics of the underclass thesis highlighted some of its limitationsin in grasping the 
phenomena of unemployment, but they failed to overcome the `exclusion-inclusion 
paradigm'. For Daniel, the thesis failed since unemployment is not a `state' but is a 
`flow of people into and out of work rather than a rubish dump' (Daniel 1981: 495), 
the notion of underclass remains too static to understand the dynamic of the labour 
market. Morris (1993) argued that `the notion of "underclass" was an 
oversimplification, contaminated by its use as a tool of political rhetoric, which had 
been too rapidly applied to complex social phenomena. Its use is rarely supported by 
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empirical research' (p. 411). To Westergaard (1992) the underclass thesis matched the 
neo-liberal age ... in affinity with free-market-economy hopes' 
(p. 580). 
The Reserve Army of Labour 
In Capital Marx suggested that there are two tendencies of capital which stand in 
contradiction: the tendency `to reduce as much as possible the number of workers 
employed' and the tendency `to produce the greatest possible mass of surplus-value' 
(Capital vol. 1: 420). The contradiction results in the permanent destruction and 
recreation of capitalist means of production. As highlighted 
`the tendency to the overaccumulation of capital ... is not only a 
feature of 
such dramatic crises, but also of the everyday reality of accumulation, as the 
pressure of competition leads to an intensification of class struggle, the 
devaluation of backward capitals, the destruction of productive capacity and 
the displacement of labour' (Clarke, 1992: 135) 
When conditions of valorisation of capital are violated, capital stands idle. To Marx, 
`it is not a contradiction that this overproduction of capital is accompanied 
by a greater or smaller relative surplus population ... if capital is sent abroad, this is not because it absolutely could not be employed at home. It is rather 
because it can be employed abroad at a higher rate of profit. But this capital 
is absolutely surplus capital for the employed working population and for the 
country in question. It exists as such alongside the relative surplus 
population, and this is an example of how things exist side by side and 
reciprocally condition one another' (Capital Vol. 3: 364-65) [and then] 
`unoccupied capital on the one hand and an unemployed working population 
on the other (idem. ant.: 359). 
The equation `unoccupied capital = unemployed labour' asserts itself as the 
impossibility for capital to exploit social labour power. In terms of the money form, 
the crisis and recomposition of capital asserts itself in the form of M-M' (Bonefeld 
1996). Yet, while M-M' appears to be capital's self-expansion, it is only a condensed 
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form though which capital achieves temporarily the goal of avoiding labour, for in 
fact, M-M' ultimately depends on the effective ability of capital to exploit labour: 
`The dissociation of money from exploitation impresses itself upon the state 
through the money power of capital (M... M'), a power in which the 
precondition of its existence, i. e. the expansive reproduction of capitalist 
exploitation of labour (M... P... M') is seemingly eliminated' (Bonefeld 1996: 
199) 
The notion of reserve army is usually applied to understand this temporary 
`avoidance' of labour by capital. According to Marx, 
`the condemnation of one part of the working class to enforced idleness by 
the over-work of the other part and vice versa, becomes a means of enriching 
the individual capitalists and accelerates at the same time the production of 
the industrial reserve army on a scale corresponding with the progress of 
social accumulation (Capital vol. I, 789-790). 
The production of the `reserve army' was, for Marx, an intrinsic aspect of capitalist 
social relations of production: 
`the capitalist mode of production... forms a disposable industrial reserve 
army, which belongs to capital just as absolutely as if the latter had bred it at 
its own cost.., it creates a mass of human material always ready for 
exploitation by capital in the interest of capital's own changing valorisation 
requirements'(Capital vol. 1: 784) ... `there should be a surplus population, 
which does not work' (Grundrisse: 609) [that] `relative surplus population 
exists in all kinds of forms. Every worker belongs to it during the time when 
he is only partially employed or wholly unemployed [but] we can identify 
three forms which it always possesses: the floating, the latent and the 
stagnant' (Capital, vol. 1: 794) [and a fourth form which] `dwells in the 
sphere of pauperism'(idem ant: 797). 
However, as suggested in Grundrisse, the surplus population was in fact a surplus of 
labour capacity, still subordinated to the value-creating practice. The `reserve army' 
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was not excluded from anywhere, but rather is defined by capital as temporarily 
superfluous: 
`this idle surplus population is not what the economists have in mind when 
they speak of surplus population. On the contrary. .. the expression, surplus 
population, concerns exclusively ... surplus of `labour capacities'. 
Labour 
capacity can perform its necessary labour only if its surplus labour has value 
for capital... if their realizability is blocked by one or another barrier, then (1) 
labour capacity itself appears outside the conditions of the reproduction of 
its existence, is therefore... needs without the means to satisfy them; (2) 
necessary labour appears as superfluous, because the superfluous is not 
necessary ... the relation of necessary and surplus labour, as 
it is posited by 
capital, turns into its opposite, so that a part of necessary labour ... is 
superfluous, and this labour capacity itself is therefore used as a surplus of 
the necessary working population ... hence 
he becomes a tramp and a pauper; 
because he no longer sustains himself through this necessary labour... he has 
fallen out of the conditions of the relation of apparent exchange and apparent 
independence' (Grundrisse: 608-9, author's emphasis). 
The destruction of capital's productive capacity during the change in its organic 
composition towards new forms of valorisation is suffered by the `surplus population' 
as a barrier to physical and spiritual reproduction of life. However, this is not just a 
problem of `economic reproduction'. 
IV 
Unemployment: a Form of labour: Deconstructing the Subject 
Not Poverty but Absolute Poverty 
Sociology defines poverty as `a state from which an inventory of lacks (of income, of 
housing, of welfare, of education, of power, of consideration' (Robert Castel 1991b: 
19). Castel (1991b) argues that these lacks are a combination of two vectors: the 
integration - non integration in labour relations (which determines economic 
vulnerability, the incapacity to obtain the means for reproduction) and insertion - non 
insertion in a system of social relations (which determines psychological or emotional 
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existence) (p: 29). Economic vulnerability (for instance in the case of short-term 
unemployment) can become the `disaffiliation from' or rupture of the societal link: 
`economic precariousness becomes helplessness, relational fragility and isolation' 
(p. 30). `Social exclusion' cannot be solved by state policies distributing, for instance, 
food or clothes among the poor: `when precariousness becomes exclusion, this 
represents a point of rupture in the economy of labour relations, (idem. ant.: 34). 
However, the feature that determines capitalist social relations is not the `inclusion' or 
`exclusion' of labourers in the process of commodity production but absolute poverty 
(Kay and Mott 1982; Negri 1991b: 68) within the intensification of real subsumption 
of labour under capital's command. As Marx highlighted: 
`The concept of the free labourer contains the pauper... It is already contained in 
the concept of free labourer, that he is a pauper.. . he is merely a 
living labour 
capacity, hence equipped with the necessaries of life... If the capitalist has no use 
for his surplus labour, then the worker may not perform his necessary labour; not 
produce his necessaries. Then he cannot obtain them through exchange... He is 
thus a virtual pauper' (Grundrisse: 604). 
The absolute poverty of the working class is mystified in the wage relation. But, 
insofar as the unemployed, as another form of living capital, are force to sell their 
labour power yet are unable to do so, the tension that underpins the capital-labour 
relation, between what we are and what we need, and whether what we are and what 
we need is useful for capital is dramatically intensified. Whilst `unemployed capital' 
means the expansion of capital through its most abstract form, `unemployed labour' 
means potential impossibility of the reproduction and expansion of life. Whereas 
human activity is subsumed under capital's command, capital classifies and 
determines the usefulness of that activity (Battistini 2000) and provides (or takes 
away) the significance and content of human life in general and workers' lives in 
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particular, owing to the particularity of capitalist social relations (real subsumption of 
society in capital) where the worker has become a `living capital' (EPHM: 335). 
(a) Problematic `Invisible' Subjectivity 
The confrontation between workers' needs and capital's and the state's requirements, 
i. e. between C-M-C' and M-C-M' (Taylor 2001), can be put in a different way: the 
inner contradiction between concrete and abstract labour respectively. Whilst capital 
expands as M-M' (value in motion), whose substance is abstract labour, concrete 
labourers suffer the unbearable present situation whithin which the future is cancelled: 
a `jobless future' (Aronowitz and Difazio 1996). The form unemployment implies the 
presence of an open contradictory form of existence of labour which simultaneously 
reveals and contests the real subsumption of human existence to the commodity form, 
i. e. the contradiction between being compelled to sell their labour power and not 
being able to sell it. In unemployment, the absolute poverty of the working class 
becomes apparent, since the use value of the commodity labour power is denied, the 
transaction postponed, yet those no employed by capital are themselves a product of 
the social relation of capital. Unemployment is a form of labour where life itself 
('surplus living capacity') is postponed in most of its aspects. This is not an external 
process but constituting of subjectivity: 
`the worker has the misfortune to be a living capital, and hence a capital with 
needs... As capital, the value of the worker rises or falls in accordance with 
supply and demand, and even in a physical sense his existence, his life, was and is treated as a supply of a commodity... as soon as it occurs to capital - whether from necessity or choice - not to exist any longer for the worker, he no longer 
exists for himself... the existence of capital is his existence, his life... political 
economy therefore does not recognise the unoccupied worker, the working man in so far as he is outside this work relationship. The swindler, the cheat, the beggar, the unemployed, the starving, the destitute and the criminal working man 
are figures which exist not for it, but only... for the eyes of doctors, judges, grave- 
diggers... '(EPHM: 335). 
Rather than the lack of work or the exclusion from, unemployment implies an 
intensification of the real subsumption of society in capital. Whereas, on the one hand, 
the worker is liberated from actual exploitation, she is, on the other hand, a prisoner of 
her commodified form of existence. Insofar as we have defined subjectivity as a 
determinate abstraction, this contradiction -deployed mainly by the antagonism 
between money and identity-, cannot be reduced to an economic issue (having a job = 
having money =I am someone), but involves most aspects of human life. The 
hidden unhappiness of capitalist work is embodied by the un-employed, and affirmed 
by the state policy making and the law, but also -and sadly- by frustrating 
sociological accounts of the misery endured of the unemployed and the so-called 
marginalised sectors of the population, usually classified in different categories such 
as `under' or `below' the `line of poverty' (! ). 
But the problem does not only lie in that capital subordinates these un-employed 
workers who become a reserve army and thus subordinates human life to its urge. 
Most significantly, the unemployed are created by M-M' and the state policy-making 
to maintain `C' until the formula M-C-M' can be re-established. Yet, the problem 
brought about by the un-employed, pauper and social excluded and their struggles is 
not economic (i. e. capital accumulation), institutional (gobernability order), social 
(disintegration), cultural (identity) but political: it is the crisis of capital as a social 
relation of exploitation and domination and its expansion in its most abstract form 
produces the most unstable forms of life (Dinerstein 1999) and thus creates an 
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unrealised materiality. The more abstract the form of capital, the more invisible and 
diffuse the subjectivity of labour. 
My question is not about how unemployment is functional to the dynamic of capital 
accumulation (reserve army), or how do the unemployed can be included again into 
the labour market or social networks (employment and social policy), or whether they 
should be considered as part of working class (underclass thesis). My question is 
rather, how can we make visible the existence and significance of this surplus life? 
Unrealised Materiality: Making Subjectivity risible: M- a I; 7- M' 
As previously mentioned, real subsumption does not mean that capital dominates and 
subordinates humanity to any logic but, rather, that the production of resistance lies at 
the core of its own reproduction. However, Marx's formula for the reproduction of 
capital C-M-C/M-C-M' and the equation to represent its crisis and recomposition in 
its money form i. e. M-M' (see Bonefeld 1996) do not allow the visibility of the 
problematic subjectivity fostered during the process of intensification of abstraction 
M-M', which asserts as a `meaningless form of capital' (Marx 1966 in Bonefeld 1996: 
191), and where the exploitation of labour is temporarily suspended, and then 
subjectivity is made invisible. In order to visualise the way in which the suffering, 
frustration, hopelessness, and pain endure by the unemployed, remarkably described 
but poorly explained by sociologists, can become a contrefeu (Bourdieu 1998), i. e. 
an act of resistance and critique from within: `C' in motion. 
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I offer a new equation able to materialise graphically the production of subjectivity 
within the process of valorisation: M- a; ß; y; 8 -M', where a, ß, y and 8 picture the 
various forms of existence produced within the real subsumption of society in capital. 
This includes those who are not recognised as being part of the process of production 
of value, i. e. the unemployed, the homeless, criminals, women, children living on the 
streets, the `socially excluded'. Whilst M-C-M' and M-M' are disembodied 
representations of the circuit of capital, where the subjectivity of unemployment is 
presented either a commodity (C) or it has virtually disappeared (M-M'), M- a; ß; y; 8 
-M' aims to make visible the production of forms of life as an intrinsic aspect of this 
process. Unlike M-M', which as a condensed form of expression of the avoidance of 
labour by capital (Bonefeld 1996, my emphasis), excludes the question of the 
production of problematic subjectivity from the 
ObSEXtIIII process of valorisation, the formula M- a; ß; y; 6- 
t'nrmpIo%mcnt Stock. Fhm-A sod M' poses the question of which are the forms Completed Duration 
produced within capital, particularly during the 
crisis and transformation of capital in its most 
abstract forms, and how and to what extent a, ß, y 
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domination, yet the forms through which 
domination is reshaped in M-M' are decisive to understand the power of resistance. 
Real subsumption implies that capital has located the possibility of resistance and 
transcendence at the core of its own reproduction. Rather than excluded, the form 
unemployed is the site of conjunction of the capitalist contradictions within the 
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subject. Yet, in that case, the production of subjectivity asserts itself as an external 
aspect of the valorisation of capital. In M-M' this process becomes invisible. 
In M-a-M' the unemployed, in this case a, come out as a real abstraction, i. e. an 
abstraction in reality (Gunn 1992) which cannot be grasped if it is separated from the 
real movement that produced it. With regard to the case I am concern with, the 
roadblocks can only be interpreted as an embodiment of the Menemist stability. 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter discussed the reality and theory of unemployment under Menem, as the 
main ingredient of stabilisation policies. The chapter explored the extent to which 
stabilisation policies, together with flexibilisation, privatisation and decentralisation 
contributed to constitution of the highest expression of life instability: unemployment 
I addressed the process of production of `the unemployed' and `the pauper' as 
subjects of state policy-making. The chapter outlined the reality of unemployment, as 
well as the arguments put forward by political authorities as well as scholars to 
explain it. The institutional changes, institutional agreements and set of passive and 
active employment policies launched under Menem to control unemployment were 
also sketched here. It was argued that focused social contributed to social 
fragmentation. The chapter considered some sociological work and most important 
debates on unemployment and the unemployed workers' capacity for resistance. The 
notion of underclass thesis and the reserve army of labour were revisited. 
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The chapter offered a critical interpretation of unemployment not as the lack of work 
but, rather, as a form of it. The difference between these two interpretations is 
politically significant. The idea of unemployment as a `lack of jobs', as well as the 
notion of `social exclusion' only contributed to the disempowerment of those who 
experience unemployment since they do not account their reality. Instead, the notion 
of unemployment as a form of labour highlights that the `unemployed' constitute a 
problematic subjectivity for capital as a social relation. 
In chapter one, I argued that the notion of form provides the tool for an investigation 
of the production of subjectivity as the embodiment of capitalist social relations in a 
determinate period. I suggested that the point of departure for the analysis of 
subjectivity, and the politics of resistance, is neither workers and social identities, 
strategies of organisation and of resistance, nor the recomposition of the state, 
money-capital and the law. I argued that subjectivity of labour is a determinate 
abstraction. Determinate abstraction indicates that subjectivity cannot be explained by 
any of the aspects which constitute it, e. g. the identity of `labour' i. e. the working 
class, but rather subjectivity of labour is the embodiment and conjunction of the 
concrete and abstract dimensions of labour (Taylor 2001) within the subject. It was 
also argued that subjectivity cannot be grasped if it is separated from the real 
movement and contradictions that produce it. Methodologically, labour and social 
conflicts are empirically fruitful since they assert themselves dramatically as critical 
moments whereby both the aspects and forms which constitute subjectivity are put in 
motion with unexpected results. Social struggles are hieroglyphics in motion which 
embody the multiple processes of struggle to constitute subjectivity in a determinate 
historical period. In what follows, I shall explore the particular configurations of the 
3US 
concrete and abstract aspects of the capital relation that are able to transform everyday 
isolation, pain and needs into a roadblock. It is to the concrete case that I now turn. 
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Part III 
Made in the 1990s. 
Reinventing Resistance. 
J1V 
Chapter Ten 
The Piqueteros, Roadblocks, Virtual Disappearance and the Struggle 
In and Against the 
Violence of Stability. 
`- Who killed the Commander, 
Mengo? ' 
- Fuenteovejuna did!. (Lope de 
Vega, Fuenteovejuna) 
`Look at what our barricades are 
made of: remains of pipes, useless 
machines, scrap iron' 
(Demonstrator to a journalist, 
Roadblock, Cutral-C6, Neuquen, 
April 1997). 
'It is as if he were forced to watch his own 
disappearance, as if, by crossing the threshold 
of this room, he were entering another 
dimension, taking up residence inside a black 
hole' (Paul Auster, The Invention of Solitude). 
'In spite of the enormous temperature of the 
hole, its total mass-energy reserves are 
colossal' 189. 
`The nature of this kind of problems, which 
turn into "assemblyeism", is anarchy... the 
deliberate attack upon democratic institutions 
is misleading and doesn't help to maintain the 
structure in which framework social problems 
could be solved' (civil servant high level, 
MTSS, author's interview, Buenos Aires, 
1997). 
At the Airport El Cadillal, an advert before the 
check-in states: `For Jujuy to take off, big 
industries are needed. Ledesma Co. wishes you 
a good flight! '. 
Every day, the local radio speaker salutes 
`Hello to all our brothers, the unemployed! 
189 Davis P 1983 The edge of infinity. Naked 
singularities and the Destruction of Space- 
time, Oxford University Press: Oxford - NY: 
125. 
Mother - `At the church, I've heard that 
Piqueteros is a subversive organisation; is this 
true, Juan? ' 
Juan - 'Mother, lam your son, you should 
trust me, but you don't 
Mother - (looking at me) `Juan has never 
been 
involved in politics! ' 
Juan-'Mother, what are you saying? Mama, 
politics is everything, eating is politics... When 
the others have something that I don't have I 
don't care. But when the others have nothing, 
then I care about it' Looking at me he adds: 
'tonight there will be a march' 
I 
Introduction to the Case Study 
In May 1997, as the economic crisis worsened and discontent stemming from the lack 
of governmental response to people's demands grew, a general agreement arose 
within the Multisectorial of Libertador General San Martin, Jujuy around the idea of 
a roadblock On Monday 19th May, no more than 50 people, mostly women, gathered 
at the San Lorenzo river bridge in Jujuy. The roadblock aimed at breaking 
government indifference to the chronic suffering of the whole community. Demands 
entailed mainly the creation of 5,000 jobs; employment programmes for 3,000; 
control over distribution of food boxes provided by the government; early retirement 
and disability pensions for ex - Ledesma workers. At 10.30 p. m. tyres were burning, 
and a big tent was installed on the river side. The roadblock on the M34 was 
preventing the sugar cane harvest from starting the next day. The government opted 
for severe repression. But repression fostered only resistance and solidarity among 
the whole community of Libertador. Although it was not the first roadblock that Jujuy 
had witnessed, this time it was, according to its main protagonists, different. 
As previously mentioned, in June 1996 and March 1997 two popular rebellions using 
roadblocks, general and hunger strikes were initiated by public sector workers, the 
unemployed and the poor in Cutral-C6 and Plaza Huincul, Neuquen. The roadblocks 
in Neuquen consolidated a new form of protest that became widespread in the 
following years. Roadblocks spread in Tartagal (Salta) and Libertador General San 
Martin (Jujuy) in April and May 1997.19° This time the roadblocks asserted 
190 On this see Cotarelo, 2000, Dinerstein 1999,1997a, 19976, Klachko and Morelli 1999, Klachko 2000 Scribano, 1998; Favaro et al 1997. 
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themselves as a form of solidarity against the repression suffered by university 
students in La Plata weeks before. After that, social protest expanded: retired people, 
students, workers and the unemployed demonstrated in Buenos Aires and the 
provinces of Entre Rios, Tierra del Fuego, Neuquen, Tucuman and Cordoba. In the 
ensuing years, the roadblocks spread across the country. 191 In short, between 1989 and 
1996 there were around 2,000 protests, that is twenty protests per month (Schuster in 
Scribano 1998). 
Roadblock 
A typical roadblock consists 
of the following: In general, 
inhabitants of a local 
community block the main 
highway by means of 
barricades, pickets and a 
. ý. 
ý ýý 
bonfire made of burning tyres. They guard the area beside the lorries and a bonfire of 
burned tyres. Women and children, bringing containers of food, co-operate with the 
organisation of resistance. The demonstrators are the poor and the unemployed; 
women and men workers, children, and owners of small- and medium-sized 
businesses, supported by the local trade unions and organisations of the unemployed. 
The Piqueteros (or Fogoneros in Neuquen) are usually very young unemployed men 
who lead the roadblock and fight face-to-face against the military police during the 
confrontations. 
191 During December 1999 and during April and May 2000, a new wave of roadblocks throughout the 
country reached massive proportions: the province of Corrientes, as well as the communities of 
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When the authorities approach them, the Piqueteros together with social organisations 
and local trade unions demand primarily the continuation of the national employment 
programmes, (usually the TRABAJAR, see chapter nine), as well as certain 
improvements to their structure, the payment of overdue wages for state workers, 
governmental assistance in establishing and developing employment projects in the 
area, and the guarantee that they would not be legally persecuted, as had been the case 
in the past, for blocking a motorway is considered, according to the law, a crime. 
The response of the government is usually twofold. On the one hand, it is immediately 
to send hundreds of military policemen to the roadblock. On the other hand, with this 
clear repressive background, it tries to force demonstrators and their leaders to a 
`dialogue' that could only take place in a `democratic' setting, stressing that a 
roadblock would jeopardise any potential agreement that could be reached between all 
parties involved. Thus, whilst the special forces await and reinforcements arrive to 
secure the area, the authorities ask the Piqueteros to go home peacefully so that the 
use of force can be avoided. 
The Piqueteros and the rest of the demonstrators usually reject the government's 
`suggestion', drawing lessons from the past that, although repression is going to be 
savage, they have to resist at the roadside. Only as a consequence of resistance will 
they be heard and can an agreement be reached. Since the demonstrators do not `go 
home', the area surrounding the motorway becomes a battlefield. Confrontation 
consists of one, two or maybe three hours of face-to-face confrontation between the 
military police and the demonstrators, the young Piqueteros being at the front line, 
Tartagal and Orin (Salta), Cutral-Co (Neuquen), Palpi (Jujuy), Resistencia (Chaco), Trelew (Chubut), 
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resisting with slingshots and sticks. Gendarmes usually retreat from the roadblock but 
attack the actual neighbourhoods. Piqueteros and union leaders are also imprisoned. 
The result of the repression is a growing solidarity with the Piqueteros among the 
population of the town. After four hours of fighting, thousands of neighbours descend 
on the roadblock, holding for instance religious images or Argentine flags, joining the 
protest against repression. 
Having to face the constraint of money within the convertibility plan, provincial 
administrations do not harness labour through `democratic' channels but by 
repression. However, repression not only delegitimises political power but usually 
leads to an even higher level of solidarity among demonstrators. State repression 
being unable to solve the problem, each social protest discloses a battle by governors 
and mayors for obtaining, controlling and distributing those flows of money (credit) 
from the World Bank and the IMF borrowed by the central government to maintain 
stability and control social conflict. 
After the battle, the place is devastated and people remain in silence at the side of the 
motorway. The local priests, who acknowledge the plight of the inhabitants, intervene 
as mediators between the government and the Piqueteros. After long hours of 
negotiations, authorities pay overdue wages, re-establish the TRABAJAR 
employment programmes and promise not to proceed in the legal prosecution of the 
demonstrators. More demands are added to the original endless lists of demands put 
forward by Piqueteros, as well as unions and social organisations, including public 
works, basic public services e. g. a network for the provision of natural gas or water, 
Cippoletti, Cruz del Eje and Rio Cuarto (Cördoba) were engaged in roadblocks. 
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the legal recognition of indigenous communities in the area and financing for small- 
and medium-scale business. 
In Buenos Aires, the secretary for Social Policy and the Minister of Labour are 
usually congratulated by the IMF for their achievement to control social unrest. Yet, 
the government acknowledges that every local agreement is like `pouring a glass of 
water into the ocean' (La Nacidn on line, 14.5.00) until the next roadblock takes place 
elsewhere. 
The case study 
This chapter offers an analysis of the roadblock unleashed in Libertador General San 
Martin, a town of 60,000 inhabitants in the north-west province of Jujuy, in May 
1997. I shall explore the means and forms through which this roadblock emerged out 
of and stood against the violence of stability. It will be shown that the roadblock 
emerged as the embodiment of the articulation between the deep transformation of 
social and economic relations in Jujuy, the specific forms of employment and social 
policy, the ways in which democratic institutions aimed to channel social demand and 
a history of resistance against political corruption and capital's prerogatives and 
repression in the area. By blocking the roads, workers, the unemployed and entire 
community of Libertador made themselves visible against what I will call the `virtual 
disappearance' of labour entailed in political indifference and in the unstable forms of 
capitalist work, and whose utmost expression is extreme poverty and unemployment. 
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The nature of the case presented a number of methodological, theoretical and political 
challenges. The methods of the research were i. examining official documents, 
employment policies, and institutional changes within the state (e. g. the creation of 
new sectors within some specific areas); ii. examining documents, journals, press 
materials and pamphlets by trade unions, church and new organisations; interviewing 
high level civil servants and politicians involved in the issue; with national and local 
union leadership, leaders of new social organisations (e. g. Piqueteros, `Commission 
for the Unemployed', Multisectoriales). This took the form of semi-structured 
individual interviews; iii. participant observation in meetings, marches and 
demonstrations held by unions, the organisations of the unemployed as well as official 
meetings (like the Mesa de Concertaciön). The information provided by the 
interviews and press material allowed the reconstruction of the historical background 
and the chronicle of events. Participant observation allowed the investigation of the 
aftermath and implications of the roadblocks and the analysis of the strategies of the 
participants Frente de Gremios Estatales (State Workers' Front , FGE), Cordinadora 
de Piqueteros; the local church) during the process of institutionalisation of the 
conflict. 
The first stage of my field work in the region was accomplished during July and 
August 1997, two months after the `roadblock' had taken place. The participants were 
still dealing with the political consequences and being institutionally recognised. The 
process of assessment and negotiation among different parties was taking place. This 
presented some advantages and disadvantages to my research purposes. The 
advantages being that through interviews and participant observation I was able to test 
and grasp the political and social atmosphere, feelings, attitudes, and thoughts, and 
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most importantly. the meanings and reasons for their engagement in collective action, 
as well as their expectations. These constituted the main purpose of my case study. 
The challenges were mainly related to the political situation of the demonstrators and 
other parties involved in the roadblock. 
The first challenge that should be 
noted is the access to all those various 
organisations who participated in the 
roadblock. Access was initiated with 
the CTA Jujuy and then a chain of 
contacts was established. Yet, the 
nature of the Pryueieros made the task hard. Since there were so many groups and 
interests involved it was hard to learn the way I which they were related and 
confronted. The second challenge was that due to the political situation, my interest in 
the roadblock could be suspected of something else. It was a moment of distrust and 
betrayals, and also police persecution. Most interviewees were under stress and 
somehow suspected my interest in the issue. In general, 1 was seen as someone from 
Buenos Aires, and from the CTA and it took some time since they realised that I was 
not a spy from the national government, the IMF or the CTA but a research fellow, or 
a journalist as they called me. 
The third challenge was that my participant observation in secret meetings where 
political decisions were made allowed me to capture the political atmosphere, 
meanings and debates around the issue yet I had to be careful to control the influence 
that my presence had in the participants' attitudes, for my presence added a certain 
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degree of anxiety to the meeting. Coupled with semi-structured interviews with 
participants, priests, union leaders and high-level civil servants, I chose to make some 
interviews in the streets during the demonstrations. The goal was to grasp the general 
atmosphere of struggle and to produce flashes of their lives. Although participants 
were `overexcited' by the situation, answering questions during the demonstrations 
forced them to produce short and effective stories about how they felt and what they 
wanted, the reasons for their involvement in the struggle, their doubts and feelings. 
Finally, my personal challenge was to take in the overwhelming poverty and scarcity 
in Libertador, accompanied by their political attitude to maintain self esteem and 
dignity. Sometimes I felt inadequate. My computer, tape recorder and my hand bag 
were like a burden for me since they accentuated the differences between them and 
me. I felt hopeless. My feeling interestingly contrasted with their strength and dignity 
and the passionate belief in what they were doing. 
The chapter is organised in three sections. Section I provides the historical 
background of social and political relations as well as the economic transformation in 
Jujuy under Menem. Section II presents a chronicle and analysis of the roadblock of 
General San Martin. Section III offers a view on the subjectivity of the roadblock and 
suggest the theoretical, methodological and political challenges presented by the case 
study. The conclusion suggests an interpretation of the roadblock. It will be argued 
that the roadblock stood against the main premises that constituted Menem(ism), 
namely the legalisation of uncertainty, the recognition of capital as the subject, and 
the end of politics in favour of the era of the administration of social misery. 
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II 
State, Capital and Labour in Jujuy 
Jujuy has around 600,000 inhabitants. Agriculture is of fundamental importance in the 
provincial economy. The provincial valleys of Jujuy and San Francisco concentrate 
the production of tobacco and sugar cane, the latter being the most relevant for the 
productive structure. Mining and steel industry as well as petrol are historical 
industries in Jujuy (INDEC 1999b). 
Since 1991, the provincial economy has been recomposed 
within the contect of economic adjustment and the 
convertibility plan. The provincial state restructuring 
itself, the crisis of the mining industry and the 
privatisation of the steel industry (Altos Homos Zapla) 
ýw ., (Ramirez and Golovanevsky 1998), as well as the %~ ý ýý .w I'3""'' I c-- ý- +`-e-,.: 
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restructuring of the sugar cane industry increased the rate 
of unemployment (INPRODES 1996: 8). In 1992, Jujuy had one of the highest rates 
of unemployment within the eight agglomerates of the country (8.8%). In May 1994 
the underemployment or the under-use of working hours reached 15.96% of the 
population, this being considered among the highest in the country. Added up, both 
rates (unemployment and underemployment) reached 24.41% in May 1994 (Marcoleri 
1994). In November 1995, the EPDH (INDEC) indicated the increase in the rate of 
urban unemployment to 12.4% and the total 23.1%. 
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Open Urban Unemployment 1990-97, Jujuy. October 
1991 
June 
1991 
Oct 
1992 
May 
1992 
Oct 
1993 
May 
1993 
Oct 
1994 
May 
1994 
Oct 
1995 
May 
1995 
Oct 
1996 
Ma 
1996 
Oct 
1997 
Ma 
1997 
Oct 
5.1 3.3 8.8 6.6 6.7 6.5 8.5 9.7 12.7 12.4 12.5 12.5 18.0 15.5 
Source: EPH, INDEC from MTSS 1999: 69. 
Urban workers with no pension (may 1995-1998) 
May 
1995 
October 
1995 
April 
1996 
October 
1996 
May 
1997 
October 
1997 
May 
1998 
Ago 
1998 
October 
1998 
May 
1999 
31.2 33.4 34.2 31.4 39.8 42.7 45.0 41.7 43.5 41.4 
Source: MISS 1999: 128, from EPH, INDEC 
The decrease in the provincial GDP produced by the growth of casual and 
unregistered employment as well as the new national Fiscal Pact resulted in a negative 
provincial budget of 29,555,218 pesos for the first 6 months of 1996 (INPRODES 
1996: 34). 192 Tokens attempted to solve the lack of cash for state workers' wages to 
be paid, but it fostered not only an increase in the provincial debt, but also a black 
market, corruption, and blackmail. 193 
Workers migrated to the cities, particularly those workers who lived and worked in 
the sugar, manufacturing and building industries as well as commerce and domestic 
service in La Puna (Clarin, 14.7.97, internet). However, migrations led to further 
problems since the cities lacked service facilities and housing as well as faced the 
crisis of health and education systems, particularly after their decentralisation in 1992. 
192 That month unregistered employment was 31.4%: in 1996 the loss of money for social security due 
to unregistered employment was 67.47% (MTSS 1997a). In 1992 Jujuy's need for financial help was 
33.3% (Feletti and Lozano 1992: 13) The provincial GDP had decreased 10% between 1990 and 1993 
(INPRODES 1996: 15). The total of automatic transfer from the federal government to Jujuy (through 
Federal Co-participation) decreased from 374.9 in 1994 to 87.2 million pesos in 1996. Non-automatic 
transfer (money from National Treasury) decreased from 10.5% to 6.0% for the same period 
(INPRODES 1996: 31-32). 
193 Provincial tokens were introduced in 1983 by the governor to replace money, due to the lack of 
cash, particularly to pay state workers' wages. However, they could not be used anywhere else nor 
could one pay national taxes with them. A black market evolved from the difficulties to transform them 
into cash. Corruption's been enormous and now we have to pay for it (Medrano, interview). 
Furthermore, `the governor emitted provincial tokens for 40 millions dollars; nowadays in order to take 
them out of circulation, 76 millions are required'. 
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Employment programmes were (are) more a problem than a solution. Workers 
benefited by the programme TRABAJAR formally complained about the working 
conditions and lack of protection they were suffering. The distribution of employment 
programmes as well as the management of focused social policies led to corruption. 
Workers argued that: 
`the Mayor forced people to work either more hours or in other kind of jobs, let's 
say on something he needed to be done. He also used to give people $150 instead 
of the corresponding $200 and pocketed the difference' 
`The government distributes boxes containing food, among the population What 
do you get? Nothing but corruption' (Medrano, FGE) 
Employment programmes in Jujuy 1996-1999 
1996 1997 1998 1999 (Jan-Sept) 
50,972 65,421 62,698 37,317 
1996 
1 50,972 
Source: MTSS, 1999: 186 
Amount spent on employment programmes, San Salvador de Jujuy, 1996-99 (in thousands pesos) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 
7,452.3 13,053.2 11,582.1 6,816.3 
1996 1997 
7,452.3 13,053.2 
Source: MTSS, 1999: 186 
1997 
65,421 
Employment Benefit (monthly average percentage) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total 
country 
73,373 
(100%) 
98,513 
100%) 
122,347 
(100%) 
127,885 
(100%) 
95,379 
(100%) 
90,711 
(100%) 
105,248 
(100%) 
Jujuy 2.4 1.5 1.6 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 
MI SS, 1999: 208. Data provided by the ANSES 
The Deconstruction of the Ledesma Domain 
The ingenio Ledesma, i. e. Ledesma Sugar States and Refining Co. Ltd, was founded 
in 1908 and Libertador General San Martin flourished around what was to become the 
main resource of employment and welfare facilities in the area. The company owns 
30,259 out of a total of 59,912 hectares planted with sugar cane in Jujuy, i. e. 57.2% 
(Ramirez and Golovanevsky 1998: 143), and became the main source of employment 
1998 
11,582.1 
1998 1999 (Jan-Sept) ý 
62,698 37,317 ý 62,698 137,317 
1999 
6,816.3 
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and welfare facilities in the area, particularly since the late 1950s. The fact that the 
inhabitants of Libertador called their town `Ledesma', borrowing from the name of 
their main industry, is revealing. Up to its restructuring, 8,000 workers were 
employed to produce 90% of its own 
sugar cane. It has incorporated one 
of the most important paper 
companies; owns two alcohol 
refineries, citrus, avocado and 
mango plantations, as well as trading 
sugar. Ledesma had also developed a 
quasi-welfare state: 
`In the past, there was a system of vales, and a system of frado. You bought 
whatever you needed in the big shops provided by the company. They wrote your 
debts down in your notebook. They took the discount from your salary... House 
provision was monumental. The quality of houses was related to the kind of 
worker you were... Services weren't paid by people. We also had a gardener! I 
was brought up in that context... all this has collapsed' (state worker at the County 
Hospital). 
Ledesma has a history of developing servile and paternalistic labour relations. 
Initially, the sugar cane industry was a complement of livestock farming so it 
inherited the labour relations of it. The sugar cane industry privileged differential rent 
rather than the introduction of technology. The elite monopolised political power. 
Rural historians explain that the labour relations in the sugar cane industry in 
Argentina were characterised by the use of a free but also servile labour force. There 
was a system of tokens but wage labour was not constituted until late. However, the 
labour force resisted this form of servile domination, particularly in Tucuman in 1904, 
1905 and before and during the harvests in 1920 (see Craviotti 1992) 
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However, Jujuy's peculiarity was the lack of conflict until the 20`h Century, because 
the labour force was composed by swallow indigenous workers, i. e. seasonal labour 
from the communities of Chaco, Formosa and even from Bolivia. After 
industrialisation, the idea of the estate as a prison was replaced by the estate as a 
factory. However, the ingenio maintained servile labour relations. Some argued that 
the ingenio remained feudalistic. Others argued that the repressive forms of work 
became part of the new forms of exploitation: they `were not part of a feudal on pre- 
capitalist economy. The ingenios were highly capitalised and technologically 
advanced enterprises, and their brutal methods of obtaining labour, [i. e. slave forms of 
mita, encomienda, peonaje] can hardly be blamed on a "traditional mentality" or 
"feudal outlook". Indeed, their historical behaviour appears to have been passed on 
quite rational capitalistic criteria' (Rutledge, 1975: 10 c. f., Rozenzvaig and Bonano, 
1993). According to the Jujenos, sugar companies are accustomed to receive special 
favours from the provincial government and are the most important debtors of the 
province (Medrano, FGE leader; Olga, Human Rights Militant). The military police 
was created by Ledesma in the 1960s to protect its business against smuggling. 
Ledesma owns all the land around here. All the valley belongs to them. They 
purchased it during the military government at 1$ per hectare (Olga, founder of the 
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, Jujuy). 194 
In the 1970s, the company participated in financial activities and achieved the highest 
rate of capitalisation within the branch. In 1979, it was ranked no 4 regarding its 
wealth, and no 27 regarding its sales. In 1992 it attempted to buy the ex-state-owned 
company Gas del Estado. The historical contradiction between chronic 
193 Olga is a Mother of the Plaza de Mayo. Every Thursday, Olga `dances alone' around the monument 
of the main square of Libertador General San Martin in memory of her husband. For more references, 
see chapter six. 
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underemployment and the importing of labour from neighbouring provinces and 
countries towards the permanent escape from social legislation by Ledesma, the 
tendency to financial speculation, and its close relationship with military regimes 
transformed the company into a `kingdom' (Rozenzvaig and Bonano, 1993). 
The search for international competitivity led to the diversification of individual 
capital's strategies, searching for more profitable means of production throughout the 
world. The regional arrangement MERCOSUR increased competition and put 
Ledesma Co. in a disadvantageous position vis-ä-vis the Brazilian sugar cane 
industry. 195 Flexibilisation of labour existed already at the ingenio. Workers are hired 
temporarily any time of the year for whatever is required, they are called `non- 
permanent regular workers' (no efectivos regulares) which meant that the company 
undertook the flexibilisation of its labour force at its, own initiative (idem. ant). But 
the convertibility plan cut tax exemptions and subsidies to the sugar industry whereas 
at the same time increased tax collection and demanded modernisation. In spite of the 
fact that during the 1990s the sugar cane industry showed a sustainable growth 
(INDEC 1999a: 14), Ledesma wanted to reduce labour costs at the Libertador factory, 
and to free capital to invest abroad. 
The restructuring of Ledesma meant the decomposition of previous social relations. 
Coupled with the deconstruction of all kinds of facilities historically provided, namely 
health services, food, supermarkets, housing provision, etc. that started in the late 
195 Whilst the Brazilian sugar cane industry aims primarily to produce petrol (alconafta) sugar and 
paper being made with the waste, Argentinean industries' target is first sugar and then paper, the 
alconafta being a secondary product obtained from the waste. It is impossible for Ledesnia to compete 
with Brazilian companies for Brazilian sugar is subsidised, and it is much cheaper than the Argentine 
sugar. Ledesma argued that unless the national government favoured it with new legislation, it couldn't 
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1970s, a reserve army of 4,000 emerged. It was composed of i) 55 year-old 
breadwinners (some of them seriously ill or disabled, with large families) sacked or 
voluntarily suspended with minimum compensation from Ledesma Co. after 30 years 
working for the company, but not old enough to qualify for retirement as regulated by 
national law (65 years old), in so far as zafreros -sugar workers- start working at age 
14; 196 ii) young male unemployed who have never worked; iii) single mothers or lone 
married women whose husbands have gone somewhere else to find a job and never 
come back. Eventually, self-employed workers had been harmed by the economic 
crisis, unemployment as well as the circulation of tokens; and state workers who 
suffer from precarious labour conditions, overdue wages, and are paid by tokens. 
The creation of massive unemployment and the suspension of welfare facilities made 
the crisis spread wide throughout the province. As Libertador inhabitants highlighted: 
`this form of lay-off constituted a snowball: unemployed breadwinners are unable 
to prevent their children and teenagers from dropping out of education, without 
any possibility of getting a job... women going to work leaving babies with their 
15 year old daughters, who had their own child already.. . the 
deepness of this 
conflict lies in that the whole family is involved in it' (Federico). 
The following comments illustrate the serious everyday struggle against scarcity: ' 97 
`Insofar as supermarkets bankrupted, we have to do shopping in the corner shop 
where everything is more expensive and there is no stock. We have learnt to look 
after the small shop's stock by buying only what is really necessary. .. It is 
difficult 
to make both ends meet when you are paid the wage for June on the 8th August. 
By 15th July, I don't have either rice, or bread, or milk or credit' (Hilda). 
keep on investing in Argentina for Brazil was much more convenient. For an evolution of the sugar 
industry during the 1990s see INDEC 1999a. See also Ramirez and Golovanevsky 1998. 196 This is not a mere coincidence, for dismissed workers have been specially selected regarding 
medical advice to the company which has strict control over workers' health so the company chose 
them to save significant amounts of money squeezed from payroll taxes for social security and health. 
Besides, when disability living allowance is required, the national institution ANSES used to refuse it, 
regardless of how obvious the case was, and suggested the workers see a solicitor. 197 Scarcity in Libertador was astonishing. The lack of circulation of cash could be felt not only in the 
shops, where it was difficult to change a 10 peso note, but in everyone's face. 
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`Sometimes, when money is not enough I prepare some soup, or white tea... we 
endure for some days and when he [her husband] gets paid I feed the children 
properly, I mean I buy chicken or something like that.. . they understand' 
(Mirta). 
Labour and Social Organisations. Previous Struggles 
The FGE was born out of a need to articulate opposition against neo-liberal policies 
and the corruption of the political authorities in Jujuy. It gathers a diverse range of 
ideologies as leaders support different political parties, and join different national 
confederations. 198 According to its leaders, `although FGE membership is state 
workers-based, the rest of the workers have got expectations about us regarding other 
issues, for instance, unemployment' (president of the Central de Empleados de la 
Educaciön Media, CEDEMS, FGE, author's interview). 
There is a remarkable political instability in the province. In spite of the endless 
triumph of the Peronist party in provincial elections, there have been 8 governors in 
14 years. The reason being not, as is argued, internal political disagreements or 
inefficiency in running the provincial economy or even the lack of democratic culture 
(civil servants high level MTSS, interviews). The reason is rather the capacity of the 
Jujenos in fighting the paternalistic and corrupted forms that liberal politics take in the 
province. Since 1989, the FGE, together with social organisations, has run several 
strikes and demonstrations, some of them massive, with severe political implications. 
In 1989 a massive demonstration of 15,000 workers organised by the FGE demanded 
governor Aparici's resignation. At the end of October 1990, the first confrontation 
took place between the police and state workers who demanded a wage increase and 
198 The FGE is constituted by six provincial unions: the ATSA (Health Workers), supported by the CGT; the ADEP (Provincial Civil Servants) and the ATE (State Workers) supported by the CTA; and 
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the end of the emission of tokens. As a result of the struggle, the Governor resigned 
and was replaced by the vice governor Alderete. During his period in office, wages 
were paid half in cash, while the other half was contributed to a short-term saving 
fund. He never paid the money back. In 1991, Dominguez won provincial elections 
and attempted to pass an emergency economic law which meant a wage freeze. The 
FGE demonstrations coupled with the lack of political support forced the resignation 
of the governor. Under Ficoseco workers' protests increased, leading to the 
Jujenazo. 199 
In 1993, the FGE organised a march through the city, against the economic 
adjustment passed at dawn by provincial MPs. They burned tyres and threw stones 
against security forces. A room for negotiation was opened to discuss the `annoying' 
aspects of the law (Pagina/12,23/12/93: 8). In March 1994 a new confrontation 
between state workers and the police resulted in 14 injured people. One month later, 
after the beginning of a jury investigation against him, the governor resigned, and 
Perassi took office. The tokens this time would be paid by 2007 (Clarin 28.5.97, 
Internet). Under Perassi's office a hunger strike at San Francisco church took place. 
Some unemployed people sewed up their mouths! (Santillän, FGE, author's interview 
1997). There was also a large mobilisation with public seminars, blocking roads and 
marches. That year, the FGE also called its first general strike since Perassi came to 
office. Workers demanded wage increases, the trial of the former governor accused of 
corruption and the end of police repression against workers' mobilisation (Pagina/12, 
21.4.94: 4). In April 1995, after another dramatic confrontation with the police forces, 
the APUAJ (Justice Workers), the CEOM (Town Hall workers) and the CEDEMS (Teachers), supported by the local CCC (Corriente Combativa Clasista). 
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workers accepted Church mediation in their conflicts: they stopped any kind of protest 
during negotiations. The conditions established by the bishop were the suspension of 
demands, a basic consensus in the law to regulate pensions and the payment of those 
working days lost (Clarin, 13/4/95: 5). In November 1995, the Multisectorial and the 
FGE organised a roadblock demanding three-months overdue wages: `Those 
roadblocks were different, they were trade union struggles' (Hilda). 
Unemployment 
Unemployment was incorporated into the FGE agenda. Three of the FGE leaders 
explained it as follows: 
`We aim to organise workers, namely: workers, unemployed, retired people. If 
we have to go out to the streets, well, there will be forms of organisation which 
might fit into this new pattern, depending on what interests and needs are 
required in very specific situations' (Acosta, CTA, 1997). 
`We need a big transformation simply because unemployment is intrinsic to this 
form of capitalism' (Santillän, Central de Empleados Y Obreros Municipales 
(CEOM), Corriente Combativa Classista, CCC 1997). 
`Up till now, unemployment was a matter of political clientelism, politicians 
shared out employment programmes and posts to keep their "voters army" quiet. 
We introduce the problem of unemployment as a political issue' (Medrano, 
CEDEMS, 1997). 
A Commission for the Unemployed was created by former Ledesnia Co. workers in 
1992. Run by Don Jimenez, its target was primarily to provide legal help to the early 
retired and ill workers seeking pensions and disability living allowances then denied 
by Ledesma Co. and the provincial administration. In 1994, the Commission achieved 
legal recognition. Insofar as it was `inoffensive' and quite functional to the company 
199 According to the FGE leaders, `the "Jujenazo", unlike the Santiagazo, was an organised struggle 
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strategies, Ledesnia managers helped the commission with a physical place and some 
resources to develop their activities. Since its creation, the Commission had tried to 
remain out of politics: `if one talks politics to Don Jimenez he trembles, the memory 
of repression strongly associated with politics still remains' (Ibi). 
The other two significant organisations in Jujuy are the Multisectorial, a locally-based 
pluralist organisation which gathers social sectors and other organisations such as 
industrial and small and medium-size business people, human rights militants, and the 
local church. The latter is a refuge for the poor. Although it is mostly concerned with 
charity, its main roles are political indoctrination and mediation in social conflicts. 
200 
During 1996 several meetings were held between the Multisectorial, the FGE and the 
church with the governor of Jujuy. On 26th June 1996 a meeting gathered the 
provincial governor and representatives of social organisations and the church from 
Puna and Humahuaca, at which the governor recognised the legitimacy of people's 
demands, and committed himself to deliver new and more employment programmes, 
housing and capital investments, tax exemptions for the unemployed, the end of 
overdue wages for state workers and of tokens, and to improve health services 
(Resolution no 19/97). 
Insofar as the demands were not met, on 11th July, the Multisectorial de La Puna sent 
a joint letter to the Minister of the Interior Mr Corach explaining the despair, 
provoked by the governor's political clumsiness... it led to repression, imprisonments, but also further 
resistance and solidarity' (Medrano and Santillän, FGE). 200 See charity by the Obra Claretiana para el Desarrollo (OCLADE) in Clarin Internet 14.7.97 ). The 
local church also has a role in political indoctrination. Although it dresses it up as religious guidance, 
the journal Hoja de Ruta establishes political advice on how not to be naive and not allow others to 
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frustration and suffering of the population. The letter also mentioned the meeting with 
the governor on 26th June and the poor results achieved, for provincial government 
attributed to national government the non-fulfilment of the promises that had been 
made to the Multisectorial of Jujuy. Eventually the letter demanded the constitution of 
a Civic-Provincial Committee for the control of all the provincial monetary incomes, 
for the traditional control institutions are `polluted and corrupted'. 
`Until when have the inhabitants of Jujuy to put up with the consequences of 
misgovernment and the political and economic personal interests of hopeless 
administrators? '(Letter to the interior minister, Multisectorial of La Puna and 
Quebrada, 11.7.96; see Working paper, Meeting 9.8.96, Jujuy). 
III 
`Stones versus Bullets': Chronicle of the Roadblock in Libertador 
Resistance and Solidarity vis-a- 
vis the State's Violence 
When they blocked the M34, 
demonstrators believed that the 
government, as well as Ledesma, 
had realised that this was not the 
same kind of protest as the previous ones: `it was not a trade union protest.. . this time 
the problem was deeper and difficult to be solved: unemployment' (HF). The 
roadblock was cutting the internal roads to Ledesma. 
At dawn, after several hours on the road, demonstrators were threatened first and 
repressed by the police after they refused to `go home'. Repression at the M34 was 
striking and disproportionate: 
scare its, to know what one wants to sav, to discern, to give priority to the concrete suffering people: 
and the external debt (Animadores, June 1997). 
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`There were 600 gendarmes. Men said: women in the front line, you will be 
respected by them. However, they did not! Water, hand grenades, vomit gases ... I 
couldn't believe it! Teachers who were on strike came to help us... suddenly we 
saw a tank which started to persecute us (laughs). I tried not to fall over but it was 
fruitless, everything was flying, the flag, even us, (laughs)... now the M34 was 
blocked by the military police! It was like the Gulf war, they looked like 
Robocop! ' (Olga). 
`Some of us tried to find fresh air far away... running... but it was a mine field 
(which means that there were spies in the meetings! ) ... floundering, we tried to jump into the river, nothing could have been better than that in spite of the cold 
weather, but bombs were 
exploding around us... at 2 
p. m. repression ceased but 
then all people went out to 
the streets' (Ibi). 
Repression made the 
roadblock stronger and 
bigger. They resisted. On 2 1st 
May military police besieged the town preventing anybody from entering or leaving 
the city, blocking the north and south access of the M34. But as the military police 
mounted in number and equipment, so agitation amongst people increased. Direct 
state violence was the typical solution brought about by the government. As 
previously shown, this has never been an `abnormal' feature of Argentine politics, but 
the very mode of existence of the political, even in democratic periods, always 
underpinning economic transformations. The period 1976-1982 entailed, as never 
before, a very close relationship between big transnational and national economic 
groups and the military government allowing, with the support of state terrorism, the 
transfer of social wealth from the state to `private' capital (see Basualdo 1992). 201 
201 See the strong link between capitalists and the military government in Päginal12,25.3.98: 6. The 
strong liaison between provincial administrations and traditional economic power makes provinces the 
means of subsidising economic groups. As an example of this discounts given to sugar cane estates became a mass of resources used by big economic groups with a regional presence, but financial 
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Some sugar estates became concentration camps during the last dictatorship 
(Rosenzvaig and Bonano 1993: 77). Businessmen actively collaborated with military 
operations in several ways. So the last dictatorship left deep marks in Libertador: 
`The memory of what happened on "the night of the power cut" (La noche del 
Apagön), when, by turning off the lights of the whole town, 400 inhabitants were 
kidnapped and then disappeared on July 27th 1976, remains intact. People are 
still afraid' (human rights militant). Olga Aredes' testimony is illustrative in this 
respect: 
`My husband was hired as a doctor for Ledesma workers forty years ago... The 
hot climate -- ideal for the sugar cane harvest -- provoked disasters in children's health. Statistics showed by then that 10 children per day died during the 
harvest... When my husband became the mayor of Ledesma, he strongly 
demanded that Ledesma Co. improve health care for workers and their families. 
On 24th March 1976, at night, military forces came in a Ledesma truck and 
kidnapped him. He disappeared like so many others in one of the same trucks 
that transported all those military policemen to repress us now, 21 years later' 
(Olga). 
At 5 o' clock there was a meeting 
between the Bishop and the 
Multisectorial. While the meeting 
took place, 10,000 people out of 
the 60,000 inhabitants were 
waiting outside. The Bishop 
informed them that 250 jobs had 
been offered instead of the 5,000 demanded, and nothing else. Although the 
government's proposal was insufficient, some members of the Commission for the 
Unemployed showed signs of conformity, regarding - they argued - the aftermath of 
repression. Nevertheless, young people strongly disagreed. Whilst they did accept the 
church mediation, they rejected the government proposal as well as the Mayor's 
valorisation of capital was realised in the capital city, allowing the expansion of business strategies far from provincial interests (Feletti and Lozano 1992: 5). 
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intention of controlling the resources from national government. As a result of 
discussion, they decided to stay and resist. But repression increased: 
`People were wild, uncontrolled, they risked their lives... some said "If I die, 
never mind"... and at a given point... policemen were hit, punched, stripped 
naked... ' (FGE leader). 
`People were furious, watching the destruction of their poor houses, being 
injured... we felt like sisters and brothers, nothing was more important than that' 
(unemployed). 
`Resistance was born against repression... we were furious (Leo). 
`The newspapers said that the unemployed were stark raving mad... I think that 
the rivalry between workers and the unemployed was overcome by facing 
repression... the whole community was involved for there is at least one 
unemployed person in every bloody home of this bloody town' (state worker). 
The incorporation of young people was a crucial fact to build up resistance. Provincial 
statistics showed that between October 1995 and 1996, those who had never worked 
before constituted 24.7% of the unemployed in Jujuy (INPRODES 1996: 12). 
Employment benefit does not include new workers since, as previously mentioned, 
one of the requirements to be eligible for the employment benefit is to have been a 
`worker' before. 
The young unemployed, who called themselves the Piqueteros (like in the roadblock 
in Cutral-C6), were in the front line against the police tanks, throwing stones and 
trying to organise themselves. When they were asked the reasons for resisting like that 
and risking their lives they answered that to recover dignity and a meaning for their 
lives was the most important thing: 
`We, young people, joined the struggle because there is no possibility of 
employment unless one migrates somewhere else. Our life does not make sense at 
all. I fought against repression, I helped to repel the gas bombs' (Piquetero, age 19). 
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`I was not scared... It wasn't fear but nuisance, hatred... the Mayor supported the 
military police. The newspapers published that' (Piquetero, age 18). 
Solidarity and Co-ordination vis-ä-vis the institutional struggle around money 
At the second stage, many people were 
injured and the media was solidly behind 
the unemployed with protests spreading 
throughout the country. Strengthened by 
repression, the Multisectorial called for a 
general strike, supported by the FGE, and 
marched to the capital city of Jujuy. Organisation against repression improved. Now, 
there were 10 roadblocks throughout the province that demanded the governor's 
resignation. The national government was scared of the international repercussions 
of events and that the conflict might damage foreign capitalists' decision to invest in 
the country (Clarin 23.5.97, Internet). The Governor looked desperately for two main 
things: a. financial help, b. political `interlocutors' to negotiate with. 
Most of the FGE leaders admitted that their strategy had been overtaken by locally- 
led roadblocks and demonstrations reflecting widespread anger: 
`Our problem was how to organise that mess. Some of us wanted to lead the 
conflict, others wanted to leave the unemployed organise themselves... there was 
disorder all over, assemblies all over... it was a moment of great political 
upheaval, political power was at stake... eventually we decided that they had to 
organise themselves' (FGE leader). 
Although FGE leaders saw the roadblocks as `a mess' demonstrators explained it as a 
moment of magic. Action turned into the experience of redefining themselves, 
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reshaping their images and relationships, recovering desire and concrete needs. 
Resisting repression and taking advantage of political struggles within the public 
administration, the practice of direct democracy and the build up of solidarity and 
organisation developed during the conflict: 
`I took the microphone and spoke up... The media turned up and that was quite 
helpful for ... most of the newspapers and radio stations in Libertador are 
controlled either by the government or by Ledesma (Juan). 202 
Protesters held their demands but now they asked for the retreat of police too as a 
condition to suspend the roadblock. However, the atmosphere turned sour when 
military riot police, supposed to clamp the masses back, cleared the road by force and 
got into the neighbourhoods. They burst into the neighbourhoods, into the houses, 
instead, taking repression further than the M34. At some point 
`There were more than 1,000 policemen. Provincial MPs firmly demanded the 
retreat of military police ... Governor Ferraro sent letters to the Interior 
Minister 
Mr Corach, the home security secretary and the head of military police asking the 
police to leave the place: they would go back down to Lote Paulina, six 
kilometres away from the roadblock. An MP stated: "If troops don't go back 
down a massacre could take place". There were 80 more injured and 22 were 
imprisoned' (Ballatorre and Pantoja Clarin, 23.5.97, Internet). 
The tent that had been installed at the roadblock was stolen by the military police who 
accused them of hiding weapons. But 
`the only weapons we had there were some knives to cut the meat and vegetables, 
and of course, the lemons to repel gases... the tent was my aunt's. She needs it to 
sell chicken on the road `when it is raining... you know... it is a shame, it was 
really expensive because it is a big double one! '(Juan). 
202 Juan is 37. He is a horse breaker and a blacksmith too. His father worked for Ledesma for 40 years. At present, he lives with his mother, Dona Mercedes, although he's got two children in Buenos Aires 
and a daughter in Ledesma. Juan's eldest brother is a policeman. With Leo and the others he became 
336 
The organisation of the roadblock improved vis-ä-vis repression. A traditional Olla 
Popular (popular pan), a big tent and a truck and microphones for assemblies were 
installed beside the river to provide food and information for everyone. The road 
became not only a battle field but also a scenario for decision-making and increasing 
solidarity: 
`Every house had a hosepipe ready (to catch the gas bombs into pails filled with 
water). At the beginning, they just shared out some lemons, but later the lemons 
were already cut and piles of stones were already prepared for the time the young 
came to pick them up... everything was organised' (demonstrator, unemployed). 
`For independence day [Sunday 25th of May] ... we had our own party on the 
road. There was a procession, a parade. More than 20,000 people were there 
eating locro, dancing to typical music, playing guitar... children wrote poems 
dedicated to Libertador's struggle. It was impressive! ' (Ibi). 
While the strength of the roadblock was growing, the government itself became the 
realm of confusion and disagreement regarding two main issues: i) political 
negotiation and ii) money resources. The roadblock disorganised the state and 
institutions. Local and national administrations were politically unable to deal with 
what they called the `social anarchy' unleashed at the roadblock as well as with the 
combative FGE, except with the help of the church: 
`The nature of these kind of problems is that they turn into anarchy' (civil 
servant, MISS). 
`Jujuy is the realm of political chaos... I mean a changing scenario' (civil 
servant, MTSS). 
`He [Minister of Labour] said to me: "let's bring an `expert in conflicts' to Jujuy. He could grasp who were the representative persons and then work it but"... The 
expert has been working there for two months.. the minister thought that he 
might find a solution' (civil servant, MTSS). 
one of the leaders within the Commission de Piqueteros Desocupados 22 de A Mayo de Libertador 
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The roadblock unfolded the struggle for obtaining, controlling and distributing the 
flows of money (credit) from the WB and the IMF borrowed by the central 
government to control social conflict, in a region where the lack of cash was striking. 
During negotiations, the central government held a tight position leading to terrible 
tension between it and the provincial government: 
`In the Pink House, the Vice Interior Minister said [Governor] Ferraro has 
promised 10,000 jobs. The national government promises 2,488. Where is 
Ferraro going to find the rest of the money? Jujuy has a month's fiscal deficit of 
10 million dollars. In order to refinance the public debt, the legislative power's 
consent is needed, but the government has got very few allies. It has to be done 
by issuing an emergency decree. The Minister of Economics rejected the 
provision of more financial help to Jujuy. He might only agree with a refinancing 
of public debt abroad through tokens, whose guarantee would be part of Jujuy's 
incomes from the Fiscal Pact. It is impossible to avoid the Fiscal Pact' (Clarin, 
3.6.97, Internet). 
Whilst the government was trying to find a `valid interlocutor' in Jujuy and get 
`money' from the central government, new leadership emerged at the roadblock. 
The Emergence of a New Organisation vis-ä-vis Institutional Recognition 
A new organisation called Coordinadora de Piqueteros de Ledesma (i. e. Libertador) 
was born in the light of discussions and disagreements around the proposal. The new 
Commission replaced the Commission for the Unemployed and organised the 
Coordinadora de Piqueteros of Jujuy. Both organisations were legitimised and 
recognised by the government to discuss and negotiate a new proposal. After long 
hours of hard negotiations with local church mediation a 19 point agreement was 
reached on the 31 S` of May. The Piqueteros had to suspend the roadblocks and give up 
their `weapons'. However, 11 out of the 19 roadblocks came back to the roads. The 
General San Martin. 
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reason being that by August the agreement had not been accomplished. Eventually, a 
final agreement was reached. It was accompanied by the organisation of two Round 
Tables convened by the church to discuss the main problems of Jujuy among the main 
social organisations of the province during August. 
As organisation and resistance increased, the government gave up repression and 
offered a new proposal. The roadblock discussed the government proposals under the 
rules of direct democracy: 
`The Commission for the Unemployed wanted the meeting to take place far away 
from the conflict point and tried to convince people of the benefits of the 
government proposal... people answered: "no way! " and we kept on blocking the 
road. The commission was thrown out. We were just a group of changos who had 
won people over. Subsequently, we replaced the old commission which had 
disobeyed the assembly's decision by going to Jujuy's capital to negotiate. I said: 
"we should put pressure on the government now... today is an opportunity for 
asking for more, not only money and you are wasting this opportunity"... more 
widespread roadblocks, we supported them and sent food, tyres and changos to 
the places... so not only the Piqueteros in Ledesma [Libertador] but also the 
Coordinadoru aa/ Piqueteros of Jujuy was born there' (Leader of Piqueteros, 
Roadblock Libertador). 
However, the members of 
the < ol)l/llOJi ii 
l 'lle'nl/)IH% &'cl experienced 
.-,... _. " T. " 
,-.,,, 
ý.. --- -I he organisation split. i ne 
Piqueteros gained in 
representation capacity. The 
whole province was blocked... the bishop invited them [one representative for 
each of the 19 roadblocks] to talk. But we, the members of the Commission for 
the Unemployed were not invited, I don't really understand why! ' (Leader of the 
Commission for the Unemployed). 
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On Tuesday 27th the Piqueleros were officially accepted by the Church and invited to 
join the negotiations with the government. The latter also officially recognised the 
Coordinadora de Piqueteros of Jujuy, that represented 19 roadblocks throughout the 
province. 
Agreement and Disagreement 
The new proposal offered 10,000 jobs (2,500 from the National Programme Trabajar, 
5,000 on provincial programmes; 3,000 created "indirectly"), that would be managed 
and distributed by the Piqueteros and the church. The government also met the FGE 
to talk about the provincial debt, the shift of the tax burden away from direct to 
indirect taxation, tax policies aimed at big enterprises, policy on unproductive lands, 
and the devolution of 15% of revenue sharing for Jujuy. Ferraro promised also the 
refinancing of the public provincial debt, which meant the end of the emission of 
tokens and a return to state workers' cash payment (Clarin, 31.5.97). Delegates 
assessed the proposal... eventually `an agreement was reached after several hours of 
exercising direct democracy. Men and women called into question and also booed 
politicians' (Eichelbaum, Clarin 31.5.97, Internet). Mr Corach thanked the church for 
it valuable mediation (Clarin 30.5.97 Internet). The 19-point Agreement of 31st May 
would oblige the suspension of roadblocks for 15 days. 203 
Yet, a new disagreement between the government and Piqueteros, without church and 
community support, arose when, two months later, on 4th August, 11 roads were 
blocked again by Coordinadora de Piqueteros. They demanded the implementation of 
the 19-point Act and a wage increase for unemployment programmes ($400 instead of 
203 See further points in Agreement 31.5.97 
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the $200 previously agreed), as well as genuine active participation in the 
management and distribution of employment programmes. Hence, roads were blocked 
again demanding the real implementation of government promises. They argued that 
`the government [was] lying: only 30% of the promises were fulfilled. Nothing has 
been said about industrialisation, or the end of the bloody tokens'. 
The Ministry of the Provincial Government said `their attitude had to be considered as 
irresponsible and out of context' (Pagina/12,5.8.97: 8). The return to the road 
provoked self-criticism within the Coordinadora de Piqueteros, since it lacked the 
full support of the community and the church: 
`We have to draw lessons from struggles, as everyone does... trial and error... the 
government wanted division, splits... The last roadblocks were a failure: they did 
not have social support' (FGE leader). 
Eventually, due to church mediation, on the 6th August, the Piqueteros suspended the 
roadblocks after reaching a truce. It added to the previous ones the provincial 
administration's commitment to fix those houses damaged by bullets and stones 
during the conflict as well as economic compensation to landlords; access to health 
care in Public Hospitals for those workers in employment Programmes; increase of 
wages within National Employment Programmes to $400 per month. The government 
recognition of the situation of the whole community and discussion of the main 
critical issues, as well as the discussion on the implementation of the 10,000 new 
places on employment programmes, were at the core of that meeting. The Piqueteros 
were also invited to the first of two Round Tables (Mesas de Concertaciön) convened 
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by the church under the slogan `Everyone wins'. 204 The Mesa de Concertaciön clearly 
aimed to depoliticise and minimise the problem as well as to create a fiction wherein 
peaceful agreement was a real possibility. The Mesa was devised by experts in 
conflicts hired by the Minister of Labour but presented as a Church proposal. 
Concertaciön 
What to do tomorrow? 
On the 22nd August, the day before the Mesa was going to take place, the Piqueteros 
of the roadblock in Libertador discussed the strategy for the meeting. The discussion 
concentrated on what to do tomorrow, or better, what Juan had to do tomorrow for he 
had been elected as the representative of Ledesma within the Coordinadora de 
Piqueteros of Jujuy for the Mesa de Concertaciön, that would gather all social, 
economic and political sectors planned by the Church. 
In general, they thought the Mesa was a trick but also an opportunity, for the 
government and the Church had recognised them as genuine participants and potential 
managers of employment programmes. During the meeting, the Piqueteros discussed 
politics. Some of the Piqueteros had joined left wing-political parties. Others don't 
have any political affiliation at all. So they discussed the convenience of having a 
party to support the struggle of the unemployed. The agreement was that the aim of 
the organisation of the Piqueteros was to gather people regardless of political 
differences. The most important thing was not to ease off and resist. They also 
204 See title of a book Todos Ganan. Claties para la negociaciön estrategica en los ämbitos personal), 
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assessed their power situation within the Coordinadora de Piqueteros of Jujuy. They 
argued that the Coordinadora was reaching a definite agreement with the government. 
Piqueteros from Libertador had initiated the struggle so they needed to remain quite 
independent from the rest of the commission yet without isolating themselves. The 
need to have political cadres was also put forward when a participant argued that 
`there are so many people who still do not understand the meaning of this struggle 
even when they are supporting it'. With regard to the Mesa de Concertaciön there was 
consensus around the idea of attending and giving Juan the support to participate. 
They agreed with the fact that some Piqueteros were clearly identified with the 
political parties that they belonged to by the government and the police, so it was 
better that Juan, who had no political affiliation, represent them tomorrow. Leo 
collected some money for Juan's coach ticket to the capital city 
The Secret Meeting: `Everyone Wins' 
The first Round Table convened by the local priests took place on the 23`' August in 
Alto Vina Hotel, outside Jujuy's capital city. The aim was `to share a common 
diagnostic towards finding mutual necessities rather than the differences to establish 
priorities for the social emergency in Jujuy; to achieve concrete commitments for 
common welfare with everyone's contribution' (Church document, 11`h June 1997). 
The 60 participants invited were the Provincial Government, provincial MPs, Mayors, 
Central Government, businessmen, Trade Unions, the Coordinadora de Piqueteros. 205 
laboral, Paidos, Buenos Aires by C Altschul and E Fernandez Longo, 1992. The latter was hired by the 
1overnment as a consultant to solve the conflict in Jujuy os According to El Tribuno de Jujuy, it was a top secret (closed) meeting. The press hardly got into the 
place, with the exception of official journalists who spent the whole day inside the hotel. A security 
operation, including door men who used to work at the government house and policemen inside the hotel, was carefully organised (El Tribuno, 23.8.97: 21). The FGE and Ledesma did not attend the Mesa de Concertaciön. Within the FGE some considered it important to participate (i. e. CTA). Others believed that the Mesa was a trick for it helped the government to show its capacity to gather different 
social organisations whereas it does not provide information as to where the money is going to conic 
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Members of the Church (Equipo Pastoral) explained the rules of the game to the six 
working groups which consisted of businessmen, trade unionists, national and 
provincial executives, national and provincial legislature, counties and unemployed: 
they had to listen sincerely to the others, reconcile disagreement and help the one who 
cannot understand other standpoints, to help to clarify their aims within every group. 
Every member has to understand them; to give up at least for today any kind of 
political or other differences in order to put forward, in the first place, what are the 
needs which are able to unite us; henceforth, to draw proposals for Jujuy's sake from 
any word or contribution; to avoid political speeches, and leading attitudes as well as 
reproaches for past actions; to control the impulse of judging others; to focus on 
essential needs and issues, avoiding debate around temporary subjects; to use a simple 
language; to respect the others; not to go out or use mobile phones, just concentrate on 
what we are doing here; to promote a model of co-operation, for to speak is not 
enough. 
I 
Before working on fears and expectations, and determining the Provincial priorities 
beyond particular interests, the participants attempted some definitions of the state, 
the government, civil society and private companies. The state was defined as `the 
community of all persons and institutions which live in the same territory, share a 
common historical background, who have organised their government on behalf of all 
of them with everyone's contribution and participation'. The government was seen as 
from the CCC. Whilst the local CGT did attend the meeting, the FGE did not take part in it. Some Unions that belong to the FGE were on strike during the meeting. After a 48-hour strike during Thursday and Friday of 80% of lecturers belonging to the CEDEMS, lecturers and high school 
teachers would keep on striking progressively until the next 24-hour strike on Wednesday 27th August. Also ATSA was on strike the last two days (Thursday and Friday) The motives were overdue wages for July, which would be paid on the Ist September (El Tribuno, Jujuy, 23.8.97: 20). The refusal of the 
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`that social actor in which all members of the state have delegated their power to be 
used in their names and on behalf of them... it is a public institution whose end is 
common welfare... It has the responsibility of the administration of wealth in order to 
achieved social welfare' As far as civil society was concerned `it is composed of all 
those people and institutions which do not take part in the government. A first 
important division is between private companies and the third sector'. `Private 
companies are civil society institutions aiming at profit with private ends. Their social 
responsibility is to create wealth, good and services without damaging the rest of the 
population'. The third sector was defined as `those institutions in civil society which 
do not aim profit. They are lead by private initiatives but for public ends. It social 
responsibility is to allow the organised participation of all citizens who are not part of 
the government on behalf of everyone's welfare' (Document given to the participants 
of the meeting, 23.8.97). 
As a result of the 6 different workshops, an 8-point document established the 
following 10 priorities for Jujuy: The development of small and medium-sized 
business as a source of job-creation and the protection of production; 2. Education, 
health and child care; 3. Social security for the unemployed working in employment 
programmes and Community Services; 4. Labour training for workers as well as the 
unemployed in specific areas; 5. The development of tourism and the mining industry; 
6. Duty free areas; 7. The strengthening of democratic institutions; 8. The end of 
tokens and their convertibility into cash. Regarding the round table, the FGE split into 
two opinions: some stressed the importance of having genuine representatives at the 
table, for anarchy could have ended up in chaos (ATE, CTA and CEDEMS, CEOM, 
governor to receive the FGE leasers made them decide not to attend the Mesa de Concertacidn. The 
345 
CCC). To others the meeting convened by the church was like `sitting the hangman 
and the victim at the same table' for `money has to be squeezed out of those who have 
got it, namely, companies which have enriched themselves with people's money' 
(CEOM, CCC). 
Assessment 
The next day, the Piqueteros assessed the results of the Round Table, at night, at 
Nelly's house, eating empanadas prepared by the women. The representative for 
Ledesma to the meeting reported the event. He explained that the Piqueteros were 
`already an institution'. Juan demanded the collection of some money to pay his aunt 
back for the loss of the tent at the hands of the police. They spoke about delegates' 
elections to the Coordinadora of the Piqueteros of Ledesma. They were really 
concerned about how to go on, what was going to happen next. On 29th August, a 
second Mesa de Concertaciön would take place in order to reach consensus and 
obtain formal commitments from all social sectors. On the same day, the CTA called 
for the First National Meeting for the Unemployed at its headquarters in Buenos 
Aires. The meeting revealed that the problems of Libertador were shared in many 
localities and regions of the country. 
CTA branch Jujuy attended the meeting as a representative of his union, ATE. 
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IV 
M- Roadblock-M' 
A Determinate Abstraction 
The theoretical Challenge 
The analysis of this new form of resistance in Argentina posed theoretical challenges. 
Struggles like the roadblocks have been labelled `IMF or food riots' (Walton and 
Shefner, 1994). As mentioned, in Argentina they were regarded in two ways forms: 
the first being a demand for `getting into the system' (Favaro et al 1997), and this 
includes the roadblock as an effect of institutional and political weakness (Gauchet in 
Tenti Fanfani, 1996: 266) and as the post-industrial form of conflict where `the 
capital and labour relation is not any longer central to the development of capitalism' 
(Garcia Delgado quoted by Favaro et al 1997: 22). The second being `popular 
rebellions' (Ifligo Carreras and Cotarelo in Klachko 2000, see chapter seven), the 
resurgence of the left (Petras, 1997) with a revolutionary potential to break down the 
system in the future (Lizaguirre et al 1997). Whilst in the former case the 
demonstrators are seen as the victims of an unfair situation, fighting social exclusion, 
struggling to be `included' and the roadblock as a residual form of resistance, a 
desperate attempt to be heard and seen against social, economic and political 
exclusion, the latter present the participants of the roadblock as a new identity-subject 
of social change. 
In this chapter, I did not aim to classify the roadblock but, rather, to allow it to speak 
by itself, by reconsidering the ways and categories through which we aim to grasp it. 
My initial question was how to understand the 'interest' of the roadblock when it 
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became a point of encounter of many interests and reasons, meanings and feelings. 
The striking feature of the roadblock was the richness and heterogeneity of the 
participants and still their capacity to organise and put demands forwards. The notion 
of `class interest' or simply `interest' were inappropriate for my understanding of the 
roadblock. Resistance, organisation and solidarity were driven by anger, fury, 
sadness, frustration and also an empowering feeling of participating, defending 
themselves, articulating action, discussing ideas, organising, defending a meaning for 
their lives. So the challenge was to understand the meaning of the roadblock by 
rejecting the notion of class interest. I realised that the roadblock did not unify class 
interests but rather dissolved them. 
Secondly, the roadblock allowed an alternative understanding between passion and 
action. The fact that demonstrators themselves expressed their anger and fury, their 
frustration and desperation as the reasons for collective action did not mean that their 
action was `irrational'. In fact, any struggle is incomprehensible without those 
elements for, far from being metaphysical, the constitution of labour capacity as 
abstract labour entails the struggle for the harnessing of passion and needs to the 
commodity form (Dinerstein 1997). But these elements are usually neglected by the 
sociological theory of action. 
Thirdly, the case study highlighted the significance of the experience of the struggle 
rather than its `outcomes'. The theoretical discussion developed in previous chapters 
emerged out of my field work and the analysis of the ways in which, by blocking the 
roads, the demonstrators not only counter posed a physical barrier to the `escape' of 
capital, but most importantly, how this action became revealing, empowerful and 
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transgressive in the here and now for those considered `excluded'. As a form of 
labour unemployment fosters its own form of subjectivity. The roadblock meant a 
moment of personal and collective realisation. 
Fourthly, the roadblock made distinction between social political and labour conflicts 
superfluous. The roadblock does not implies the `politicisation' of the labour conflict 
or a social conflict of those who cannot be included in the category of `labour. As a 
determinate abstraction, the roadblock represents an explosion of energy (politics) 
which resists encapsulations into the category of `labour', or `social' of political' 
Finally, the roadblock questioned the sociological distinction between global and 
local struggles. I aimed to show that this `local' struggle is not just and example of a 
global or national trend but rather, as the particular expression of the global 
recomposition of capitalist social relations, it encapsulates the global and local. 
The Political Challenge 
The empowering feature of the roadblock lay in that it allowed the so-called `surplus 
labour capacity' to express itself as surplus (unsustainable) life produced by capital. 
The decision to block the road puts in motion existing contradictions within the 
national and provincial administrations and capitalist financial institutions, allowing 
the roadblock to evolve into a more sophisticated form of resistance and to constitute 
people's identity as demonstrators. The first form in which the roadblock becomes 
powerfully material was by means of the resistance against repression. Pushed by the 
young unemployed, the roadblock rejected subordination and set a physical barrier to 
the uncertainty imposed by the scarcity of money underpinning unemployment which 
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turned the M34 into a battlefield. Rather than intimidating the demonstrators, police 
repression led to anger and fury, and fostered a great sense of solidarity. So the road 
became also the place for expressions of solidarity, connections, decision making, 
communication, negotiation and recomposition of identities. The roadblock 
articulated frustration, suffering, isolation and misery into a movement of enthusiastic 
resistance. State repression was a catalyst for the building up of resistance and 
solidarity simply because it made capital's struggle for real subsumption visible, 
liberal institutions hollow, employment policies hopeless and corruption clear. 
The second form in which the roadblock contested invisibility was the development of 
their own organisation beyond resistance to repression. Whilst resistance developed 
into a higher level of co-ordination and organisation of diverse participants of the 
struggle, different institutional layers struggled to find resources to meet the 
demonstrators' demands. New organisations emerged out of the old and were 
institutionally recognised by political power. During the struggle, the old 
commissions for the unemployed were transformed into the Con ision de Piqueteros 
and after that into the Coordinadora de Piqueteros of the province, where young 
unemployed had a leading role. The third form in which the roadblock achieved 
strength was through the capacity to achieve political recognition without losing their 
initial organisations. They also influenced local and national union strategies with 
regards to unemployment in general and the roadblock in particular. 
The roadblock posed political challenges to the organisations of the unemployed 
themselves, democratic institutions and trade unions. The first political challenge 
posed by the roadblocks was the degree of organisation, consolidation and networking 
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capacity of those civil society organisations and new identity movements, such as the 
Piqueteros and the Coordinadora de Piqueteros, the Movimiento de los Trabajadores 
Desocupados (Francisco Solano, Buenos Aires) and other organisations such as 
Grupo de Apoyo al Pueblo Mapuche (Neuquen), Archipielagos, Cätedra Libre 
Guevara (La Pampa) (see Archipielagos 2000) which emerged out of the economic 
crisis, disenchantment and protests of the 1990s. 
Secondly, the roadblock revealed 
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institutional arrangements which 
regulated both labour and socio- 
political relations, as well as the 
unsustainable tension between 
local and central administrations, and the central administration and the IMF. Under 
Menem, two major debates within the cabinet developed between those who were 
determined to defend the country's financial performance and those whose goal was 
to reduce social tension through social reform. As this tension continued into 2001 the 
struggle to maintain stability provoked the deepest political crisis of the last decade 
(see conclusion). 
Thirdly, the roadblock illustrated the effort and difficulties of the existing labour 
organisation in incorporating the problem of unemployment and social exclusion in 
their agendas. In August 1997 the executive committee of the CTA organised the 
First National Meeting for the Unemployed with local and provincial representatives 
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of the unemployed and other social groups taking part (see previous measures against 
unemployment in CTA 1996). The aim of the meeting was to discuss the functioning 
and achievements of existing local commissions for the unemployed, as well as the 
perspectives for further developing the organisation of the unemployed in 
Argentina. 206 
Most of the issues arising in the workshops during the meeting constituted a common 
pattern that was present in the Jujuy case. The partial achievements of the different 
social organisations and the organisations of the unemployed throughout the country 
have been: special treatment for the unemployed with regard to the payment for 
public services, tax exemption and suspension of mortgages with no interest with the 
`House Provision Institute', FONAVI (Resistencia, Chaco; Viedma, Rio Negro). In 
some localities, organisätions achieved a moratorium for taxes, free public transport, 
training courses for the unemployed in telecommunications (Rosario) or in the 
management of the employment programmes (San Miguel, Buenos Aires). In other 
cases they achieved temporary jobs by agreements with small companies to do jobs 
like rubbish collection (Pergamino, Buenos Aires) and small business (Santa Rosa, La 
Pampa). In Bahia Blanca the unemployed went from protest to proposal ('de la 
protesta a la propuesta) and achieved 500 TRABAJAR employment programmes 
after a 79 day strike under a tent installed at the front door of the county hall. They 
also created a co-operative for job creation. This is also the case of Capitän 
Bermudez, Santa Fe where the unemployed had an office where they devised a project 
to create kindergartens to help single mothers. In La Plata, the unemployed 
organisations deliver courses to allow the unemployed to finish primary and 
206 The strategy of the CTA was to increase pressure on the unions to which the unemployed belonged before, to let them enjoy benefits as workers: `The unemployed are not unemployed from nowhere! ' 
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secondary schools, since this is an exigency to find a job. A programme of market 
gardens in the neighbourhoods (huertas en los barrios) has also been created through 
the National Institute of Agro Technology (INTA). They also organise professionals 
to provide counselling, particularly to the male unemployed. As the delegate put it, 
`the culture of the breadwinner is very deep in our society and this is nowadays 
broken 
... we talk with psychologists to have counselling to make the companero 
understand that he/she has to struggle against this plan of death'. Puerto Madryn, 
Chubut presented an interesting case for the unemployed to achieve institutional 
status. Namely, they undertook a serious statistical study of unemployment and 
determined the main necessities of each family group. The results highlighted that 
among a population of 50,000 there were 800 families, i. e. 3,500 people, in a very 
vulnerable situation. Divorce spread. Men left home trying to find a job somewhere 
else. Most of the unemployed were single mothers, old people and children. 
Yet, for the CTA organising the unemployed was not and is not easy. Organisational, 
geographical and financial problems also arose. First, whilst the leadership of the 
roadblocks, i. e. the leaders of the unemployed and of other social organisations, were 
reluctant to join a trade union confederation, trade union activists suspected the 
unemployed of being unable to join the union in a organisational form. Whilst the 
former feared being co-opted by the confederation, the latter feared being disrupted 
by the unemployed. Some of the unemployed pointed at a contradiction within the 
CTA, i. e. whereas the unemployed were encouraged to affiliate to the CTA and 
participate, they were not included in the executive committee. Secondly, the 
roadblocks take place in isolated areas of the country and have been patchy. Thirdly, 
(see welcome speech and press release). 
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the unemployed can provide very little financial contribution to the trade union. This 
can increase the competition between workers and the unemployed. As a result, rather 
than promoting a centralisation of the organisation of the unemployed, the 
subordination of the unemployed to the executive committee of CTA and giving 
financial support to the unemployed organisations, the CTA decided that the Central 
should act as a network. The challenge was, then, to articulate and to connect different 
social struggles and organisations that genuinely emerge in different parts of the 
country. Not only workers and the unemployed but also prostitutes, children in the 
streets, pensioners, the sin tierra (landless) would join the CTA (interviews with the 
CTA leaders 1999; see further action against unemployment in CTA 1999, La Naciön 
on line 8.6.00; Pdgina/12,6.8.00, internet). 
Ya Basta!? 
By blocking the roads, workers, the unemployed and entire community of Libertador 
made themselves visible against the violence of stability entailed in the current forms 
of capitalist work. The roadblock set a physical barrier to the flight of capital and the 
uncertainty imposed by the scarcity of money underpinning stabilisation and 
flexibilisation policies. It called into question the rationality of the end of politics and 
offered an alternative to it. Necessity became politics (see Kennedy 1996; Mellucci 
1989). Political action became a form of survival. I did not claim for the unemployed, 
instead of the working class, to become the historical subject for revolutionary social 
change; rather, I argued that the process of valorisation of capital creates critical 
forms of existence. The unemployed are not just `externally' forced to exist in a 
unsustainable form, but rather produced as an unsustainable human form of existence. 
» It 
Unsustainability refers no only to the simple fact that, under the real subsumption of 
society in capital (Negri 1992) neither autonomisation nor reproduction of labour are 
possible. Most importantly, unsustainability highlights the hidden unhappiness 
produced not by the lack by the intensification of capitalist work, intensified in the 
case of massive unemployment and poverty. This significant element is usually 
neglected in favour of more abstract (politicist, economistic and sociological) analysis 
of unemployment. I argued that it is this unhappiness what makes the subjectivity of 
unemployment political. The struggle made apparent how the more `abstract' capital 
becomes, the more invisible labour becomes. The political power of the roadblock 
does not just lie 
obtain more 
programmes or 
capital 
impoverished 
Its political power 
materiality to the 
in the ability to 
employment 
even more jobs and 
investments for the 
areas of the country. 
lies in that it provides 
abstraction of M-M', 
by making the avoidance of labour impossible. It was shown how the contradictions 
underpinning the production and reproduction of capitalist society as a totality, and 
within which dynamic we usually lose ourselves, can articulate in a dramatic form 
within us. Following this, the roadblock is an attempt to contest the hidden 
unhappiness entailed in the virtual disappearance of labour. Enough! 
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Resources for the Case Study 
Press Material: Clarin/ Pc gina/12; La Naciön; The Economist; El Tribuno de Jujuy; 
El Pregön de Jujuy, El Tribuno de Salta, Animadores Journal of the Prelatura de 
Humahuaca Ano XVIII Junio 1997 n° 198); Journal Conectandonos (CTA). 
Official documents and Legislation: Agreement Act 6.6.97; Decree 3065, Jujuy, 
6.6.97; Decree 3,115 Jujuy 12.6.97; Agreement 26.6.96, Provincial Government, 
Jujuy; Multisectorial of Puna and Quebrada, Letter to the Minister of the Interior, 
11.7.96; Working paper of the Meeting 9.8.96; Agreement 31.5.97; Agreement 
between the provincial government and the Commission for the Unemployed, 6.8.97; 
Provincial Legislature of Jujuy, Resolution no 19,27.6.97; Invitation by the Prelatura 
de Humahuaca to the Mesa de Concertaciön; Aproved Projects (Servicios 
Comunitarios (Ledesma); Ficha Procesamiento de Desempleo (Ledesma). 
Interviews: CTA National level: Egardo Depetris, Secretario de Organizaciön - CTA 
Nacional, 26.8.97 Buenos Aires; Victor De Genaro, Secretary General CTA, 4.8.97 
Buenos Aires; Claudio Lozano, Director IDEP - ATE, 4.9.97 Buenos Aires; FGE San 
Salvador de Jujuy: Carlos Perro Santillän, Secretary General CEOM, Leader 
Corriente Combativa Clasista, 20.8.97, Federico Medrano, Secretary General 
CEDEMS (Centro de Docentes de Ensenanza Media y Superior de Jujuy) 19.8.97; 
Juana Sosa. CEOM (Sindicato de Municipales de Jujuy), 20.8.97; Fernando Acosta, 
Secretary General ATE and CTA Jujuy 19.8.97; MTSS civil servant high level related 
to Jujuy case: Enrique Deibe, Director Regional Buenos Aires, MTSS, 15.8.97, 
Buenos Aires; Jose Hugo Ceriani, Director Regional NOA MTSS, 26.8.97 Buenos 
Aires; Members of the Commission for the Unemployed (5); Leaders Coordinadora 
de Piqueteros (5); Other key informants from Human Rights Organisations (Olga 
Aredes, Madres de Plaza de Mayo) and social organisations (Hilda Figueroa); 
Participants in the roadblocks (20). 
Participant Observation: March, Thursday 22.8.97, Libertador General San Martin, 
Jujuy; Meeting Piqueteros before the Mesa de Concertaciön, Libertador General San 
Martin, 22.8.97; Meeting FGE 22.8.97, Libertador general San Martin; Mesa de 
Concertaciön 23.8.97, Jujuy capital city; Meeting to assess the developments within 
the Mesa de Concertaciön 24.8.97 Libertador General San Martin; Activity of the 
Piqueteros after the agreement Libertador General San Martin, First National Meeting 
for the Unemployed 29.8.97, Buenos Aires. 
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Conclusion 
2000: Fighting `Virtual' Disappearance 
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This thesis comprised a theoretical and empirical investigation of the subjectivity of 
labour in Argentina, with particular emphasis on the 1990s. The global capitalist crisis 
of the I 970s produced a unique recomposition of capitalist social relations worldwide. 
Although capital has been always global, `globalisation' seems to be new in that for 
the first time capital asserted itself as a global social imagery where it is seen as free 
and detached from labour. 207 This `disconnection' between capital and labour is 
deeply disempowering for it denies the source of social transformation (labour) in 
favour of the reification of an abstraction (capital). 
A social imagery is not a myth, an illusion, or an ideology but a material dimension of 
social practices. The adequate ideas about ourselves, the others and society are 
constitutive of social practices and not just `external' notions to be `internalised' by 
the subjects involved but constitutive of our subjectivity. The social imagery of 
globalisation, and within it, the need for stability, has been validated, since the 1970s, 
by the real predominance of the abstract over the concrete aspects of the capitalist 
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relation produced by the volatilisation, liquidification, liberation, deregulation and 
transnationalisation of global capital which followed the capitalist crisis of 
overaccumulation. This dominant imagery of a dynamic and positive `melting' of the 
barriers to capital's circulation (Bauman 2000) and its expansion coexists with the 
fragmented reality of violence underpinned by the intensification of exploitation, the 
destruction of the productive capacity of capital, the reorganisation of production, 
consumption and of technological arrangements, unemployment, poverty, 
environmental destruction, etc. 
Insofar as local, national and global struggles have endlessly emerged against this 
new form of planetarian global capital, many have attempted to elaborate a critical 
account of the new situation as a means of contesting the material and spiritual 
hopelessness and frustration that globalisation brought about. It is clear that 
traditional categories and methods of analysis to understand the subjectivity of labour 
in 2000 are becoming increasingly meaningless or, even worse, a barrier to assess the 
new forms of the power of labour. 
In Argentina, the reification of `global capital' led to a social obsession with 
economic stabilisation. This obsession is not new. As shown in this thesis, political 
and economic instability have been the historical features of Argentina since the 
constitution of the national state in 1880 onwards, thus seeking economic stability 
was also a historical goal of successive governments. Yet, the obsession with stability 
intensified in the 1990s when the halt of hyperinflation legitimated a deep 
recomposition of social relations. The 1990s marked the emergence of a new social 
207 See Clarke 2001, Harvey 1999; Negri 1992. 
360 
arrangement based on both the idea that labour (i. e. Peronism) was defeated and that 
stability, which accomplished the much needed control of the uncontrollable, i. e. 
hyperinflation, was supposed to benefit everyone, particularly workers. As an 
untouchable achievement stability located popular demands as destabilising stability, 
since they make governability and the accomplishment of international financial 
compromises difficult. The repression of labour in favour of the reification of an 
abstraction created a vicious circle which led to a general `bad social mood', 
frustration and anger, which outlived the Menem's administration period in office. 
This problem evoked a re-examination of widely shared assumptions regarding both 
the crisis of labour and the triumph of neo-liberalism, which were of major concern of 
this work. Multidisciplinary studies of the period 1989-1999, although abundant and 
interesting, lack an adequate interrogation and questioning of the categories and 
methods used to grasp Menem(ism) insofar as it transformed the subjectivity (power) 
of labour in Argentina. This is why my focus was not Menemism but subjectivity. 
Going beyond the formulation that the state, money and the law are the political 
economic forms of the social relation of capital (Holloway and Picciotto 1977; Clarke 
1991; 1988), 1 suggested that the subjectivity of labour is itself a determinate 
abstraction. The notion and method of subjectivity as a determinate abstraction aimed 
to relocate human subjectivity at the focal point of the process of valorisation of 
capital. As mentioned this was politically relevant in a moment in which the current 
forms of existence of labour appear to be excluded form the process of valorisation of 
capital itself, e. g. unemployment in the Argentine case. Once subjectivity is 
recognised as being produced by capital from within, the critique of capital can only 
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be located from within capital itself, even when it appears, like in the present time, 
that subjectivity is no longer determined or produced by labour (see Gorz 1999). 
What is subjectivity as a determinate abstraction? First I work on the idea that there 
was an inner connection between the process of valorisation of capital and 
subjectivity. The connection being that valorisation is a political process (Cleaver 
1979) which not only subordinates (Cleaver 1992;. 1993) but produces forms of 
human existence that allow capital to reproduce and expand, as well as to enter into 
crisis. As argued in chapter one, real subsumption implies not only that workers have 
become part of the machine, and that the generalisation of commodity production 
makes capital to appear as the subject, by the complete subordination of workers to 
capital. Most importantly, real subsumption indicates that since capital has become 
the form of society (Postone 1996) subjectivity is now produced as an intrinsic and 
inner aspect of capital. Human existence and action is produced by capital and creates 
the barrier to the valorisation of capital from within it. However, since value is not an 
established fact but a social relation (Bonefeld 1996; Neary 2000), the forms of 
subjectivity are permanently recreated as capital expands itself as a form of society 
through class struggle. 
I call subjectivity of labour a dramatic form of existence which emerges as the 
articulation of the subjective and objective aspects and social forms that mediate 
labour as a social activity within the subject. Postone (1996) has suggested that the 
problem between the social constitution of capital as the subject and the possibility of 
the emergence of oppositional subjectivity can be overcome by studying the 
dialectical mutual constitution of social structures and everyday forms of social 
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practice. According to him, Marx `analyses social objectivity and subjectivity not as 
two ontologically different spheres that must be related but as intrinsically related 
dimensions of the form of social life that are grasped by his categories' (Postone, 
1993: 224). The implications of this proposal for the development of a theory of 
subjectivity are significant: it is `a non functionalist theory of subjectivity ... 
based on 
an analysis of the forms of social relations' (1996: 218). 
However, the contradictory process of production of subjectivity in a world produced 
by labour, but where capital has become the subject is still mysterious. 208 I suggested 
that Marx's critique of political economy and his method of determinate abstraction 
allow an understanding of subjectivity as a determinate abstraction. Subjectivity as a 
determinate abstraction offers the possibility to relocate human action at the core of 
capital, and therefore contributes to an empowering (non)theory of subjectivity 
(praxis). 
As argued real subsumption indicates that, since capital has become the form of 
society (Postone 1996), labour as value-creating social activity materialises in two 
forms: as `labour' and as `social forms' both historically produced by class struggle 
(Postone 1996; Neary 2000) Whilst the former refers to the human form of existence 
of capitalist social relations, i. e. what we usually call `labour', the later refers to the 
social forms which mediate the impersonal domination of labour by capital (Postone 
1996: 59), i. e. what we usually call `capital': the state, money and the law. In order to 
understand a form of subjectivity, it is important to look at the interaction between the 
209 On this see the exciting work of Neary and Taylor, 1999; Neary, 1999,2000; De Angelis 1995; Cleaver 1993; 1996; Neary Michael and Rikowski Glenn 2000; Rikowski, 2001; MacLaren, 1999. 
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aspects which constitutes `labour' and the social forms which constitute the capitalist 
powers for both mediate labour as a social activity. 
On the one had, `labour' exists through at least three aspects: identities, organisation 
and strategies of resistance. These aspects mediate and shape labour as a social 
activity. For example, the labour movement facilitates both the organisation of the 
working class' resistance and the institutionalisation of it. But although these aspects 
can be approached separately, e. g. in order to understand a form of `labour' we can 
look at the significance of the national identity of the working class, or the power of 
trade unions, none of them alone can explain a form of `labour' for each constitutes a 
partial expression of a totality. On the other hand, labour as social activity is mediated 
by social forms which, represent the capitalist powers. Capital materialises through 
this forms. The state, money and the law allow capital to exercise it command over 
labour. As an example, the state and the law are decisive in shaping the identity of the 
working class. However, each of these social `objectified' forms represent a partial 
aspect of a totality. The study of the relationship between `labour' and, for instance, 
the state, although decisive, is insufficient to grasp the constitution of the subjectivity 
of labour. 
Following this, subjectivity of labour is the site of conjunction of the aspects which 
characterise `labour' in and against the capitalist powers. As a determinate abstraction 
(historical, transient, concrete and abstract) subjectivity can be seen as a hieroglyphic 
in motion of the multiple forms, struggles and contradictions which constituted as 
such in a determinate historical moment of struggle. Class struggle is ultimately a 
struggle over the form of subjectivity. Since labour is a mediated activity, the struggle 
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over the form of subjectivity does not take place directly, but is transferred on to (or 
asserts itself as a struggle over) the subjective, political, economic and legal forms 
which mediate labour, namely it expresses as a struggle over workers' identity, 
ideology, imageries, the forms of the institutionalisation and regulation of class 
conflict, the forms of control of the power of trade unions, the welfare state, the 
labour code, workers' or human rights, wages and so on. This understanding of class 
struggle as a struggle over the form of subjectivity is not only relevant to 
understanding the main changes in workers and social identity, labour and social 
organisations and the forms of resistance, but most importantly it allows first a better 
understanding of the recomposition of the state, money and the changes in the law 
insofar as the production of adequate subjectivity is their raison d'etre, and secondly, 
of the of dynamic interaction between the concrete and abstract aspects of capital as a 
social relation, which are embodied in a particular form of subjectivity. 
But if these forms of being were created within the process of valorisation of capital it 
was necessary to grasp them in the historical moment of their production, within a 
non-teleological continuum of class antagonism. I suggested that, in order to be 
consistent with my theoretical framework, the analysis of labour and social conflicts 
were fruitful since they assert themselves dramatically as critical moments whereby 
the aspects and forms which constitute subjectivity are, like in drama, put in motion 
with unexpected results. 
I explored five historical forms of subjectivity which emerged as the dramatic 
expression of the social relation of capital: the Anarchist (1920s), the Peronist 
(1940s), the Anti- imperialist (1960s), the Revolutionary (1970s) and the Democratic 
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(1980s). My intention was not to present the most significant moments in the history 
of struggles but, rather, to show how labour mad history by taking dramatic forms 
which encapsulated crisis, deconstruction and new integration into another one, i. e. 
how labour moves (Neary 2001; Dinerstein and Neary 1998). The analysis of each 
from was then located in a continuum of resistance vis-a-vis the different forms 
achieved by capital, the state and the law. These dramatic moments of subjectivity 
reconstructed the dynamic principle, the multiple contradictions and subjective and 
objective forms which underpin the production and transformation of subjectivity in 
each historical period and allowed me to establish the inner connections between 
forms of valorisation of capital and the production of determinate forms of existence 
of labour. Each chapter contributed to my argument that subjectivity of labour was a 
transient conjunction of multiple aspects, the producer and the product of historical 
capitalist social relations, a form of being which bears the past yet puts it in motion 
into the future. 
Labour Moves 
Chapter two presented the Anarchist forni of labour through an analysis in motion of 
the rural workers' strikes in Patagonia in 1921. I did so with the help of a film. The 
use of a film provided me with an excellent tool which matched my methodological 
and theoretical proposal. Whilst historical documents can uncover the identity, 
organisation and forms of struggles of Patagonia Rebelde, subjectivity exists in the 
form of a mythical representation of the event. The film is an expression of that 
mythical representation. The dramatic nature of the plot allows one to capture the 
movement of production of subjectivity, by recreating the imperceptible dynamic 
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which is detectable only in action. Each scene asserted a synthesis of a multiplicity of 
conflicts, meanings, reasons, feelings and contradictions which develop through 
action. 
The conflict in Patagonia in 1921 signalled an apex in the struggle for and against the 
real subsumption of labour by capital. The Anarchist rural labour force was produced 
within extensive accumulation of capital in light of the expansion of the agro-export 
economy led by landed classes and foreign capital. It was composed by immigrant 
labour force which rejected integration into the state. The Patagonia Rebelde put in 
motion the struggle for and against the real subsumption of labour by capital which 
took the form of a centripetal antagonism between workers' tactics of direct action 
and capitalists' and conservative politicians' unlawful repression of workers by means 
of military operations or starvation wages. The limits of this form of labour and of 
class antagonism was that the crisis of extensive accumulation of capital and the shift 
towards intensive accumulation required the progressive institutionalisation of class 
conflict by the state. When the strikes in Patagonia took place, a more complex form 
of labour and class antagonism had already emerged. 
Chapter three (1945-55) illustrated the movement of labour into a constitutive 
moment of appropriation, recognition and integration of labour into the state under a 
new form: the national (Peronist) working class. It was shown that the 17th October 
marked a turning point insofar as the power of labour became apparent, corporeal and 
visible. Peronism meant the social construction of the imagery integration of the 
working class under a self-contained identity, ideology and doctrine, as well as a 
powerful state-sponsored trade union movement (politically active and strongly 
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developed at the workplace). The peculiarity of Peronism lay in that workers 
invented it (James 1988), as well as that it produced a peculiar form of subjectivity 
where the political became emotional, i. e. a sentimiento (a feeling). The constitutive 
emotional characteristic of Peronism was rooted in the political recognition of labour 
as the driving force of society by the state. The strength of the populist state was 
rooted in the power of the working class. But, as shown, this peculiar arrangement of 
the post-WWII period did not mean the end of class antagonism but a centrifugal form 
of it. The main contradiction of this form lay in that whilst the recognition of the 
centrality of the power of labour was achieved by means of the recomposition of the 
state in a way which it allowed its institutionalisation, the power of labour and 
resistance was posited at the heart of the state. This made class struggle `political'. 
Economic crisis and political instability will be, from now onwards, associated with 
Peronism and the power of the working class. 
The struggle for the deconstruction of the Peronist form which marked the following 
45 years of struggle in Argentina, and which asserted itself as anti-Peronism, military 
corporatism, democratic struggles, labour reforms and economic crisis, was ultimately 
a struggle for and against the deconstruction of the centrality of labour within the 
state, in light of the transformation of capital after 1955. Whilst capital aimed at the 
deconstruction of the recognition and integration of labour into the state 
(deperonisation) (Tedesco 1999), the power of labour took even more radical forms 
Chapter four addressed the first of these radical forms: anti-imperialist resistance 
embodied in the Cordobazo in 1969. The anti-institutional and anti-capitalist spirit of 
Anarchist labour and the strength of the working class was put in motion by a new 
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non-bureaucratic and anti-imperialist political movement with a nationalistic class- 
oriented ideology which was to become central to Argentine politics during the 1970s. 
The Cordobazo produced a real change in the forms of resistance in Argentina vis-ä- 
vis the also new forms of repression embodied in the first bureaucratic state 
(O'Donnell 1988) which blatantly subsumed the whole society under state control 
and repression. The period 1955-69 was marked by the increasing penetration and 
expansion of transnational capital into the country's economy as well as an increasing 
imposition of the US in politics. During this period, and although Peron was in exile, 
the state achieved democratic and dictatorial forms produced by the capitalist struggle 
to deperonise labour, i. e. to harness radical grass-roots activism (the resistencia 
peronista), as well as the political influence of the union bureaucracy. The expansion 
of capital command over and the intensification of repression also led to the 
expansion of resistance to other social sectors which joined the working class against 
imperialist capital and state terror. The Cordobazo highlighted the existence of a 
consolidated and combative industrial working class explicitly determined to fight 
imperialism, a labour movement divided into the bureaucratic leadership and radical 
grass roots resistance and the unity between workers, students and the whole society 
against a common enemy broke the dichotomy labour movement versus university 
students entrenched by the Peronist doctrine, gathered the CGTA. The main 
contradiction of the anti-imperialist form highlighted lay in that the intensification of 
the process of real subsumption of society in capital (by means of the technological 
transformation and the transnationalisation of the economy), as well as a dictatorial 
state did not control labour but rather produced a powerful industrial working class 
and the articulation and expansion of radical politics to other sectors of society, such 
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as artists and students, which contested the technological revolution, the 
transnationalisation of the economy and repression. 
Chapter five focused on the second radical form which followed the Cordobazo: the 
revolutionary Peronist guerrilla organisation Montoneros. The Monto gathered a new 
young generation of radical Peronists who pushed the contradictions underpinning the 
Peronist form toward their limits. Rather than the humanisation of capital, 
Montoneros and the JP aimed at a socialist (although Peronist) revolution. The 
populist state and the Peronist doctrine offered them the starting point for their 
project. As a result, the struggle over subjectivity was expressed in this case as a 
struggle over the meaning of Peronism and the state, personified in the complex 
relationship between Peron and Montoneros. 
The crisis of Montoneros was presented in the chapter by looking at the massacre of 
Ezeiza in June 1973 and the mobilisation of the Ist of May 1974 in Plaza de Mayo. 
Whilst Ezeiza symbolised the explosion of the 30 years of contradictions of Peronism 
(Verbitsky 1995), the ls` of May 1974 symbolised the deconstruction of the pact 
between revolutionary labour and the capitalist state. The main contradiction of this 
revolutionary form was that whilst Montoneros aimed at socialism, their project 
clashed with the impossibility for Peronism and the populist form of the state to 
transgress the capitalist arrangement. This impossibility was reinforced by the forms 
taken by capital in the 1970s. The defeat of the Chilean socialist project was the best 
example of this. 
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After the defeat of revolutionary projects in the mid- 1970s, the intensification of the 
abstraction of capital in its money form marked a decisive moment of disembodiment 
of labour, when the repression of Montoneros and radical militants was extended to 
the whole society leading to the `disappearance' of thousands by state terrorism. 
The physical elimination of humans (1976-1982) as a form of eliminating the 
centrality of labour highlighted the highest moment in the struggle by capital to 
exorcise labour. As shown, a period of seven years of torture, social, political, 
economic, physical and psychological intimidation and repression (the disappearance 
of labour) facilitated the intensification of the abstraction of capital (the disappearance 
of capital) through the flight of capital, the creation of the public debt, financial 
speculation and the astonishing transference of resources from society to new 
economic groups linked to transnational corporations. Yet, the main contradiction of 
the military regime lay in that the physical elimination of labour coupled with the 
madness of money made stability impossible to be achieved. The 1980s were marked 
by the struggle to achieve the necessary `stability' to legalise and legitimise the 
terrorism of money (Marazzi 1996). Against this background, democracy emerged as 
a foundational moment and the magical solution to the past years. 
Chapter six addressed the period (1983-1989) when the struggle over the form of 
subjectivity materialised as a struggle over democracy. During this period, so-called 
`transition to democracy', resistance which had been organised in clandestinity under 
state terrorism (i. e. social and human rights movements, new trade union groupings, 
other social movements, see Jelin 1985) were openly recognised. Human Rights 
movements expanded to the extent to which they constituted, together with the 
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sindicalismo de base, the basis for the consolidation of democracy itself. On the one 
hand, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo emerged out of the physical elimination of 
labour into a unique form of resistance. The Mothers organised around a lack, around 
absence and transformed it into a political issue. They brought about materiality and 
visibility to the unreality and immateriality of `disappearance'. The Mothers's 
demand of apariciön con vida was (is) in no way moral or sentimental but eminently 
political. Thus, although legitimate, Mothers' demands became a barrier to the 
consolidation of democracy. 
On the other hand, the labour movement was reorganised and renewed against the 
union bureaucracy, as well as the pressure of the IMF and international banks and 
creditors for the payment of the service of the external debt. The unions' demands of 
wage increases and economic independence became also a barrier to the stability 
required by the new rules of global money, particularly since democracy allowed their 
democratisation and renewal. 
The most important contradiction of this `transitional' period lay in that, although 
democracy facilitated the materialisation and visibility of the political and economic 
terror of previous years and legitimated political and economic demands, it 
simultaneously repressed resistance in favour of a progressive legitimisation of a new 
form of domination via uncertainty, instability and economic repression. Pluralist 
theorists of transition to democracy were at the time unable to grasp this hidden 
transition, which deployed an intense struggle over democracy. The hyperinflationary 
episodes of 1989 crystallised the climax of this antagonism and facilitated the 
legalisation of the `terrorism of money' (Marazzi 1996) under the form of Stability. 
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The 1990s 
In order to grasp the main forms of subjectivity of the 1990s, the second part of the 
thesis offered an analysis of the main set of policies under Menem insofar as they 
contributed to the social construction of the paradigm of Menemist `stability', defined 
as the legalisation of uncertainty, the reification of capital and the end of politics. It 
was shown that the apparent paradox between these policies which were argued to be 
the source of stability and economic growth, and the creation and legalisation of 
unstable forms of labour and of human life, could not be grasped by understanding 
Menemism as an unavoidable economic or political strategy, and the new forms of 
labour resistance as produced, in a quasi religious sacrifice, as `undesirable' effect of 
a `necessary' strategy. Rather it was argued that, in order to understand the 
subjectivity of the 1990s, Menemism must be seen as a new form of class antagonism 
based on the intensification of the abstract aspects of capital and the consequent 
imagery deconstruction of the centrality of labour, which is, in the Argentine case, 
identified with Peronism. 
The three chapters in part II focused on three main sets of policies, addressed ceteris 
paribus the others only for the purpose of the analysis. Chapter seven explored the 
transformation of the subjectivity of labour as an intrinsic aspect of the privatisation 
of state-owned companies and the decentralisation of education under Menem. The 
recomposition of the state led to a crisis of identity for those workers in the public 
sector and state-owned companies; as a redefinition of trade union organisation and 
their relationship with the state, and as a weakening of rank-and-file resistance. The 
reform of the state contributed to the social imagery of crisis of the public sphere, 
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privatisation, individualism, decentralisation, depoliticisation, marketisation of social 
life. 
However, the chapter emphasised the contradictions of this deconstruction: although 
these policies were to depoliticise, decentralised and fragment public sector industrial 
disputes, as well as weaken state workers' struggles, they led to the politicisation and 
national articulation of fragmented and local protests, like roadblocks and the Carpa 
Blanca, as well as to the renewal of trade unions opposition trade unionism, i. e. the 
CTA. Thus, the state did not transfer the problem of the power of labour to the 
private sector, but rather expanded it in more un-institutionalised and direct forms. 
Chapter eight explored the struggle around the labour reform under Menem. Through 
the labour reform, the struggle over subjectivity asserted itself as a struggle over the 
law. The legislative changes contributed to the construction of stability in that they 
legalise the uncertainty, insecurity, risk and instability entailed in the internal and 
external flexibilisation of labour, the privatisation of social security, the marketisation 
of health, occupational accidents and pensions. It was shown that the union 
bureaucracy played a significant role in legitimising the flexibilisation and 
destabilisation of workers' lives, labour relations and working conditions. The CGT 
reshaped itself in a form whereby collective bargaining and their participation in 
business were the means to exchange workers' rights for the government's or 
capitalists' financial or political privileges for the unions. I called this the perversion 
of the trade unions. Perversion lay in that the financial stabilisation of the unions was 
achieved by means of the legalisation of the instability of workers' lives in a moment 
in which these policies were being discussed, negotiated and also imposed. 
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Yet, since the co-optation, confrontation and agreement between the CGT and the 
Menem administration was `institutional', neither the government nor the CGT could 
control grass-roots resistance and the expansion of labour and social struggles led by 
the CTA (and the MTA). Together with the struggles led by an agonic UOM, the 
CTA and the MTA attempted to organise fragmented and geographically dispersed 
conflicts, owed in great part to unemployment, one of the main products of the labour 
reform agreed by the CGT. 
Chapter nine discussed the new reality: massive unemployment, as the main product 
of stability. The chapter offered an analysis of the causes of unemployment, i. e. 
stabilisation plans, economic adjustment and flexibilisation of labour (the creation of 
the subject). It presented an exposition of the institutional and legal transformation of 
the state, as well as state employment and social policies launched to `cope' with 
unemployment and poverty (the control of the subject). Finally, the chapter revisited 
some theoretical interpretations of unemployment (underclass thesis and reserve army 
of labour). It was argued that social and employment policies reinforced the 
fragmentation of labour and became a problem itself. The reason for this lay in the 
historical characteristic of social policy in Argentina reinforced by the rationale 
behind the policies: that unemployment means temporarily exclusion from the labour 
market. The state aims to mediate this exclusion and maintain social order by means 
of employment benefit, workfare, social policies or the repression of the unemployed. 
It was argued that the widespread interpretation of unemployment as `exclusion' does 
not account for the reality of the unemployed and contributes to their 
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disempowerment. By contesting the dominant assumption that unemployment means 
the lack of work and exclusion from the labour market, while the absence of adequate 
employment policies implies the erosion of social networks, the main argument of the 
chapter was that unemployment was rather a form of labour produced by the 
intensification of the real subsumption of labour in capital. This form of labour fosters 
forms of existence which, whilst experienced by subjects as their exclusion from the 
production process, the labour market and even from social networks, constitute an 
intrinsic aspect of the process of valorisation of capital. 
The form `unemployed' is defined by the non participation of the unemployed as 
subjects in the productive process. As a matter of fact, the (un)employed cannot sell 
their labour power. But owing to the real subsumption of society under capital, they 
cannot free themselves from their commodified form of existence either (c. f. Gorz 
1999a, 1999b). In the subjectivity of the unemployed, the abstract aspects of labour 
have overwhelmed the concrete. The absolute poverty of the working class becomes 
apparent since the use-value of the commodity labour power is denied, the 
transaction postponed, yet the unemployed are still subsumed under the social relation 
of capital. This tension is eminently political. It cannot be reduced to an economic or 
social problem. The contradiction within the subject constitutes a critical form of 
subjectivity, which although seemingly `invisible', becomes a barrier to the self- 
expansion of capital. 
I pointed at the political problem of how to give an account of this invisible 
subjectivity which is derived out of the intensification of the abstraction of capital and 
its crisis? In order to make the subjectivity of the unemployed visible and integrated 
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into the process of valorisation, I extended Marx's formula for the reproduction of 
capital C-M-C/M-C-M' and its crisis and recomposition in its money form, i. e. M-M' 
(Bonefeld 1996), with my own equations that highlights the presence of critical 
subjectivity of labour: M- a; ß; y' S W. a, ß, y and S portray the contradictory forms 
of existence (subjectivity) produced within the circuit of reproduction of capital. This 
include those who are not recognised as being part of the process of production of 
value, i. e. the unemployed and the `socially excluded'. Unlike M-C-M', where 
`labour' is a `commodity, and M-M', which is a condensed form of expression of the 
avoidance of labour by capital (Bonefeld 1996), and thus both leave the question of 
subjectivity out of the process of valorisation, M-a; (3; y, S -M' asks first, how were 
these forms of subjectivity produced within the process of valorisation and, secondly, 
to what extent a, ß and S became a barrier to that process. In M-a; ß; 'y; S- M' the 
subjectivity of the unemployed ((x) comes out, as a visible real abstraction, i. e. an 
abstraction in reality (Gunn 1992) which cannot be grasped if it is separated from the 
real movement that produced it. 
Part III offered an insight into this proposal by means of a case study of one of the 
main forms of resistance of the 1990s produced in and against stability: roadblocks. 
M-Roadblocks-M', organised by the unemployed, public sector workers and the local 
community have spread uninterruptedly throughout several provinces of Argentina 
during the 1990s. 
The roadblocks were regarded initially by scholars and politicians as a spontaneous 
(somehow violent) response to the effects of the neo-liberal adjustment and 
stabilisation plans. Some insisted on the idea that, apart from being developing new 
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cultural identities among demonstrators, such as the Piqueteros, the demonstrators at 
the roadblock simply aimed to get into the capitalist system (Favaro et al 1997). 
Others emphasised the significance of the working class rather than the unemployed 
in the organisation of the roadblock (Inigo Carreras and Cotarelo 1999). Finally, 
others saw in the roadblock the potential revolutionary character to break down the 
system (Lizaguirre et al 1997, Petras, 1997). 
Yet, this thesis showed that not enough attention had been paid to the inner 
connection between those struggles and the capitalist transformation, that is to the 
extent to which these struggles were produced as an intrinsic aspect of stabilisation 
and economic adjustment and move beyond. The aforementioned interpretations do 
not account for the inner connection between the roadblocks and stability insofar they, 
by opposite reasons, i. e. need to be included or liberation, are based on M-M' and 
thus reinforce the notion of unemployment as exclusion (struggles for inclusion or 
liberation of labour. 
The chapter showed in a case study the processes through which a condition of 
misery, isolation and frustration suffered by the unemployed, public sector workers 
and other social organisations was transformed into an act of resistance which gave 
visibility to the virtual disappearance of labour in unemployment and poverty. My 
main point was that like the Patagonia Rebelde, the 17hh October, Cordobazo, Ezeiza 
and the struggle of the Mothers, at their own time, the Roadblock is the crystallisation 
of the transformation of capital in the 1990s. As a determinate abstraction, the 
analysis of this particular roadblock illustrated that the recomposition of the state, the 
labour reform and the economic adjustment did not prevent the constitution of 
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problematic subjectivity from emerging but rather produces new forms which 
encapsulate the contradiction of the dual character of labour within the subject. 
As a determinate abstraction, the roadblock embodied the transformation of identity, 
labour and social organisations and forms of resistance, as well as the recomposition 
of the state money and the law during the 1990s. The roadblock questions the 
traditional view of the industrial working class as the most important subject of class 
struggle. This is not to argue that the unemployed and the `maginalised sectors', 
instead of the workers, became the historical subject of `revolution'. Rather, the 
roadblocks show that casual workers, the unemployed and the poor are not excluded 
from capital's command. Their struggles can contribute to the resistance to capital's 
exploitation. Secondly, the roadblocks pose a major question to the unions' 
organisational strategies. Unemployment has been included as a major issue in the 
unions' agenda. However, their challenge is to articulate diverse local struggles and 
organisations that emerge in different parts of the country. Finally, the roadblocks 
challenge the traditional conception of social, political and labour conflicts as discrete 
forms of protest, since during the roadblock, the road becomes the setting for the 
construction of new identities and the building up of political solidarity beyond class 
fragmentation. 
There is a significant difference between conceiving the roadblock as an `effect of' 
stability or as a phenomenon `produced within' stability. Whereas in the former case, 
the capacity of those involved in the struggle to modified the objective situation is 
remote, and then their capacity of critique is eliminated (i. e. democracy consolidated 
with social exclusion see Acuna 1994), in the latter case subjectivity is produced 
379 
from within and therefore becomes a barrier and thus a powerful critique from within. 
Following the same example, here democracy is not consolidated with unemployment 
and poverty but rather thanks to them. M-roadblock-M' facilitates the visibility of the 
unemployed, casual workers, poverty, and other forms of unhappiness produced as a 
`living critique' of stability. 
It was shown that the contradiction within the subject between the concrete and 
abstrac aspects of the capital relation constitutes a critical subjectivity, which although 
seemingly `invisible', becomes a barrier to the self expansion of capital. Whether or 
not capital exploits labour effectively, the commodified form of existence of the 
unemployed does not cease to exist. Rather than the lack of or exclusion 
unemployment implies an intensification of the real subsumption of labour under 
capital: whereas, on the one hand, the worker is liberated from actual exploitation, she 
is, on the other hand, a prisoner of her commodified form of existence. But this cannot 
be reduced to an economic situation but involves almost all aspects of human 
sociability. The hidden unhappiness of capitalist work comes out clear through the 
un-employed, and its affirmed and reified by the state and society but also by 
sociological accounts of the misery endure of the unemployed and the marginalised. 
Stability, Instability and the Power of Labour 
By looking at the inner connection between the forms of capitalist social relations and 
the forms of subjectivity produced within it, I put forward a discussion of the 
widespread belief that Argentine history is a history of political and economic 
discontinuities (instability and crisis) (Waisman, 1987; Lewis 1992). The source of 
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this `abnormality' is argued to be, among other reasons, the lack of democratic 
culture, corporatism, the difficulties to establish political legitimisation, structural 
economic problems, the lack of an hegemonic project of the dominant class and so on. 
The meaning that we give to instability conditions our understanding of stability. The 
key to understanding the problem of instability - stability in Argentina as opposed 
social imageries which organise social practices is the analysis of the struggle over 
the form of subjectivity. One of the main arguments of this thesis is that the political 
and economic instability before 1991 was owed to the recognition of the power of 
labour as a central theoretical, political and economic issue by the state. The notions 
of economic or political crisis impregnated social relations from 1955 until President 
Menem took office. 
I presented the history of Argentine labour through moments of resistance or events, 
where the political and economic instability, discontinuities and crisis were fostered 
by the struggle over the form of the subjectivity of labour, particularly after 1945 
when the power of labour produced a form of the state which in time appropriated and 
integrated that power into its form and thus class conflict became political. As 
mentioned in chapter one, the process of real subsumption does not indicate that 
capital controls labour but that the production of problematic subjectivity lay at the 
heart of capital as a social relation. 
By emphasising the contradictions underpinning the emergence and crisis of 
subjectivity in different historical period, as well as the link between then, I showed 
that political and economic instability was the phenomenal expression of the class 
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struggle to force labour to exist in adequate forms for capital accumulation and the 
resistance to it. The forms presented in this thesis illustrated this. 
I attempted to move beyond the historical discussion of Peronism-anti-Peronism, by 
providing the content which constitute them as major explanations of social relations 
in Argentina. It was shown, on the one hand, that in the 1940s Peronism emerged as 
the most important form of labour: the national working class. Yet, the imagery 
integration of the working class into this homogeneous form was relative. On the 
other hand Menemism did not imply the consistent and systematic disintegration of 
the working class either. The historical perspective contests the notion of Menemism 
as a break with the past. 
As shown, in the 1990s the concern about consolidation of democracy and economic 
instability appear to come to an end. However, my investigation showed that there is 
nothing in the 1990s which forces us to think that the historical pattern of `instability' 
has changed for the good except for one aspect: that the political deconstruction of the 
power of labour became increasingly legitimised as the key to sustaining democratic 
institutions and to maintaining zero inflation and thus generate the conditions for 
capital investments and the payment of the interest of the external debt to 
international creditors. The `defeat' of labour has been politically, economically, 
discursively and legally legitimised not only by those in power but by those who 
resist, trapped into the vicious circle of instability-stability. 
Although stability seems to be about politics i. e. the consolidation of democracy, or 
the law, i. e. the proper re(de)gulation of labour conflict, markets and society; or 
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economics, i. e. a monetary strategy to provide the stable basis for economic growth, 
like instability, it cannot be understood simply in terms of `political' or `economic' 
or `legal' terms but must be viewed more comprehensively in terms of social imagery 
which emerged as a rationalisation of class antagonism. These imageries cannot be 
understood as detached from the social relations which produce them. Similarly, the 
violence of stability cannot be explained by the policies or political strategies which 
constitute stability, i. e. the Menem administration's success in defeating Peronist 
labour through anti-labour policy-making and the co-optation of the CGT, the 
capacity of Minister Cavallo to force provincial governors' to enforce an inhuman 
economic adjustment, and so on. It was only by looking at the unstable forms of life 
produced by stability that I was able to grasp the essence of stability beyond 
discussions of the subjective, economic, political and legal aspects of Menemism. 
Stability did not mean the real stabilisation and democratisation of society but rather 
the opposite: it is a metaphor for a new form of instability which suffocates and 
dominates labour resistance not by its physical elimination or political confrontation 
but, rather, by producing unstable and desperate forms of existence under the form of 
the virtual disappearance of labour from the political and economic scenario. The 
violence of stability lay in that, whereas it became a social imagery of the basis for 
the amelioration of the future, it created the most unstable forms of existence, which 
made it an impossible project. The domination of the 1990s is a domination via 
uncertainty. 
The social construction of stability was the means of the `natural' selection of those 
who will `belong' and those who will not belong to the new capitalist project. To that 
383 
extent, stability plays a regulatory role for any struggle. It provides the setting for 
protest and critique to develop and became the struggle not to be `out'. However, by 
looking at the subjectivity produced within stability, I showed that stability was far 
from preventing labour conflicts and social protest from emerging. It only changed 
their forms. Poverty and unemployment are not `negative effects' outside stability, but 
rather its main ingredients. The uncertainty, instability and insecurity brought about 
by stability are constitutive of subjectivity, embodied in the new forms of resistance in 
and against unsustainable life, presented in this thesis. 
Although it looks rather the opposite, the roadblocks do not destabilise stability, as it 
is implicitly or explicitly argued but, rather, as a form of class antagonism, stability 
destabilises individual and social life. Menemism implied the continuation of the 
struggle to exorcise labour as the means of achieving stability. It is possible to argue 
that wisely, the politics of resistance of the 1990s aimed to stabilise the uncertainty 
entailed in the violence of stability by imposing visibility and physicality on the 
abstraction of global capital. 
It was shown that the period previous to the 1970s, the recognition of the centrality of 
labour allowed more political, direct and physical forms of repression. The 
recognition of labour was expressed in the corporeal struggle in and against the state 
of the 17`h October, expanded in the Cordobazo vis-ä-vis and intensified through the 
guerrilla movement. The 1970s marked a shift to physical elimination to uproot de 
cuajo the power of labour from the state. Since then, there has been a progressive 
apparent detachment of capital from labour and from institutional control, and a 
tendency to a centripetal struggle between labour and capital within which the state is 
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taking repressive forms. The form of the `avoidance' of labour by capital is virtual 
disappearance. Yet, history does not repeat itself. The Piqueteros are not, and could 
not be, Anarchists. Real subsumption points out the impossibility of externality. The 
Piqueteros are a product of the present form of capital as a social relation. The 
conditions for transcendence must be found in the contradictions between the cncrete 
and abstract aspects of labour embodied by a form of subjectivity (determinate 
abstraction), within the totality constituted by capital. 
2000 and One 
In October 1999, when the centre-left Alianza won the general elections, the illusion 
of the end of monetarism associated with the defeat of President Menem soon 
vanished: the new administration, scrutinised by the IMF, not only embraced the same 
solutions to the economic crisis as the previous one, but launched an even deeper plan 
to maintain stability. As a result, during April and May 2000, a new wave of 
roadblocks throughout the country reached massive proportions in Tartagal and Oran 
(Salta), Cutral-Co (Neuquen), Palpä (Jujuy), Resistencia (Chaco), Trelew (Chubut), 
Cippoletti, Cruz del Eje and Rio Cuarto (Cordoba). 
Having the roadblocks as a background, many of the issues which marked the 
contested relationship between the Menem administration and the labour bureaucracy 
were `solved'. The labour reform was a crucial issue demanded by the IMF to the new 
government. On the 201h April, a demonstration at the National Congress against the 
new labour law organised by the ex MTA and recently created `dissident CGT' 
(Confederaciön General del Trabajo disidente), supported by the CTA, was severely 
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repressed by the police. Workers attempted to physically prevent the national MPs 
from getting into the debating chamber where the labour reform law was going to be 
discussed. This time the labour reform bill would change industrial relations for good 
since it destroyed the bargaining power of central confederations by decentralising 
collective bargaining to the level of the enterprise and disowning the collective 
agreements as the framework wherein each specific agreement would be reached. As 
under Menem, the new labour law was argued to create the conditions to generate 
stable employment. It has been pictured as `a progress in the way towards 
modernisation' (Gerchunoff, La Naciön on line 28.4.00: 2). However, according to 
the unions, since it extends the `probationary period' from one to three months up to 
one year and decentralises collective bargaining, now located at the level of 
enterprise, it might lead to an even deeper casualisation of jobs, wage reductions, the 
lose of social benefits and the worsening of working conditions, but above all it 
destroyed the power of central unions. 
In June 2000 a final Decree issued by the Vice President Alvarez, firmly rejected by 
the three central confederations, deregulated the OS. The new government recognised 
that if competition is not `regulated', health `could become a big business' (Minister 
Meijide in Clarin, internet, 4.6.00). The labour reform, the OS deregulation Decree 
(together with wages decrease in the public sector) led to a general strike carried out 
on the 9th of June against these unpopular measures and to give a voice to the 
unemployed and oppose the deepening of the economic adjustment. Support for the 
general strike was massive: 85% according to the organisers' estimations and 60% 
according to official sources. 
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In spite of this, a new LPA 25,250 aimed to send a signal of governability and 
stability to the international bodies and capital. Whilst the previous one (14,250) 
allowed monopoly of representation and was only modified at the confederation level 
(Murillo 1997a: 81), the new law allowed the collective agreements at the company 
level without the intervention of the union at the branch or activity level. 
The deepening of the economic adjustment to maintain stability fostered, as in the 
previous ten years, further instability. When President de la Rüa took office in 
December 1999, a roadblock in the province of Corrientes ended up with the murder 
of two workers by the military police, in addition to the many injured and imprisoned. 
In a press conference with the participation of representatives of the Mothers of the 
Plaza de Mayo and the Nobel Peace Prize recipient Perez Esquivel, the CTA called 
for a 24-hour general strike for the 20`h of December to repudiate state repression, to 
demand the liberation of prisoners and an investigation of the murders. 
In November 2000, Anibal 
Verön, a 37 year old worker, 
father of five children, was 
killed by the riot police during 
battle that took place 
between 400 military police 
officers and 100 
demonstrators as a roadblock of the M34 in Tartagal, a small locality of the northern 
province of Salta, ended dramatically. Verön's death took place in the same 
circumstances as that of Victor Choque in Tierra del Fuego in 1995 (see chapter eight) 
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and Teresa Rodriguez in Neuquen in 1997 (see chapter seven). After Verön's death, 
the government kept on insisting that any dialogue with the demonstrators must be 
based on `peace and order' (La Naciön, 14.11.00, on line). As a response to the 
government's indifference, the CTA and the MTA called for a 36-hour general strike 
and a demonstration on November 23. The general strike was considered the most 
important in the last 15 years. The demonstration gathered thousands of strikers 
outside the National Congress in Buenos Aires. 
The persistence of the roadblocks had opened a much needed debate within the 
government between those who were determined to defend the country's financial 
performance (Ministry of Economics) and those, primarily in the Ministries of the 
Interior, Education, Social Development, and Labour, whose objective was to reduce 
social tension through social reform (Pagina/12,16.05.00). Whilst the organisation of 
the roadblocks, trade unions, and all sorts of social organisations were reasonably 
expanding (see Archipielagos 2000) in March 2001, the alliance in power entered a 
political crisis. The struggle between IMF pressure and social protest led to the 
resignation of the Minister of Economics, Machinea, who was replaced by the 
economist Lopez Murphy. The new Minister launched a deep economic adjustment 
directed to liberate sources to pay the interest on the external debt and avoid technical 
default. This affected particularly the public expenditure in the area of education. 
Teachers' strikes and social protests spread. Consequently, those cabinet members 
who belonged to the left-wing FREPASO within the Alianza left the government as a 
sign of opposition to the shift to the right and the deepening of the economic 
adjustment led by President de la R6a. After these news another week of protests and 
a 48-hour general strike in the education area followed. After two weeks in office, the 
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minister of Economics Lopez Murphy resigned his post too and was replaced, in a 
`desperate choice' (The Economist 24.3.01: 24) by the `father' of the stabilisation 
policies under Menem, Domingo Cavallo (! ). 
Another general strike, successful in those areas where the roadblocks had been 
taking place, e. g. Jujuy and Salta (La Naciön 22.3.01, on line) was carried out on the 
22"d of March. In an atmosphere of general disappointment, political crisis, investors' 
panic, the narrowing of political manoeuvre (The Economist 24.3.01: 24) and 
economic instability, another general strike and more demonstrations were organised 
by unions and social organisations for the 5th and 6th of April (see Dinerstein 2001). 
This would include roadblocks and demonstrations throughout the country. At the 
moment of writing, (May 2001) the roadblocks have expanded throughout Buenos 
Aires, the richest area of the country. Roadblocks in La Matanza, La Plata but also 
Jujuy and Salta ratified the roadblock as the main form of protest in Argentina 
(Buenos Aires oculta. com). Argentina, according to many, has become a big 
roadblock. The tension between the IMF demands to renegotiate the payments of the 
external debt and popular demands is becoming unsustainable. 
In 2001, neither democracy nor stability can be argued to have been the major 
achievements of the 1990s. The problem of instability-stability proved already to be 
rather than technical, political, i. e. the power of labour. Yet, the accurate appreciation 
of the significance of new forms of struggle depends on political praxis. This thesis is 
a contribution to it. 
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August, San Salvador de Jujuy 
MISS n. d. `Modemizaciön del Mercado de Trabajo', Buenos Aires. 
MISS n. d. `Programa Trabajar, Resoluciön MTSS 576/95 and Resoluciön SeyFP 03/95, 
Buenos Aires. 
MTSS n. d. Programa Trabajar II, Resoluciön MTSS no 240/97 and Resoluciön SeyCL no 202/97. 
1 For the case study, see chapter ten. 
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MTSS n. d. Programa Servicios Comunitarios Resoluciön MISS no 453/96 and Resoluciön 
SeyFP no 107/96, Buenos Aires. 
MTSS. Information on Employment Programmes, several pamplhets. 
MTSS 1999 Revista de Trabajo Ano 5, no 13, Estadisticas Laborales, Buenos Aires 
MTSS 1998a El Trabajo en Argentina. La transformacion Laboral, Buenos Aires. 
MTSS 1998b Programas y Acciones de Empleo y Capacitaciön 1998, Informe ak 30-3-98, 
Buenos Aires 
MTSS 1997a Encuesta de Indicadores Laborales, Mes de Junio (Copyright MISS) Buenos 
Aires. 
MTSS 1997b Informe de Coyuntura Laboral, Buenos Aires 
MTSS 1996a Desempleo (Informe especial) Buenos Aires 
MTSS 1996b Anc lisis y Dinämica Colectiva 1991/1996, Buenos Aires. 
MTSS 1996c Programa Forestar, Informe 1996, Buenos Aires 
MISS 1995a Boletin de Estadisticas Laborales no 29 II Trimestre. Buenos Aires. 
MISS 1995b Medidas de Politica Laboral y de Empleo, Informe August 1995, Buenos Aires. 
MTSS 1995c Relaciones Laborales en las PyMEs. Comentarios al Titulo III de la Ley 24,467, 
Buenos Aires 
MISS 1994 Boletin El Ministerio de Trabajo Informa, Ano 1, Nos 11 and 12, November and 
December Buenos Aires. 
Other Sources 
Newspapers, Various Issues 
Ambito Financiero 
Clarin, Buenos Aires, Argentina and Clarin Internet www. Clarin. com. ar 
El Tribuno de Jujuy 
El Tribuno de Salta 
El Pregön de Jujuy 
The Economist 
Latin American Weekly Report 
xxx 
La Naciön, Buenos Aires, Argentina and La Naciön on line www. Lanacion. com. ar 
Pcgina/12, Buenos Aires, Argentina and Pägina/12 internet www. pagina I 2. com. ar 
Unions' and Social Organisations' Pamphlets and Journals, Various Issues 
Aerogremial nos 33 to 37, January 1990 to August 1991, APA Buenos Aires 
Animadores, Journal Prelatura de Humahuaca, no 198 Anno XVIII, Jujuy, June, 1997 
Mural Information, ATE, Several years. 
El Trabajador del Estado, ATE . 
Conectandonos, pamphlet CTA. 
CTA, la Revista de la Central de los Trabajadores Argentinos, several issues 1998 
CTA Central de Trabajadores Argentinos 1996 Documentos 1er Congreso Nacional de 
Delegados, 4-5 Noviembre 1996, Buenos Aires. 
CTA Central de Trabajadores Argentinos 1999 Documento Abierto, 2do. Congreso Nacional 
de Delegados, April, Buenos Aires. 
En Marcha, Asociaciön Judicial Bonaerense 
Fundaciön Sindical, Instituto de Investigaciones y Altos Estudios, CGT, Septiembre 1993, 
Buenos Aires. 
8 de Octubre, Journal of light and power union, Mar del Plata, CTA. 
El Pregön Judicial, Federacion Judicial Argentina CTA. 
Soluciones, Revista de Debate y Divulgaciön, no 1 October 1993, ATE, Buenos Aires. 
El Telefönico. 
UTPBA, Journal of UTBA. 
Internet 
www. imforp, /extemal/r)ubs/ft/andd/2000/03/pou. htm 
www. yendor. comlvanished/conader). htmI 
www. madres. org 
www. nuncamas. orv-/documents. soea. htmI 
www. imf. org 
www. buenosairesoculta. com 
XXXI 
www. cculturalcoop. org. ar 
www. solocineweb. com. ar 
Movies and Documentary Films 
Archipielagos, Documentary Film, Centro Cultural de la Cooperaciön, Departamento de 
Estudios Politicos, Buenos Aires, 2000. 
Cazadores de Utopias. Documentary Film directed by I Blaustein, Instituto Nacional de 
Cinematografia and Zafra Cine Difusion.. 
La Historia Oficial, directed by O. Puenzo, Buenos Aires 
La Republica Perdida I Documentary film, Orson Producciones SRL, M Perez. Screenplay: 
Luis Gregorich, Buenos Aires. 
La Republica Perdida II. Documentary films, . NORAN Producciones, M Perez. 
Screenplay: 
Luis Gregorich, Buenos Aires. 
La Patagonia Rebelde, directed by H Olivera. 
La Voz de los Panuelos, Documentary film, M Cespedes and C Guarini, Cineojo, 1992. 
